Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Textual analysis and comparative discussion on early Buddhist sects and texts.
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Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by mikenz66 »

Alexander Wynne's new article on early Buddhist meditation:
https://www.academia.edu/36752191/Sarip ... meditation

My initial impression is that he is arguing that the earliest approach was a kind of “bare insight”, but not in the later Commentarial sense, but perhaps more along the lines of Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda’s analysis.
We have seen that there are two fundamentally distinct understandings of ‘conciousness’ or ‘mind’, and two related soteriologies, in the early Buddhist discourses. It is difficult to see how they could be reconciled, for both suggest different outcomes towards the end of the Buddhist path. According to our reading of Kaccana, liberation requires mindfulness in the sense of bare cognition; but according to our reading or Sariputta, liberation is attained by minimising experience to its most refined state, which confers the ability to see ideas clearly, or to comprehend the refined contents of this state, or else to jump into a state of non-experience.
There are some links to Wynne's lectures on the subject, and some other comments here: https://discourse.suttacentral.net/t/al ... tions/9603

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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by Pseudobabble »

Hi Mike,

Very interesting article.

I'm not quite finished, but Wynne highlights a contradiction which doesn't seem too problematic to me:
Screenshot from 2018-06-01 07-49-48.png
Screenshot from 2018-06-01 07-49-48.png (60.41 KiB) Viewed 8605 times

It seems to me that the dichotomy posed between Sariputta's application of constructed/refined mental states and Kaccana's cognition stripped of artifice (avoiding 'bare' because of modern connotations) is not really a problem, because Sariputta operates in a terminological framework suited to 'technique', and Kaccana a framework for 'objective state', if I can speak very broadly.

We need to construct a concentrated state of mind, because only a concentrated mind is not disturbed by incidental mental activity, which would prevent it from perceiving the constructed nature of mind/reality. Such perception (of the constructed nature of reality, supported by concentrative clarity) is a function of the cognitive faculty of awareness, and as such is not itself constructed, but requires the artificially clarified environment of a mind cleared by concentration, which is 'constructed' in the sense that it is the result of a process of intentional direction of attention, rather than being a cognitive function or capability.

Basically, in Thanissaro's terms, we fabricate a state of mind which will allow us to perceive the fabricated (conditioned) nature of things. The moment of 'seeing things as they are' is a moment of 'bare cognition', but its not possible to have such a moment without training in 'constructions'.

I've come up against this in my own practice too - after a session of meditation, I get up, and walk into the kitchen. I see the fridge. My mind pictures what is inside the fridge, and the tongue tastes the memory of the food. BAM, hunger. The hunger was not there before, it is purely a result of imagining the taste of the food. That hunger is 'made up', so to speak, constructed on conditions. This process no doubt occurs every time I look at the fridge - who knows how many things have been eaten, purely because I remembered what they taste like! The point is the process occurs far too quickly and obscurely to be perceived when I have not been meditating. It is the artificially constructed state of concentration which allows awareness to perceive the mind in action, and thus demonstrate the conditionality of desire (and other mental states).

No debate here, just wanted to drop a comment. Very interesting article.
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by mikenz66 »

Pseudobabble wrote: Fri Jun 01, 2018 7:18 am We need to construct a concentrated state of mind, because only a concentrated mind is not disturbed by incidental mental activity, which would prevent it from perceiving the constructed nature of mind/reality.
...
That's a good point, and one might argue that the difference between Wynne's "Kaccana approach", and other "insight" approaches are in matters of detail. However, what about the construction of states such as cessation of perception and feeling?

Having now read the article more closely, I'm even more struck by the relationships between Wynne's characterisation of Kaccana's approach, and Nanananda's Nibbana Sermons, which also make heavy use of Kaccana's MN 18 https://suttacentral.net/mn18/en/sujato exposition of papanca https://suttacentral.net/mn18/en/sujato#16.1 (in Sermon 11) and the 4th and 5th chapters of the Sutta Nipata. Of course, Wynne does reference Nananda's early book on Concept and Reality...

