right, you love appearances. i am saying the nihilism comes from not accepting the objects which the appearances are based on.Ñāṇa wrote:I've never denied the appearance of phenomena.5heaps wrote:this doesnt do anything to address that prior to being conceptually designated, the thing is still the thing. if the thing werent a thing, there would be a lack of the thing (nihilism) in which case it would be senseless to say it could be the focus of conceptual designation.Ñāṇa wrote:Moreover, the individuation of phenomena requires apperceptive memory recognition (saññā) and conceptual designation (paññatti) for differentiation. All such individuation is fabricated, relational, and conventional, and therefore phenomena cannot be established as ultimately existent.
even in mindonly which doesnt accept external objects, they do not say that physical form for example is equivalent to appearance of the mental consciousness.
they should all be studied. or, in a more generalized and progressive format. in the indian tenet system (which Tilt calls "tibetan tenet system") the shift from vaibhashika momentariness to sautrantika to momentariness is very profound. likewise into midonly it is very profound. these 4 systems are used as an outline, like a map, for finding subtler and subtler objects of negation, for the purpose of meditation.Which position would that be? More specifically, which theory of radical momentariness do you accept? The Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda version? The Sautrāntika-Sarvāstivāda version?
they dont say that a thing is produced in dependence on causes and conditions? and that once this thing is produced, it abides? and then disintegrates? i guess they all happen at once then? still no? i guess theyre unchanging then. no? what other option is there? even Arya Nagarjuna accepts a qualified momentariness, as do all the schools who assert no nature.Sorry, but no Theravāda commentator would agree that "moments exist."
all that delusion misconceives to be true is svabhava. there is nothing wrong with the object itself, its just that it has never been clearly seen since its generally mixed with an appearance of svabhava.And how are you going to establish the objective validity your momentary thing "that maintains its characteristic nature as it is undergoing subtlest change"? If you rely on any criterion or measurement (pamāṇa) based on deluded worldly cognitions, then all you will ever "prove" is that deluded worldly cognitions are deluded.5heaps wrote:the thing which is impermanent is the thing which is momentary (maintains its characteristic nature as it is undergoing subtlest change). for us its simple -- impermanent thing, momentary thing, conditioned thing and functioning thing are all equivalent.