🟩 Mind doesn't obsess the mind (Weeks of November 14 and 21, 2021)

[pulga]

But certainly there seems to be a 'background', at least for some of us, deluded as we may be. Even philosophical treatises have been mentioned in this thread that speak about it. So, what are we to do about it, should we address it?

There is the Pali word āpātha (range, sphere, horizon (Ven. Ñanamoli's rendering of the word.) Wouldn't this imply a background from which the bahiddhāyatanā enter into the range of the ajjhattikāyatanā?

Ajjhattikañceva, āvuso, cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti, bāhirā ca rūpā na āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, no ca tajjo samannāhāro hoti, neva tāva tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti. Ajjhattikañceva, āvuso, cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti bāhirā ca rūpā āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, no ca tajjo samannāhāro hoti, neva tāva tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti. Yato ca kho, āvuso, ajjhattikañceva cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti, bāhirā ca rūpā āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti. Evaṃ tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti.
Yaṃ tathābhūtassa rūpaṃ taṃ rūpupādānakkhandhe saṅgahaṃ gacchati, yā tathābhūtassa vedanā sā vedanupādānakkhandhe saṅgahaṃ gacchati, yā tathābhūtassa saññā sā saññupādānakkhandhe saṅgahaṃ gacchati, ye tathābhūtassa saṅkhārā te saṅkhārupādānakkhandhe saṅgahaṃ gacchanti, yaṃ tathābhūtassa viññāṇaṃ taṃ viññāṇupādānakkhandhe saṅgahaṃ gacchati. ... sotaṃ...ghānaṃ...jivhā...kāyo...mano...
So evaṃ pajānāti: ‘evañhi kira imesaṃ pañcannaṃ upādānakkhandhānaṃ saṅgaho sannipāto samavāyo hoti. Vuttaṃ kho panetaṃ bhagavatā: “yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati so dhammaṃ passati; yo dhammaṃ passati so paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passatī”ti. Paṭiccasamuppannā kho panime yadidaṃ pañcupādānakkhandhā. Yo imesu pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu chando ālayo anunayo ajjhosānaṃ so dukkhasamudayo. Yo imesu pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu chandarāgavinayo chandarāgappahānaṃ, so dukkhanirodho’ti. Ettāvatāpi kho, āvuso, bhikkhuno bahukataṃ hoti. MN i 190

“If, friends, internally the eye is intact but no external forms come into the horizon, and there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and external forms come into the horizon, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and external forms come into the horizon and there is the corresponding engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness....ear...nose...tongue...body...mind...
“The material form in what has thus come to be is included in the material form aggregate affected by clinging. The feeling in what has thus come to be is included in the feeling aggregate affected by clinging. The perception in what has thus come to be is included in the perception aggregate affected by clinging. The determinations in what has thus come to be are included in the determinations aggregate affected by clinging. The consciousness in what has thus come to be is included in the consciousness aggregate affected by clinging. He understands thus: ‘This, indeed, is how there comes to be the inclusion, gathering, and amassing of things into these five aggregates affected by clinging. Now this has been said by the Blessed One: “One who sees dependent origination sees the Dhamma; one who sees the Dhamma sees dependent origination.” And these five aggregates affected by clinging are dependently arisen. The desire, indulgence, inclination, and holding based on these five aggregates affected by clinging is the origin of suffering. The removal of desire and lust, the abandonment of desire and lust for these five aggregates affected by clinging is the cessation of suffering.’ At that point too, friends, much has been done by that bhikkhu.

It shows up in a few other suttas as well: MN i 118, AN iv 404, and SN iv 159.

[mikenz66]

...
I was implying for someone who believes in "background" it must be like the influence of the lingering scent?
The hard work involved in getting rid of the scent? storage in a chest permeated with scent?
is likely the hard work involved in getting rid of the deeper idea "I am".
With love

I would note that Bhikkhu Sujato's translation is a little ambiguous, unless read really carefully.
Bhikkhu Bodhi has:

Even though that cloth would become pure and clean, it would still retain a residual smell of cleaning salt, lye, or cowdung that had not yet vanished. The laundryman would then give it back to the owners. The owners would put it in a sweet-scented casket, and the residual smell of cleaning salt, lye, or cowdung that had not yet vanished would vanish.

