What is being quoted in this Visuddhimagga quote?

[zan]

Greetings Zan,

What is being quoted?

Unless it's traced back to the Tipitaka, which I don't believe it is, I suspect it refers to commentators prior to Buddhaghosa.

Metta,
Paul.

Thanks. So "Ancients" in Vism probably usually refers to the commentaries then. Makes sense.

[zan]

Just to clear things up:

The suttas firmly and unequivocally state sabbe dhamma anatta.

The Buddha declares that “all phenomena are nonself” (sabbe dhammā anattā), which means that if one seeks a self anywhere one will not find one. Since “all phenomena” includes both the conditioned and the unconditioned, this precludes an utterly transcendent, ineffable self."
-Bhikkhi Bodhi’s footnote to the Ānanda Sutta (SN.44.10)

So there is no atta in anything whatsoever, confirming Vism XIX.20.

Reading AN 6.38 as contradicting Vism XIX.20 is to ignore sabbe dhamma anatta and to introduce contradiction into the core doctrine of the suttas themselves.

[ToVincent]

Hi Vincent,

What’s your background in Sanskrit and Vedic texts/lexicography? Do you have qualifications in it or are you self taught?

What's yours, Bro?

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ToVincent:
There is no Ka — the continuous and blissful self — in saḷāyatana nidāna and below — because things are neither continuous (anicca), nor blissful there. Period.
That does not preclude an atta as a personal pronoun related to satta (see Olivelle above). An atta (personal pronoun, related to satta), with no atta (spiritual Self/self).

How does this understanding work when applied to the materialists/annihilationists, specifically the strict materialists who denied a divine self (which is then annihilated)?

?

[SteRo]

Just to clear things up:

The suttas firmly and unequivocally state sabbe dhamma anatta.

The Buddha declares that “all phenomena are nonself” (sabbe dhammā anattā), which means that if one seeks a self anywhere one will not find one. Since “all phenomena” includes both the conditioned and the unconditioned, this precludes an utterly transcendent, ineffable self."
-Bhikkhi Bodhi’s footnote to the Ānanda Sutta (SN.44.10)

So there is no atta in anything whatsoever, confirming Vism XIX.20.

Reading AN 6.38 as contradicting Vism XIX.20 is to ignore sabbe dhamma anatta and to introduce contradiction into the core doctrine of the suttas themselves.

[Ceisiwr]

ToVincent

What's yours, Bro?

Nothing in Sanskrit or Vedic texts. Science is my area. So, have you studied these texts and Sanskrit professionally? I’m just interested if you have qualifications in them or not.

?

The materialists didn’t believe in a “ka” or divine self, but they still thought there was a self or being. How does your analysis apply to them?

Metta

[ToVincent]

So, have you studied these texts and Sanskrit professionally? I’m just interested if you have qualifications in them or not.

I think you should ask people if they are part of a sect, cult, or any secret fraternal order or fellowship. That would be more proper.

Moreover, when I see Sujato translating maññati as "identify", or sankhara as "choice", or citta as "the hearth", or metta as "love" etc. — I wonder if "qualification" still means something. Or else.

_____

The materialists didn’t believe in a “ka” or divine self, but they still thought there was a self or being. How does your analysis apply to them?

?
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[Ceisiwr]

ToVincent

I think you should ask people if they are part of a sect, cult, or any secret fraternal order or fellowship. That would be more proper.

Moreover, when I see Sujato translating maññati as "identify", or sankhara as "choice", or citta as "the hearth", or metta as "love" etc. — I wonder if "qualification" still means something. Or else.

I’ll take that as a no then. Nothing wrong in being an amateur of course.

The materialists didn’t believe in a “ka” or divine self, but they still thought there was a self or being. How does your analysis apply to them?

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I can only repeat the question. At this point you seem to be evading giving an answer, which makes me doubt your prior argument.

Metta

[ToVincent]

I’ll take that as a no then. Nothing wrong in being an amateur of course.
_________

The materialists didn’t believe in a “ka” or divine self, but they still thought there was a self or being. How does your analysis apply to them?

I can only repeat the question. At this point you seem to be evading giving an answer, which makes me doubt your prior argument.

Oh "amateur" - from the Latin amare "to love", and the French "one who loves".
Surely I prefer that to "professional"; for the reason above, for instance - as in "free from the ones who pay the bills".

Now you take whatever you want as an answer - but know that I usually pay the bills.

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As for the other question is concerned, I just can't relate to your question, (to which you seem, to have already answered).
Is Buddhism marked by materialism?!?!
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[Ceisiwr]

ToVincent

Oh "amateur" - from the Latin amare "to love", and the French "one who loves".
Surely I prefer that to "professional"; for the reason above, for instance - as in "free from the ones who pay the bills".

