Bhikkhu KL Dhammjoti - Sarvāstivāda AbhidharmaThe question of what actually constitutes the instrument through which we come to acquire knowledge of the external world is one of the important epistemological issues among the Abhidharma schools. As regards the problem: “What sees?”, the MVŚ70 informs us that in addition to the Vaibhāṣika’s own view, there are three others, which are all refuted:
There are some who hold that visual consciousness sees, like Venerable Dharmatrāta.
There are some who hold that the ‘understanding’ conjoined with visual consciousness sees, like Venerable Ghoṣaka.
There are some who hold that the complex (sāmagrī) [of citta-caitta]71 sees, like the Dārṣṭāntika …
Now, if visual consciousness sees, then consciousness should have the characteristic of seeing; since consciousness does not have this characteristic, the proposition is not acceptable. If the understanding conjoined with visual consciousness sees, the understanding conjoined with auditory consciousness should also hear sound; since understanding does not have this characteristic of hearing, the proposition is not acceptable. If it is the complex that sees visible forms, it follows that we should be able to see forms at all times, since a complex always exists; hence this proposition too is unacceptable.
This controversy, in a more elaborated form, is also found in the PVV (= Pañcavastukavibhāṣā) 72 by a certain Dharmatrāta, ca. 4th century C.E. Here, all four divergent views (i.e., including the Vaibhāṣika view) are also enumerated and then refuted, by a certain disputant. Another work of this Dharmatrāta, the *Abhidharmahṛdayavyākhyā (T no. 1552) contains an even more elaborate account of the controversy, the first part of which is very similar to that in the PVV. Vasubandhu (known to have substantially based his AKB on this work and Dharmaśrī’s *Abhidharma‑hṛdaya, of which this work is a commentary/revision), the author of the ADV as well as Saṃghabhadra seem most likely to have consulted this text in their accounts on this controversy. The ADV differs from the Pañcavastuka mainly with regard to the notion of “the complex which is given as that of the eye, etc.” (cakṣurādisāmagrī paśyati).73
10.5.2. The “eye sees” view of the Vaibhāṣika
The various sources74 all explain that the Vaibhāṣika considers the eye as a view in the sense of seeing/perceiving, ālocanārthena. This is unlike the other views subsumed under prajñā which are views on account of their judgmental nature.75 According to the Vaibhāṣika, the mere-seeing by the eye is, strictly speaking, non-epistemic, since the proper operation of prajñā is not involved — which is to say, in this instantaneous process there is no element of ‘understanding’, properly speaking. This is to be contrasted with the function of cognizing by the simultaneously arising visual consciousness and the discriminative function of the mental cognition (mano-vijñāna) induced in the subsequent moment. In the context of explaining why the five sense faculties are called thus — that is, in each case an “indriya” which is said to denote ādhipatya, “supremacy/dominance” — Vasubandhu in the AKB differentiates the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika views: According to the Vaibhāṣika, the eye is an indriya because it exercises dominance in the seeing of visual forms, whereas for the Sautrāntika, the dominance is with regard to the apperception of its specific object (svārthopalabdhi).76 As far as the statement in the Sautrāntika proposition — “dominance in the perceiving of its specific object” — is concerned, the author of the ADV may be justified in remarking that it is not any different from the Vaibhāṣika view.77 However, the different senses ascribed to the statement underscore their fundamentally different views as regards the perceptual process. For the Sautrāntika, it means that the dominance is with regard to consciousness (vijñāne tu tayor ādhipatyam), for the perceiving — as far as one can speak of a “perceiving agent” in a relative sense — is performed by visual consciousness, not by the visual faculty. There is in fact no “seeing of a visual form” or “hearing of a sound” apart from consciousness:78 There can be no seeing of form apart from grasping (grahaṇa), and grasping is none other than consciousness.79
In other words, in-as-much as the eye has dominance in the arising of visual consciousness, one could speak of its “seeing of a visual form”. But this should really mean the “perceiving of a visual form by consciousness”. And as the Dīpa-kāra (= author of the ADV) notes elsewhere, the mere seeing (ālocana) by the eye is vastly different from the apperceiving (upalabdhi) by consciousness.80 In the Ny, Saṃghabhadra argues vehemently that it is absolutely necessary for the function of seeing visible forms to belong uniquely to the visual organ. It is in fact, for that matter, absolutely necessary that each dharma, in the complex process of dependent origination, is able to exercise its specific function. Here we can better appreciate why Saṃghabhadra insists at such great length that it is the eye that sees. This absolute necessity, of course, stems from the central Vaibhāṣika conception that in the persistence of all dharma‑s in the three periods of time, each and every dharma is a distinct dharma by virtue of its specific nature and function. Thus the MVŚ says:
Question: How are the 12 āyatana‑s to be established ?
Answer: On the basis of the difference as regards intrinsic nature and activity. Although the 12 āyatana‑s all pertain to the one personal existence,
their 12 species of intrinsic natures and activities are different; they are not mutually commingled.81
Now, if the eye does not have a specific function — the only one of seeing visible forms — as mentioned in the sūtra (at least so from the Vaibhāṣika viewpoint) and confirmed in experience of the world — the eye as an āyatana or a unique rūpa dharma will fail to be established.
The Theravādin position is as follows:
Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha(2) Sensitive material phenomena (pas±dar³pa) are five types of matter located in each of the five sense organs.4 The sensitivity is to be distinguished from the gross sense organ which functions as its support. What is conventionally called the eye is spoken of in the Abhidhamma as the composite eye (sasambh±ra-cakkhu), a compound of various material phenomena. Among these is eye-sensitivity (cakkhu-pas±da), the sensitive substance in the retina that registers light and colour and serves as a physical base and door for eye-consciousness. Ear-sensitivity (sota-pas±da) is to be found inside the ear-hole, “in the place shaped like a finger-stall and surrounded by fine brown hairs”; it is the sensitive substance that registers sounds and serves as a physical base and door for ear-consciousness. Nose-sensitivity (gh±na-pas±da) is to be found inside the nasal orifice, as the substance that registers smells. Tongue-sensitivity (jivh±-pas±da) is to be found diffused over the tongue, serving to register tastes. And body sensitivity (k±ya-pas±da) extends all over the organic body “like a liquid that soaks a layer of cotton,” and serves to register tactile sensations. The eye’s characteristic is sensitivity of the primary elements that is ready for the impact of visible data; or its characteristic is sensitivity of the primary elements springing from a desire to see. Its function is to pick up a visible datum as object. It is manifested as the foundation of eye-consciousness. Its proximate cause is the primary elements born of kamma springing from a desire to see. Each of the other sensitive material phenomena—the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the body—should be similarly understood, with appropriate substitutions.
What "sees" in Buddhadhamma? The eye, eye-consciousness, some other dhamma or is seeing what occurs when various dhammas work together?