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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by AlexBrains92 »

mikenz66 wrote: Fri Jun 01, 2018 9:27 am Having now read the article more closely, I'm even more struck by the relationships between Wynne's characterisation of Kaccana's approach, and Nanananda's Nibbana Sermons, which also make heavy use of Kaccana's MN 18 https://suttacentral.net/mn18/en/sujato exposition of papanca https://suttacentral.net/mn18/en/sujato#16.1 (in Sermon 11) and the 4th and 5th chapters of the Sutta Nipata. Of course, Wynne does reference Nananda's early book on Concept and Reality...
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by DooDoot »

mikenz66 wrote: Thu May 31, 2018 8:24 pm My initial impression is that he is arguing that the earliest approach was a kind of “bare insight”, but not in the later Commentarial sense, but perhaps more along the lines of Bhikkhu Ñāṇananda’s analysis.
We have seen that there are two fundamentally distinct understandings of ‘conciousness’ or ‘mind’, and two related soteriologies, in the early Buddhist discourses. It is difficult to see how they could be reconciled, for both suggest different outcomes towards the end of the Buddhist path. According to our reading of Kaccana, liberation requires mindfulness in the sense of bare cognition; but according to our reading or Sariputta, liberation is attained by minimising experience to its most refined state, which confers the ability to see ideas clearly, or to comprehend the refined contents of this state, or else to jump into a state of non-experience.
Even though Ceisiwr might revile my post, my impression is Alexander Wynne may not understand the stream to Nibbana. Kaccana in MN 18 appears to merely refer to basic foundational sati-sampajjana. Where as the various samadhi suttas of Sariputta refer to the natural samadhi development from maintaining the basic sati-sampajjana described by Kaccana.
On seeing a form with the eye, he doesn't grasp at any theme or details by which — if he were to dwell without restraint over the faculty of the eye — evil, unskillful qualities such as greed or distress might assail him. On hearing a sound with the ear... On smelling an aroma with the nose... On tasting a flavor with the tongue... On touching a tactile sensation with the body... On cognizing an idea with the intellect, he doesn't grasp at any theme or details by which — if he were to dwell without restraint over the faculty of the intellect — evil, unskillful qualities such as greed or distress might assail him. Endowed with this noble restraint over the sense faculties, he is inwardly sensitive to the pleasure of being blameless.

Endowed with this noble aggregate of virtue, this noble restraint over the sense faculties, this noble mindfulness & alertness, he seeks out a secluded dwelling: a wilderness, the shade of a tree, a mountain, a glen, a hillside cave, a charnel ground, a forest grove, the open air, a heap of straw. After his meal, returning from his alms round, he sits down, crosses his legs, holds his body erect, and brings mindfulness to the fore.

Abandoning covetousness with regard to the world, he dwells with an awareness devoid of covetousness. He cleanses his mind of covetousness. Abandoning ill will & anger, he dwells with an awareness devoid of ill will, sympathetic with the welfare of all living beings. He cleanses his mind of ill will & anger. Abandoning sloth & drowsiness, he dwells with an awareness devoid of sloth & drowsiness, mindful, alert, percipient of light. He cleanses his mind of sloth & drowsiness. Abandoning restlessness & anxiety, he dwells undisturbed, his mind inwardly stilled. He cleanses his mind of restlessness & anxiety. Abandoning uncertainty, he dwells having crossed over uncertainty, with no perplexity with regard to skillful mental qualities. He cleanses his mind of uncertainty.

Having abandoned these five hindrances — imperfections of awareness that weaken discernment — then, quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities, he enters and remains in the first jhāna: rapture & pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation.

