Eko Care wrote: ↑Tue May 03, 2022 9:29 pm
mjaviem wrote: ↑Sat Apr 30, 2022 3:15 am
Eko Care wrote: ↑Thu Apr 28, 2022 12:24 pm
There is a popular belief that "Rupa is originated by Mind" or "Everything is originated by Mind"....
Eko Care wrote: ↑Fri Apr 29, 2022 3:28 am
...
Was the Buddha created by some other one's mind?
Was the Dhamma created by some other one's mind?
Are you speaking to people created by your own mind?
...
Was the Buddha nothing?
Was the Dhamma nothing?
Are the other people you speaking to, nothing?
robertk wrote: ↑Fri Apr 29, 2022 5:20 am
...
So while these physical and mental elements are insubstantial and fleeting there is no idealism here. In fact their classification
as paramattha dhammas- ultimate realities - shows this. "Hardness"(paṭhavi ) is hardness whether there is any experience of it or not.
More questions:
Is "what I am thinking" created by your mind?
Is "what I want" created by your mind?
Is "my opposition to you" created by your mind?
Is "my anger about you" created by your mind?
Is "what you want" nothing?
Is "what you say" nothing?
Is "your right to live" nothing?
Is "honesty of you" nothing?
The bizarre hoops people jump through in order to twist the dhamma, even the abhidhamma, into subjective idealism, or some other "it's all mind/nothing is real" position, or whatever they want to call it, despite the clear, and unequivocal realism, directly and clearly stated in the suttas and abhidhamma by the Buddha himself, is cringe to the extreme. It's like discussing astronomy with flat Earthers:
no matter what you say they will twist things around, and use word games to redefine things to make their position "correct," so much so that even the suttas, abhidhamma, maybe even the commentary "agree" with their radical interpretation of the dhamma, all through an absurd understanding of language.
My solution is to point out, not the proofs for objective reality, because those denying them are already lost in paradox, and oblivious to the fact, but rather largely what you're getting at with your questions above: the inherent incoherence of the opposite position. It is literally impossible, by all accounts, with no exceptions, to hold that all is mind, nothing is real, etc., because none of these are positions that can be defended without self refuting, or making themselves incoherent, self referencing statements. Any intelligent person who truly held these positions necessarily ends up as entirely positionless. Not the fake "positionlessness" of Nagarjuna, where they still hold a ton of positions, but embarrassingly deny that their positions are positions, and argue a bunch of points, while claiming, with total lack understanding, that they're not points, but truly just a shrug to every question. That is literally the only place to go after one denies reality, as, there couldn't possibly be anything else.
In other words: if there is no objective reality, there
cannot be any discussion.
Some may think to escape this by saying that our minds are real, and your mind makes your reality, and others make theirs, and they can communicate via the internet they both created and shared. But, then, the internet words created by you exist objectively, and independently of the person you're communicating with, because, if they didn't, you would never receive the message, as it would only exist in the sender's mind. Instead, it must be admitted that the message actually exists, and so can reach you, thus confirming objective reality. And then, each mind exists objectively to the other minds, and the language they both share confirms the external world as well, yet again, confirming some kind of objective reality. It truly cannot be escaped except by running to full on "nothing is real/everything is imaginary, including other minds," but then, that can only lead to total positionlessness, because then
nothing could possibly have meaning, and the position leads, inexorably, to self refutation, and incoherence.
To open discussion is to assume objective reality. To deny it after opening discussion is to show lack of understanding, and welcome embarrassment. It's like declaring "There is no oxygen in this room whatsoever." And then walking into the room, and breathing comfortably, while still arguing that there is no oxygen in the room, no matter how many people point out that you are clearly breathing, and using the oxygen to even be able to argue lol! These people use objective reality at every turn, all the while ignorant to the fact, as they deny that it exists. Language itself is built on objective reality, and couldn't exist without it.
This seems to be what you're urging others towards, and I commend you.
