Jhana and the early Mahayana

Textual analysis and comparative discussion on early Buddhist sects and scriptures.
ToVincent
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by ToVincent »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 1:17 pm ...
No, this is "right view": https://justpaste.it/48ny7 .
Not what you are expecting it to be, to match your desire to make Buddhism a Humean old-hat analytical knowledge.

As already said, a Mara's advocate would say that Buddha, as a man coming from a land of the gods, telling people that his experience (a priori) of nibbāna is the one and only ultimate truthful experience, is indubitably synthetic.

I have my faith somewhere else, than in your long & gibberish Humean interpretations about DN 1 - based on your dubious premises.
And that concern the rest also.

My "sloppy" argument that "whilst in the 1st Jhāna sound can still be experience", is exactly the same "sloppy" argument that, "whilst in the state of cessation of perception and feeling, a perception and feeling can prick one in that state" .
Where does that sound "sloppy"?

There is a sutta where Ananda (I suppose), loses his state (due to some "thorn"), and Buddha descends to warn him to get back quickly into it, and how to do it.
That's not the only occurence of someone losing his state due to some "thorn" - isn't it?

------

Again, your deductions come from your (personal) premise that kāmehi or kāmā are "external sense objects", and not "objects of sensual pleasures" — based on some very profound and undisputable knowledge of yours.
Friend, heavenly objects of sensual pleasures are better than human objects sensual pleasures.
‘mānusakehi kho, āvuso, kāmehi dibbā kāmā abhikkantatarā ca paṇītatarā ca.
SN 55.54 (perfect parallel for that matter).
I suppose that this is the final nail, on the coffin of your personal interpretation.
Unless you find again some long and digressive sophistry to add to it.
.
.
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by Ceisiwr »

ToVincent wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 3:06 pm
This is the last time I adress this topic.
...
And generally, I won't argue any longer upon your absurd and contradictory fundaments.
I thought you were not going to respond further ;)
No, this is "right view": https://justpaste.it/48ny7 .
Of course, and the special knowledge of the Buddhas is the analytical a priori knowledge of paṭiccasamuppāda.
Not what you are expecting it to be, to match your desire to make Buddhism a Humean old-hat analytical knowledge.
You have no idea what my desire is. Even if you did, which you do not, my desire has no bearing on the truth or falsity of my arguments.
As already said, a Mara's advocate would say that Buddha, as a man coming from a land of the gods, telling people that his experience (a priori) of nibbāna is the one and only ultimate truthful experience, is indubitably synthetic.
No, this is not what you said. What you originally said was:

"Then come a man, from the land of the gods, that proclaims to have experienced a "higher" and "true" nibbāna.
And that becomes analytical a priori knowledge."


Which is not the same. I addressed this point in my last post. Now you have introduced new ideas through "nibbāna is the one and only ultimate truthful experience," This is called moving the goalposts.
I have my faith somewhere else, than in your long & gibberish Humean interpretations about DN 1 - based on your dubious premises.
And that concern the rest also.
You could believe in the Cheshire cat for all I care here. What you believe has no bearing on the argument at hand.
My "sloppy" argument that "whilst in the 1st Jhāna sound can still be experience", is exactly the same "sloppy" argument that, "whilst in the state of cessation of perception and feeling, a perception and feeling can prick one in that state" .
Where does that sound "sloppy"?
You are attempting to argue, badly, that whilst in Jhāna someone can hear a sound. I countered by if the thorn to a meditation is experienced when actually in the meditation, then perceptions and feelings would be experienced in the cessation of perception and feelings. This is contradictory. The two states are mutually exclusive:

P1) Nirodha-samāpatti is without perception and feeling.
P2) Perception & feeling is being experienced.
C) Therefore, you are not in nirodha-samāpatti.

Perception & feeling is a thorn to nirodha-samāpatti because when they are experienced you are no longer in nirodha-samāpatti. Now, apply that logic to the other thorns and you end up with sound not being experienced within the 1st Jhāna.
Again, your deductions come from your (personal) premise that kāmehi or kāmā are "external sense objects", and not "objects of sensual pleasures" — based on some very profound and undisputable knowledge of yours.

Friend, heavenly objects of sensual pleasures are better than human objects sensual pleasures.
‘mānusakehi kho, āvuso, kāmehi dibbā kāmā abhikkantatarā ca paṇītatarā ca.
SN 55.54 (perfect parallel for that matter).

