What sees?

Textual analysis and comparative discussion on early Buddhist sects and scriptures.
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Ceisiwr
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What sees?

Post by Ceisiwr »

What exactly "sees" was one of the hotly debated topics among the early schools. Below is a brief outline of the Sarvāstivādin and Sautrāntika positions.
The question of what actually constitutes the instrument through which we come to acquire knowledge of the external world is one of the important epistemological issues among the Abhidharma schools. As regards the problem: “What sees?”, the MVŚ70 informs us that in addition to the Vaibhāṣika’s own view, there are three others, which are all refuted:

There are some who hold that visual consciousness sees, like Venerable Dharmatrāta.

There are some who hold that the ‘understanding’ conjoined with visual consciousness sees, like Venerable Ghoṣaka.

There are some who hold that the complex (sāmagrī) [of citta-caitta]71 sees, like the Dārṣṭāntika …

Now, if visual consciousness sees, then consciousness should have the characteristic of seeing; since consciousness does not have this characteristic, the proposition is not acceptable. If the understanding conjoined with visual consciousness sees, the understanding conjoined with auditory consciousness should also hear sound; since understanding does not have this characteristic of hearing, the proposition is not acceptable. If it is the complex that sees visible forms, it follows that we should be able to see forms at all times, since a complex always exists; hence this proposition too is unacceptable.

This controversy, in a more elaborated form, is also found in the PVV (= Pañcavastukavibhāṣā) 72 by a certain Dharmatrāta, ca. 4th century C.E. Here, all four divergent views (i.e., including the Vaibhāṣika view) are also enumerated and then refuted, by a certain disputant. Another work of this Dharmatrāta, the *Abhidharmahṛdayavyākhyā (T no. 1552) contains an even more elaborate account of the controversy, the first part of which is very similar to that in the PVV. Vasubandhu (known to have substantially based his AKB on this work and Dharmaśrī’s *Abhidharma‑hṛdaya, of which this work is a commentary/revision), the author of the ADV as well as Saṃghabhadra seem most likely to have consulted this text in their accounts on this controversy. The ADV differs from the Pañcavastuka mainly with regard to the notion of “the complex which is given as that of the eye, etc.” (cakṣurādisāmagrī paśyati).73

10.5.2. The “eye sees” view of the Vaibhāṣika
The various sources74 all explain that the Vaibhāṣika considers the eye as a view in the sense of seeing/perceiving, ālocanārthena. This is unlike the other views subsumed under prajñā which are views on account of their judgmental nature.75 According to the Vaibhāṣika, the mere-seeing by the eye is, strictly speaking, non-epistemic, since the proper operation of prajñā is not involved — which is to say, in this instantaneous process there is no element of ‘understanding’, properly speaking. This is to be contrasted with the function of cognizing by the simultaneously arising visual consciousness and the discriminative function of the mental cognition (mano-vijñāna) induced in the subsequent moment. In the context of explaining why the five sense faculties are called thus — that is, in each case an “indriya” which is said to denote ādhipatya, “supremacy/dominance” — Vasubandhu in the AKB differentiates the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika views: According to the Vaibhāṣika, the eye is an indriya because it exercises dominance in the seeing of visual forms, whereas for the Sautrāntika, the dominance is with regard to the apperception of its specific object (svārthopalabdhi).76 As far as the statement in the Sautrāntika proposition — “dominance in the perceiving of its specific object” — is concerned, the author of the ADV may be justified in remarking that it is not any different from the Vaibhāṣika view.77 However, the different senses ascribed to the statement underscore their fundamentally different views as regards the perceptual process. For the Sautrāntika, it means that the dominance is with regard to consciousness (vijñāne tu tayor ādhipatyam), for the perceiving — as far as one can speak of a “perceiving agent” in a relative sense — is performed by visual consciousness, not by the visual faculty. There is in fact no “seeing of a visual form” or “hearing of a sound” apart from consciousness:78 There can be no seeing of form apart from grasping (grahaṇa), and grasping is none other than consciousness.79

