thomaslaw wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 5:56 am
Bhikkhu Bodhi in the talk says he does not like the idea, paramattha "ultimate reality", indicated in the Abhidhamma. About the term, see also his book p. 25.
Does he explain why? All it means is what can be really be known via direct experience, beyond the concepts, and so is true knowledge. It’s merely empiricism and a dash of logic. One of the admirable things about the Abhidhamma, the Theravadin one, is its systematic attempt to erase all notions of both atta and substance metaphysics.
Because the Buddha in the suttas does not teach that paramattha idea.
You once argued before that concepts (paññatti) are mental dhammas, which would mean they are real. If paññatti are real then the self exists . What we actually find is the Buddha making use of conventional truths and ultimate truths. Conventionally the Buddha said “I do x”, but ultimately there was no “I”. It was merely a concept without an underlying reality. This is Abhidhamma. When the Buddha said “I do x” all there was were dhammas arising and ceasing according to conditions. No actual “I” was found, because only the dhammas are actual.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
retrofuturist wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 5:33 am
[quote=retrofuturist post_id=626352 time=1622957613
Curious comment, directly contradicted by the Buddha himself.
As this is the Abhidhamma sub-section the Abhidhamma is taken as authoritative, no? Still, I’m open to some debate here.
It's fine to be a fan of the Abhidhamma, but when that fanhood leads to you directly contradicting the Buddha's words it might be worth reflecting on whether you're taking it too far.
Please point to this contradiction? The more I study it and the Abhidhammas of the other schools (most if not all had one btw, which should tell you something), the more apparent it is that the Theravadin one perfectly lines up with the Suttas and what the Blessed one taught. Could you point to say 3 contradictions?
This is indeed the Abhidhamma section and in this section I would not question its authority as far as it extends to the Theravada school... but the suttas still have a certain degree of authority (hopefully) and to imply that the suttas and the Buddha's pronouncements are deficient would offend most schools of Buddhism... past & present.
BrokenBones wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:17 am
This is indeed the Abhidhamma section and in this section I would not question its authority as far as it extends to the Theravada school... but the suttas still have a certain degree of authority (hopefully) and to imply that the suttas and the Buddha's pronouncements are deficient would offend most schools of Buddhism... past & present.
Indeed. The Abhidhamma isn’t better than the suttas. It’s merely the Dhamma framed mostly in terms of ultimate truth rather than conventional ones. As I said earlier, one of the beautiful things about the Theravadin Abhidhamma and it’s commentaries is the lengths they go to to systemically erase both atta and substance metaphysics in even the most fleeting of conscious experience, anywhere. The Abhidhamma takes a moment of consciousness and shows how a self or a permanent substance can never be found. As Venerable Buddhaghosa said the Vinaya is virtue, the Suttas concentration and the Abhidhamma wisdom. The Abhidhamma is Right View.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:27 am, edited 1 time in total.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
Does he explain why? All it means is what can be really be known via direct experience, beyond the concepts, and so is true knowledge. It’s merely empiricism and a dash of logic. One of the admirable things about the Abhidhamma, the Theravadin one, is its systematic attempt to erase all notions of both atta and substance metaphysics.
Because the Buddha in the suttas does not teach that paramattha idea.
But he does. Vedana etc are real, whilst concepts such as “self” are not.
No, he does not say that.
Vedana etc, and also concepts, are all conditioned dhammas, which are seen as void (without reality, rittaka), insubstantial (tucchaka), and lacking essence (asaaraka). See SN 22.95.
Last edited by thomaslaw on Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:37 am, edited 1 time in total.
thomaslaw wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:26 am
No, he does not say that.
Vedana etc, and also concepts, are all conditioned dhammas.
Where does he say that? If concepts are conditioned dhammas then they arise, persist and then cease just like all dhammas. There is no difference between a dhamma and a concept, so a unicorn exists as much as vedana does, yes? Pain and unicorns share the same level of existence, yes? A further problem. Concepts require a mind, so where do all these concepts come from in your view?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
thomaslaw wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:26 am
No, he does not say that.
Vedana etc, and also concepts, are all conditioned dhammas.
Where does he say that? If concepts are conditioned dhammas then they arise, persist and then cease just like all dhammas. There is no difference between a dhamma and a concept, so a unicorn exists as much as vedana does, yes? Pain and unicorns share the same level of existence, yes? A further problem. Concepts require a mind, so where do all these concepts come from in your view?