The sweet-scented casket is "contemplating rise and fall in the five aggregates" and the residual smell is "I am".


Mike

[ssasny]

Pulga posted:


There is the Pali word āpātha (range, sphere, horizon (Ven. Ñanamoli's rendering of the word.) Wouldn't this imply a background from which the bahiddhāyatanā enter into the range of the ajjhattikāyatanā?

Ajjhattikañceva, āvuso, cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti, bāhirā ca rūpā na āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, no ca tajjo samannāhāro hoti, neva tāva tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti. Ajjhattikañceva, āvuso, cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti bāhirā ca rūpā āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, no ca tajjo samannāhāro hoti, neva tāva tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti. Yato ca kho, āvuso, ajjhattikañceva cakkhuṃ aparibhinnaṃ hoti, bāhirā ca rūpā āpāthaṃ āgacchanti, tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti. Evaṃ tajjassa viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti.
MN i 190

“If, friends, internally the eye is intact but no external forms come into the horizon, and there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. If internally the eye is intact and external forms come into the horizon, but there is no corresponding engagement, then there is no manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness. But when internally the eye is intact and external forms come into the horizon and there is the corresponding engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness....ear...nose...tongue...body...mind..."



Thanks, Pulga, for this quotation from Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta, MN 28. I would take 'āpāthaṃ āgacchanti' together as 'come into range'.
I think this portion of the sutta is describing how visual objects, etc. register in consciousness. I've had experiences, and I'm sure I'm not alone, where visual or say, audible objects have been available but have not immediately clicked into consciousness. They've been there 'in plain sight' but don't register immediately. And once they do it seems I can recall a type of knowing of them prior to the 'samannāhāro' the paying of attention to, or the 'viññāṇabhāgassa pātubhāvo', the 'manifestation of the corresponding class of consciousness'. (the registration)
(I don't mean to imply this is any kind of special power, rather a very mundane experience.)

So it seems this background, or horizon, 'out of range' possible awareness is there. Or if awareness of it is not always possible, its existence is clearly there. Objects that are in a sense present for a person move into range. -Example: I walk into a quiet room, at first I hear nothing. After a few moments the sound of air ducts blowing becomes very noticeable. I can't 'unhear' it, even when the room's overall sound level increases.
What do we make of it? How is it instructive? How is this type of viññana related to 'citta'?

I have to say that I don't find this 'background' having anything to do with the higher fetter of conceit, asmi māna, except for perhaps that the five aggregates are clung to by all save the arahant. So all consciousness (not just 'background') except the arahant's can be said to be tainted with this conceit.

P.S. The philosophical treatise is mentioned by Pulga on page 4 of this thread, Aaron Gurwitsch's The Field of Consciousness,
and perhaps Ven Ñaṇavira's book.

[pulga]

I have to say that I don't find this 'background' having anything to do with the higher fetter of conceit, asmi māna, except for perhaps that the five aggregates are clung to by all save the arahant. So all consciousness (not just 'background') except the arahant's can be said to be tainted this conceit.

The background is extra-temporal, i.e. experienced as eternal and unchanging. In one of his footnotes to Fundamental Structure II Ven. Ñanavira writes:

Now we see that three levels of the hierarchy are involved: on top, at the most general level of the three, we have a thing enduring eternally unchanged; below this, we have a thing changing at regular intervals of one unit of duration, one moment; and below this again, in each of these regular intervals, in each of these moments, we have an infinite series of moments of lesser order accelerating and coming to an end. We have only to take into account an eternal thing of still higher order of generality to see that our former eternal thing will now be changing at regular intervals, that the thing formerly changing at regular intervals will be accelerating its changes (and the series of changes repeatedly coming to an end at regular intervals), and that the formerly accelerating series will be a doubly accelerating series of series. There is no difficulty in extending the scheme infinitely in both directions of the hierarchy; and when we have done so we see that there is no place for anything absolutely enduring for ever, and that there is no place for anything absolutely without duration.

Note where I've underlined. The background is always limited. On a higher level of generality it can always be expanded, like the open ends of a horizon.