In other words, in-as-much as the eye has dominance in the arising of visual consciousness, one could speak of its “seeing of a visual form”. But this should really mean the “perceiving of a visual form by consciousness”. And as the Dīpa-kāra (= author of the ADV) notes elsewhere, the mere seeing (ālocana) by the eye is vastly different from the apperceiving (upalabdhi) by consciousness.80 In the Ny, Saṃghabhadra argues vehemently that it is absolutely necessary for the function of seeing visible forms to belong uniquely to the visual organ. It is in fact, for that matter, absolutely necessary that each dharma, in the complex process of dependent origination, is able to exercise its specific function. Here we can better appreciate why Saṃghabhadra insists at such great length that it is the eye that sees. This absolute necessity, of course, stems from the central Vaibhāṣika conception that in the persistence of all dharma‑s in the three periods of time, each and every dharma is a distinct dharma by virtue of its specific nature and function. Thus the MVŚ says:

Question: How are the 12 āyatana‑s to be established ?

Answer: On the basis of the difference as regards intrinsic nature and activity. Although the 12 āyatana‑s all pertain to the one personal existence,
their 12 species of intrinsic natures and activities are different; they are not mutually commingled.81

Now, if the eye does not have a specific function — the only one of seeing visible forms — as mentioned in the sūtra (at least so from the Vaibhāṣika viewpoint) and confirmed in experience of the world — the eye as an āyatana or a unique rūpa dharma will fail to be established.
Bhikkhu KL Dhammjoti - Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma

The Theravādin position is as follows:
(2) Sensitive material phenomena (pas±dar³pa) are five types of matter located in each of the five sense organs.4 The sensitivity is to be distinguished from the gross sense organ which functions as its support. What is conventionally called the eye is spoken of in the Abhidhamma as the composite eye (sasambh±ra-cakkhu), a compound of various material phenomena. Among these is eye-sensitivity (cakkhu-pas±da), the sensitive substance in the retina that registers light and colour and serves as a physical base and door for eye-consciousness. Ear-sensitivity (sota-pas±da) is to be found inside the ear-hole, “in the place shaped like a finger-stall and surrounded by fine brown hairs”; it is the sensitive substance that registers sounds and serves as a physical base and door for ear-consciousness. Nose-sensitivity (gh±na-pas±da) is to be found inside the nasal orifice, as the substance that registers smells. Tongue-sensitivity (jivh±-pas±da) is to be found diffused over the tongue, serving to register tastes. And body sensitivity (k±ya-pas±da) extends all over the organic body “like a liquid that soaks a layer of cotton,” and serves to register tactile sensations. The eye’s characteristic is sensitivity of the primary elements that is ready for the impact of visible data; or its characteristic is sensitivity of the primary elements springing from a desire to see. Its function is to pick up a visible datum as object. It is manifested as the foundation of eye-consciousness. Its proximate cause is the primary elements born of kamma springing from a desire to see. Each of the other sensitive material phenomena—the ear, the nose, the tongue, and the body—should be similarly understood, with appropriate substitutions.
Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha

What "sees" in Buddhadhamma? The eye, eye-consciousness, some other dhamma or is seeing what occurs when various dhammas work together?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: What sees?

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Cakkhu vinnana, eye consciousness.
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Ceisiwr
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Re: What sees?

Post by Ceisiwr »

robertk wrote: Tue Jun 22, 2021 8:41 pm Cakkhu vinnana, eye consciousness.
I thought it was sensitive matter? Interesting that Theravāda seems to agree with the Sautrāntikas here. If it is then visual consciousness which sees, aren’t we then greeted with a representationalist theory of cognition? That when I see a chair I’m actually seeing a mental representation in the mind? The Sautrāntikas certainly held this view, albeit partly due to their extreme version of momentariness (physical dhammas last as long as mental ones). This representationalist theory certainly influenced Vasubandhu and Yogācāra, as shown by vijñapti-mātra (representation only).