MN 38
The above said, Kaccana's discourse does not appear to be literally about the Path but merely a teaching using an analogy. In MN 18, it appears the Buddha says: "If...there is nothing there to relish, welcome or remain fastened to, then that is the end of... taking up rods & bladed weapons, of arguments, quarrels, disputes, accusations, divisive tale-bearing & false speech". Then Kaccana explains: "Now, when there is no eye, when there are no forms, when there is no eye-consciousness... When there is no ear...When there is no nose... When there is no tongue... When there is no body... When there is no intellect, when there are no ideas, when there is no intellect-consciousness... there is nothing there to relish, welcome or remain fastened to...." In other words, Kaccana appears neither teaching about the Path of sense control nor teaching about some secret path of nothingness. Instead, Kaccana appears to simply explain about if & when there are no sights, sounds, smell, tastes, touches & ideas to obsess over. :smile:
mikenz66 wrote: Fri Jun 01, 2018 9:27 am Having now read the article more closely, I'm even more struck by the relationships between Wynne's characterisation of Kaccana's approach, and Nanananda's Nibbana Sermons, which also make heavy use of Kaccana's MN 18 https://suttacentral.net/mn18/en/sujato exposition of papanca https://suttacentral.net/mn18/en/sujato#16.1 (in Sermon 11) and the 4th and 5th chapters of the Sutta Nipata. Of course, Wynne does reference Nananda's early book on Concept and Reality...
The Sutta Nipata, consistent with the Buddha-Dhamma, appears to be about not grasping at views rather than about having no perceptions or no concepts or no views.
Tassīdha diṭṭhe va sute mute vā,
Pakappitā natthi aṇūpi saññā;
Taṃ brāhmaṇaṃ diṭṭhimanādiyānaṃ,
Kenīdha lokasmiṃ vikappayeyya.

Concerning the seen, the heard and cognized,
not the least notion is fashioned by him,
that one who’s perfected grasps at no view,
by whom in the world could he be described?

https://suttacentral.net/snp4.5/en/mills
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by AlexBrains92 »

DooDoot wrote: Thu Oct 22, 2020 10:04 am The Sutta Nipata, consistent with the Buddha-Dhamma, appears to be about not grasping at views rather than about having no perceptions or no concepts or no views.
It doesn't seem to me that Alexander Wynne supports 'no view' instead of 'right view'.
He links the two, like Paul Fuller does here:
The understanding of views in the Atthakavagga compared to other parts of the Pāli canon

In a well-known article, ‘Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli Canon’, Luis Gómez has argued that the no-views understanding is only found in the Sutta-nipāta and in ‘isolated’ Nikāya passages, and that it only found full expression in the Madhyamaka. Gómez argues that:

"With the exception of the older parts of the Suttanipāta (Atthakavagga and Pārāyanavagga) and scattered passages in the Nikāyas, the Pāli tradition has adopted a view of avidyā which suggests a condemnation of specific theories or views, rather than an outright rejection of the clinging to theorising and opinionating. The ineffability of the goal is not taken to imply the impossibility of theorisation (as in the Mādhyamika), and theorisation is not seen as inextricably connected to clinging (as in the Suttanipāta). Nevertheless, the Pāli tradition preserves, in the Suttanipāta and elsewhere, several important passages in which one could perhaps discover some kind of ‘proto-Mādhyamika’."

Gómez describes the two understandings:

"It is obvious then that the Attha’s intention is not to propose a different view. Nor does it propose a nonview (systematic rejection of all views). The involved rhetoric of this short text seems to be aimed at an injunction to detachment from the tendency of the mind to become fixed in cognitive and affective extremes, in immutable mind-made polarities. I do not believe we could consistently interpret the Attha as the pronouncement of a self-serving Buddhist who believes that the clash of views is counterproductive merely because there is only one correct view and that he who possesses that view (that is, the Buddhist) can afford not to enter the ring of dispute, for, after all, he knows that he is right."

I do not think a ‘self-serving Buddhist’ believes in right-view. To believe in right-view would be to adopt a position. I have argued that the reluctance to state any position, as expressed by the middle-way, is prominent in the Nikāyas and Pāli canon in general. Gómez also equates wrong-view with a form of ignorance. As I argued in Chapter 3, to do this is to misunderstand why views are wrong. They are primarily wrong because they are a form of attachment, not essentially a form of ignorance, though these ideas are clearly related in Buddhism. The Atthakavagga could be taken as a description of the non-attached cognition of the stream-attainer, and as such there is nothing incongruous with this description and that found in other parts of the Pāli canon. The stream-attainer sees the dependent nature of all phenomena, which is the middle-way, grasping no extremes. However, Gómez does not acknowledge such a process in the Pāli canon as a whole and argues that such ideas were ‘unfortunately neglected’ by the Abhidhamma. This book has suggested the contrary.
Much of his argument is based upon an apparent condemnation of certain terms denoting wisdom or insight found in the Atthakavagga. This in turn is used as another way of distinguishing it from other parts of the Nikāyas. It is this aspect of the no-views understanding that leads me to question it, for it appears to propose the rejection of all views and knowledge. However, the Atthakavagga condemns attachment to knowledge, not knowledge itself. Knowledge is a valid means to overcome dukkha if there is no craving for knowledge. Right-view can overcome wrong-view if the content of right-view is an expression of calm and insight: if it expresses what is true and of value, ‘is’ and ‘ought’. However, Gómez claims that there is a criticism of knowledge (ñāna) found in the Mahāviyuha-sutta of the Atthakavagga. This is in the following verse:

