JohnK wrote: ↑Thu Feb 11, 2021 10:57 pm
Here is an excerpt from the thread link in the immediately preceding post, quoting Dhammanando here from 5/20/2018 [emphasis added]:
What is called māna may occur either as yāthāva-mānā, “conceits that conceive in accordance with fact” or as ayāthāva-mānā, “conceits that conceive contrary to fact”. Of the nine kinds of conceit, three are yāthāva-mānā:
1. The conceit “I am superior to him” conceived by one who is in fact superior.
2. The conceit “I am equal to him” conceived by one who is in fact equal.
3. The conceit “I am inferior to him” conceived by one who is in fact inferior.
While the other six are ayāthāva-mānā:
1. The conceit “I am superior to him” conceived by one who is in fact equal.
2. The conceit “I am superior to him” conceived by one who is in fact inferior.
3. The conceit “I am equal to him” conceived by one who is in fact superior.
4. The conceit “I am equal to him” conceived by one who is in fact inferior.
5. The conceit “I am inferior to him” conceived by one who is in fact superior.
6. The conceit “I am inferior to him” conceived by one who is in fact equal.
This only does not entail an inconcistency with the mutual exclusion of wrong view and conceit defined in abhidhamma (see above):
B. Bodhi wrote:Wrong view, conceit: ... However, the two exhibit contrary qualities, and, thus, they cannot coexist in the same
citta.
... if EITHER "conceive contrary to fact” isn't considered to be "wrong view" because self (or I) isn't considered to be a "thing" and - as I've stated in the OP - "because wrong view refers to things other than self" OR assuming that in case of "a mode of self-evaluation" that is conceit AND is a misapprehension interpreting "self" "in a manner contrary to actuality" there are at least two different cittas involved, one with conceit and the other with the misapprehension called "wrong view". Comparing the two optional solutions to avoid an inconsistency I'd opt for the latter.
Nevertheless provided that what Ven. D. states originates from adhidhamma that's interesting and might reveal that abhidhamma strictly obeys the 'two truths' doctrine 'conventional vs ultimate reality'.
A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma wrote: wrote:The things contained in the Abhidhamma, spoken of therein, are altogether
fourfold from the standpoint of ultimate reality: consciousness (citta), mental factors
(cetasika), matter (rūpa), and Nibbāna.
B. Bodhi comments:
According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are two kinds of realities — the conventional (sammuti)
and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional realities are the referents of ordinary
conceptual thoughts (paññatti) and conventional modes of expression (vohāra-desanā).
They include such entities as living beings, persons, men, women, animals, and the
apparently stable persisting objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world.
The Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate
validity, for the objects that they signify do not exist in their own right as irreducible
realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are products of mental
construction (parikappanā), not realities existing by virtue of their own nature.
So even though both, "things" and "self", are "products of mental construction", they are taken seriously in terms of cittas and their concomitant mental factors. While mentally constructed "things" may appear "in the mode of misapprehending, that is, " may be interpreted "in a manner contrary to [conventional, mentally constructed] actuality", "self" may appear in a "mode of self-evaluation" that is independent of whether "self" is interpreted "in a manner contrary to" or "in a manner" corresponding with "[conventional, mentally constructed] actuality" and this mode of self-evaluation is called "conceit".
It follows that there must be also "a mode of self-evaluation" that isn't conceit but is either an misapprehension interpreting "self" "in a manner contrary to [conventional, mentally constructed] actuality" ('wrong view'?) or is an apprehension interpreting "self" "in a manner" corresponding with "[conventional, mentally constructed] actuality" (correct view).
One might assume that the "mode of self-evaluation" that
always isn't conceit AND
always interprets "self" "in a manner" corresponding with "[conventional, mentally constructed] actuality" (correct view) is the "mode of self-evaluation" of an arahant and that all 'below' arahant might have a "mode of self-evaluation" that
sometimes interprets "self" "in a manner contrary to [conventional, mentally constructed] actuality" ('wrong view'?) and
sometimes interprets "self" "in a manner" corresponding with "[conventional, mentally constructed] actuality" (correct view) and
sometimes this self-evaluation occurs in a "mode of self-evaluation" that is conceit.
[
As a side note:
Now the thrust of abhidhamma's strict 'two truths (realities) doctrine' may become obvious: Even though (acc. to B. Bodhi) conventional reality is considered to be "mentally constructed" this mental construction is understood to be the same in all individuals. The talk of "contrary to actuality" and "contrary to fact" would not be possible if "actuality" or "fact" would not be equaled with the mental construction of conventional reality which is possible only if the mental construction is assumed to be inter-individually the same. Referring to well-known (but controversial) madhyamaka categorizations the abhidhamma view of reality might be considered to be 'svatantrika'-like which is not surprising due to the experiential realism of theravada.]
Cleared. αδόξαστος.