For several much more articulate arguments than mine, please see below:
Modern philosopher's arguments:
The Incoherence of Solipsism
With the belief in the essential privacy of experience eliminated as false, the last presupposition underlying solipsism is removed and solipsism is shown as foundationless, in theory and in fact. One might even say, solipsism is necessarily foundationless, for to make an appeal to logical rules or empirical evidence the solipsist would implicitly have to affirm the very thing that he purportedly refuses to believe: the reality of intersubjectively valid criteria and a public, extra-mental world. There is a temptation to say that solipsism is a false philosophical theory, but this is not quite strong or accurate enough. As a theory, it is incoherent. What makes it incoherent, above all else, is that the solipsist requires a language (that is, a sign-system) to think or to affirm his solipsistic thoughts at all.
Given this, it is scarcely surprising that those philosophers who accept the Cartesian premises that make solipsism apparently plausible, if not inescapable, have also invariably assumed that language-usage is itself essentially private. The cluster of arguments—generally referred to as “the private language argument”—that we find in the Investigations against this assumption effectively administers the coup de grâce to both Cartesian dualism and solipsism. (I. § 202; 242-315). Language is an irreducibly public form of life that is encountered in specifically social contexts. Each natural language-system contains an indefinitely large number of “language-games,” governed by rules that, though conventional, are not arbitrary personal fiats. The meaning of a word is its (publicly accessible) use in a language. To question, argue, or doubt is to utilize language in a particular way. It is to play a particular kind of public language-game. The proposition “I am the only mind that exists” makes sense only to the extent that it is expressed in a public language, and the existence of such language itself implies the existence of a social context. Such a context exists for the hypothetical last survivor of a nuclear holocaust, but not for the solipsist. A non-linguistic solipsism is unthinkable and a thinkable solipsism is necessarily linguistic. Solipsism therefore presupposes the very thing that it seeks to deny. That solipsistic thoughts are thinkable in the first instance implies the existence of the public, shared, intersubjective world that they purport to call into question.
-Stephen P. Thornton
All the four expressions I have just introduced, namely, “Material things are not real,” “Space is not real,” “Time is not real,” “The Self is not real,” are, I think, unlike the expressions I used in (1), really ambiguous. And it may be that, in the case of each of them, some philosopher has used the expression in question to express some view he held which was not incompatible with (2). With such philosophers, if there are any, I am not, of course, at present concerned. But it seems to me that the most natural and proper usage of each of these expressions is a usage in which it does express a view incompatible with (2); and, in the case of each of them, some philosophers have, I think, really used the expression in question to express such a view. All such philosophers have, therefore, been holding a view incompatible with (2).
All such views, whether incompatible with all of the propositions in (1), or only with some of them, seems to me to be quite certainly false; and I think the following points are specially deserving of notice with regard to them:
(a) If any of the classes of propositions in (2) is such that no proposition of that class is true, then no philosopher has ever existed, and therefore none can ever have held with regard to any such class, that no proposition belonging to it is true. In other words, the proposition that some propositions belonging to each of these classes are true is a proposition which has the peculiarity, that, if any philosopher has ever denied it, it follows from the fact that he has denied it, that he must have been wrong in denying it. For when I speak of “philosophers” I mean, of course (as we all do), exclusively philosophers who have been human beings, with human bodies that have lived upon the earth, and who have at different times had many different experiences. If, therefore, there have been any philosophers, there have been human beings of this class; and if there have been human beings of this class, all the rest of what is asserted in (1) is certainly true too. Any view, therefore, incompatible with the proposition that many propositions corresponding to each of the propositions in (1) are true, can only be true, on the hypothesis that no philosopher has ever held any such view. It follows, therefore, that, in considering whether this proposition is true, I cannot consistently regard the fact that many philosophers, whom I respect, have, to the best of my belief, held views incompatible with it, as having any weight at all against it. Since, if I know that they have held such views, I am, ipso facto, knowing that they were mistaken; and, if I have no reason to believe that the proposition in question is true, I have still less reason to believe that they have held views incompatible with it; since I am more certain that they have existed and held some views, i.e. that the proposition in question is true, than that they have held any views incompatible with it.
…
If this first point in my philosophical position, namely my belief in (2), is to be given any name, which has actually been used by philosophers in classifying the positions of other philosophers, it would have, I think, to be expressed by saying that I am one of those philosophers who have held that the “Common Sense view of the world” is, in certain fundamental features, wholly true. But it must be remembered that, according to me, all philosophers, without exception, have agreed with me in holding this: and that the real difference, which is commonly expressed in this way, is only a difference between those philosophers, who have also held views inconsistent with these features in “the Common Sense view of the world,” and those who have not.
