This thread is in the Classical section, and the OP is specifically asking about how the Abhidhamma and Commentaries define Nibbana as a dhamma. If you want to explore other questions from a sutta point of view please start a thread in the General Theravada section.Twilight wrote:What I was speaking about are views expressed in the suttas. I am not familiar with those views and would be interested to hear what they are about.
It specifically talks about the Commentarial description.Twilight wrote:From what I know, the pali canon is held in high esteem within classical therevada. And I did not see OP asking for specific abhidhamma or commentary point of view.
Visuddhimagga: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/auth ... on2011.pdfTwilight wrote: On the contrary, I see him asking how to interpret a sutta from SN. And I am curious what Vism XVI 63-74 has to say about this cause I can not find it online.
63. So it is because suffering ceases only through the cessation of its origin
that, when teaching the cessation of suffering, the Blessed One therefore taught
the cessation of the origin. For the Perfect Ones behave like lions.15 When they
make suffering cease and when they teach the cessation of suffering, they deal
with the cause, not the fruit. But the sectarians behave like dogs. When they
make suffering cease and when they teach the cessation of suffering, by teaching
devotion to self-mortification, etc., they deal with the fruit, not the cause. This, in
the first place, is how the motive for teaching the cessation of suffering by means
of the cessation of its origin should be understood.
64. This is the meaning. Of that same craving: of that craving which, it was said,
“produces further becoming,” and which was classed as “craving for sense
desires” and so on. It is the path that is called fading away; for “With the fading
away [of greed] he is liberated” (M I 139) is said. Fading away and cessation is
cessation through fading away. Remainderless fading away and cessation is cessation
through fading away that is remainderless because of eradication of inherent
tendencies. Or alternatively, it is abandoning that is called fading away; and so
the construction here can be regarded as “remainderless fading away,
remainderless cessation.”
65. But as to meaning, all of them are synonyms for Nibbána. For in the ultimate
sense it is Nibbána that is called “the noble truth of the cessation of suffering.”
But because craving fades away and ceases on coming to that,16 it is therefore
called “fading away” and “cessation.” And because there comes to be the giving
up, etc., of that [craving] on coming to that [Nibbána], and since there is not even
one kind of reliance here [to be depended upon] from among the reliances
consisting in the cords of sense desires, etc., it is therefore called giving it up,
relinquishing it, letting it go, not relying on it.
66. It has peace as its characteristic. Its function is not to die; or its function is
to comfort. It is manifested as the signless; or it is manifested as nondiversification.17
[DISCUSSION ON NIBBÁNA]
67. [Question 1] Is Nibbána non-existent because it is unapprehendable, like
the hare’s horn?
[Answer] That is not so, because it is apprehendable by the [right] means. For
it is apprehendable [by some, namely, the nobles ones] by the [right] means, in
other words, by the way that is appropriate to it, [the way of virtue, concentration,
and understanding]; it is like the supramundane consciousness of others, [which
is apprehendable only by certain of the Noble Ones] by means of knowledge of
penetration of others’ minds. Therefore it should not be said that it is non-existent
because unapprehendable; for it should not be said that what the foolish ordinary
man does not apprehend is unapprehendable.
68. Again, it should not be said that Nibbána does not exist. Why not? Because
it then follows that the way would be futile. [508] For if Nibbána were nonexistent,
then it would follow that the right way, which includes the three
aggregates beginning with virtue and is headed by right understanding, would
be futile. And it is not futile because it does reach Nibbána.
[Q. 2] But futility of the way does not follow because what is reached is absence,
[that is, absence of the five aggregates consequent upon the cutting off of the
defilements].
[A.] That is not so. Because, though there is absence of past and future
[aggregates], there is nevertheless no reaching of Nibbána [simply because of
that].
[Q. 3] Then is the absence of present [aggregates] as well Nibbána?
[A.] That is not so. Because their absence is an impossibility, since if they are
absent their non-presence follows. [Besides, if Nibbána were absence of present
aggregates too,] that would entail the fault of excluding the arising of the Nibbána
element with result of past clinging left, at the path moment, which has present
aggregates as its support.
