"Is it possible to accept Nagarjuna's argument and remain a Theravadan?"

[Sabbe_Dhamma_Anatta]

• Is it possible to accept N's argument and remain a Theravadan?

  https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/ques ... 4352_38709

Yes.

Ven. Nanananda lived & died being a Theravadan monk.

[confusedlayman]

• Is it possible to accept N's argument and remain a Theravadan?

  https://buddhism.stackexchange.com/ques ... 4352_38709

Yes.

Ven. Nanananda lived & died being a Theravadan monk.

Compatible

[Sabbe_Dhamma_Anatta]

...
Compatible

A great word.

[Ceisiwr]

I wouldn’t say so. What makes a Theravādin or a Sarvāstivādin or any other early Buddhist school is their Abhidhamma/Abhidharma and commentaries. If you accept Nāgārjuna then your interpretation of the Dhamma will be different to those traditions. You might try to reconcile Nāgārjuna with the suttas (I don’t think he can be, but that’s a different discussion) but reliance on the suttas alone does not make one a Theravādin.

[Ceisiwr]

It’s also worth pointing out that although they shared somethings in common Ven. Nanananda also criticised Madhyamaka, although some might say he was simply misunderstanding it.

[Sabbe_Dhamma_Anatta]

..
You might try to reconcile Nāgārjuna with the suttas (I don’t think he can be, but that’s a different discussion)
...

That's interesting. Please kindly refer to where I can find that on DWT, or please make a topic, if it is handy at the moment. The topic may be something like: "Nagarjuna isn't Reconcilable with the suttas", isn't it? Atm, I don't have enough readings to make that topic.

It’s also worth pointing out that although they shared somethings in common Ven. Nanananda also criticised Madhyamaka, although some might say he was simply misunderstanding it.

That's also a great point. Where [which book] should I search for Ven. Nanananda's criticisms on Madhyamaka? Thanks in advance. Just the name of the book would suffice for the time being.

[mikenz66]

That's also a great point. Where [which book] should I search for Ven. Nanananda's criticisms on Madhyamaka? Thanks in advance. Just the name of the book would suffice for the time being.

I think he probably just means the brief quote from Questions and Answers.
https://seeingthroughthenet.net/books/

“I didn’t quote from the Mahāyāna texts in the Nibbāna
sermons,” he says, “because there was no need. All that was
needed was already found in the Suttas. Teachers like Nāgārjuna
brought to light what was already there but was hidden from
view. Unfortunately his later followers turned it in to a vāda.”

Mike

[Spiny Norman]

Can anyone explain in a nutshell what Nargajuna's argument is?

[confusedlayman]

Can anyone explain in a nutshell what Nargajuna's argument is?

he says u can't label or pinpoint anything due to ever changing, no essence in anything

hence all thoughts are concepts rooted in illusion.

[Ceisiwr]

That's also a great point. Where [which book] should I search for Ven. Nanananda's criticisms on Madhyamaka? Thanks in advance. Just the name of the book would suffice for the time being.

I think he probably just means the brief quote from Questions and Answers.
https://seeingthroughthenet.net/books/

“I didn’t quote from the Mahāyāna texts in the Nibbāna
sermons,” he says, “because there was no need. All that was
needed was already found in the Suttas. Teachers like Nāgārjuna
brought to light what was already there but was hidden from
view. Unfortunately his later followers turned it in to a vāda.”

Mike

No it’s in “Concept and Reality” if I recall. I’ll check later.

[Ceisiwr]

Here is some of it:

We have already discussed with special reference to the term 'Suññatâ', some of the limitations of the Mâdhyamika dialectic. Their concept of the dialectical Middle Path, which even made them declare that their position is 'no-position', ultimately ran into difficulties due to lack of appreciation of the pragmatic approach. As to this latter approach, the Theravâdins had it in good measure, even to .the extent of ignoring the dialectical significance of the term 'papañca'. Hence any rapprochement between the two systems on the question of papañca will be of mutual benefit, as both will have much to learn and unlearn by comparing notes.

[mikenz66]

No it’s in “Concept and Reality” if I recall. I’ll check later.

Yes, you're right. Same link as I gave...


Mike

[Sabbe_Dhamma_Anatta]

That's also a great point. Where [which book] should I search for Ven. Nanananda's criticisms on Madhyamaka? Thanks in advance. Just the name of the book would suffice for the time being.

