Kathāvatthu: An exploration of the text and its meaning

[DooDoot]

2) however, at least, definitely the Abhidhamma Vibhanga, and possibly this Kathāvatthu, only treat sati as a wholesome factor

Vibhanga says:

Therein what is faculty of mindfulness? That which is mindfulness, constant mindfulness, recollection, mindfulness, act of remembering, bearing in mind, non-superficiality, non-forgetfulness, mindfulness, faculty of mindfulness, power of mindfulness, right mindfulness. This is called faculty of mindfulness.

https://suttacentral.net/vb5/en/thittila

[SarathW]

The Āndhaka stance IMO only makes sense if for them "sati" is being treated 1) as a sabbacittasādhāraṇa cetasika, a "universal mental factor" as it is often given in English, and 2) as not inherently a sobhana cetasika, a "wholesome mental factor."

While the translation i posted is not exactly clear to me:

1) SarathW often posts on this forum sati is a universal mental factor, as stated in Sutta, such as MN 117

2) however, at least, definitely the Abhidhamma Vibhanga, and possibly this Kathāvatthu, only treat sati as a wholesome factor

certainly that the Theravādins have it as a sabbacittasādhāraṇa cetasika also would inform their rejection of the Āndhaka proposal IMO.

maybe... but i do not comprehend the translation clearly

Sati is not universal according to Abhidhamma.
In Abhidhamma, Sati is termed as a beautiful mental factor.
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/aut ... el322.html

Also read my this post:

Why "Sati" is always beautiful?
viewtopic.php?f=13&t=39957&p=618404&hilit=

[DooDoot]

Sati is not universal according to Abhidhamma.
In Abhidhamma, Sati is termed as a beautiful mental factor.
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/aut ... el322.html

So you don't believe in Abhidhamma when you always post every action has an eightfold path?

Regardless, back to topic, i actually do not know what the basic controversy of the Kathāvatthu: Satipaṭṭhānakathā is.

Can you or another explain it? Thanks

[SarathW]

The following appears to say Theravada asserts the devas can be evil. Have i read this clearly? Thank you

Yes, that is how I read it too.
There are some evil Devas such as Kali as per Sri Lankan belief. Perhaps this is something to do with Hinduism.

[SarathW]

Sati is not universal according to Abhidhamma.
In Abhidhamma, Sati is termed as a beautiful mental factor.
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/aut ... el322.html

So you don't believe in Abhidhamma when you always post every action has an eightfold path?

Regardless, back to topic, i actually do not know what the basic controversy of the Kathāvatthu: Satipaṭṭhānakathā is.

Can you or another explain it? Thanks

Ven Dhammanado gave me a link to Kathavattu with comments on it.
Please ask him for the link.
Ven. Dhammanado inspired me to read Kathavattu.

[Coëmgenu]

Andhaka: Then is it wrong to say “all things are applications in mindfulness”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Andhaka: But is not mindfulness established concerning all cognizable things?

Theravādin: Yes.

My Note: This is how you practice Satipathana

Reflecting on this, looking at the text (the translation from 1915 is rather antiquated), I might have to revise my speculations as to the stance that the Āndhaka interlocutor argues. Rather than only having a "Sabbāthivādin-ish" view of sati, you can read it more naturally if you presume that the Āndhaka interlocutor of the Theravādin holds some sort of view of "all dhammas," and the sati that applies to them, that is somewhat similar to views you find endorsed in things like Buddhist Tantra, that all dhammas are inherent pure, that all mindfulness is inherently pure, maybe even that "the mind" is inherently pure, and that sati can be pure even when it might "seem" like micchāsati. It is views of sati and the dhammas like this that cause Buddhists of some sects to entertain eccentric notions like that you can maintain pure dispassionate awareness of "all dhammas" that occur during something like supposedly-sacred lovemaking or the consumption of impure substances or even when engaging in violence, like in "Samurai Zen." That the Āndhaka suggests that "all things" can be/are "applications in mindfulness, they could be suggesting that violence or copulation, for instance, can be an object of satipaṭṭhāna, which is of course rejected by the Theravādin. Whether the Āndhakas themselves believed this or whether it is a consequence of their belief that the Theravādin is stressing the incoherency of is unclear if this is the case.

[DooDoot]

Ven. Dhammanado inspired me to read Kathavattu.

how is the above related to the comment below:

I can see from the Kathavattu discussion (re Satipathana) that you don't know how to practice Satipathana.

[DooDoot]

That the Āndhaka suggests that "all things" can be/are "applications in mindfulness, they are suggesting that violence or copulation, for instance, can be an object of satipaṭṭhāna, which is of course rejected by the Theravādin.