I suppose that this is the final nail, on the coffin of your personal interpretation.
Unless you find again some long and digressive sophistry to add to it.
I'll add my thoughts to this in a few hours or so.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
ToVincent
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by ToVincent »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:11 pm ....
Ceisiwr wrote:I thought you were not going to respond further
I still have to give the last hit on the coffin's last nail, of your personal interpretation
Ceisiwr wrote:No, this is not what you said. What you originally said was: ....... (see above)
You know exactly what I mean.
Buddhism is a metaphysical synthetic a priori - and you're making it an analytical a priori, with your dubious and twisted Humean logic.
Again, the concept of a Buddha, as a man coming from the land of the gods, and who told people that his experience of nibbāna, is the one and only ultimate truthful experience, is indubitably and intrinsically synthetic.
"Buddhism is true" is core synthetic a priori.
To have faith in that, is another matter.
Ceisiwr wrote: Perception & feeling is a thorn to nirodha-samāpatti because when they are experienced you are no longer in nirodha-samāpatti. Now, apply that logic to the other thorns and you end up with sound not being experienced within the 1st Jhāna.
Oh Lord, we are entering the land of bad faith.
By saying "no longer" you somewhat admit that one was there previously — and maybe (eel-wriggling applies), that it is the "thorn" that took one back to the previous state..
That's flimsy eel-wriggling — a little fuzzy ambiguity won't hurt, will it?
ToVincent wrote: Again, your deductions come from your (personal) premise that kāmehi or kāmā are "external sense objects", and not "objects of sensual pleasures" — based on some very profound and undisputable knowledge of yours.

Friend, heavenly objects of sensual pleasures are better than human objects sensual pleasures.
‘mānusakehi kho, āvuso, kāmehi dibbā kāmā abhikkantatarā ca paṇītatarā ca.
SN 55.54 (perfect parallel for that matter).

I suppose that this is the final nail, on the coffin of your personal interpretation.
Unless you find again some long and digressive sophistry to add to it.
You say you'll think of that.
I suppose I'll have some more hit to give to that final nail.
.
.
Last edited by ToVincent on Sat Apr 10, 2021 5:45 pm, edited 1 time in total.
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
sphairos
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by sphairos »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 1:22 pm
See above. Synthetic a priori propositions can be made, since it is possible to say "every event has a cause", but they are, as you say, impossible to justify. I'm also not a follower per se of Kant.
Yes, they can be made and they can be necessarily true: 5 + 7 = 12. Experientially and logically. Then they are called a synthetic a priori knowledge or science.

The statement “The angles of a triangle are equal to the sum of two right angles” is a synthetic a priori judgement, and it is always true for everyone experientially.

"Every event has a cause" is also a valid synthetic apriori principle, because an event without a cause is unthinkable logically and can not be experienced.

Moreover, you can create metaphysics as a science, as Kant writes at the very end of the Prolegomena -- this is what you need to do:
Metaphysics, as a natural disposition of reason, is actual. Yet metaphysics itself leads to illusion and dialectical argument. In order for metaphysics to become a science, a critique of pure reason must systematically investigate the role of a priori concepts in understanding. The mere analysis of these concepts does nothing to advance metaphysics as a science. A critique is needed that will show how these concepts relate to sensibility, understanding, and reason. A complete table must be provided, as well as an explanation of how they result in synthetic a priori knowledge. This critique must strictly demarcate the bounds of reason. Reliance on common sense or statements about probability will not lead to a scientific metaphysics. Only a critique of pure reason can show how reason investigates itself and can be the foundation of metaphysics as a complete, universal, and certain science.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prolegome ... etaphysics
The problem arises when you make the synthetic a priori judgements that you can not justify in experience at all: "the thinking subject is permanent". Maybe it's permanent, maybe it's not. How can we know for sure? Most ofthe ideas about self, world and the Ultimate are such synthetic a priori judgements that go beyond the possible experience and can not be ever verified as valid synthetic a priori judgements.

This is the problem with the synthetic a priori judgements, not them themselves.