I think he probably just means the brief quote from Questions and Answers.
https://seeingthroughthenet.net/books/

“I didn’t quote from the Mahāyāna texts in the Nibbāna
sermons,” he says, “because there was no need. All that was
needed was already found in the Suttas. Teachers like Nāgārjuna
brought to light what was already there but was hidden from
view. Unfortunately his later followers turned it in to a vāda.”

Mike

Thanks a lot, Mike. I think there maybe more than that. And, I don't think it's criticism to Ven. Nagarjuna, but to "his later followers".

[Ceisiwr]

Though there were attempts to assert the importance of ethics, the Mâdhyamika system with its ruthless attack on concepts tended to overshoot itself in its dialectical ebullience. Thus much of the significant service rendered by that system of thought in exposing the futility of the preoccupation with concepts in 'Hînayâna' circles, was ultimately offset by its own extravagances. It was rightly affirmed by the Mâdhyamikas, that the Buddha had recommended the abandonment of all views including that of sûnyatâ.2 This affirmation, however, was belied as the system lacked those 'built-in' safeguards against perversion that are to be found in the Pali Nikâyas. According to the early Buddhist standpoint, the Middle Path consisted neither in the confrontation of every thesis with its antithesis, nor in their synthesis, nor again in their total refutation, but in a balanced understanding of the relative and pragmatic value of concepts. Dialectical consciousness, therefore, as an intellectual experience of the ultimate futility of concepts, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the attainment of the Goal. Nor is it a panacea for the all-pervasive dukkha. It is no doubt an essential ingredient in sammâ diññhi, which is but the first step in the Path. The ethical Middle Path lies right through conceptual formulations as steps of training, which are to be made use of with circumspection and detachment. The dialectician pledged to logical consistency might regard this position as being riddled with contradictions.

There is more. Typical to his fashion he talks at great length and detail.

[Ceisiwr]

It apppears that the difference in approach between early Buddhism and the Mâdhyamika system towards the problem of concepts hinges on what might be called a subtle shift of emphasis in the interpretation of the terms 'suñña' and 'attâ'... Thus the main prong of attack is levelled at the concept of the soul as the controlling agent who is capable of experiencing happiness, which necessarily has to be permanent in order to be perfect. It is true that what gives rise to this notion is the idea of permanence or substantiality, but this latter is sufficiently rendered by the term 'nicca'. The illusion of substantiality is linked with the psychological impulse for happiness (sukha), which in its turn sustains the illusion of the ego (attà). Now, the Mâdhyamika system often seems to stress this notion of substantiality underlying the illusion of an 'âtman', thereby giving an objective twist to that word...

In coining the two expressions, 'pudgala nairâtmya' and 'dharma- nairâtmya', the Mâdhyamikas seem to have ignored the original significance of the term 'anattà’. According to the early Buddhist point of view, there can be no basis for such a distinction since the dharmas or elements, when they are regarded as being one's self or as belonging to one's self, would thereby become objects of his mind and part of his five aggregates. When it was said that one should look upon all dhammas as anattâ, it only meant that one has to regard them as not being one's own self or a part thereof. Perhaps a better way to bring out the crux of the present argument would be to pose the question whether there will be any dharma-nairâtmya left over to be realised, when one has realised the so-called pudgala-nairâtmya. It might of course be urged in mitigation that what gave rise to the above two expressions, was the very dogmatic attitude of the 'Hînayânists' in clinging to the dharmas. But this does not appear to be sufficient justification, since that dogmatic attitude of the 'Hînayânists' is merely an indication that they have not grasped the full significance of the nairâtmya doctrine. If they had, they would no longer be dogmatic with regard to the dharmas which are the objects of the sixth sense. In any case, this confusion as to the basic issues involved seems to have had its repercussions on the Mâdhyamika conception of sûnyatâ...

The upshot of the above discussion on suññatâ would be the revelation that the dialectician, if he seriously intends escaping from all views and concepts, should disown and transcend them rather than demolish them in toto. As the objects of the sixth sense, concepts are as much a fact of experience as are the objects of the other senses. Hence they will continue in the world as worldly conventions in spite of all their flaws and contradictions. The Middle Path, therefore, consists essentially in the pragmatic approach of choosing and using what is essential for the purpose, without attachment. This approach is abundantly clear in a certain criterion which the Buddha is seen declaring so often in the suttas. For the purpose of quotation, we may choose the following context which has a striking relevance to the present discussion.