[Q. 4] Then will there be no fault if it is non-presence of defilements [that is
Nibbána]?
[A.] That is not so. Because it would then follow that the noble path was
meaningless. For if it were so, then, since defilements [can be] non-existent also
before the moment of the noble path, it follows that the noble path would be
meaningless. Consequently that is no reason; [it is unreasonable to say that
Nibbána is unapprehendable, that it is non-existence, and so on].
69. [Q. 5] But is not Nibbána destruction, because of the passage beginning,
“That, friend, which is the destruction of greed … [of hate … of delusion … is
Nibbána]?” (S IV 251).
[A.] That is not so, because it would follow that Arahantship also was mere
destruction. For that too is described in the [same] way beginning, “That, friend,
which is the destruction of greed … of hate … of delusion … is Arahantship]” (S
IV 252).
And what is more, the fallacy then follows that Nibbána would be temporary,
etc.; for if it were so, it would follow that Nibbána would be temporary, have the
characteristic of being formed, and be obtainable regardless of right effort; and
precisely because of its having formed characteristics it would be included in
the formed, and it would be burning with the fires of greed, etc., and because of
its burning it would follow that it was suffering.
[Q. 6] Is there no fallacy if Nibbána is that kind of destruction subsequent to
which there is no more occurrence?
[A.] That is not so. Because there is no such kind of destruction. And even if
there were, the aforesaid fallacies would not be avoided.
Also because it would follow that the noble path was Nibbána. For the noble
path causes the destruction of defects, and that is why it is called “destruction”;
and subsequent to that there is no more occurrence of the defects.
70. But it is because the kind of destruction called “cessation consisting in
non-arising,” [that is, Nibbána,] serves figuratively speaking as decisive-support
[for the path] that [Nibbána] is called “destruction” as a metaphor for it.
[Q. 7] Why is it not stated in its own form?
[A.] Because of its extreme subtlety. And its extreme subtlety is established because
it inclined the Blessed One to inaction, [that is, to not teaching the Dhamma (see M
I 186)] and because a Noble One’s eye is needed to see it (see M I 510).
71. It is not shared by all because it can only be reached by one who is possessed
of the path. And it is uncreated because it has no first beginning.
[Q. 8] Since it is, when the path is, then it is not uncreated.
[A.] That is not so, because it is not arousable by the path; it is only reachable,
not arousable, by the path; that is why it is uncreated. It is because it is uncreated
that it is free from ageing and death. It is because of the absence of its creation
and of its ageing and death that it is permanent. [509]
72. [Q. 9] Then it follows that Nibbána, too, has the kind of permanence [claimed]
of the atom and so on.
[A.] That is not so. Because of the absence of any cause [that brings about its
arising].
[Q. 10] Because Nibbána has permanence, then, these [that is, the atom, etc.]
are permanent as well.
[A.] That is not so. Because [in that proposition] the characteristic of [logical]
cause does not arise. [In other words, to say that Nibbána is permanent is not to
assert a reason why the atom, etc., should be permanent]
[Q. 11] Then they are permanent because of the absence of their arising, as
Nibbána is.
[A.] That is not so. Because the atom and so on have not been established as facts.
73. The aforesaid logical reasoning proves that only this [that is, Nibbána] is
permanent [precisely because it is uncreated]; and it is immaterial because it
transcends the individual essence of matter.
The Buddhas’ goal is one and has no plurality. But this [single goal, Nibbána,]
is firstly called with result of past clinging left since it is made known together
with the [aggregates resulting from past] clinging still remaining [during the
Arahant’s life], being thus made known in terms of the stilling of defilement
and the remaining [result of past] clinging that are present in one who has
reached it by means of development. But [secondly, it is called without result of
past clinging left] since after the last consciousness of the Arahant, who has
abandoned arousing [future aggregates] and so prevented kamma from giving
result in a future [existence], there is no further arising of aggregates of existence,
and those already arisen have disappeared. So the [result of past] clinging that
remained is non-existent; and it is in terms of this non-existence, in the sense
that “there is no [result of past] clinging here” that that [same goal is called]
without result of past clinging left (see It 38).