And you call some pure experiential judgements synthetic a priori.
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by Ceisiwr »

ToVincent wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 4:53 pm
I still have to give the last hit on the coffin's last nail, of your personal interpretation
It is indeed my interpretation, just like yours is yours. Unless of course yours is somehow a non-personal and objective interpretation? This of course would require a 3rd party. If so it would be interesting to hear who that 3rd party is?
You know exactly what I mean.
Buddhism is a metaphysical synthetic a priori - and you're making it an analytical a priori, with your dubious and twisted Humean logic.
Again, the concept of a Buddha, as a man coming from the land of the gods, and who told people that his experience of nibbāna, is the one and only ultimate truthful experience, is indubitably and intrinsically synthetic.
"Buddhism is true" is core synthetic a priori.
To have faith in that, is another matter.
If saying it made it so. "Buddhism is a metaphysical synthetic a priori ", not that you have shown. As to this:

"Again, the concept of a Buddha, as a man coming from the land of the gods, and who told people that his experience of nibbāna, is the one and only ultimate truthful experience, is indubitably and intrinsically synthetic."

You will have to provide a sutta reference and expand on what you mean by "the one and only truthful experience"? Is dukkha not a "truthful experience"?
Oh Lord, we are entering the land of bad faith.
By saying "no longer" you somewhat admit that one was there previously — and maybe (eel-wriggling applies), that it is the "thorn" that took one back to the previous state..
That's flimsy eel-wriggling — a little fuzzy ambiguity won't hurt, will it?
To argue in bad faith would mean I was being deceptive. That in some way I didn't believe the argument I was making. This is not the case, so I am slightly bemused as to why you have levied that charge? Moving on from this strange turn of the conversation, I never denied that the meditator in the sutta in question was in x meditative attainment. My argument was that said attainment is incompatible with the thorn. Just like how there can only be 1 feeling at a time, the meditator cannot simultaneously be in the 1st Jhāna and be listening to sounds in the same way they cannot be in the cessation of perception & feeling whilst simultaneously experiencing perception & feelings. If perceptions & feelings arise, they are no longer in nirodha-samāpatti. Perception & feeling is a thorn to it. If sound arises then they are no longer in the 1st Jhāna. Sound is a thorn to it. As for eel-wriggling, that would be an avoidance of the question due to either stupidity or aversion. I have not avoided your questions. I have directly addressed them.
Friend, heavenly objects of sensual pleasures are better than human objects sensual pleasures.
‘mānusakehi kho, āvuso, kāmehi dibbā kāmā abhikkantatarā ca paṇītatarā ca.
SN 55.54 (perfect parallel for that matter).
"Friend, heavenly sense objects are better than human sense objects."

The heavenly world is more pleasant than the human world. The sights, sounds, tastes etc are better there. I see no issue here if we read "kāmehi" as external objects. The sutta of course does discuss the kāmaguṇa before discussing the kāmehi, thus it seems to equate the two. I'll get back to this in a moment. Regarding the parallel, my Chinese is poor so I have to rely on DeepL. As such I can't make a definitive argument here, however based on that translation I noticed the following:
佛告難提:「若有智慧優婆塞,當詣餘智慧優婆塞、優婆夷疾病困苦者所,以三種穌息處而教授之言:『仁者!汝當成就於佛不壞淨,於法、僧不壞淨。』以是三種穌息處而教授已,當復問言:『汝顧戀父母不?』彼若有顧戀父母者,當教令捨,當語彼言:『汝顧戀父母得活者,可顧戀耳,既不由顧戀而得活,用顧戀為?』彼若言不顧戀父母者,當歎善隨喜,當復問言:『汝於妻子、奴僕、錢財諸物有顧念不?』若言顧念,當教令捨,如捨顧戀父母法;若言不顧念,歎善隨喜,當復問言:『汝於人間五欲顧念以不?』若言顧念,當為說言:『人間五欲惡露不淨,敗壞臭處,不如天上勝妙五欲。』教令捨離人間五欲,教令志願天上五欲。若復彼言心已遠離人間五欲,先已顧念天勝妙欲,歎善隨喜,復語彼言:『天上妙欲無常、苦、空、變壞之法,諸天上有身勝天五欲。』若言已捨顧念天欲,顧念有身勝欲,歎善隨喜,當復教言:『有身之欲,亦復無常、變壞之法,有行滅、涅槃、出離之樂,汝當捨離有身顧念,樂於涅槃寂滅之樂為上、為勝。』彼聖弟子已能捨離有身顧念,樂涅槃者,歎善隨

