The way I understand there are three categories.
Vinnana = ie Sankhara paccya Vinnana - conditioned
Nana = mere knowing - conditioned because it take as I me and myself
Panna = Nibbana - unconditioned as it does not take as self
From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
“As the lamp consumes oil, the path realises Nibbana”
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Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
Greetings,
A clue to the answer might lie in the notion of the "31 planes of existence", and that nibbana isn't classified as "existence" amongst them.
Paul.
[The following is not in conflict with the commentarial presentation to the best of my knowledge, but I stand to be corrected...]
A clue to the answer might lie in the notion of the "31 planes of existence", and that nibbana isn't classified as "existence" amongst them.
Metta,AN 1.329 wrote:“Monks, just as even a tiny amount of feces is foul-smelling, in the same way, I don’t praise even a tiny amount of bhava (becoming / existence) —even as much as a finger-snap.”
Paul.
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
Because the above implied condition: "If things are impermanent and suffering, Then they are not self" does NOT guarantee the outcome: "If things are permenent and non-suffering, Then they are self". This is due to what's called the necessity and sufficiency conditional relationship in logic and mathematics. To put it simply, for a conditional of: If P then Q, P is sufficient for Q (ie P being true always implies Q is true), but P NOT being true does NOT always imply that Q is NOT true. Ex: If entity A is a doctor, then entity A is a human; If entity A is NOT a doctor, then entity A is NOT a human!!zan wrote:To my knowledge, the rules are that things that are impermanent, and lead to suffering are not self, these things are literally everything but nibbana. Since nibbana doesn't fall under these descriptions, what rules it out from being self?
Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
Just to clearly delineate for anyone who doesn't know:
The Mahayana, Nagarjuna version of things has all things being empty of svabhava, or intrinsic nature, including nibbana:
Thus, there is a huge difference between the Mahayana position that all is empty, and even nirvana doesn't exist, and the Theravada position, especially with nibbana. Some have made the point, myself included (and very possibly incorrectly considering the Theravada position stated above is literally the opposite of Nagarjuna's), that since Nagarjuna was critiquing the Sarvastivadin position that all dhammas exist in the past, present and future, and not the Theravada presentism position, that his critique is irrelevant to Theravada. This, however, even if correct, does not apply to nibbana, because nibbana ultimately exists in Theravada, and, while it is empty of a self, it does bear its own intrinsic nature, and is an ultimate reality. The Theravada position is wholly incompatible with the Mahayana view that nibbana doesn't exist, and is empty like other dhammas.
It is also worth mentioning that the Mahayana understanding of "emptiness" and dependent origination is not the same as how these words are defined in the Pali Canon.
The Mahayana, Nagarjuna version of things has all things being empty of svabhava, or intrinsic nature, including nibbana:
Within the Madhyamaka school, svabhava is used to describe the concept of sunyata (emptiness). In this context, svabhava is the "essence" or "inherenent existence" that things are empty of. This concept is central to Madhyamaka reasoning, in which Nagarjuna asserts that anything that arises due to causes and conditions can have no inherent existence (svabhava).
-encyclopedia of Buddhism
Here is the Theravada understanding:Both samsara and nirvana,
Neither of these two exists;
The thorough understanding of cyclic existence
This is referred to as "nirvana"
-Nagarjuna, Sixty Stanzas, verse 6
In Theravada, dhammas exist as ultimate realities, and do have svabhava. Nibbana is a dhamma, and an ultimate reality, and is the supreme, endless reality.It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…
…
Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions…
...
...the commentaries consummate the dhamma theory by supplying the formal definition of dhammas as "things which bear their own intrinsic nature" (attano sabhavam dharenti ti dhamma).
…
...concretely produced matter...possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.
…
Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 15, 26, 235, 260
Thus, there is a huge difference between the Mahayana position that all is empty, and even nirvana doesn't exist, and the Theravada position, especially with nibbana. Some have made the point, myself included (and very possibly incorrectly considering the Theravada position stated above is literally the opposite of Nagarjuna's), that since Nagarjuna was critiquing the Sarvastivadin position that all dhammas exist in the past, present and future, and not the Theravada presentism position, that his critique is irrelevant to Theravada. This, however, even if correct, does not apply to nibbana, because nibbana ultimately exists in Theravada, and, while it is empty of a self, it does bear its own intrinsic nature, and is an ultimate reality. The Theravada position is wholly incompatible with the Mahayana view that nibbana doesn't exist, and is empty like other dhammas.
