Is animal euthenasia 'humane'?

[SarathW]

No.
At this stage this is how I rationalise my point.
You are free to disagree with me.
It is just your opinion against mine.

[tiltbillings]

So it's form of the vitalist theory?

Only in the sense that the disjunction between inanimate (aviññāṇaka) rūpa, such as that of a stone or a rotting corpse, and animate (saviññāṇaka) rūpa, such as that of living humans and animals, is conceived as absolute and not merely a matter of degree.

Other than that the description's not a very comfortable fit. In vitalist theories...

1. The animating principle is usually an immaterial one. Buddhist doctrine posits both a material and a non-material jīvitindriya.

2. The animating principle is usually unitary. In Buddhist doctrine, besides the twofold distinction mentioned above, an instance of the material jīvitindriya is present in every single materiality-cluster (rūpakalāpa) in one’s body, so in effect there are billions of them.

3. The animating principle is either everlasting or at least lasts for the duration of a being’s life. In Buddhist doctrine the jīvitindriya is as ephemeral as any other dhamma.

What does any of this actually really mean? This sort of thing certainly is not even remotely found in the suttas, and where is its actual, practical application in one's life? I have seen a fair amount of actual dying processes leading to death, but I have yet to see a jīvitindriya.

[tiltbillings]

No.
At this stage this is how I rationalise my point.
You are free to disagree with me.
It is just your opinion against mine.

Why do you want to rationalize your point?

[SarathW]

Because some people think my point of view on a particular subject is incorrect.
So my own investigation is pointing towards affirming my point of view.

[tiltbillings]

What exactly is a "life-faculty" and how does one become aware/conscious of it?

In the Vinaya (e.g., Vin. iii. 73) and in the Suttas (e.g., D. ii. 305), the life-faculty is that which when it is cut off makes you dead. In the Abhidhamma more precise and technical descriptions are given, but as these are descriptions concerned with fostering insight development, an examination of them for our present purposes would be overkill.

As to the would-be killer’s awareness of his victim’s life-faculty, except in the unlikely event that he has discerned it through bhāvanā, his knowledge of it will be no more than inferential. That is, he will know of it through its effects: the continuance of vitality in the living being, as manifested in its appearance and behaviour, or else detectable via the medical monitoring devices.

So, if I have sufficient capacity as a result of bhāvanā I can see, or sense in some way or other, life-faculty? Do the suttas say that?

[Sylvester]

[If the commentaries are wrong then we must treat death by one’s own hand as being something other than pāṇātipāta, given that the Suttas unqualifiedly declare an arahant to be incapable of the latter. (There is in fact a strong Vinaya case to be made for this, quite independently of any conclusions one might draw from these alleged suicides by arahants).

Bhante, might the Vinaya case be based on Ven Ananda's passing? How about the Buddha's decision to relinquish "His" āyusaṅkhāra?

[cooran]

I don't understand what this has to do with putting down a dying animal.....

[SarathW]

It appears that Sylvester think it is similar to euthanasia.
If that is the case, the difference is there is no attachment, aversion and ignorance in that decision.
There are few other stories in Buddhism that Arahant end life after they come to the end of life.
If there are nothing more to be done best thing to leave the place.

[Dhammanando]

What does any of this actually really mean?

Perhaps it means that there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in the philosophy of the North American neo-Sautrāntika school.

This sort of thing certainly is not even remotely found in the suttas, and where is its actual, practical application in one's life?

In the context of this Ethical Conduct sub-forum its practical application is that it supplies an authoritative dhammic repudiation of claims such as this:

A cat is run over in the road; bisected and dying, not dead yet; incredible, excruciating agony, the look in the cat's eyes...
Ending that life is not killing it; the car did that.

and this:

The thing about this is that's not how it's perceived by the people doing the euthanasia. Not with the veterinarians I worked with anyway. The perception from them was that this being has already been deprived of it's life. The euthanasia not considered "destroying or deprivation of life" to begin with. The animals life is considered to already be destroyed.

In the Buddha’s Dhamma life’s not over so long as the jīvitindriya’s still there and “soon to be over” doesn’t mean “over”.

I have seen a fair amount of actual dying processes leading to death, but I have yet to see a jīvitindriya.

But you have surely seen the continuance of vitality in living beings, and in the Suttas the jīvitindriya is stated to be the pavattasīsa or “lord of continuance”.

So, if I have sufficient capacity as a result of bhāvanā I can see, or sense in some way or other, life-faculty? Do the suttas say that?