The Buddha said to Nanti: "If there are any wise yupasins, go to the rest of the wise yupasins and yupasins who are sick and suffering, and teach them the three kinds of resting places, saying: 'Master! Thou shalt attain to the purity of the Buddha and to the purity of the Dharma and the Sangha. After teaching with these three types of sesshin, he asked, "Do you care for your parents? If he cares for his parents, he will teach them to give up, and he will say to them, "If thou canst live by caring for thy parents, thou canst live by caring for them. If he says that he does not care for his parents, he is to be admired, and he is to be asked, "Do you care for your wife, your servants, your money, and other things? If he says he cares for them, he will teach him to give them up, as he gives up the law of caring for his parents; if he says he does not care for them, he will be pleased with them, and will ask again, "Do you care for the five human desires? If thou sayest thou regardest the five human desires, say: "The five human desires are impure and corrupting, not as good as the five heavenly desires. Teach him to forsake the five human desires and to desire the five heavenly desires. If he says that his mind is far from the five human desires, and he has first thought of the heavenly desires, and he sighs with joy, he says to him, "The heavenly desires are impermanent, bitter, empty, and corrupt. If he says, "If he has given up thinking of heavenly desires, and thinks of the desire for bodily victory, he will say, "The desire for bodily victory is also impermanent, impermanent, and corruptible, and there is the joy of death, nirvana, and emancipation; give up thinking of the desire for bodily victory, and rejoice in the joy of nirvana and silence. If the holy disciple is able to give up bodily cares and rejoice in nirvana, he will be honored.
https://suttacentral.net/sa1122/lzh/taisho

欲: desire, want, long for intend

This is obviously referring to external objects. The "five human desires" are sights, sound, tastes, smells and tactile sensations. This places kāmā firmly in the external world, as objects of the senses. These objects are desirable ones. Taken in conjunction with the sutta it seems to be saying the same thing. The kāmehi are external lovely sense objects. However, take a look at MN 13 where a distinction is made between kāmā and the kāmaguṇa:

Ko ca, bhikkhave, kāmānaṁ assādo?
And what, Bhikkhus, is the enjoyment of kāmānaṁ?

Pañcime, bhikkhave, kāmaguṇā.
There are five strings of lust.

Katame pañca?
What five?

Cakkhuviññeyyā rūpā iṭṭhā kantā manāpā piyarūpā kāmūpasaṁhitā rajanīyā,
Sights known by the eye that are likable, desirable, agreeable, pleasant, sensual, and arousing.

sotaviññeyyā saddā …pe…
Sounds known by the ear …

ghānaviññeyyā gandhā …
Smells known by the nose …

jivhāviññeyyā rasā …
Tastes known by the tongue …

kāyaviññeyyā phoṭṭhabbā iṭṭhā kantā manāpā piyarūpā kāmūpasaṁhitā rajanīyā—
Touches known by the body that are likable, desirable, agreeable, pleasant, sensual, and arousing.

ime kho, bhikkhave, pañca kāmaguṇā.
These are the five kinds of strings of lust.

Yaṁ kho, bhikkhave, ime pañca kāmaguṇe paṭicca uppajjati sukhaṁ somanassaṁ—ayaṁ kāmānaṁ assādo.
The pleasure and happiness that arise from these five strings of lust: this is the enjoyment of kāmānaṁ.


We could simplify this to:

"And what, Bhikkhus, is the enjoyment of sense objects? The pleasure and happiness that arise based on pleasurable sights, sounds etc. This is enjoying of sense objects."

If we look to the parallel, admittedly relying on an English translation since I lack the Chinese skills to translate it myself, the distinction is found there:
“As for sense pleasures, what is enjoying them like? There are the so-called five sense-pleasures. Which are the five? When the eye sees forms, eye-consciousness is caused to arise followed by excessive fondness for forms, ever-present in mankind and giving it complete satisfaction. When the ear hears sounds, the nose smells scents, the tongue recognises flavours and when tangibles are felt with the body the respective kinds of consciousness are caused to arise followed by excessive fondness for the respective sense-objects, ever-present in mankind and giving it complete satisfaction. Now when on account of these five sense-pleasures one’s mind experiences pleasures and pain, this is called enjoyment of sense-pleasures.