I suppose it might not necessarily entail Representationalism. The Theravādin Abhidhamma and commentaries subscribe to a form of direct realism don’t they, a phenomenalist one of sorts? Personally I’ve always suspected that the Abhidhamma might be better read in terms of strict phenomenalism, which would entail Representationism.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: What sees?

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Ceisiwr wrote: Tue Jun 22, 2021 8:54 pm
robertk wrote: Tue Jun 22, 2021 8:41 pm Cakkhu vinnana, eye consciousness.
I thought it was sensitive matter? Interesting that Theravāda seems to agree with the Sautrāntikas here. If it is then visual consciousness which sees, aren’t we then greeted with a representationalist theory of cognition? That when I see a chair I’m actually seeing a mental representation in the mind? The Sautrāntikas certainly held this view, albeit partly due to their extreme version of momentariness (physical dhammas last as long as mental ones). This representationalist theory certainly influenced Vasubandhu and Yogācāra, as shown by vijñapti-mātra (representation only).

I suppose it might not necessarily entail Representationalism. The Theravādin Abhidhamma and commentaries subscribe to a form of direct realism don’t they, a phenomenalist one of sorts? Personally I’ve always suspected that the Abhidhamma might be better read in terms of strict phenomenalism, which would entail Representationism.
Cakkhu vinnana experiences color/visible object - not sure what you mean by Representationism,
The senstive matter , cakkhu pasada in the eye, which is conditioned to arise by kamma is a necessary condition (among others) for cakkhu vinnana to arise.
Rupa - such as cakkhu pasada- has no possibility of experiencing anything, ever.
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Re: What sees?

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robertk wrote: Wed Jun 23, 2021 4:21 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Tue Jun 22, 2021 8:54 pm
robertk wrote: Tue Jun 22, 2021 8:41 pm Cakkhu vinnana, eye consciousness.
I thought it was sensitive matter? Interesting that Theravāda seems to agree with the Sautrāntikas here. If it is then visual consciousness which sees, aren’t we then greeted with a representationalist theory of cognition? That when I see a chair I’m actually seeing a mental representation in the mind? The Sautrāntikas certainly held this view, albeit partly due to their extreme version of momentariness (physical dhammas last as long as mental ones). This representationalist theory certainly influenced Vasubandhu and Yogācāra, as shown by vijñapti-mātra (representation only).

I suppose it might not necessarily entail Representationalism. The Theravādin Abhidhamma and commentaries subscribe to a form of direct realism don’t they, a phenomenalist one of sorts? Personally I’ve always suspected that the Abhidhamma might be better read in terms of strict phenomenalism, which would entail Representationism.
Cakkhu vinnana experiences color/visible object - not sure what you mean by Representationism,
The senstive matter , cakkhu pasada in the eye, which is conditioned to arise by kamma is a necessary condition (among others) for cakkhu vinnana to arise.
Rupa - such as cakkhu pasada- has no possibility of experiencing anything, ever.
So is the idea that cakkhu-vinnana cognises ("sees") the "raw data" of the visual field, with sanna then identifying what is seen?
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Re: What sees?

Post by DooDoot »

the suttas say three things meet for contact. therefore it must be consciousness that sees
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Re: What sees?

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Not a valid question.

I don't say what sees, but rather seeing is dependent on the "eye".

What is the "eye"?
cornea, lens, retina, optic nerve, optic radiation, visual cortex and much much more.
It isn't just the eyeball!

There is no "eye" - "Eye" is without self/essence. You cannot point out and say that is the "eye".

And yet there is the experience of seeing.

What "sees" in Buddhadhamma? The eye, eye-consciousness, some other dhamma or is seeing what occurs when various dhammas work together?
The last option is correct.
"Lord, who makes contact?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "I don't say 'makes contact.' If I were to say 'makes contact,' then 'Who makes contact?' would be a valid question. But I don't say that. When I don't say that, the valid question is 'From what as a requisite condition comes contact?' And the valid answer is, 'From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling.'"

