SN 12.2, which is the key explanation of Dependent Origination, describes the 2nd condition as follows:
In certain suttas about kamma, such as AN 4.171, SN 12.25 & MN 57, the terms kāyasaṅkhāraṃ, vacisaṅkhāraṃ & manosaṅkhāraṃ are found, as follows:And what are saṅkhārā [plural]?
Katame ca, bhikkhave, saṅkhārā?
There are three kinds of saṅkhārā [plural].
Tayome, bhikkhave, saṅkhārā—
Body saṅkhāro [singular], speech saṅkhāro [singular] and mind saṅkhāro [singular].
kāyasaṅkhāro, vacīsaṅkhāro, cittasaṅkhāro.
Above, I have assumed (guessed) kāyasaṅkhāro in SN 12.2 is singular in the 'nominative case' and kāyasaṅkhāraṃ in AN 4.171 is singular in the 'accusative case'.By oneself one instigates the choice that gives rise to bodily action [singular], conditioned by which that pleasure and pain arise in oneself.
Sāmaṃ vā taṃ, bhikkhave, kāyasaṅkhāraṃ abhisaṅkharoti, yaṃpaccayāssa taṃ uppajjati ajjhattaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ.
Now, there are lofty or supramundane suttas about Dependent Origination, such as SN 12.12 & SN 12.17, which say suffering is not "self-made" (which I interpret to mean suffering is made by the element of ignorance rather than by a "self"). I base this categorization of "supramundane" (vs "mundane") on the two sorts of right view mentioned in MN 117 (which says "kamma" is "mundane").
OK. My questions and topic for discussion.
Q1: If kāyasaṅkhāraṃ in AN 4.171, SN 12.25 & MN 57 is singular in the 'accusative case'; does this mean these suttas are not "supramundane", given the accusative case assumes conventional self-agency?
Q2: Otherwise, is kāyasaṅkhāraṃ in the 'accusative case' explaining the attachment/self-view of the 9th condition has already arisen?