Again, you've raised very good points, and I hope to do them justice. Please bear with my long-winded analysis.
The formula socati, kilamati, paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati, sammohaṃ āpajjati describes the actions that result from cetasika feeling, but not the feeling itself.
That’s correct, which was why I was careful to say “This very same formula appears in SN 36.6 and is identified with
cetasika feeling ” instead of “This very same formula appears in SN 36.6 and is identified as
cetasika feeling ”. But this pericope, whether used in SN 36.6 or MN 148 or the many other places where it occurs, is easily understood to be talking about the feeling of grief in its various manifestations. At least, even the Commentary understands it as a list of manifestations, so that socati
is explained in mental terms –
Socatīti citte uppannabalavasokena socati
while kilamati is explained in terms of kāya -
Kilamatīti kāye uppannadukkhena kilamati
The meaning here is quite clear - mental pain also should not produce sorrow, grief and lament, but should be dealt with patience.
That is true. But what do you think about how SN 36.6 organise feelings into these categories -
for pleasure (sukha
), pain (dukha
) and neutral (adukkhamasukha
for joy (somanassa
), grief (domanassa
) and equanimity (upekhā
Besides the SN 36.6 categorisation, you’ve also identified the mano-samphassa
category. I would suggest that the mano-samphassaja
feeling is cetasika
feeling. This would tie its foil kāyasamphassaja
feeling with kāyika
“Mental pain”, as we see from MN 148, is described in terms of both dukha
, and domanassa
Dependent on the mind & states there arises consciousness at the mind. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as a requisite condition, there arises what is felt either as pleasure, pain, or neither pleasure nor pain. ...(If, when) touched by a feeling of pain, one does not sorrow, grieve, or lament, beat one's breast or become distraught, then one's latent tendency to aversion does not underlie.
According to DN 22, mano-samphassaja
feeling is domanassa
, thereby making it coincide with cetasika
feeling. Yet, MN 148 provides that the mind as a sense base also facilitates contact which is the cause of pain (dukha
), which according to SN 36.6 is kāyika
(As a sidenote, I’m puzzled by the absence of neutral kāyika feelings in the 5-fold analysis of feelings as indriya
My take-away from how these suttas are using kāya
in this bifurcation between kāyika/ kāyasamphassa
versus cetasika/ mano-samphassaja
is that kāya
is probably referring to the kāya
(collection) of the 6 āyatanā
. This seems to be the only way to account for sukha
feelings being felt at the mind, without their usual anusaya
intruding and giving rise to lust, grief or ignorance.
However, I do note one very unusual sutta, Pātāla Sutta, SN 36.4. Instead of kāyika
(bodily), it uses sārīrikāya
(BB translates this also a “bodily”), to describe bodily feelings. Interestingly, its Chinese parallel simply uses 身(body), without the technical 舍利 that would have stood for sārīra
. We do not see this sārīrikāya
occurring in the context of feelings anywhere else, except MN 36, where the term is used by Saccaka. However, in the Buddha’s reply to him, the Buddha did not employ the kāyika
terminology but simply described these 2 categories in non-technical terms –
Kathañca, aggivessana, abhāvitakāyo ca hoti abhāvitacitto ca? Idha, aggivessana, assutavato puthujjanassa uppajjati sukhā vedanā. So sukhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno sukhasārāgī ca hoti sukhasārāgitañca āpajjati. Tassa sā sukhā vedanā nirujjhati. Sukhāya vedanāya nirodhā uppajjati dukkhā vedanā. So dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati. Tassa kho esā, aggivessana, uppannāpi sukhā vedanā cittaṃ pariyādāya tiṭṭhati abhāvitattā kāyassa, uppannāpi dukkhā vedanā cittaṃ pariyādāya tiṭṭhati abhāvitattā cittassa. Yassa kassaci, aggivessana, evaṃ ubhatopakkhaṃ uppannāpi sukhā vedanā cittaṃ pariyādāya tiṭṭhati abhāvitattā kāyassa, uppannāpi dukkhā vedanā cittaṃ pariyādāya tiṭṭhati abhāvitattā cittassa, evaṃ kho, aggivessana, abhāvitakāyo ca hoti abhāvitacitto ca.
How, Aggivessana, is one undeveloped in body and undeveloped in mind? Here, Aggivessana, pleasant feeling arises in an untaught ordinary person. Touched by that pleasant feeling, he lusts after pleasure and continues to lust after pleasure. That pleasant feeling of his ceases. With the cessation of the pleasant feeling, painful feeling arises. Touched by that painful feeling, he sorrows, grieves, and laments, he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught. When that pleasant feeling has arisen in him, it invades his mind and remains because body is not developed. And when that painful feeling has arisen in him, it invades his mind and remains because mind is not developed. Anyone in whom, in this double manner, arisen pleasant feeling invades his mind and remains because body is not developed, and arisen painful feeling invades his mind and remains because mind is not developed, is thus undeveloped in body and undeveloped in mind.
Notice this “because body is not developed”. In MN 152, the road towards equanimity in the face of contact which is pleasant, painful or neutral is part of the noble disciple’s development of the indriya
. Might the kāya
in MN 36 refer to MN 152’s body of all 6 indriya
The concept of a sārīrikāya
is put into the mouth of a Jain. The Buddha, in MN 36, does not take up that term, but uses the more familiar SN 36.6 method of categorising feelings into hedonic tone versus emotional tone. Could the Pali version of SN 36.4 therefore be the outcome of an accidental use of a Jain term, since the Chinese version shows no such intrusion?