The features in question (namely, propositions of any of the classes defined in defining (2)) are all of them features, which have this peculiar property – namely, that if we know that they are features in the “Common Sense view of the world,” it follows that they are true: it is self-contradictory to maintain that we know them to be features in the Common Sense view, and that yet they are not true; since to say that we know this, is to say that they are true. And many of them also have the further peculiar property that, if they are features in the Common Sense view of the world (whether “we” know this or not), it follows that they are true, since to say that there is a “Common Sense view of the world,” is to say that they are true. The phrases “Common Sense view of the world” or “Common Sense beliefs” (as used by philosophers) are, of course, extraordinarily vague; and, for all I know, there may be many propositions which may be properly called features in “the Common Sense view of the world” or “Common Sense beliefs,” which are not true, and which deserve to be mentioned with the contempt with which some philosophers speak of “Common Sense beliefs.” But to speak with contempt of those “Common Sense beliefs” which I have mentioned is quite certainly the height of absurdity. And there are, of course, enormous numbers of other features in “the Common Sense view of the world” which, if these are true, are quite certainly true too: e.g. that there have lived upon the surface of the earth not only human beings, but also many different species of plants and animals, etc. etc.
-A Defense of Common Sense, G. E. Moore
Here is Epictetus on this type of “all is mind” thinking, not about Buddhism, but still relevant, as he is refuting identical core beliefs. However, it seems he is poking fun, so, this should be taken as humor, for entertainment purposes only. This must be seen as humor especially because he jokes about suicide, which is wrong, and should not be done:
If I were a slave of one of these gentlemen, even at the risk of being whipped to the bone every day, I would never stop tormenting him.
‘Throw a bit of oil into the bath, boy.’
I’d take some fish sauce and go and pour it over his head.
‘What’s this?’
‘ I had an impression that was indistinguishable from that of oil; it was just the same, I swear that by your fortune.’
‘ Here pass me the gruel.’
I’d bring him a dish full of vinegar.
‘Didn’t I ask you for the gruel?’
‘ Yes, master, this is gruel.’
‘ But surely it’s vinegar?’
‘ Why that rather than gruel?’
‘Take some and smell it, take some and taste it.’
‘ Well, how do you know, if it is true that our senses deceive us?’
If I had three or four fellow slaves who thought in the same way as I did, I’d soon make him explode with anger and hang himself, or else change his ideas.
But as things are, men like this are making fun of us, they make use of all the gifts of nature while abolishing them in theory.
Discourses: 2:20
Back to a Buddhist defense, the very idea is impossible per the suttas:
A given instance of perceptual consciousness is said to arise only in dependence upon two conditions: the sense organ and its corresponding object-field. This implies that perceptual consciousness arises only in conjunction with an appropriate and existent object; perceptual consciousness of a nonexistent object or without an object is, therefore, impossible.
-Disputed Dharmas
Early Buddhist Theories on Existence
An Annotated Translation
of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought
from Sanghabhadra’s Nyayanusara
Collett Cox
p 136-137
Here is a Mimamsa philosopher refuting Yogacara idealism:
The Thesis Is Self-Undermining
For Kumārila, not only is the Thesis called into question by perceptual and inferential counterevidence, but it also undermines itself in three different ways.
• No Difference Between Qualificand and Qualifier. First, the conclusion of any
argument makes sense only insofar as it involves two components. The first
is a qualificand (viśes.
ya), i.e., the site. In the Buddhist argument, the qualificand is the awareness of a pillar, etc… The second is a qualifier (viśes.an. a),
i.e., the target property that is inferred. In this case, it is supportlessness. But
if there are no distinct objects apprehended by awareness-events apart from
themselves or their aspects, then there can’t be any distinction between the
qualificand and the qualifier (v. 35)
Impossibility of Communication. The awareness of the qualificand and the
qualifier, which arises in both the speaker and the hearer, doesn’t apprehend
anything distinct from it. But the view that is being conveyed by the Thesis itself can only be known only if there are such objects. So, the Buddhist
who puts forward this thesis is caught in a pragmatic contradiction: they assert something which, if true, cannot be known (and therefore shouldn’t be
asserted) (v. 36).