It is also worth mentioning that the Mahayana understanding of "emptiness" and dependent origination is not the same as how these words are defined in the Pali Canon.
DooDoot wrote:"Empty" is wrongly used above and is the ultimate fatal failure of Nagarguna & heresy of Madhyamaka. The word 'empty" is not synonymous with "dependently originated". Buddha-Dhamma is as follows:Similarly, the third noble truth is the truth of cessation. But inher-
ently existent things cannot cease. Empty ones can.
A. All things are empty
B. But not all things (for example Nibbana) are dependently originated.
C. Therefore, emptiness does not equal dependent origination.
D. Dependent origination is empty
E. But emptiness is not dependently originated.
F. Therefore, emptiness does not equal dependent origination.
If this entire mass of suffering completely ceases, this complete cessation must be an inherently existent thing. If this complete cessation was not an inherently existent thing, it would cease to completely cease and there would be arising again.By reason of the cessation of one factor in the twelvefold chain, another successor factor fails to arise. Thus does this entire mass of suffering completely cease.
-MKK 26.12 ibid
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.
"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
DooDoot's logic in that quote is faulty and at variance with the classical position. He says, "If this complete cessation was not an inherently existent thing, it would cease to completely cease and there would be arising again." This is introducing a non-Theravadin notion, namely the "cessation of cessation," which is often paired with an "arising of arising." Theravadin Abhidhamma does not contain these teachings, AFAIK, them being the products of foreign Abhidharmas from different schools.
Via his logic as demonstrated in that quotation, Nibbana-with-No-Remainder would be impossible, as "there would be arising again." That is not the classical position, suffice to say.
Via his logic as demonstrated in that quotation, Nibbana-with-No-Remainder would be impossible, as "there would be arising again." That is not the classical position, suffice to say.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
No , nibbana is the ending of the five aggregates which is suffering . When five aggregates never arise again , suffering doesnt arise .
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Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
you are reducing it to annihilation
however Buddha was careful to not imply this
Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
You are missing context. He was careful not to imply this to Vacchagotta, arguably. You objecting to "aggregates never arise again" is not "Classical Theravada."
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
I’m objecting to saying Nirvana is not permanent
with the implication that would suggest
Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
How is that "annihilation"?
When there is no 'fresh' consciousness arises, then there is no arising of mentality-materiality. Things don't arise due to absence of suitable conditions.When this exists, that comes to be. With the arising (uppada) of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be. With the cessation (nirodha) of this, that ceases.
— Samyutta Nikaya 12.61
There is nothing here to be destroyed or annihilated.
Hiriottappasampannā,
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.
https://suttacentral.net/ja6/en/chalmer ... ight=false
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.
https://suttacentral.net/ja6/en/chalmer ... ight=false
Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
First, the Pāli word is Nibbāna. Theravada tradition don't take Sanskrit words.cappuccino wrote: ↑Fri Jan 21, 2022 3:54 pmI’m objecting to saying Nirvana is not permanent
with the implication that would suggest
Second, Nibbāna is necessarily to be permanent (technically) and infallible. If it is not, then people might as well say "Arahants, having attained Nibbāna, are subject to degeneration too, since that state of Nibbāna isn't permanent."
The "permanence" of Nibbāna should be understood as "Asankhata" or "Unconditioned".
Hiriottappasampannā,
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.
https://suttacentral.net/ja6/en/chalmer ... ight=false
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.
https://suttacentral.net/ja6/en/chalmer ... ight=false
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Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
And now you are saying Paṭiccasamuppāda is belongs to advaita?
Hiriottappasampannā,
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.
https://suttacentral.net/ja6/en/chalmer ... ight=false
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.
https://suttacentral.net/ja6/en/chalmer ... ight=false
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Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
Re: From the classical position only, in which nibbana is not self nor consciousness, why isn't nibbana self?
Okay, since you reject Abhidhamma Pitaka and Atthakatha. I don't bring them out.cappuccino wrote: ↑Fri Jan 21, 2022 5:04 pmI’m saying your understanding is flawed
whether or not you care to correct it
So, I give you a Sutta reference, then you said it is wrong.
You're sus.
Hiriottappasampannā,
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.
https://suttacentral.net/ja6/en/chalmer ... ight=false
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.
https://suttacentral.net/ja6/en/chalmer ... ight=false