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html
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Re: What sees?

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pegembara wrote: Wed Jun 23, 2021 5:21 am Not a valid question.

I don't say what sees, but rather seeing is dependent on the "eye".

What is the "eye"?
cornea, lens, retina, optic nerve, optic radiation, visual cortex and much much more.
It isn't just the eyeball!

There is no "eye" - "Eye" is without self/essence. You cannot point out and say that is the "eye".

And yet there is the experience of seeing.

What "sees" in Buddhadhamma? The eye, eye-consciousness, some other dhamma or is seeing what occurs when various dhammas work together?
The last option is correct.
"Lord, who makes contact?"

"Not a valid question," the Blessed One said. "I don't say 'makes contact.' If I were to say 'makes contact,' then 'Who makes contact?' would be a valid question. But I don't say that. When I don't say that, the valid question is 'From what as a requisite condition comes contact?' And the valid answer is, 'From the six sense media as a requisite condition comes contact. From contact as a requisite condition comes feeling.'"

https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html
Considering this in the context of DO, does this mean that for seeing to cease, all the nidanas prior to contact would need to cease?
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Re: What sees?

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Spiny Norman wrote: Wed Jun 23, 2021 4:52 am
robertk wrote: Wed Jun 23, 2021 4:21 am
Cakkhu vinnana experiences color/visible object - not sure what you mean by Representationism,
The senstive matter , cakkhu pasada in the eye, which is conditioned to arise by kamma is a necessary condition (among others) for cakkhu vinnana to arise.
Rupa - such as cakkhu pasada- has no possibility of experiencing anything, ever.
So is the idea that cakkhu-vinnana cognises ("sees") the "raw data" of the visual field, with sanna then identifying what is seen?
Sanna arises in conjunction with vinnana but it merely marks the object - vinnana, citta, is the chief in experiencing the object. But without sanna there wouldn't be memory of what was perceived.
I think 'raw data' is a good term.
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Re: What sees?

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While we're discussing sense-consciousness, I'd like to understand why it's presented as being six-fold in the suttas, and whether this is done for a specific reason.
You could just make the general statement that sense-consciousness arises in dependence on sense-bases and sense-objects. Why is consciousness split up between the sense-bases in the suttas?
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Re: What sees?

Post by Coëmgenu »

Spiny Norman wrote: Wed Jun 23, 2021 11:43 amWhile we're discussing sense-consciousness, I'd like to understand why it's presented as being six-fold in the suttas, and whether this is done for a specific reason.
You could just make the general statement that sense-consciousness arises in dependence on sense-bases and sense-objects. Why is consciousness split up between the sense-bases in the suttas?
One answer is that "consciousness" actually includes both the body and mind as they are understood by the Westerner. The assumption of "consciousness" into "namarupa" by the Abhidharmikas is, IMO, a consequence of this. According to the ideology that assumes consciousness into namarupa, those two are two different modalities of the "same thing." One modality is necessarily dormant and the other modality inevitably leads to reactivity with the external world via contact, but they are "the same thing" according to many Buddhists. They are not necessarily "the same thing" in all kinds of Buddhism contemporary and historical. For instance, in the Pali suttas and Mahasamghika agamas, consciousness itself is excluded from "namas," but is included in it in the Sarvastivadin agamas. In the Pali suttas, consciousness is reliably excluded as a factor in namarupa, and yet namarupa is also used in them as a synonym for "the five aggregates."