“As for sense-pleasures, what is their wretchedness? Now there is a son of a good family who, for his livelihood, trains to become proficient in many a field: either farming or writing or public service or calculating or pretension to empowerment or courier service or royal service. He does not avoid exposing his body to heat and cold, and in his training he works hard and zealously, taking great pains and without sparing himself. Becoming rich and making a fortune by taking so much trouble—that is great wretchedness for the sake of sense-pleasures. In this world all suffering is due to attachment to and desire for them.
https://suttacentral.net/ea21.9/en/huye ... b-pasadika

The translator has opted for "sense-pleasures" but we can see that if we take the Pāli understanding of kāmā as being external sense objects, it makes more sense:
“As for sense objects, what is enjoying them like? There are the so-called five sense-pleasures. Which are the five? When the eye sees forms, eye-consciousness is caused to arise followed by excessive fondness for forms, ever-present in mankind and giving it complete satisfaction. When the ear hears sounds, the nose smells scents, the tongue recognises flavours and when tangibles are felt with the body the respective kinds of consciousness are caused to arise followed by excessive fondness for the respective sense-objects, ever-present in mankind and giving it complete satisfaction. Now when on account of these five sense objects one’s mind experiences pleasures and pain, this is called enjoyment of sense-objects.

“As for sense objects, what is their wretchedness? Now there is a son of a good family who, for his livelihood, trains to become proficient in many a field: either farming or writing or public service or calculating or pretension to empowerment or courier service or royal service. He does not avoid exposing his body to heat and cold, and in his training he works hard and zealously, taking great pains and without sparing himself. Becoming rich and making a fortune by taking so much trouble—that is great wretchedness for the sake of sense-objects. In this world all suffering is due to attachment to and desire for them."
Now if we look to the Pāli sutta we see:

II “And what, bhikkhus, is the danger of kāmānaṁ? Here, bhikkhus, on account of the craft by which a clansman makes a living—whether checking or accounting or calculating or farming or trading or husbandry or archery or the royal service, or whatever craft it may be—he has to face cold, he has to face heat, he is injured by contact with gadflies, mosquitoes, wind, sun, and creeping things; he risks death by hunger and thirst. Now this is a danger in the case of kāmānaṁ, a mass of suffering visible here and now, having kāmahetu as its reason, kāmanidānaṁ as its source, kāmādhikaraṇaṁ as its basis, the reason being simply kāmānameva.

The kāmā here are clearly external objects, but they aren't pleasurable ones. The suttas then take a stance that kāmā are external objects, which can sometimes be lovely and sometimes not. The kāmaguṇa seem to be a sub-set of the kāmā, and so it seems they can sometimes be conflated.

Lastly, you have not addressed my concern that your methodology is internally inconsistent? Earlier you accused me of evasion. Projection perhaps? I suppose we can only speculate.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Sun Apr 11, 2021 1:54 pm, edited 14 times in total.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by Ceisiwr »

sphairos wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 5:03 pm
Yes, they can be made and they can be necessarily true: 5 + 7 = 12. Experientially and logically. Then they are called a synthetic a priori knowledge or science.
As I said, I am not a strict follower of Kant per se. Frege and Carnap offered an analysis where mathematics is not synthetic a priori but rather analytic a priori. As for science, if we exclude mathematics it only deals in probabilities and never in certain knowledge.
The statement “The angles of a triangle are equal to the sum of two right angles” is a synthetic a priori judgement, and it is always true for everyone experientially.
Euclidean geometry has been shown to be only true over short distances. It doesn't match with general relativity. If it were synthetic a priori knowledge it should be true in every instance.
"Every event has a cause" is also a valid synthetic apriori principle, because an event without a cause is unthinkable logically and can not be experienced.
Is it really? I would be interested to know how you get "cause" from "event" without an appeal to sense experience, which of course would then open you up to the problem of induction? Being "unthinkable" is not an argument for "cause" being contained within "event". It being outside of experience has no bearing here.
Moreover, you can create metaphysics as a science, as Kant writes at the very end of the Prolegomena -- this is what you need to do:
He did claim that. It depends if you think Kant was successful in rescuing some form of metaphysics or not, such as causality. Interestingly even if you accept that he rescued causality from the devastation of Hume, he did so only in principle. His thought allows for the world to be structured according to causality, but it does not allow you to say that X causes Y. Naturally this would still throw a causality based interpretation of dependent origination out of the window. Thankfully, dependent origination has nothing to do with causality.
The problem arises when you make the synthetic a priori judgements that you can not justify in experience at all
This is a misunderstanding. Synthetic a priori statements are not justified by experience at all, like how analytical a priori statements aren't. Naturally I don't think synthetic a priori statements can be justified. I don't think the Buddha did either. Cast it into the flames and you will be tranquil.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by sphairos »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:34 pm
sphairos wrote: Sat Apr 10, 2021 5:03 pm
Yes, they can be made and they can be necessarily true: 5 + 7 = 12. Experientially and logically. Then they are called a synthetic a priori knowledge or science.
As I said, I am not a strict follower of Kant per se. Frege and Carnap offered an analysis where mathematics is not synthetic a priori but rather analytic a priori. As for science, if we exclude mathematics it only deals in probabilities and never in certain knowledge.
Then don't use the Kantian concepts, because whenever you summon them you find yourself caught in the synthetic a priori intuition of space and time, where the space and time are a priori forms of all sensation, and your ambitious Humean project is dismantled.