74. Because it can be arrived at by distinction of knowledge that succeeds
through untiring perseverance, and because it is the word of the Omniscient
One, Nibbána is not non-existent as regards individual essence in the ultimate
sense; for this is said: “Bhikkhus, there is an unborn, an unbecome, an unmade,
an unformed” (It 37; Ud 80).18
Reading it may possibly correct the misunderstandings in the post below:Twilight wrote:Thank very much. I'm reading it right now
MN 117 states abandoning wrong view & entering into right view is right mindfulness.Twilight wrote:Dependent origination explains the fire. (made out of the 5 aggregates) It explains how this fire burns because of oxygen, fuel, etc. how it produces light, heat etc. It explains the conditionalities between fuel, heat, light, oxygen etc.
Nibbana is when this fire (described by DO) does not exist anymore because no more fuel (craving) has been put in and, lacking fuel, the fire has been extinguished.
When there is no more fire (no more aggregates subject to clinging) there can not be any craving because the things that could be subject to craving do not exist anymore. Saying nibbana is the absence of hatred and delusion is incorrect. That means you believe in a state of been or even, god forbid, a self not subject to greed, hatred & delusion. The only way to describe nibbana is by using the fire metaphor. One who understands things this way would not describe nibbana as absence of hatred or delusion because it is the absence of everything. One could very well say nibbana is the absence of compassion, absence of wisdom, absence of mindfulness etc. or pick any things that exist and say nibbana is their absence. Nibbana is the absence of all conditioned things, meaning everything. Greed, hatred, delusion, compassion, generosity, etc. are all part of the fire. Nibbana is when this fire gets extinguished.
I may have been thinking about these:mikenz66 wrote:There is a sutta that states that, but I can't think of it offhand. Probably one of the MN suttas.SarathW wrote:I can't recall Buddha said like this.Anihilationism was considered by Buddha to be the best of the wrong views.
Mike
MN 74: https://suttacentral.net/mn74The view of those good recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view “there definitely is no cessation of being” is close to lust, close to bondage, close to delighting, close to holding, close to clinging; but the view of those good recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view “there definitely is cessation of being” is close to non-lust, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-holding, close to non-clinging.’ After reflecting thus, he practises the way to disenchantment with being, to the fading away and cessation of being.
https://suttacentral.net/en/mn60/41.751-
4. “Aggivessana, there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘Everything is acceptable to me.’ There are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘Nothing is acceptable to me.’ And there are some recluses and brahmins whose doctrine and view is this: ‘Something is acceptable to me, something is not acceptable to me.’ [734] Among these, the view of those recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view ‘Everything is acceptable to me’ is close to lust, close to bondage, close to delighting, close to holding, close to clinging. The view of those recluses and brahmins who hold the doctrine and view ‘Nothing is acceptable to me’ is close to non-lust, close to non-bondage, close to non-delighting, close to non-holding, close to non-clinging.”
Bhikkhu Bodhi's note 734:
MA identifies the three views here as eternalism, annihilationism, and partial eternalism. The eternalist view is close to lust (sārāgāya santike), etc., because it affirms and delights in existence in however sublimated a form; annihilationism is close to non-lust, etc., because, though involving a wrong conception of self, it leads to disenchantment with existence. If the second view is understood as radical scepticism, it could also be seen as close to non-lust in that it expresses disillusionment with the attempt to buttress the attachment to existence with a theoretical foundation and thus represents a tentative, though mistaken, step in the direction of dispassion.
This is also handy:mikenz66 wrote:I may have been thinking about these:
To "overreach" is probably better than to "hold back".And how, bhikkhus, do some hold back? Devas and humans enjoy being, delight in being, are satisfied with being. When Dhamma is taught to them for the cessation of being, their minds do not enter into it or acquire confidence in it or settle upon it or become resolved upon it. Thus, bhikkhus, do some hold back.