Now you take whatever you want as an answer - but know that I usually pay the bills.

I take that to mean you are an amateur when it comes to Sanskrit and Vedic texts. You could have simply stated that earlier instead of dancing around.

As for the other question is concerned, I just can't relate to your question, (to which you seem, to have already answered).
Is Buddhism marked by materialism?!?!
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No, it isn’t. You argued that the Buddha criticised the idea of a divine Self or self, but that it was ok to say there was a self related to being if it wasn’t thought of as divine. I’m asking then how this understanding applies to the materialists who denied a divine Self/self and being but still thought in terms of self and being? I couldn’t have been more clear.

Metta

[ToVincent]

...

You want dancing lessons.
You pay the bill?
If I need lessons on Veda, I'll call you.
Maybe we can arrange something.

Meanwhile, when did I "argue that the Buddha criticised the idea of a divine Self or self,..."?!?!?

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[Ceisiwr]

ToVincent

Meanwhile, when did I "argue that the Buddha criticised the idea of a divine Self or self,..."?!?!?

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Let’s go through this again. You said:

Buddhism is a nasti-Ka philosophy. There is no Prajapati made selves (Ka) in the actualized world. There is no Ka — the continuous and blissful self — in saḷāyatana nidāna and below — because things are neither continuous (anicca), nor blissful there. Period.

There is no divine self in the world according to Buddhism. The materialists would also agree, albeit likely for different reasons.

That does not preclude an atta as a personal pronoun related to satta (see Olivelle above). An atta (personal pronoun, related to satta), with no atta (spiritual Self/self).

The materialists would also agree.

You seem to be arguing that the Buddha only denied a divine self. I’m then asking how this interpretation makes sense when we look at the materialists? What was he was criticising in the materialists, who also denied a divine self but still thought in terms of self and being? Did he agree with them when they said there is a self/being? I’m asking because as far as I can see the Buddha argued against any type of self thinking. You seem to be saying that some form of self thinking is perfectly fine. If, however, that isn’t what you meant then please feel free to clarify.

To quote your good self “ Holy Molly — how long is this nonsense going to last?”

Metta

[zan]

...

What was he was criticising in the materialists, who also denied a divine self but still thought in terms of self and being? Did he agree with them when they said there is a self/being?

...

Which sutta(s) are you referencing?

[Ceisiwr]

Hello zan

Which sutta(s) are you referencing?

These are the first two which come to mind:

Herein, bhikkhus, a certain recluse or a brahmin asserts the following doctrine and view: ‘The self, good sir, has material form; it is composed of the four primary elements and originates from father and mother. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way some proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being.

“To him another says: ‘There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. For there is, good sir, another self—divine, having material form, pertaining to the sense sphere, feeding on edible nutriment. That you neither know nor see, but I know it and see it. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way others proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being.

“To him another says: ‘There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. For there is, good sir, another self—divine, having material form, mind-made, complete in all its limbs and organs, not destitute of any faculties. That you neither know nor see, but I know it and see it. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way others proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being...

Therein, bhikkhus, when those recluses who are eternalists proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be eternal—that is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible.

“When those recluses and brahmins who are eternalists in regard to some things and non-eternalists in regard to other things proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal—that too is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible.

“When those recluses and brahmins who are extensionists proclaim their views; when those who are fortuitous originationists proclaim their views; when those who are speculators about the past and hold settled views about the past assert on eighteen grounds various conceptual theorems referring to the past; when those who maintain a doctrine of percipient immortality, non-percipient immortality, or neither percipient nor non-percipient immortality proclaim their views; when those who are annihilationists proclaim their views; when those who maintain a doctrine of Nibbāna here and now proclaim their views; when those who are speculators about the future and hold settled views about the future assert on forty-four grounds various conceptual theorems referring to the future—that too is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible.

“When those recluses and brahmins who are speculators about the past, speculators about the future, speculators about the past and the future together, who hold settled views about the past and the future, assert on sixty-two grounds various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future—that too is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible.

https://suttacentral.net/dn1/en/bodhi

The Realized One understands this as follows. The ascetics and brahmins who assert the annihilation, eradication, and obliteration of an existing being; from fear and disgust with identity, they just keep running and circling around identity. Suppose a dog on a leash was tethered to a strong post or pillar. It would just keeping running and circling around that post or pillar. In the same way, those ascetics and brahmins, from fear and disgust with identity, just keep running and circling around identity.

https://suttacentral.net/mn102/en/sujato

From what I understand of the Dhamma the materialists were still clinging to the aggregates, which is why they still thought in terms of self. They equated the self with the aggregates, which upon death is annihilated. They did that without thinking about a divine self. It isn’t thoughts of a divine self that is the problem. It is clinging and the thought of self in general which is the problem. Materialist annihilationism or a Upanishadic universe soul are but two sides of the same coin. That is to say they are merely different expressions of the same problem, namely clinging and “I am”.