• Impossibility of Truth/Accuracy. Finally, if all awareness-events lack an objective support, then it’s impossible to undergo any true or accurate awareness
at all (since truth, intuitively, involves some kind of correspondence with an
independent reality). Various bad consequences will then follow.
The awareness as of the reason being present in the site is either true
or false. If it is false, then the view can’t be proved on that basis (vv.
74cd-75cd). If the awareness is true, then it is made true by some apprehended objects, i.e., by the site and its possessing awareness-hood.
So, at least, some awareness-events have to have an external objective
support (v. 75cd).
The Buddhist’s own awareness that awareness-events exist, and are distinct and momentary, must either be true or false. If it is true, that
awareness-event must have an external objective support, so the Buddhist’s argument fails. If it is false, the Buddhist can’t take their Thesis to
be true (since it presupposes or entails the existence of such awarenessevents) (vv. 81cd-82).
Finally, if the Thesis is qualified so that it only says that all awarenessevents other than the awareness-events about the site, the target property, or the reason, lack objective support, then we could still end up
with the conclusion that these awareness-events have an external objective support. But since they aren’t fundamentally different from other
waking awareness-events, we wouldn’t be able to rule out the possibility that those awareness-events also have an external objective support
(v. 76).
Upshot: the Thesis is self-undermining.
-Kumarila Bhatta, verses 35-76
And a Hindu philosopher refuting Yogacara, and then Madhyamaka:
To maintain, as the Yogâkâras do, that the general rule of idea and thing presenting themselves together proves the non-difference of the thing from the idea, implies a self-contradiction; for ‘going together’ can only be where there are different things. To hold that it is a general rule that of the idea—the essential nature of which is to make the thing to which it refers capable of entering into common thought and intercourse—we are always conscious together with the thing, and then to prove therefrom that the thing is not different from the idea, is a laughable proceeding indeed.
…the Nothing is the only reality.—To this the Sûtra replies, ‘And on account of its being in everyway unproved’—the theory of general Nothingness which you hold cannot stand. Do you hold that everything is being or non-being, or anything else? On none of these views the Nothingness maintained by you can be established. For the terms being and non-being and the ideas expressed by them are generally understood to refer to particular states of actually existing things only. If therefore you declare ‘everything is nothing,’ your declaration is equivalent to the declaration, ‘everything is being,’ for your statement also can only mean that everything that exists is capable of abiding in a certain condition (which you call ‘Nothing’). The absolute Nothingness you have in mind cannot thus be established in any way. Moreover, he who tries to establish the tenet of universal Nothingness can attempt this in so far only as,—through some means of knowledge, he has come to know Nothingness, and he must therefore acknowledge the truth of that means. For if it were not true it would follow that everything is real. The view of general Nothingness is thus altogether incapable of proof.—Here terminates the adhikarana of 'unprovedness in every way.
-Ramanuja, Vedanta sutra 2.2.28-2.2.31
And, let's not forget the Buddha clearly declared that reality exists, specifically
even when we're not aware of it:
“Student, suppose there were a man born blind who could not see dark and light forms, who could not see blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms, who could not see what was even and uneven, who could not see the stars or the sun and moon. He might say thus: ‘There are no dark and light forms, and no one who sees dark and light forms; there are no blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms, and no one who sees blue, yellow, red, or carmine forms; there is nothing even and uneven, and no one who sees anything even and uneven; there are no stars and no sun and moon, and no one who sees stars and the sun and moon. I do not know these, I do not see these, therefore these do not exist.’ Speaking thus, student, would he be speaking rightly?”
“No, Master Gotama. There are dark and light forms, and those who see dark and light forms…there are the stars and the sun and moon, and those who see the stars and the sun and moon. Saying, ‘I do not know these, I do not see these, therefore these do not exist,’ he would not be speaking rightly.”
“So too, student, the brahmin Pokkharasāti is blind and visionless.
-MN 99
No matter how you slice it, denying objective reality is not possible for any logical, intelligent person. Denying everything, and so being truly without position is valid, but people who truly hold that position wouldn't be discussing anything to begin with, as they'd have to deny that there was anything to discuss, and anyone to discuss with, in the first place. So it's either objective reality exists, or being totally without position. There's really no in between.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.
"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa