clarity1982 wrote: ↑Sun Apr 24, 2022 11:37 am
I meant more in the general scheme of the distinction between the "Unconditioned" and the phenomenal "world" and not in the elaborate enumeration, etc. In broad strokes, there seems to be agreement between the Nikayas and the Samkhya although they use different terms and the Samkhya is much more focused on creating an ontological system as opposed to praxis. Overall, they're opposed to the monistic idealism that one sees Advaita Vedanta.
Gauḍapāda accepted a phenomenal world and an unconditioned reality, but as an Advaita Vedantin. He was also very critical of Samkhaya. He was critical because Samkhaya argues for causality, which he thought was an incoherent concept, and because it argues for a plurality. That there are a plurality of Purusha is a characteristic of Samkhaya thought. Now for Gauḍapāda there is in reality only one thing that exists. Because there is only one thing there is, ultimately, no arising, no ceasing, no birth, no ageing, no death and no suffering. What he is doing here is using Venerable Nāgārjuna's argument but as a means to argue
for something. For Venerable Nāgārjuna ultimately there is no arising, no ceasing, no birth etc because all is empty of being. Since all is empty, ultimately no concepts apply at all. The highest truth then in Madhyamaka is a "non-implicative negation". Gauḍapāda instead argues that
because there is only Being then there is no arising, no ceasing etc. He also argues that concepts do not apply, even the concepts of Ātman ultimately do not apply, because concepts are bound up with non-real phenomenal world and Being is beyond that. Yogācāra also argues that dhammas can't be said to exist, and that ultimately there is only one thing but this one thing can't be described other than "Suchness". Now Theravāda argues that there really are things. There really are two kinds of things. There really are conditioned dhammas which arise and cease in the world, and there really is 1 unconditioned dhamma which does not arise and cease. Concepts for the conditioned have real referents, but to truly know these conditioned dhammas you have to directly experience them without a conceptual overlay. For the unconditioned, the concept "nibbāna" refers to something real but apart from "exists" and "permanent" no positive description of it can be made. It can only be referred to via negation, because in it concepts do not apply.
If we just take these schools, we can break them down into three camps. Those that say ultimately there is 1 thing (Yogācāra), those that says there are two types of things with the unconditioned being beyond concepts (Theravāda) and those who say that ultimate truth is to stop thinking in terms of true existence or non-existence of things, both conditioned and unconditioned (Madhyamaka). Now Samkhaya might too say that the ultimate is beyond words, but I don't think this means that the Buddha and Samkhaya had the same thing in mind for as we have seen, other schools of thought also make similar claims regarding their Ultimate. Another problem is that even though the ultimate is beyond words there is still a plurality of this ultimate in Samkhaya. In Buddhism nibbāna is never seen as a plurality. It's always singular. From this then I would say that Advaita Vedānta is closer to Buddhism than Samkhaya. Advaita Vedānta though argues that there is really only 1 thing, and this thing is a type of unconditioned consciousness. I think we have enough evidence to say the Buddha would have disagreed with that. Why then is nibbāna beyond words? It could be because it really is some thing which is indescribable, a real dhamma or the "Suchness" of reality. Or it could be because nibbāna is the cessation of conceptual thought altogether. Or, perhaps its for another reason. Whatever the case, I don't see how Samkhaya is quite close to the message of the suttas.