Ven Bodhesako goes into this in detail in Chapter 3 of his essay Change. I highly recommend a careful reading of the chapter. What I find fascinating is the idea that from the perspective of the foreground the background is eternal, yet the background exists only in relation to the foreground. We perceive change (impermanence) from the perspective of the background and eternity from the perspective of the foreground. But consider what Ven. Bodhesako has to say about pleasure, i.e. its being extra-temporal in relation to the background.

Sabbe sankhārā aniccā; Sabbe sankhārā dukkhā; Sabbe dhammā anattā. ('All determinations are impermanent; All determinations are unpleasurable (suffering); All things are not-self.') Attā, 'self', is fundamentally a notion of mastery over things (cf. Majjhima iv,5 <M.i,231-2> & Khandha Samy. vi,7 <S.iii,66>[7]). But this notion is entertained only if it is pleasurable,[c] and it is only pleasurable provided the mastery is assumed to be permanent; for a mastery—which is essentially a kind of absolute timelessness, an unmoved moving of things—that is undermined by impermanence is no mastery at all, but a mockery. Thus the regarding of a thing, a dhamma, as attā or 'self' can survive for only so long as the notion gives pleasure, and it only gives pleasure for so long as that dhamma can be considered as permanent (for the regarding of a thing as 'self' endows it with the illusion of a kind of super-stability in time). In itself, as a dhamma regarded as attā, its impermanence is not manifest (for it is pleasant to consider it as permanent); but when it is seen to be dependent upon other dhammā not considered to be permanent, its impermanence does then become manifest. To see impermanence in what is regarded as attā, one must emerge from the confines of the individual dhamma itself and see that it depends on what is impermanent. Thus sabbe sankhārā (not dhammā) aniccā is said, meaning 'All things that things (dhammā) depend on are impermanent'. A given dhamma, as a dhamma regarded as attā, is, on account of being so regarded, considered to be pleasant; but when it is seen to be dependent upon some other dhamma that, not being regarded as attā, is manifestly unpleasurable (owing to the invariable false perception of permanence, of super-stability, in one not free from asmimāna), then its own unpleasurableness becomes manifest. Thus sabbe sankhārā (not dhammā) dukkhā is said. When this is seen—i.e. when perception of permanence and pleasure is understood to be false --, the notion 'This dhamma is my attā' comes to an end, and is replaced by sabbe dhammā anattā. Note that it is the sotāpanna who, knowing and seeing that his perception of permanence and pleasure is false, is free from this notion of 'self', though not from the more subtle conceit '(I) am' (asmimāna);[d] but it is only the arahat who is entirely free from the (false) perception of permanence and pleasure, and 'for him' perception of impermanence is no longer unpleasurable. ~ Ven. Ñanavira, SN Dhamma (underlining added)

[mikenz66]

Note where I've underlined. The background is always limited. On a higher level of generality it can always be expanded, like the open ends of a horizon.

Trying to decode the quote into plain speech, is it simply saying that some phenomena are perceived to be constant relative to those that are changing more rapidly?

I have to say that I don't find this 'background' having anything to do with the higher fetter of conceit, asmi māna, except for perhaps that the five aggregates are clung to by all save the arahant. So all consciousness (not just 'background') except the arahant's can be said to be tainted with this conceit.

You may be right. I was trying to make sense of what I've heard from various teachers (and famously some of the Thai Forest teachers) imply that this 'background awareness) is something important (eternal citta, etc). And sometimes that it is outside of the aggregates (or even nibbana). I'm rather suspicious of any such idea.


Mike

[pulga]

Trying to decode the quote into plain speech, is it simply saying that some phenomena are perceived to be constant relative to those that are changing more rapidly?

He is saying that aniccatā is a structural matter, not so much to be seen (in the literal sense) but to be understood (paññāyati). Saṅkhārā are eternal, but only so long as they last. As Ven. Bodhesaka puts it:

To be extra-temporal, then, is a quality which inheres in a thing (by virtue of endowment) now. It is eternal at this minute. In other words, a thing can be eternal, but only until it comes to an end.

no c’assa no ca me siyā
na bhavissati na ca me bhavissati SN 22.55.3

If it were not, it would not be mine.
It shall not be, it shall not be mine.