Indeed. It is a controlling-faculty after all, and since every controlling-faculty is a potential object of insight (sammasana-dhamma) and a potential object of higher knowledge (abhiññeyya-dhamma), both the Suttanta and Abhidhamma Piṭakas list it among the dhammas to be known.

Jīvitindriyaṃ abhiññeyyaṃ.

“The vitality controlling-faculty is to be known.”
(Paṭisam. i. 7)

[Dhammanando]

Hi Sylvester,

Bhante, might the Vinaya case be based on Ven Ananda's passing? How about the Buddha's decision to relinquish "His" āyusaṅkhāra?

No, I wasn't thinking of either of those but of an episode in the Pārājikakaṇḍa (Vin. iii. 82).

It relates that an unhappy bhikkhu, wishing to kill himself, jumped off Vulture's Peak and landed on top of a basket-maker. The basket-maker was killed but the bhikkhu survived. The matter was then reported to the Buddha. Since the bhikkhu had no intention of killing the basket-maker, obviously that action was no offence. But what about the attempted suicide? If it were the case that suicide was pāṇātipāta, then the bhikkhu's unsuccessful attempt would have amounted to an incomplete commission of the third pārājika. In that case we should expect the Buddha to have declared him guilty of a thullaccaya offence, as would be the case with a bhikkhu who made an unsuccessful murder attempt. Instead the Buddha pronounces the bhikkhu's action to be no offence at all. He then proceeds to establish a new minor rule making it a misdemeanour for bhikkhus to jump from high places.

[ihrjordan]

In short, we all may have "interpretations," but some are clearly more justifiable than others.

[Sylvester]

It relates that an unhappy bhikkhu, wishing to kill himself, jumped off Vulture's Peak and landed on top of a basket-maker. ...

Thanks Bhante.

I understand your position re the incompatibility of the intention to euthanize with wholesomeness according to the Abhidhamma. But might there be a loophole to allow for such a compatibility under the possibility that the Dhammasaṅgaṇī listings of what constitutes kusala or akusala are not closed lists but ideal exemplars of the 2 poles. I'm speaking of course of the "Ye vā pana tasmiṃ samaye aññepi atthi paṭic­ca­samup­pannā arūpino dhammā—ime dhammā kusalā" allowance that peppers the lists. (Now these—or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states there are on that occasion—these are states that are good. - Mrs Rhys Davids transl).

[SarathW]

What exactly is a "life-faculty" and how does one become aware/conscious of it?

In the Vinaya (e.g., Vin. iii. 73) and in the Suttas (e.g., D. ii. 305), the life-faculty is that which when it is cut off makes you dead. In the Abhidhamma more precise and technical descriptions are given, but as these are descriptions concerned with fostering insight development, an examination of them for our present purposes would be overkill.

As to the would-be killer’s awareness of his victim’s life-faculty, except in the unlikely event that he has discerned it through bhāvanā, his knowledge of it will be no more than inferential. That is, he will know of it through its effects: the continuance of vitality in the living being, as manifested in its appearance and behaviour, or else detectable via the medical monitoring devices.

There are two types of Jivitandriya.
Nama Jivitandriya and Rupa Jivitandriya.
It is said Plants also possess Rupa Jivitandriya.
I think we cant kill Nama Jivitandriya.

[seeker242]

The thing about this is that's not how it's perceived by the people doing the euthanasia. Not with the veterinarians I worked with anyway. The perception from them was that this being has already been deprived of it's life. The euthanasia not considered "destroying or deprivation of life" to begin with. The animals life is considered to already be destroyed.

In the Buddha’s Dhamma life’s not over so long as the jīvitindriya’s still there and “soon to be over” doesn’t mean “over”.

Thanks. I think I understand that part. But my point was really that if a person does honestly believe that soon to be over equals over, and some other person knows it's not, doesn't that imply that these two people, if they do the same action, will be making different kamma? Doesn't one's perception influence what kind of kamma is made? For example, a little kid squashing some bugs for fun vs us squashing some bugs. It seems to me that we would be making worse kamma than the little kid because we are fully aware of that being's sentience and the kid is not. In other words, we have a different perception of the situation and that has an influence on the making of kamma.

[SarathW]

Person who make a kamma knowing is greater than the person who is doing unknown.
In this case, the thought killing is Ok is a wrong view.
Hence he is doing a greater unwholesome kamma than a person doing without the wrong view.

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