"The brahmin, considering, does not submit to figments. He does not follow views (and) he has no association with knowledge, and knowing commonplace opinions he is indifferent to them (saying) ‘Let others take them up’."

He might equally have cited the Patthāna as giving a criticism of knowledge. The Patthāna describes something very similar to the Mahāviyuha-sutta. This is that there should be a correct attitude to the path. It should not give rise to craving and attachment. In fact, the early Abhidhamma suggests that right-view cannot give rise to craving and attachment. To have ‘no association with knowledge’ is not to be bound by it (ñānabandhu).
The Suddhahaka-sutta is often cited as the epitome of the anti-knowledge thesis of the Atthakavagga. This sutta states that purity does not come by knowledge. But the sutta is clearly explaining attachment to knowledge:

"‘I see what is purified, highest, diseaseless. Purity comes to a man by means of what is seen.’ Understanding this, knowing ‘(It is) the highest,’ (and thinking) ‘I am a seer of the purified,’ he believes that knowledge (leads to purity)."

Knowledge usually implies knowledge of something. However, knowledge is being described in a certain way in the Atthakavagga. The sutta is explaining that if knowledge is taken as asserting that it is the highest knowledge, then it is a form of attachment. This is another way of saying ‘only this is true, anything else is wrong’. The middle-way is the dhamma, and apprehending it constitutes ñāna, or right-view, the non-attached seeing of the rise and fall of all dhammas.
The Atthakavagga does not follow the no-views understanding in the sense of rejecting all knowledge and views, it proposes the same thing as the four primary Nikāyas: the transcendence of all views. It seems to me that the opposition understanding and the no-views understanding have led us away from the teachings of both the four primary Nikāyas (which do not teach the opposition understanding), and the Atthakavagga (which does not teach the no-views understanding). They both teach the same thing: a non-attached attitude through the cultivation of right-view.
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by DooDoot »

AlexBrains92 wrote: Thu Oct 22, 2020 3:58 pm It doesn't seem to me that Alexander Wynne supports 'no view' instead of 'right view'.
In respect to whatever Wynne is attempting to say, the above appears irrelevant. The relevant issue is Wynne appears to be saying the Path including the various jhanas is different to and unrelated to MN 18. I pointed out the essence of what is taught in MN 18 is simply the prerequisite foundation of the Path including jhanas.
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by AlexBrains92 »

DooDoot wrote: Fri Oct 23, 2020 10:40 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Thu Oct 22, 2020 3:58 pm It doesn't seem to me that Alexander Wynne supports 'no view' instead of 'right view'.
In respect to whatever Wynne is attempting to say, the above appears irrelevant. The relevant issue is Wynne appears to be saying the Path including the various jhanas is different to and unrelated to MN 18. I pointed out the essence of what is taught in MN 18 is simply the prerequisite foundation of the Path including jhanas.
Wynne appears to be saying that MN 18 clearly considers papañca-saññā-sankhā as a problem, and that upekkhā-sati-parisuddhi in fourth jhāna consists of bare cognition in the sense of non-conceptual awareness. This makes sense to me.
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

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AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 23, 2020 11:29 am Wynne appears to be saying that MN 18 clearly considers papañca-saññā-sankhā as a problem, and that upekkhā-sati-parisuddhi in fourth jhāna consists of bare cognition in the sense of non-conceptual awareness. This makes sense to me.
Sounds like nonsense to me, which is why MikeNZ, yourself and myself disagree. :smile:
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by Pulsar »