In other words, the sort of empirical, manifest impermanence that we all see isn't what the Buddha is referring to.

"When one understands how form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness (and how the eye, etc.) are impermanent, one therein possesses right view." SN 22:51; 35:155 (Ven. Ñanamoli's translation)

Avijjā is dependent on something we take to be permanent (saṅkhārā ). A “constant” is dependent upon a “constant”. We don't "see" saṅkhārā rise and fall, but we can "understand" the inevitability of such. We can do away with avijjā and the whole contextual hierarchy that gives meaning to experience remains intact.

Whether Perfect Ones appear or not, there remains this element, this structure of things (phenomena), this certainty in things: All formations are impermanent; all formations are suffering; all things are not-self. AN 3:134 (Ven. Ñanamoli's translation)

[mikenz66]

Hmm, OK. I'm still not sure if it's saying any more than what I said, but since I have little understanding of Nanavira's approach I probably should bow out.


Mike

[ssasny]

reviewing Samanera Bodhesako's essay Change this afternoon, as recommended by Pulga, here are some excerpts:

p. 70
"Things exist not in isolation but against a background of what they are not.
"And each background is in turn subsidary to and defined by a yet more general level of experience. When change occurs it does so on a particular level of generality, and against a background of non-change at the next higher level.

p. 71
Since on each higher level of generality there is no change at all we can say that from a point of view within any one level the next higher level is eternal. Or, better, extra-temporal. Just as change is perceptible only against a background of non-change, so too impermanence (temporality) is perceptible only against a background of extra-temporality...

[mjaviem]

...

p. 70
"Things exist not in isolation but against a background of what they are not...

That's simply sañña. Perception. You discriminate things. You regard them as being something differentiated. (<-- Plus ping to @Coëmgeru. This also ceases as explained by D.O.)

[Ceisiwr]

p. 71
Since on each higher level of generality there is no change at all we can say that from a point of view within any one level the next higher level is eternal. Or, better, extra-temporal. Just as change is perceptible only against a background of non-change, so too impermanence (temporality) is perceptible only against a background of extra-temporality...

And the Buddha taught this?

[Coëmgenu]

...

p. 70
"Things exist not in isolation but against a background of what they are not...

That's simply sañña. Perception. You discriminate things. You regard them as being something differentiated. (<-- Plus ping to @Coëmgeru. This also ceases as explained by D.O.)

I find it interesting that you get the umlaut but not the N.


I'll have to give it a read, but I'm quite busy right now.

[pulga]

Some passages from Ven. Ñanavira's correspondence that might prove helpful:

Your question about satisampajañña. Observing the particular 'doing' or 'feeling' is reflexive experience. The 'doing' or 'feeling' itself (whether it is observed or not) is immediate experience. But since one obviously cannot observe a 'doing' or a 'feeling' unless that 'doing' or 'feeling' is at the same time present, there is no reflexive experience (at least in the strict sense used here) that does not contain or involve immediate experience. Reflexive experience is a complex structure of which immediate experience is a less complex part (it is possible that I use the term 'reflexive consciousness' a little ambiguously—i.e. either to denote reflexive experience as a whole or to distinguish the purely reflexive part of reflexive experience from the immediate part).
Yes: observing the 'general nature' of an experience is reflexion (though there are also other kinds of reflexion). No: in reflexively observing the 'general nature' of an experience you have not 'left out the immediate experience'; you have merely 'put the immediate experience in brackets'—that is to say, by an effort of will you have disregarded the individual peculiarities of the experience and paid attention to the general characteristics (just as you might disregard a witness' stammer when he is giving evidence and pay attention to the words he is uttering). You simply consider the immediate experience as 'an example of experience in general'; but this does not in any way abolish the immediate experience (any more than your disregarding the stammer of the witness stops his stammering). ~ [L. 50 | 57] 19 May 1963