“How, bhikkhus, do some overreach? Now some are troubled, ashamed, and disgusted by this very same being and they rejoice in (the idea of) non-being, asserting: ‘In as much as this self, good sirs, when the body perishes at death, is annihilated and destroyed and does not exist after death—this is peaceful, this is excellent, this is reality!’ Thus, bhikkhus, do some overreach.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... ml#iti-049
Perhaps AN 10.29? The MN ones (60 & 74) also certainly point that way.mikenz66 wrote:There is a sutta that states that, but I can't think of it offhand. Probably one of the MN suttas.SarathW wrote:I can't recall Buddha said like this.Anihilationism was considered by Buddha to be the best of the wrong views.
Mike
AN 10.29 wrote: “Bhikkhus, of the speculative views held by outsiders, this is the foremost, namely: ‘I might not be and it might not be mine; I shall not be, and it will not be mine.’ For it can be expected that one who holds such a view will not be unrepelled by existence
and will not be repelled by the cessation of existence. There are beings who hold such a view. But even for beings who hold such a view there is alteration; there is change. Seeing this thus, the instructed noble disciple becomes disenchanted with it; being disenchanted, he becomes dispassionate toward the foremost, not to speak of what is inferior.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.htmlTwilight wrote:What I was speaking about are views expressed in the suttas. I am not familiar with those views and would be interested to hear what they are about.
Oh boy. Good old idealist Thanissaro, still believing in a self and in nibbana as a realm or some form of infinite consciousness... Completely ignoring the whole pali canon in favor of a wrong interpretation of an obscure verse.spacenick wrote:http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka ... .than.htmlTwilight wrote:What I was speaking about are views expressed in the suttas. I am not familiar with those views and would be interested to hear what they are about.
Research vinnana anidassanam, the synonym for Nibbana
Bhante Sujato:n the first edition, I retained Ñm’s own translation of these lines, which read:
The consciousness that makes no showing,
Nor has to do with finiteness,
Not claiming being with respect to all.
In retrospect, I find this rendering far from satisfactory and thus here offer my own. These lines (which also appear as part of a full verse at DN 11.85/i.223) have been a perennial challenge to Buddhist scholarship, and even Ācariya Buddhaghosa seems to founder over them. MA takes the subject of the sentence to be Nibbāna, called “consciousness” (viññāṇṁ) in the sense that “it can be cognized” (vijānitabbaṁ). This derivation is hardly credible, since nowhere in the Nik̄yas is Nibb̄na described as consciousness, nor is it possible to derive an active noun from the gerundive. MA explains anidassanaṁ as meaning invisible, “because it (Nibbāna) does not come within range of eye-consciousness,” but again this is a trite explanation. The word anidassana occurs at MN 21.14 in the description of empty space as an unsuitable medium for painting pictures; thus the idea seems to be that of not making manifest.
MA offers three explanations of sabbato pabhaṁ: (1) completely possessed of luminosity (pabhā); (2) possessing being (pabhū̇taṃ) everywhere; and (3) a ford (pabhaṁ) accessible from all sides, i.e., through any of the thirty-eight meditation objects. Only the first of these seems to have any linguistic legitimacy. Ñm, in Ms, explains that he takes pabhaṁ to be a negative present participle of pabhavati—apabhaṁ—the negative-prefix a dropping off in conjunction with sabbato: “The sense can be paraphrased freely by ‘not predicating being in relation to “all,”’ or ‘not assuming of “all” that it is or is not in an absolute sense.’” But if we take pabhaṁ as “luminous,” which seems better justified, the verse links up with the idea of the mind as intrinsically luminous (pabhassaram idaṁ cittaṁ , AN i.10) and also suggests the light of wisdom (pa), called the best of lights (AN ii.139). I understand this consciousness to be, not Nibbāna itself, but the arahant’s consciousness during the meditative experience of Nibb̄na. See in this connection AN v.7–10, 318–26. Note that this meditative experience does not make manifest any conditioned phenomena of the world, and thus may be truly described as “non-manifesting.”
https://sujato.wordpress.com/2011/05/13 ... E2%80%99t/“I’ve just read yet another assertion that tries to slip a ‘cosmic consciousness’ Nibbana into the Suttas. In these kinds of arguments the same mistakes are made again and again, and you should beware of them.