Thanks. But the Theravadin view is mindfulness can be established concerning all cognizable things.

The Āndhaka view might be all things or all actions can be performed with mindfulness.

[SarathW]

Andhaka: Then is it wrong to say “all things are applications in mindfulness”?

Theravādin: Yes.

Andhaka: But is not mindfulness established concerning all cognizable things?

Theravādin: Yes.

My Note: This is how you practice Satipathana

Reflecting on this, looking at the text (the translation from 1915 is rather antiquated), I might have to revise my speculations as to the stance that the Āndhaka interlocutor argues. Rather than only having a "Sabbāthivādin-ish" view of sati, you can read it more naturally if you presume that the Āndhaka interlocutor of the Theravādin holds some sort of view of "all dhammas," and the sati that applies to them, that is somewhat similar to views you find endorsed in things like Buddhist Tantra, that all dhammas are inherent pure, that all mindfulness is inherently pure, maybe even that "the mind" is inherently pure, and that sati can be pure even when it might "seem" like micchāsati. It is views of sati and the dhammas like this that cause Buddhists of some sects to entertain eccentric notions like that you can maintain pure dispassionate awareness of "all dhammas" that occur during something like supposedly-sacred lovemaking or the consumption of impure substances or even when engaging in violence, like in "Samurai Zen." That the Āndhaka suggests that "all things" can be/are "applications in mindfulness, they could be suggesting that violence or copulation, for instance, can be an object of satipaṭṭhāna, which is of course rejected by the Theravādin. Whether the Āndhakas themselves believed this or whether it is a consequence of their belief that the Theravādin is stressing the incoherency of is unclear if this is the case.

Agree.
That is how I understood it.

[DooDoot]

That the Āndhaka suggests that "all things" can be/are "applications in mindfulness, they could be suggesting that violence or copulation, for instance, can be an object of satipaṭṭhāna, which is of course rejected by the Theravādin.

That is how I understood it.

The above appears to be wrong understooding because the Satipaṭṭhānakathā says all things can be an object of mindfulness. For example, if i see a poster in DW engaged in false speech, my right mindfulness remembers that wrong speech is wrong speech.

[Coëmgenu]

Agree.
That is how I understood it.

If we are at all correct, the "heresy" underlying the proposal might be something like that sammāsati can transform an impure/unwholesome dhamma into a pure/wholesome dhamma, even if it is something traditionally unwholesome like the examples given before. This allows the Āndhaka to also possibly have room for belief in micchāsati, but to them the difference between sammāsati and micchāsati would be irrespective of the wholesomeness or unwholesomeness of the object of mindfulness.

[retrofuturist]

Greetings,

Agree.
That is how I understood it.

If we are at all correct, the "heresy" underlying the proposal might be something like that sammāsati can transform an impure/unwholesome dhamma into a pure/wholesome dhamma, even if it is something traditionally unwholesome like the examples given before. This allows the Āndhaka to also possibly have room for belief in micchāsati, but to them the difference between sammāsati and micchāsati would be irrespective of the wholesomeness or unwholesomeness of the object of mindfulness.

Maybe, but it all sounds like straw-men to me, because what constitute "points of controversy" nowadays don't seem to have any correlation to what's presented in the Kathāvatthu. It appears traditions are good at explaining their own positions, but less so (either through lack of comprehension, or intentional sleight-of-hand) when it comes to explaining others. When those others, or their modern-day counterparts are not here to represent themselves, it feels like a very one-sided and somewhat academic discussion.

Metta,
Paul.

[Coëmgenu]

It's a very fine difference between the two

1) all things are applications in mindfulness
2) mindfulness [is] established concerning all cognizable things

The 1st is rejected by the Theravādin and the second lauded. It is all going to boil down to what something being "an application" in mindfulness entails. The first can be taken to entail that all observation of all experience is always satipaṭṭhāna.

[DooDoot]

So the unresolved issue is what is the meaning of:

Sabbe dhammā satipaṭṭhānāti?

Does this render the usual false translations of AN 10.58 as false

satādhipateyyā sabbe dhammā

all things are governed by mindfulness

AN 10.58

[SarathW]

That is how I understood it.

The above appears to be wrong understooding because the Satipaṭṭhānakathā says all things can be an object of mindfulness. For example, if i see a poster in DW engaged in false speech, my right mindfulness remembers that wrong speech is wrong speech.

I am sorry to say that your understanding of Satipathana is completely incorrect.
in Satipathana we contemplate on internal not external even though we see it as internal external.