So long as we are awake, obviously enough, there is always some degree of awareness present, since new problems, large or small, are always presenting themselves, and we are obliged to consider them (even if only for a moment or two) in order to deal with them. (When we dream, on the other hand, awareness is in abeyance; and it is this very fact that we are unable to look at our dream problems objectively that distinguishes dreams from waking experience. When we are awake we are always aware 'I am awake', but when we dream we are not aware 'I am dreaming'; and, in fact, when we have a nightmare and struggle to wake up, all we are doing is trying to remember [or become aware] that we are dreaming, and if we succeed we wake up.) But though, unlike in sleep, there is always some degree of awareness present in our waking life, it is normally only enough to enable us to deal with unexpected circumstances as they occur; for the rest we are absorbed in what we are doing—whether it is the daily task of earning a livelihood, or our personal affairs with our emotional attitudes towards other people (affection, dislike, fury, lust, boredom, and so on), it makes no difference. To maintain a detached attitude is difficult when there is much routine work to be done in a hurry, and it robs our personal relationships with others of all emotional satisfaction. We prefer to get through our work as quickly and with as little effort as possible, and then to wallow in our emotions like a buffalo in a mud-hole. Awareness of what we are doing, which is always an effort, we like to keep to the absolute minimum. But we cannot avoid awareness altogether, since, as I remarked earlier, it is necessary in order to deal with unexpected problems, however insignificant, as they arise.

But this awareness is practised merely for the purpose of overcoming the obstacles that lie in the path of our daily life—it is practised simply in order to get through the business of living as expeditiously and as efficiently as possible.

Awareness in the Buddha's Teaching, however, has a different purpose: it is practised for the purpose of attaining release from living. These two different purposes, while not directly opposed, do not in fact co-operate—they are, as it were, at right angles to each other[1]; and since the amount of awareness that can be practised at any one time is limited, there is competition between these purposes for whatever awareness is available. Thus it happens that in activities requiring much awareness simply for their successful performance (such as writing this letter) there is not much scope for the practice of awareness leading to release (though no doubt if I got into the unlikely habit of writing this same letter twice a day over a number of years I should be able to devote more of the latter to it). ~ [L. 2 | 2] 27 March 1962

[1]Cf. FS I §16:

The same structure, naturally, is repeated at each level of generality, as will be evident from the numbers in the figure at the end of §11. The whole (either at the immediate or at any reflexive level) forms a hierarchy infinite in both directions (thus disposing, incidentally, of the current assumptions of absolute smallness—the electron—in quantum physics, and absolute largeness—the universe—in astronomical physics). It will also be evident that successive orders of reflexion generate a hierarchy that is infinite, though in one direction only (perpendicular, as it were, to the doubly infinite particular-and-general hierarchy). Underlining added

In satisampajañña attention is directed to the background, the doing. But in doing so, the background becomes the foreground of a yet higher level within the hierarchy, i.e. the hierarchy of consciousness. This is the vertical point of view that needs to be developed that Ven. Ñanavira writes of and commends.

[pulga]

reviewing Samanera Bodhesako's essay Change this afternoon, as recommended ...

For me the heart of the essay is Chapter 3. I find his explanation of the recursive nature of craving, while not necessarily wrong, to be difficult to follow.

[ssasny]

...

p. 70
"Things exist not in isolation but against a background of what they are not...

That's simply sañña. Perception. You discriminate things. You regard them as being something differentiated. (<-- Plus ping to @Coëmgeru. This also ceases as explained by D.O.)

Certainly, for us, things are "simply" the five aggregates. It seems pretty easy to understand them incorrectly, though. If we all properly understood the 5A, being 'simple', we wouldn't need this forum.
FH Bradley certainly did not regard things as differentiated, for example. c.f. Appearance and Reality.

[Pulsar]

Pulga wrote

In satisampajañña attention is directed to the background, the doing. But in doing so, the background becomes the foreground of a yet higher level within the hierarchy, i.e. the hierarchy of consciousness. This is the vertical point of view that needs to be developed that Ven. Ñanavira writes of and commends.

Attention directed to the background?? Is this Nanavira's speculation? Ca you pl. quote a sutta that supports this? This is Sutta Study forum.
Nowhere in the suttas have I read instances where background becomes the foreground.
Can you help me locate a sutta? Neither do I find a

• hierarchy of consciousness.

in Buddha's teachings.
Is there a sutta that refers to this? Are these all fabricated by V. Nanvira, without a meditative background.
Intellectual speculation?
With love