AlexBrains wrote
Wynne appears to be saying that MN 18 clearly considers papañca-saññā-sankhā as a problem, and that upekkhā-sati-parisuddhi in fourth jhāna consists of bare cognition in the sense of non-conceptual awareness. This makes sense to me.
It makes perfect sense. If one could handle Phassa, Vedana and Sanna in a way that it would not give rise to Papanca.
  • Right there, Dependent Origination is assaulted so that it cannot proceed further.
Basically this is what Buddha said to Bahia, which is repeated in many suttas, 'Bare Cognition' or 'Vinnana Matta' as taught to Bahia and Malunkyaputta, not "bare awareness" as discussed in the Burmese Vipassana tradition, not a teaching of the Buddha.

The truth is as simple as MN 18 and Bahia sutta, but too much simplicity, daunts some.

With love :candle:
Last edited by Pulsar on Fri Oct 23, 2020 9:21 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by Pulsar »

Wynne defines the four jhanas
as a natural process of psycho-somatic transformation, allowing sentience to be suffused or distributed back to its somatic roots.
The transformation is realized in the Arahant, who is freed from the "Tree of Becoming"

Wynne also defines Liberating insight as a non-conceptual awareness of the way things really are, which totally matches with the statements to Bahia.
With love :candle:
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by DooDoot »

Pulsar wrote: Fri Oct 23, 2020 9:03 pm If one could handle Phassa, Vedana and Sanna in a way that it would not give rise to Papanca.
  • Right there, Dependent Origination is assaulted so that it cannot proceed further.
The above appears false. The mind of a practitioner of the above that does not proceed to jhana has not & cannot practise the above permanently. The suttas refer to dependent origination ceasing without remainder (never arising again). Non-jhana means there cannot be dependent origination ceasing without remainder (never arising again).
Pulsar wrote: Fri Oct 23, 2020 9:03 pm Basically this is what Buddha said to Bahia, which is repeated in many suttas
The above appears false. What Buddha said to Bahia is not repeated in many suttas.
Pulsar wrote: Fri Oct 23, 2020 9:19 pmWynne also defines Liberating insight as a non-conceptual awareness of the way things really are, which totally matches with the statements to Bahia.
The above appears false. Liberating insight is not non-conceptual. Because liberating insight develops new views in the mind, such as impermanence, not-self, etc, it cannot be non-conceptual. At best, Bahiya saw the absence of self brings peace. This insight is perceived "conceptually". While the mind is relatively silent, the insight still occurs with conceptual constructs that are "wisdom" ("panna").
Pulsar wrote: Fri Oct 23, 2020 9:03 pm With love
With false view. :spy:
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

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AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 23, 2020 11:29 am Wynne appears to be saying that MN 18 clearly considers papañca-saññā-sankhā as a problem, and that upekkhā-sati-parisuddhi in fourth jhāna consists of bare cognition in the sense of non-conceptual awareness. This makes sense to me.
Hi Alex!

If you don't mind, could you explain what do you mean by "non-conceptual"?
Is it in the sense of the 2nd jhana (and onwards) having no vitakka and vicara?
Or is it like having no categorization and distinction of phenomena (which is how I understand the term 'perception') at all?

Based on the descriptions of the Satipatthana Suttas and of that of the 4th jhana, I don't see nothing that could be interpreted in the second sense, if that's what you mean. As I see it, equanimity and sati allow to see arising phenomena without distortions (i.e. not assuming permanence, satisfactoriness and self) and without holding to the vedana that could arise (i.e. by letting it arise and cease on its own terms), which is not the same to having attention without any categorization whatsoever.

Kind regards!
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by AlexBrains92 »

bridif1 wrote: Sun Oct 25, 2020 7:00 am
AlexBrains92 wrote: Fri Oct 23, 2020 11:29 am Wynne appears to be saying that MN 18 clearly considers papañca-saññā-sankhā as a problem, and that upekkhā-sati-parisuddhi in fourth jhāna consists of bare cognition in the sense of non-conceptual awareness. This makes sense to me.
Hi Alex!

If you don't mind, could you explain what do you mean by "non-conceptual"?
Is it in the sense of the 2nd jhana (and onwards) having no vitakka and vicara?
Or is it like having no categorization and distinction of phenomena (which is how I understand the term 'perception') at all?

Based on the descriptions of the Satipatthana Suttas and of that of the 4th jhana, I don't see nothing that could be interpreted in the second sense, if that's what you mean. As I see it, equanimity and sati allow to see arising phenomena without distortions (i.e. not assuming permanence, satisfactoriness and self) and without holding to the vedana that could arise (i.e. by letting it arise and cease on its own terms), which is not the same to having attention without any categorization whatsoever.

Kind regards!
Hi Bridif!
In my opinion, the former sense implies the latter.
In addition to 'Sariputta or Kaccāna?' by Alexander Wynne, I suggest you his book 'The Origin of Buddhist Meditation' (at least the last chapter):
http://www.ahandfulofleaves.org/documen ... 0Wynne.pdf.
I also suggest you 'Seeing Through' by Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda:
https://seeingthroughthenet.net/wp-cont ... ev-0_3.pdf
"If appeasement of desires is what is really blissful, 'desirelessness' as the appeasement of all desires would be the Supreme Bliss, and this in fact is what Nibbāna is." (Bhikkhu Kaṭukurunde Ñāṇananda)
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Re: Alexander Wynne: Sariputta or Kaccāna? A preliminary study of two early Buddhist philosophies of mind and meditation

Post by Pulsar »

DooDoot wrote
"The above appears false. What Buddha said to Bahia is not repeated in many suttas"
Perhaps it is failure to pay the right attention to suttas, that makes you think so.
I will address this one point as briefly as possible, so as not to get entangled with you.
When i wrote 'repeated' i did not mean verbatim, even though it appears verbatim in a sutta spoken to Malunkyaputta. Dhamma is not a parrot's domain. It has to be understood through Dhammic lang. as Rev. Buddhadasa wrote. 
SN 35.95 Malunkyaputta's liberation
In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen.
In reference to the heard, only the heard.
In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In reference to the cognized, only the cognized.
That is how you should train yourself.
When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the sensed in reference to the sensed, only the cognized in reference to the cognized, then, Malunkyaputta, there is no you in connection with that. When there is no you in connection with that, there is no you there.
When there is no you there, you are neither here nor yonder nor between the two. This, just this, is the end of stress."
MN 1 Mulapariyaya sutta, sections 19-20.
perceiving the seen as the seen, ....cognized as cognized
(but not inserting a self in the midst, by conceiving himself in the sensed)
In MN 51 Kandaraka sutta section16.
On seeing a form with the eye.... on cognizing a mind object he does not grasp at its signs and features.
In MN 112 Chabbisodhana sutta Section 4.
"Regarding the seen as the seen, heard as the heard, ...cognized as the cognized, i abide unattracted, unrepelled, independent, detached, free, dissociated"
only the one who has eradicated defilements can act in this manner.  One without right view, without right intention, etc. how can he?
In AN 11.1 Sandha sutta
Perception has disappeared, in relation to whatever is seen, heard, sensed, cognized, reached, sought after, and examined by the mind.
Dearest DooDoot, Don't you think in all suttas where Buddha says There is no "I", what he intends is there is the seen, but no one to be seen, neither is there the "I" seeing,
People immersed in ignorance have a hard time believing that there is no "I" here, 
even Buddha's advice to his son Rahula
"that there is no "I" in the past, the future and the present feelings, perceptions etc."
incline towards the same notion,
that there is the seen, heard, sensed, cognized,
without the insertion of "I" 
Dhamma can only be seen when you still the mind,
when you get rid of the ego,
In a posture of humility.
  That everywhere and anywhere, all that Buddha  was trying to say in this vast sensosphere we are born to, due to craving and kamma in this repeated birthing, the culprit of our suffering is the insertion of "I". 
Instead of letting go of the seen, heard, sensed and cognized, we revel in these and hence we suffer, and fail to see the cause of our suffering is our own failure.

Buddha claims in Mahavagga.
  • 'This that through many toils I've known?
    By folk with lust and hate consumed;
    The dhamma is not understood-
    Subtle, deep difficult to see delicate. Unseen it will be by passion's slaves,  
    cloaked in the murk of ignorance.
 
With love  :candle:
PS There are many more suttas, but you are smart, these few should convince you.
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