The "rupa" aspect of "consiousness" corresponds to the organs that inform the consciousnesses that respond to rupa, namely those derived from the eye, ear, body, nose, and tongue, in the Abhidharmika understanding as best I understand it. The "nama" aspect of consciousness refers to the consciousness that is not derived from rupa, namely the manas, as well as the derived consciousnesses. So both "namarupa" and "vijnana," particularly when the vijnana is sixfold, both refer to a "bodymind." How does consciousness become sixfold before contact? This should be impossible according to causative and linear models of DO. AFAIK, in the Theravada tradition, this impossibility is stressed by "consciousness" being (re)interpreted as "rebirth-linking-consciousness," not a perceptual one. One answer: consciousness is not sixfold before contact. According to Ven Vasubandhu, consciousness in the DO formula refers to a twofold consciousness of mind and tactility that a being possesses while in the womb. It does not yet have the features of sixfold contact. Interesting business. I don't necessarily trust Ven Vasubandhu to always get things 100% correct vis-a-vis Sarvastivadin doctrine.

The sequence of DO in the Dharmaskandha, for instance, goes

ignorance --> sankharas
sankharas --> consciousness
consciousness --> namarupa
namarupa --> consciousness
namarupa --> sixfold sense bases
namarupa --> contact
sixfold sense bases --> contact
etc.

You'll notice that namarupa is duplicated in a way similar to in DN 15, the Mahānidānasutta. Namarupa serves as the condition for three things here, one, the scandalous "consciousness" which was allegedly a necessarily condition for it, and two, the sixfold sense media, and three, the subsequent contact, which the sixfold sense media serves as a co-cause for.

That doesn't answer your question about why it is sixfold. It is sixfold because there are six senses.

Whether or not the six constitute six distinct consciousnesses that cooperate or one consciousness in six modalities is another big fight in Buddhism.
Last edited by Coëmgenu on Wed Jun 23, 2021 1:34 pm, edited 4 times in total.
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Re: What sees?

Post by Coëmgenu »

Coëmgenu wrote: Wed Jun 23, 2021 12:37 pmAccording to Ven Vasubandhu, consciousness in the DO formula refers to a twofold consciousness of mind and tactility that a being possesses while in the womb. It does not yet have the features of sixfold contact.
One odd consequence of this is that "physical birth" now has to come with the first instance of sixfold sense media and contact with the external. "Jati" in the DO formula, for Ven Vasubandhu, always refers to "future birth," and not "current birth." The future birth, the "jati," in that system, will presumably be its own instance of first contact via sixfold sense media. I don't know if Ven Vasubandhu ever makes this explicit or if something he says complicates what I perceive to be this consequence of his interpretation.

Also, this:
Coëmgenu wrote: Wed Jun 23, 2021 12:37 pmThe sequence of DO in the Dharmaskandha, for instance, goes

ignorance --> sankharas
sankharas --> consciousness
consciousness --> namarupa
namarupa --> consciousness
namarupa --> sixfold sense bases
namarupa --> contact
sixfold sense bases --> contact
etc.
...is based on pages 129-120 of Derpendent Origination: Its Elaboration in Early Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Texts by Collett Cox available on "A Handful of Leaves."
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: What sees?

Post by pegembara »

Spiny Norman wrote: Wed Jun 23, 2021 11:43 am While we're discussing sense-consciousness, I'd like to understand why it's presented as being six-fold in the suttas, and whether this is done for a specific reason.
You could just make the general statement that sense-consciousness arises in dependence on sense-bases and sense-objects. Why is consciousness split up between the sense-bases in the suttas?
That's the ingenuity of the Buddha.
The reason is to deconstruct the sense experience into its parts or the self into the five aggregates.

Eg. we assume we know what a "computer" is but, in reality, the computer is merely a convention. There is no computer without the CPU, storage device, circuitry, etc.