Yes, we do have. You cannot be your own father.
The statement “The angles of a triangle are equal to the sum of two right angles” is a synthetic a priori judgement, and it is always true for everyone experientially.
Euclidean geometry has been shown to be only true over short distances. It doesn't match with general relativity. If it were synthetic a priori knowledge it should be true in every instance.
But it's true for our transcendental experience. Kant allows many possible worlds, where synthetic a priori judgements are different. Macro-Universe, micro-Universe and human Universe may as well be be such worlds.
"Every event has a cause" is also a valid synthetic apriori principle, because an event without a cause is unthinkable logically and can not be experienced.
Is it really? I would be interested to know how you get "cause" from "event" without an appeal to sense experience, which of course would then open you up to the problem of induction? Being "unthinkable" is not an argument for "cause" being contained within "event". It being outside of experience has no bearing here.
Here , Section 27, 311 - 314 .

http://web.mnstate.edu/gracyk/courses/p ... omena5.htm

Kantian solution of the Humean empirical scepticism.

Our experience is already pre-programmed by synthetic a priori intuitions and judgements. It's not simplistic Humean thinking.

Another version from a different angle is the Popperian solution of the Humean induction problem.
Moreover, you can create metaphysics as a science, as Kant writes at the very end of the Prolegomena -- this is what you need to do:
He did claim that. It depends if you think Kant was successful in rescuing some form of metaphysics or not, such as causality. Interestingly even if you accept that he rescued causality from the devastation of Hume, he did so only in principle. His thought allows for the world to be structured according to causality, but it does not allow you to say that X causes Y. Naturally this would still throw a causality based interpretation of dependent origination out of the window. Thankfully, dependent origination has nothing to do with causality.
Causality is not metaphysics, but a basic fact of existence, without which anything is unthinkable and unimaginable.

Only your own interpretation of the dependent origination suffers.
The problem arises when you make the synthetic a priori judgements that you can not justify in experience at all
This is a misunderstanding. Synthetic a priori statements are not justified by experience at all, like how analytical a priori statements aren't. Naturally I don't think synthetic a priori statements can be justified. I don't think the Buddha did either. Cast it into the flames and you will be tranquil.
[/quote]

Kant says they do:

"Besides, it only refers to objects of the external sense and therefore does not give an example of a universal science of nature, in the strict sense, for such a science must reduce nature in general, whether it regards the object of the external or that of the internal sense (the object of Physics as well as Psychology), to universal laws. But among the principles of this universal physics there are a few which actually have the required universality; for instance, the propositions that "substance is permanent, " and that "every event is determined by a cause according to constant laws," etc. These are actually universal laws of nature, which subsist completely a priori."

The problem is that you incorrectly use Kantian concepts, that are only meaningful and usable within his majestic system. Just use the Humean concepts.

Yes, they are justified. Geometry, math, fundamental principles of Universe and experience.

Basically, space and time are our synthetic a priori proto-judgements. Everything has at the same time empirical reality and transcendental ideality. Hume thought that everything is just pure Experience, but Kant showed that Experience is already pre-programmed by Pure Mind (die reine Vernunft). Everything is much trickier than Hume ingenuously assumed.

Your ideas about the Buddha and causality are premature. To me you paint the Buddha as a simpleton I would never even consider to follow. The Buddha, was, of course, a transcendentalist. That's why he taught avyākatas, saṃskṛta/asaṃskṛta etc. I can recommend you a number of sophisticated treatises about the principles of the Buddha's teaching ("philosophy").
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by Ceisiwr »

sphairos wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 2:04 pm ...
Full passage and reference please before I respond to the rest of your post. You also did not address my point regarding causality. Even if Kant does rescue some metaphysics and so causality (I don't think he does) that still only gives you causality in principle. It does not allow you to say X causes Y. This would still make dependent origination impossible if it were a causality model, which it is not.
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by Coëmgenu »

So it looks like the reason these debates go on forever is because the sutta can be interpreted in two ways, and I'm hardly the first to point this out in the thread.

