ToVincent wrote: ↑Sat Apr 10, 2021 10:39 am
"The analytic and synthetic distinction doesn't refer to the origin of the concepts, but rather the justification of the reasoning."
Then few lines later, you dare say:
"Notice what is common to both of them? They both start from the same premise:
'This self' "
There is no contradiction there. As I said, the analytic and synthetic divide relates to the justification of the reasoning rather than the origin of the concepts themselves. If we take an analytic a priori proposition such as "all Batchelors are unmarried", whilst the concepts of "bachelor" and "unmarried" come from sense experience the justification for the statement is purely a priori. When someone understands the concept of "bachelors" and "unmarried" they do not need to consult experience to have knowledge that "all Batchelors are unmarried" since the predicate is contained within the subject. Regarding a synthetic a posteriori proposition such as "All swans are white" once again, whilst the concepts can come from experience it is the justification of the statement we are interested in. In this case "All swans are white" is synthetic, since "white" is not contained within "swan" and it is a posteriori since it's justification depends upon sense experience. One has to consult sense experience to know if it is true. Since analytic a posteriori is logically impossible this then leave synthetic a priori. This would be a proposition where the predicate is not contained within the subject, thus being synthetic, yet is justified and known to be true independent of experience (a priori). One such statement would be "Every event has a cause". The issue then centres around where knowledge can be found in these different types of reasoning. If we take the analytic a priori, we can indeed say there is certain knowledge since the predicate "unmarried" is contained within the subject "bachelor". It is true by definition, independent of experience. We do not need to look to experience to know that it is true. If we look to the synthetic a posteriori we can see that "all swans are white" is not knowledge. It is contingent on sense experience and all swans existing being white. Any justification of this position however will fall, since it is impossible to know one has accounted for all possible swans. It also relies upon inductive reasoning, which is epistemologically flawed. Finally, looking to the synthetic a priori we can see that it is not knowledge either. Being a priori it's justification does not relate to sense experience since nothing in sense experience gives us the justification of "every event has a cause", yet it is not knowledge since the predicate (cause) is not contained in the subject (event). The synthetic a priori then are a collection of statements which are not knowledge and which can never be known. It then naturally follows that metaphysics is a dead end. Its theories can be argued about endlessly, but can never be known. They are the contortion of views, the net of views. One of course could try instead to justify their metaphysics by appeals to sense experience. For example, regarding causation they could claim that the constant conjunction of two events justifies "all events have a cause", but this would fall due to its basis in induction. Instead of this thick sticky web of ever more fanciful, convoluted and unknowable theories the Buddha choose knowledge. That is to say, the analytical knowledge of paṭiccasamuppāda. He then, unlike the other ascetics, does not have a view as in a theory but rather understanding and knowledge. This is Right View".
Now, getting back to our ascetics the Buddha elsewhere (SN 22.47) offers a psychological basis for the origin of the sense of self whilst the actual words "I" and "existence" obviously have their origins in language. They are mere words which express a previously held notion/concept. The psychological basis for the sense of self is ignorance based contact. The justification for "I have a true self" or rather "I permanently exist" is entirely synthetic a priori. There is nothing in sense experience which justifies "I permanently exist" yet the predicate "permanently exist" is not contained in the subject "I", thus it is not knowledge but a mere abstract theory. It cannot be justified. This then does allow the Buddha to say "not-self". This synthetic a priori proposition then becomes the basis for the ascetics view that when furnished with the appropriate sense pleasure or the otherworldly pleasure of the Jhānā the Self has then attained nibbāna. This view is also contortion itself. It is rooted in desire, thus analytically their claim is false.
So what you say, is that the problem comes from the premise "This self" — that is where the synthetic a priori lies, from your point of view.
What about Buddha's implicit "This not-self", then ? — (which by the way, He never clearly denied, outside of paṭiccasamuppāda — something you seem to categorically acknowledge, on the other hand).
Answered above. He doesn't have to deny there being a self "outside of paṭiccasamuppāda", whatever that means, since his critique is a purely psychological and epistemological one of that position.
I wonder if this strange reasoning, is not just here to nurter your narcissistic inclination - having people endlessly turn around the pot, so you can show how better you are at everything.
I am not avoiding talking about subjects. I'm directly addressing them. You may not like what I am saying, but that is a different thing entirely.
If one speak to you about ants — well, you've been doing just that, since childood - watching them for hours - studying their behaviors very closely.
I was fascinated by ants as a child and used to spend hours watching them. I still find them fascinating little critters today. I'm not an expert though, and I even said as much in the thread you are referring to.
If one speak about genetics — well, you have a scholar eye on the matter.
Given my education and my job I do have some knowledge of genetics. Having not chosen it as my discipline I am not an expert.
If one speak about Veda — well, 9 months will be enough to start with that, and become a pundit in the matter - as well as telling us how sorry you are, because you don't have the time to give us your proper translation of the extract you are quoting — as obviously, you are also becoming a pundit in Sanskrit.