Vedana etc, and also concepts, are all conditioned dhammas, which are seen as void (without reality, rittaka), insubstantial (tucchaka), and lacking essence (asaaraka). See SN 22.95 (see p. 54 from Choong Mun-keat's book)
About concepts (pa~n~natti) are conditioned dhammas, see the verbal form pa~n~aapeti (to reveal) from SN 14.13 (see p. 138 from the book)
thomaslaw wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:26 am
Vedana etc, and also concepts, are all conditioned dhammas, which are seen as void (without reality, rittaka), insubstantial (tucchaka), and lacking essence (asaaraka). See SN 22.95.
The Abhidhamma systematically erases substance metaphysics, perfectly in line with SN 22:95. Also where on earth does this sutta say that dhammas are concepts? It says they have no substance. Do you understand the difference between substance metaphysics and phenomenalism, which is the Theravādin Abhidhamma (different from Phenomenology)? It seems you’ve been hiding in that echo chamber called SuttaCentral for far too long rather than engaging with actual Abhidhammikas
Furthermore, see how the Abhidhamma is inescapable Even Sujato admits that what he does is Abhidhamma, it’s just a Neo-Suttavadin kind. The same with you.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:53 am, edited 3 times in total.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
thomaslaw wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:26 am
No, he does not say that.
Vedana etc, and also concepts, are all conditioned dhammas.
Where does he say that? If concepts are conditioned dhammas then they arise, persist and then cease just like all dhammas. There is no difference between a dhamma and a concept, so a unicorn exists as much as vedana does, yes? Pain and unicorns share the same level of existence, yes? A further problem. Concepts require a mind, so where do all these concepts come from in your view?
Vedana etc, and also concepts, are all conditioned dhammas, which are seen as void (without reality, rittaka), insubstantial (tucchaka), and lacking essence (asaaraka). See SN 22.95 (see p. 54 from Choong Mun-keat's book)
About concepts (pa~n~natti) are conditioed dhammas, see the verbal form pa~n~aapeti (to reveal) from SN 14.13 (see p. 138 from the book)
So a unicorn has the same existential status as pain? There is no difference at all in your quasi-Prajñaptivādin Abhidharma?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
thomaslaw wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:26 am
Vedana etc, and also concepts, are all conditioned dhammas, which are seen as void (without reality, rittaka), insubstantial (tucchaka), and lacking essence (asaaraka). See SN 22.95.
... Also where on earth does this sutta say that dhammas are concepts? ...
See the mentioned SN 14.13, and p. 138 in Choong Mun-keat' book: Concepts are conditions and actions derived from the dhaatu, which is a dhamma 'phenomenon'.
Last edited by thomaslaw on Sun Jun 06, 2021 7:01 am, edited 2 times in total.
thomaslaw wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 6:26 am
Vedana etc, and also concepts, are all conditioned dhammas, which are seen as void (without reality, rittaka), insubstantial (tucchaka), and lacking essence (asaaraka). See SN 22.95.
... Also where on earth does this sutta say that dhammas are concepts? ...
See the mentioned SN 14.13, and p. 138 in Choong Mun-keat' book.
I asked you, not an AI librarian. Think for yourself and make the argument man.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
See the mentioned SN 14.13, and p. 138 in Choong Mun-keat' book.
I asked you, not an AI librarian. Think for yourself and make the argument man.
Concepts are conditions and actions derived from the dhaatu, which is a dhamma 'phenomenon'.
So an atta has an arising?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
Ceisiwr wrote: ↑Sun Jun 06, 2021 5:42 am
Could you point to say 3 contradictions?
This is not the section for that. I was just suggesting you may not wish for your evangelical love of the Abhidhamma to lead you to say things that directly contradict the Blessed One's words. Or maybe you do, it's your life, I guess.
All the best.
Metta,
Paul.
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
Concepts are conditions and actions derived from the dhaatu, which is a dhamma 'phenomenon'.
So an atta has an arising?
The sutta SN 14.13 indicates three kinds of dhaatu, which arises the 16. uppatti (rebirth).
Sorry you will have to expand. Does an atta arise and then persist, before ceasing?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
. What we actually find is the Buddha making use of conventional truths and ultimate truths. Conventionally the Buddha said “I do x”, but ultimately there was no “I”. It was merely a concept without an underlying reality. This is Abhidhamma. When the Buddha said “I do x” all there was were dhammas arising and ceasing according to conditions. No actual “I” was found, because only the dhammas are actual.