One popular argument is based on the famous passage:
viññāṇāṁ anidassanaṁ anantaṁ sabbato pabhaṁ
‘Consciousness non-manifest, infinte, radiant all around.’
This is sometimes said to be a term for Nibbana, although since it is an obscure poetic passage of dubious meaning we should not infer any major conclusions from it.
This obscure passage has been often exalted to the revelation of the highest teachings of Nibbana. One of the arguments one hears is that viññāṇa normally means ‘separative consciousness’, and that this has been revalued to refer to an infinite awareness. This argument is wrong. ...”
https://sujato.wordpress.com/2011/05/13 ... E2%80%99t/It is in the next lines of the verse, which are usually overlooked by the viññāṇa = Nibbana school, that the Buddha’s true position is stated. With the cessation of viññāṇa all this comes to an end. The ‘infinite consciousness’ is merely the temporary escape from the oppression of materiality, but true liberation is the ending of all consciousness.
‘Kattha āpo ca pathavī,
Tejo vāyo na gādhati;
Kattha dīghañca rassañca,
Aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ;
Kattha nāmañca rūpañca,
Asesaṃ uparujjhatī’ti.
Where does water and earth
fire, air not find a footing?
Where does long and short
Small, gross, fair and ugly,
Where does name and form
Without remainder cease?
Tatra veyyākaraṇaṃ bhavati—
For that the explanation is:
‘Viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ,
Anantaṃ sabbatopabhaṃ;
Ettha āpo ca pathavī,
Tejo vāyo na gādhati.
Viññāṇa non-manifest
Infinite, radiant all-round
There water and earth
fire, air do not find a footing
Ettha dīghañca rassañca,
Aṇuṃ thūlaṃ subhāsubhaṃ;
Ettha nāmañca rūpañca,
Asesaṃ uparujjhati;
Viññāṇassa nirodhena,
Etthetaṃ uparujjhatī’”ti.
There does long and short
Small, gross, fair and ugly,
There does name and form
Without remainder cease:
With the cessation of viññāṇa
There this ceases.
The problem is not so much the interpretation of viññāṇa as such, but the syntax of the verses – which is one reason why poetry should not decide doctrine. The Buddha rephrases the original question, but his rephrasing has three question words and two verbs. It may be read as a single complex question, but this assumes that the two verbs mean the same thing (which they don’t: na gādhati means ‘does not find a firm footing’, like a man crossing a ford, while uparujjhati means ‘ceases’) – and that viññāṇa means ‘infinite consciousness of Nibbana’ in the first occurrence and ‘separative sense consciousness’ in the second.
I am not taking the words of somebody who had not exerienced nibbana to talk about nibbana. This is because my position is based on my personal reading of the pali canon. Therefore it is based on the position of Buddha and on my own understanding. It just so happens that B.Bhodi has the same opinion.You're taking the words of someone who has *not* experienced Nibbana to talk about... Nibbana.
Here's the post I referred to about vegetarianism: https://sujato.wordpress.com/2012/01/28 ... xtra-cute/Twilight wrote:You are discussing the person, not the ideas. And by the way, what is Sujato stance regarding vegetarianism ? You made me curious.I am not taking the words of somebody who had not exerienced nibbana to talk about nibbana. This is because my position is based on my personal reading of the pali canon. Therefore it is based on the position of Buddha and on my own understanding. It just so happens that B.Bhodi has the same opinion.You're taking the words of someone who has *not* experienced Nibbana to talk about... Nibbana.
I suggest reading the pali canon for yourself so you won't have to rely on famous monks, judging them by what positions they have on vegetarianism or things like that.