AN 6.63 says "saṅkapparāgo purisassa kāmo," which Ven Sujāto translates as "Greedy intention is a person’s sensual pleasure." The same text later says, "Añño, bhikkhave, kāmo rūpesu, añño kāmo saddesu, añño kāmo gandhesu, añño kāmo rasesu, añño kāmo phoṭṭhabbesu. Ayaṁ vuccati, bhikkhave, kāmānaṁ vemattatā," which corresponds to "The sensual desire for sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and touches are all different. This is called the diversity of sensual pleasures" from the same translation. Because the second "this is kāma" identifies it as "kāmo rūpesu [...] kāmo saddesu," etc., it is more similar to the definition of "kāma" at MN 13, where it is "sotaviññeyyā [...] ghānaviññeyyā [...] jivhāviññeyyā," etc., or "that cognized/perceived by the ear," (no longer using Ven Sujato's translation, just as a clarification to those reading who might be confused) etc. If kāma/kāmā is "sotaviññeyyā" etc., then the suttas can be definitively said to state in at least some places that "vivicceva kāmehi" means "secluded from sense perceptions" rather than "secluded from the saṅkapparāgo" which is "kāmo rūpesu" etc.

However, unless I'm confused reading the thread, elsewhere you say that Venerable Buddhaghosa has to run through hoops to justify this which conflicts with the Vibhaṅga. I can't find the exact expression you used but it was something like having to run through hoops to justify something. Does he have to run through hoops, or do the suttas definitively say that kāma in the plural always refers to "sotaviññeyyā etc." and generally does not refer to "kāmo rūpesu," "kāmo saddesu," etc. in the sense of "saṅkapparāgo purisassa kāmo" with respect to rupa, sadda, etc.? The argument seems to hinge upon the plural of something always being distinct from the singular of it, and that the plural of it will never refer to different "saṅkapparāgos," but will always refer to a multitude of things that are "viññeyyā."
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by ToVincent »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Apr 11, 2021 12:09 pm ...
Don't fall into your usual nonsensical logorrhoea.

MN 13 extract is about the dangers of kāma.
As in, theft is an inherent unpleasant danger of the desire to accumulate wealth.
The object of desire is wealth — The unpleasant danger is theft.

Sophistry!

------

As seen here:
https://justpaste.it/img/62c4c6b65f2a5b ... 710f2f.png

— Rūpa (as per Buddha's definition,) is the four great elements/mahābhūtā (water, fire,...) AND the forms derived from them (tree, perfume,...)
— External fields of sensorial experience are bāhirāni āyatanāni (form, scent,...).
— Internal fields of sensorial experience are ajjhattikāni āyatanāni (eye, nose,...).

and

— Kāma is an object of desire, love, or pleasure.
— Kāmā and kamehi are plural forms.

The upādāyarūpa, (the forms derived from the four great elements,) are the "external objects".
They might or they might not be object of (desire, love, or) sensual pleasure — and they might, or they might not arouse sensual pleasure.
Like one person intelligently remarked previously on this forum: what is an object of desire for one, might not be an object of desire for another.

You seem to confound sensorial and sensual.

In the first jhāna, one separates oneself from the objects that initiate desire, love, or pleasure.

--------

Kāmaguṇā loke.
Ah, the goodness, impulsivity and ignorant darkness of the desires, loves, and pleasures of this world.

---------

Enough time waisted.
.
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Re: Jhana and the early Mahayana

Post by Ṭhānuttamo »

Ceisiwr wrote: Wed Mar 31, 2021 8:14 pm A further question. If the 1st jhāna is temporary freedom from sensual pleasures, why were the Buddha and the Arahants not constantly in jhāna or simply slipping into it quite at random? The Buddha would be totally free from sensual pleasures, as in lust. He wasn't totally free from sensual objects, until final nibbāna. We can then see how on an absorption based model the Buddha and Arahants would not be constantly in jhāna, or falling in and out of them at random. This becomes harder on a jhāna-lite model. How do you propose a solution to this contradiction in your argument?
That's a good question! Never occurred to me ...
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