I have indeed spent that last few months reading said texts and teaching myself Sanskrit and Pāli, although this has paused somewhat as of late as I have to focus attention on other things for the time being. That is the reason why I can't always give full replies, mostly during the week.
Another of your late logical flaw, is in how you formulate your premise on "sound" in the first jhana.
You seem to have missed some important points. The sutta in question discusses seeing an unsuitable show being a thorn to sense restraint. This obviously refers to going to a show. The message being, paying attention to the show. If someone is enjoying a show, they are not in the state of sense restraint. Likewise someone who keeps the company of women will not be practicing celibacy, which includes not having sexual thoughts. Regarding sound the comparison is made between pain and happiness. Since when pain exists happiness does not it follows that when sound is experienced the 1st Jhāna is not. Let's follow your conclusions through to it's logical end though. Your argument, as sloppy as it is, seems to be that whilst in the 1st Jhāna sound can still be experience. I must ask then, how can perception and feeling simultaneously exist in the cessation of perception and feeling?
"Perception and feeling are a thorn to the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling."
To me the sutta is clear. If someone is experiencing perception and feeling then they are not in the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling. Likewise if someone is experiencing sound one is not in the 1st Jhāna, and if someone is experiencing attractive women and watching shows then they are not in the state of celibacy nor sense restraint.
As for the pericope "Na te kāmā yāni citrāni loke" - there is no parallel for that.
I'll get back to this "no parallel, therefore not valid" position in a moment.
You say : "You've been taking that from the Sarvāstivāda's Abhidhamma" .
I say: "No, this comes straight from a sutra, if you can read - (SA 298)."
It coming from SA 298 does not mean it hasn't come from the later Abhidharma.
And anyway, there is no way to prove that any Abhidhamma stuff, has been added later in a sutra or sutta. That's always, mere speculative crummy red
herring; dedicated at turning around the pot — for a good "reason".
The inclusion of consciousness under the heading of nāma can only be found across Abhidhamma and commentarial texts, both North and South, whilst within the suttas and parallels we see that it is not so ubiquitous. Based on what has been translated so far we only see it's inclusion in SA 298 and 2 sanskrit fragments. If it were early we should expect to see it within the Pāli suttas also. Given that northern texts have been shown to include commentarial literature, the more likely conclusion is that SA 298 and the fragments are the result of editing under the influence of the Abhidharma. In contrast the Pāli suttas retain a definition which is closer to how nāmarūpa was understood at the time the Buddha was alive. This then brings me back to your earlier "no parallel" objection to "Na te kāmā yāni citrāni loke"
. If your approach is to reject that which has no parallel across the various texts you should by your own method reject SA 298 and your idea of there being 2 different types of nāmarūpa, one "sensualised" and the other not. By not doing so your method is internally inconsistent. The question then arises, why should anyone accept a theory, which you have provided in graphic form, when the methodology is flawed?
As for both definition of SA 298 and SN 12.2, which are not paralells, yet adressing the same subject of nāma — I have already told you several times about it.
(Remember: you can't logically put manasikāro in the nāmarūpa nidāna, if mano is considered an ajjhattikāni āyatanāni, that appears for the first time, in the following saḷāyatana nidāna (another idiosyncrasy of Buddhism)).
There is a before, and an after the descent of nāmarūpa in the saḷāyatanāni.
The same kind of issue happens with the definition of MN 44 & SN 41.6 with the Sarvāstivāda parallel.
The Theravāda's definition of cittasaṅkhāroti is Saññā and Vedanā.
The difference in the Agama, is that cittasaṅkhāroti is Saññā & Cetanā.
The two definitions are not incompatible. They are logically complementary.
The Theravāda's definition adresses the saṅkhārā nidāna.
This time, it is the Sarvāstivāda's definition that gives the new meaning of cittasaṅkhāroti, after the "sensualization" in the saḷāyatana nidāna.
I suppose Buddha meant to have a non-schismatic overview of the all thing.
This has been addressed above. You are merely adopting the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma. This is quite evident when we look at your tendency to reify certain concepts into distinctly existing entities. Citta and mano would be one perfect example. Like the Sarvāstivādins of old, you are becoming quite the specialist in ontological realism. Regarding MN 44 & SN 41.6 and their parallels, even if we accept your argument it does not logically follow that because these suttas and parallels complement each other SA 298 complements it's Pāli equivalents.
There is a before, and an after the descent of nāmarūpa in the saḷāyatanāni.
I'm astounded that someone who boasts so much about being an expert in pre-Buddhist literature would fail to account for the pre-Buddhist meaning of nāmarūpa. If we take nāmarūpa as it would have been understood during his time, we can see that "descent of nāmarūpa" simply means "being to be born" since nāmarūpa could mean simply "that individual over there". The Buddha used this definition as well as his own more detailed definition. We see both usages in DN 15, where nāmarūpa refers to the being being born and the Buddhas own usage of nāmarūpa and it's role in sensory experience.
This is the last time I adress this topic.
And generally, I won't argue any longer upon your absurd and contradictory fundaments.
Oh I doubt that.