When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, ‘I am’ occurs to him; ‘I am this’ occurs to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these occur to him.

“The five faculties remain right there, bhikkhus, but in regard to them the instructed noble disciple abandons ignorance and arouses true knowledge. With the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, ‘I am’ does not occur to him; ‘I am this’ does not occur to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these do not occur to him.”

https://suttacentral.net/sn22.47/en/bodhi

Metta

[zan]

Hello zan

Which sutta(s) are you referencing?

These are the first two which come to mind:

Herein, bhikkhus, a certain recluse or a brahmin asserts the following doctrine and view: ‘The self, good sir, has material form; it is composed of the four primary elements and originates from father and mother. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way some proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being.

“To him another says: ‘There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. For there is, good sir, another self—divine, having material form, pertaining to the sense sphere, feeding on edible nutriment. That you neither know nor see, but I know it and see it. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way others proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being.

“To him another says: ‘There is, good sir, such a self as you assert. That I do not deny. But it is not at that point that the self is completely annihilated. For there is, good sir, another self—divine, having material form, mind-made, complete in all its limbs and organs, not destitute of any faculties. That you neither know nor see, but I know it and see it. Since this self, good sir, is annihilated and destroyed with the breakup of the body and does not exist after death, at this point the self is completely annihilated.’ In this way others proclaim the annihilation, destruction, and extermination of an existent being...

Therein, bhikkhus, when those recluses who are eternalists proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be eternal—that is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible.

“When those recluses and brahmins who are eternalists in regard to some things and non-eternalists in regard to other things proclaim on four grounds the self and the world to be partly eternal and partly non-eternal—that too is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible.

“When those recluses and brahmins who are extensionists proclaim their views; when those who are fortuitous originationists proclaim their views; when those who are speculators about the past and hold settled views about the past assert on eighteen grounds various conceptual theorems referring to the past; when those who maintain a doctrine of percipient immortality, non-percipient immortality, or neither percipient nor non-percipient immortality proclaim their views; when those who are annihilationists proclaim their views; when those who maintain a doctrine of Nibbāna here and now proclaim their views; when those who are speculators about the future and hold settled views about the future assert on forty-four grounds various conceptual theorems referring to the future—that too is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible.

“When those recluses and brahmins who are speculators about the past, speculators about the future, speculators about the past and the future together, who hold settled views about the past and the future, assert on sixty-two grounds various conceptual theorems referring to the past and the future—that too is conditioned by contact. That they can experience that feeling without contact—such a case is impossible.

https://suttacentral.net/dn1/en/bodhi

The Realized One understands this as follows. The ascetics and brahmins who assert the annihilation, eradication, and obliteration of an existing being; from fear and disgust with identity, they just keep running and circling around identity. Suppose a dog on a leash was tethered to a strong post or pillar. It would just keeping running and circling around that post or pillar. In the same way, those ascetics and brahmins, from fear and disgust with identity, just keep running and circling around identity.

https://suttacentral.net/mn102/en/sujato

From what I understand of the Dhamma the materialists were still clinging to the aggregates, which is why they still thought in terms of self. They equated the self with the aggregates, which upon death is annihilated. They did that without thinking about a divine self. It isn’t thoughts of a divine self that is the problem. It is clinging and the thought of self in general which is the problem. Materialist annihilationism or a Upanishadic universe soul are but two sides of the same coin. That is to say they are merely different expressions of the same problem, namely clinging and “I am”.

When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, ‘I am’ occurs to him; ‘I am this’ occurs to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these occur to him.

“The five faculties remain right there, bhikkhus, but in regard to them the instructed noble disciple abandons ignorance and arouses true knowledge. With the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, ‘I am’ does not occur to him; ‘I am this’ does not occur to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these do not occur to him.”

https://suttacentral.net/sn22.47/en/bodhi

Metta

Comprehensive answer!

Thank you

[ToVincent]

You seem to be arguing that the Buddha only denied a divine self.

Did I ever mean that?

There is no blissful and continuous Self/self (atta) - like Ka - in the salayatana nidana and below.
Is that hard to understand.
I don't care about what the "materialists" thought. That's your problem.

Now learn about Self/self in the Veda. Maybe you'll find that Buddha didn't deny a Self/self, or a Self outside that range - or maybe not.
I am too much of an amateur to help you on that matter.
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