We assume that "I" see, hear, smell, taste, touch, think, feel, etc. That self is a fabrication. Without the experience, where is the self?
The "body" is also a construct. Hence the teaching like this analysis of the body-

Senses
"If anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable. The arising & falling away of the eye are discerned. And when its arising & falling away are discerned, it would follow that 'My self arises & falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be tenable if anyone were to say, 'The eye is the self.' So the eye is not-self. If anyone were to say, 'Forms are the self,' that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self and forms are not-self. If anyone were to say, 'Consciousness at the eye is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self, forms are not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self. If anyone were to say, 'Contact at the eye is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self, forms are not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self, contact at the eye is not-self. If anyone were to say, 'Feeling is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable... Thus the eye is not-self, forms are not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self, contact at the eye is not-self, feeling is not self. If anyone were to say, 'Craving is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable. The arising & falling away of craving are discerned. And when its arising & falling away are discerned, it would follow that 'My self arises & falls away.' That's why it wouldn't be tenable if anyone were to say, 'Craving is the self.' Thus the eye is not-self, forms are not-self, consciousness at the eye is not-self, contact at the eye is not-self, feeling is not self, craving is not-self.

"If anyone were to say, 'The ear is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable...

"If anyone were to say, 'The nose is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable...

"If anyone were to say, 'The tongue is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable...

"If anyone were to say, 'The body is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable...

"If anyone were to say, 'The intellect is the self,' that wouldn't be tenable.
Body parts
"Furthermore, the monk reflects on this very body from the soles of the feet on up, from the crown of the head on down, surrounded by skin and full of various kinds of unclean things: 'In this body there are head hairs, body hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, tendons, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, pleura, spleen, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, gorge, feces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, skin-oil, saliva, mucus, fluid in the joints, urine.' Just as if a sack with openings at both ends were full of various kinds of grain — wheat, rice, mung beans, kidney beans, sesame seeds, husked rice — and a man with good eyesight, pouring it out, were to reflect, 'This is wheat. This is rice. These are mung beans. These are kidney beans. These are sesame seeds. This is husked rice'; in the same way, the monk reflects on this very body from the soles of the feet on up, from the crown of the head on down, surrounded by skin and full of various kinds of unclean things: 'In this body there are head hairs, body hairs, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, tendons, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, pleura, spleen, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, gorge, feces, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, skin-oil, saliva, mucus, fluid in the joints, urine.' And as he remains thus heedful, ardent, & resolute, any memories & resolves related to the household life are abandoned, and with their abandoning his mind gathers & settles inwardly, grows unified & centered. This is how a monk develops mindfulness immersed in the body.
Elements
"Furthermore, the monk contemplates this very body — however it stands, however it is disposed — in terms of properties: 'In this body there is the earth property, the liquid property, the fire property, & the wind property.' Just as a skilled butcher or his apprentice, having killed a cow, would sit at a crossroads cutting it up into pieces, the monk contemplates this very body — however it stands, however it is disposed — in terms of properties: 'In this body there is the earth property, the liquid property, the fire property, & the wind property.' And as he remains thus heedful, ardent, & resolute, any memories & resolves related to the household life are abandoned, and with their abandoning his mind gathers & settles inwardly, grows unified & centered. This is how a monk develops mindfulness immersed in the body.
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

Five aggregates
"Form, monks, is not self. If form were the self, this form would not lend itself to dis-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.' But precisely because form is not self, form lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to form, 'Let this form be thus. Let this form not be thus.'

"Feeling is not self...

"Perception is not self...

"[Mental] fabrications are not self...

"Consciousness is not self. If consciousness were the self, this consciousness would not lend itself to dis-ease. It would be possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, 'Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.' But precisely because consciousness is not self, consciousness lends itself to dis-ease. And it is not possible [to say] with regard to consciousness, 'Let my consciousness be thus. Let my consciousness not be thus.'
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Post by sunnat »

signals from active sense bases are delivered in discrete packets so rapidly that continuity and multitasking is a readily believable illusion, but an illusion nevertheless
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Post by Spiny Norman »

sunnat wrote: Wed Jun 23, 2021 2:22 pm signals from active sense bases are delivered in discrete packets so rapidly that continuity and multitasking is a readily believable illusion, but an illusion nevertheless
What's this based on? Is it in the suttas?
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