ToVincent wrote: ↑Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:53 pm
I still have to give the last hit on the coffin's last nail, of your personal interpretation
It is indeed my interpretation, just like yours is yours. Unless of course yours is somehow a non-personal and objective interpretation? This of course would require a 3rd party. If so it would be interesting to hear who that 3rd party is?
You know exactly what I mean.
Buddhism is a metaphysical synthetic a priori - and you're making it an analytical a priori, with your dubious and twisted Humean logic.
Again, the concept of a Buddha, as a man coming from the land of the gods, and who told people that his experience of nibbāna, is the one and only ultimate truthful experience, is indubitably and intrinsically synthetic.
"Buddhism is true" is core synthetic a priori.
To have faith in that, is another matter.
If saying it made it so. "Buddhism is a metaphysical synthetic a priori ", not that you have shown. As to this:
"Again, the concept of a Buddha, as a man coming from the land of the gods, and who told people that his experience of nibbāna, is the one and only ultimate truthful experience, is indubitably and intrinsically synthetic."
You will have to provide a sutta reference and expand on what you mean by "the one and only truthful experience"? Is dukkha not a "truthful experience"?
Oh Lord, we are entering the land of bad faith.
By saying "no longer" you somewhat admit that one was there previously — and maybe (eel-wriggling applies), that it is the "thorn" that took one back to the previous state..
That's flimsy eel-wriggling — a little fuzzy ambiguity won't hurt, will it?
To argue in bad faith would mean I was being deceptive. That in some way I didn't believe the argument I was making. This is not the case, so I am slightly bemused as to why you have levied that charge? Moving on from this strange turn of the conversation, I never denied that the meditator in the sutta in question was in x meditative attainment. My argument was that said attainment is incompatible with the thorn. Just like how there can only be 1 feeling at a time, the meditator cannot simultaneously be in the 1st Jhāna and be listening to sounds in the same way they cannot be in the cessation of perception & feeling whilst simultaneously experiencing perception & feelings. If perceptions & feelings arise, they are no longer in nirodha-samāpatti. Perception & feeling is a thorn to it. If sound arises then they are no longer in the 1st Jhāna. Sound is a thorn to it. As for eel-wriggling, that would be an avoidance of the question due to either stupidity or aversion. I have not avoided your questions. I have directly addressed them.
Friend, heavenly objects of sensual pleasures are better than human objects sensual pleasures.
‘mānusakehi kho, āvuso, kāmehi dibbā kāmā abhikkantatarā ca paṇītatarā ca.
SN 55.54 (perfect parallel for that matter).
"Friend, heavenly sense objects are better than human sense objects."
The heavenly world is more pleasant than the human world. The sights, sounds, tastes etc are better there. I see no issue here if we read "kāmehi" as external objects. The sutta of course does discuss the kāmaguṇa before discussing the kāmehi, thus it seems to equate the two. I'll get back to this in a moment. Regarding the parallel, my Chinese is poor so I have to rely on DeepL. As such I can't make a definitive argument here, however based on that translation I noticed the following:
佛告難提:「若有智慧優婆塞,當詣餘智慧優婆塞、優婆夷疾病困苦者所,以三種穌息處而教授之言:『仁者!汝當成就於佛不壞淨,於法、僧不壞淨。』以是三種穌息處而教授已,當復問言:『汝顧戀父母不?』彼若有顧戀父母者,當教令捨,當語彼言:『汝顧戀父母得活者,可顧戀耳,既不由顧戀而得活,用顧戀為?』彼若言不顧戀父母者,當歎善隨喜,當復問言:『汝於妻子、奴僕、錢財諸物有顧念不?』若言顧念,當教令捨,如捨顧戀父母法;若言不顧念,歎善隨喜,當復問言:『汝於人間五欲顧念以不?』若言顧念,當為說言:『人間五欲惡露不淨,敗壞臭處,不如天上勝妙五欲。』教令捨離人間五欲,教令志願天上五欲。若復彼言心已遠離人間五欲,先已顧念天勝妙欲,歎善隨喜,復語彼言:『天上妙欲無常、苦、空、變壞之法,諸天上有身勝天五欲。』若言已捨顧念天欲,顧念有身勝欲,歎善隨喜,當復教言:『有身之欲,亦復無常、變壞之法,有行滅、涅槃、出離之樂,汝當捨離有身顧念,樂於涅槃寂滅之樂為上、為勝。』彼聖弟子已能捨離有身顧念,樂涅槃者,歎善隨
The Buddha said to Nanti: "If there are any wise yupasins, go to the rest of the wise yupasins and yupasins who are sick and suffering, and teach them the three kinds of resting places, saying: 'Master! Thou shalt attain to the purity of the Buddha and to the purity of the Dharma and the Sangha. After teaching with these three types of sesshin, he asked, "Do you care for your parents? If he cares for his parents, he will teach them to give up, and he will say to them, "If thou canst live by caring for thy parents, thou canst live by caring for them. If he says that he does not care for his parents, he is to be admired, and he is to be asked, "Do you care for your wife, your servants, your money, and other things? If he says he cares for them, he will teach him to give them up, as he gives up the law of caring for his parents; if he says he does not care for them, he will be pleased with them, and will ask again, "Do you care for the five human desires? If thou sayest thou regardest the five human desires, say: "The five human desires are impure and corrupting, not as good as the five heavenly desires. Teach him to forsake the five human desires and to desire the five heavenly desires. If he says that his mind is far from the five human desires, and he has first thought of the heavenly desires, and he sighs with joy, he says to him, "The heavenly desires are impermanent, bitter, empty, and corrupt. If he says, "If he has given up thinking of heavenly desires, and thinks of the desire for bodily victory, he will say, "The desire for bodily victory is also impermanent, impermanent, and corruptible, and there is the joy of death, nirvana, and emancipation; give up thinking of the desire for bodily victory, and rejoice in the joy of nirvana and silence. If the holy disciple is able to give up bodily cares and rejoice in nirvana, he will be honored.
https://suttacentral.net/sa1122/lzh/taisho
欲: desire, want, long for intend
This is obviously referring to external objects. The "five human desires" are sights, sound, tastes, smells and tactile sensations. This places kāmā firmly in the external world, as objects of the senses. These objects are desirable ones. Taken in conjunction with the sutta it seems to be saying the same thing. The kāmehi are external lovely sense objects. However, take a look at MN 13 where a distinction is made between kāmā and the kāmaguṇa:
Ko ca, bhikkhave, kāmānaṁ assādo?
And what, Bhikkhus, is the enjoyment of kāmānaṁ?
Pañcime, bhikkhave, kāmaguṇā.
There are five strings of lust.
Katame pañca?
What five?
Cakkhuviññeyyā rūpā iṭṭhā kantā manāpā piyarūpā kāmūpasaṁhitā rajanīyā,
Sights known by the eye that are likable, desirable, agreeable, pleasant, sensual, and arousing.
sotaviññeyyā saddā …pe…
Sounds known by the ear …
ghānaviññeyyā gandhā …
Smells known by the nose …
jivhāviññeyyā rasā …
Tastes known by the tongue …
kāyaviññeyyā phoṭṭhabbā iṭṭhā kantā manāpā piyarūpā kāmūpasaṁhitā rajanīyā—
Touches known by the body that are likable, desirable, agreeable, pleasant, sensual, and arousing.
ime kho, bhikkhave, pañca kāmaguṇā.
These are the five kinds of strings of lust.
Yaṁ kho, bhikkhave, ime pañca kāmaguṇe paṭicca uppajjati sukhaṁ somanassaṁ—ayaṁ kāmānaṁ assādo.
The pleasure and happiness that arise from these five strings of lust: this is the enjoyment of kāmānaṁ.
We could simplify this to:
"And what, Bhikkhus, is the enjoyment of sense objects? The pleasure and happiness that arise based on pleasurable sights, sounds etc. This is enjoying of sense objects."
If we look to the parallel, admittedly relying on an English translation since I lack the Chinese skills to translate it myself, the distinction is found there:
“As for sense pleasures, what is enjoying them like? There are the so-called five sense-pleasures. Which are the five? When the eye sees forms, eye-consciousness is caused to arise followed by excessive fondness for forms, ever-present in mankind and giving it complete satisfaction. When the ear hears sounds, the nose smells scents, the tongue recognises flavours and when tangibles are felt with the body the respective kinds of consciousness are caused to arise followed by excessive fondness for the respective sense-objects, ever-present in mankind and giving it complete satisfaction. Now when on account of these five sense-pleasures one’s mind experiences pleasures and pain, this is called enjoyment of sense-pleasures.
“As for sense-pleasures, what is their wretchedness? Now there is a son of a good family who, for his livelihood, trains to become proficient in many a field: either farming or writing or public service or calculating or pretension to empowerment or courier service or royal service. He does not avoid exposing his body to heat and cold, and in his training he works hard and zealously, taking great pains and without sparing himself. Becoming rich and making a fortune by taking so much trouble—that is great wretchedness for the sake of sense-pleasures. In this world all suffering is due to attachment to and desire for them.
https://suttacentral.net/ea21.9/en/huye ... b-pasadika
The translator has opted for "sense-pleasures" but we can see that if we take the Pāli understanding of kāmā as being external sense objects, it makes more sense:
“As for sense objects, what is enjoying them like? There are the so-called five sense-pleasures. Which are the five? When the eye sees forms, eye-consciousness is caused to arise followed by excessive fondness for forms, ever-present in mankind and giving it complete satisfaction. When the ear hears sounds, the nose smells scents, the tongue recognises flavours and when tangibles are felt with the body the respective kinds of consciousness are caused to arise followed by excessive fondness for the respective sense-objects, ever-present in mankind and giving it complete satisfaction. Now when on account of these five sense objects one’s mind experiences pleasures and pain, this is called enjoyment of sense-objects.
“As for sense objects, what is their wretchedness? Now there is a son of a good family who, for his livelihood, trains to become proficient in many a field: either farming or writing or public service or calculating or pretension to empowerment or courier service or royal service. He does not avoid exposing his body to heat and cold, and in his training he works hard and zealously, taking great pains and without sparing himself. Becoming rich and making a fortune by taking so much trouble—that is great wretchedness for the sake of sense-objects. In this world all suffering is due to attachment to and desire for them."
Now if we look to the Pāli sutta we see:
II “And what, bhikkhus, is the danger of kāmānaṁ? Here, bhikkhus, on account of the craft by which a clansman makes a living—whether checking or accounting or calculating or farming or trading or husbandry or archery or the royal service, or whatever craft it may be—he has to face cold, he has to face heat, he is injured by contact with gadflies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and creeping things; he risks death by hunger and thirst. Now this is a danger in the case of kāmānaṁ, a mass of suffering visible here and now, having kāmahetu as its reason, kāmanidānaṁ as its source, kāmādhikaraṇaṁ as its basis, the reason being simply kāmānameva.
The kāmā here are clearly external objects, but they aren't pleasurable ones. The suttas then take a stance that kāmā are external objects, which can sometimes be lovely and sometimes not. The kāmaguṇa seem to be a sub-set of the kāmā, and so it seems they can sometimes be conflated.
Lastly, you have not addressed my concern that your methodology is internally inconsistent? Earlier you accused me of evasion. Projection perhaps? I suppose we can only speculate.