Theravada is a Direct realism?

Discussion of Abhidhamma and related Commentaries
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Eko Care
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Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by Eko Care »

Y. karunadasa in his book "Buddhist Analysis of Matter", says that Theravada theory is a kind of direct realism. And perception is not an object of mental interpretation but something that is ultimately real.
Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter:
Regarding their theory of sense perception and the nature of the cognitive object, the Theravāda Abhidhamma view is a kind of direct realism that says we do perceive external physical objects.
"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters. The whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, which has the attainment of Nibbana as its final goal, is based on the recognition of the material world and the conscious living beings living therein.
This theory ensures that the object of direct and immediate perception is not an object of mental interpretation but something that is ultimately real.
This theory ensures that the object of direct and immediate perception is not an object of mental interpretation but something that is ultimately real.
Thus the Theravādins were able to establish the theory of direct perception of the external object despite their recognizing the theory of momentariness.
Is the Theravada system one of direct realism?
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings,

So are you asking if these comments are true?

Once again, what is the purpose of this topic?

Metta,
Paul. :)
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by Ceisiwr »

I’ve heard the Abhidhamma called a phenomenalist realism.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings Ceisiwr,
Ceisiwr wrote: Wed Oct 05, 2022 11:47 pm I’ve heard the Abhidhamma called a phenomenalist realism.
How does that account for rupas then? Are rupas really rupasanna? I didn't think that was the case according to the Mahavihara.

Metta,
Paul. :)
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by Ceisiwr »

retrofuturist wrote: Wed Oct 05, 2022 11:51 pm Greetings Ceisiwr,
Ceisiwr wrote: Wed Oct 05, 2022 11:47 pm I’ve heard the Abhidhamma called a phenomenalist realism.
How does that account for rupas then? Are rupas really rupasanna? I didn't think that was the case according to the Mahavihara.

Metta,
Paul. :)
If true it would mean external physical objects exist purely as qualities. This would be close to the Empiricist’s bundle theory (Hume) or Mill’s “potentialities”. The source of where I read it is here:
Different Buddhist schools, however, held different positions on the distinctive nature of perceptual experience, and on the specific roles of the sense faculties and status of sense objects in it. The Theravāda Abhidhamma and the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika both espouse a view that proposes a direct contact between perceptual consciousness and its sense objects, the latter being understood as sensibilia, for what we perceive are not objects of common sense but their sensible qualities. We may characterize this view as phenomenalist realism (Dreyfus 1997, 331 & 336).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abhidharma/

On such a view there is no enduring substance to an Apple, as all that can be known about the Apple is that it’s a bundle of external qualities such as hard, sweet, red etc.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by Spiny Norman »

Ceisiwr wrote: Wed Oct 05, 2022 11:57 pm
retrofuturist wrote: Wed Oct 05, 2022 11:51 pm Greetings Ceisiwr,
Ceisiwr wrote: Wed Oct 05, 2022 11:47 pm I’ve heard the Abhidhamma called a phenomenalist realism.
How does that account for rupas then? Are rupas really rupasanna? I didn't think that was the case according to the Mahavihara.

Metta,
Paul. :)
If true it would mean external physical objects exist purely as qualities. This would be close to the Empiricist’s bundle theory (Hume) or Mill’s “potentialities”. The source of where I read it is here:
Different Buddhist schools, however, held different positions on the distinctive nature of perceptual experience, and on the specific roles of the sense faculties and status of sense objects in it. The Theravāda Abhidhamma and the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika both espouse a view that proposes a direct contact between perceptual consciousness and its sense objects, the latter being understood as sensibilia, for what we perceive are not objects of common sense but their sensible qualities. We may characterize this view as phenomenalist realism (Dreyfus 1997, 331 & 336).
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/abhidharma/

On such a view there is no enduring substance to an Apple, as all that can be known about the Apple is that it’s a bundle of external qualities such as hard, sweet, red etc.
You mean we can only experience the qualities (characteristics?) of objects, and not the essence/substance?

Is this similar to the sutta distinction between derived form (ie sense objects) and the four great elements?
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by User13866 »

As i understand it,

The direct & indirect realism are a prism of wrong views through which many people will interpret the Dhamma and these people have written some of the commentaries. In general these people are annihilationists and think that Buddha taught annihilation of an existent being, which is quite agreeable to them.

Direct\Naive realism is basically thinking something akin to 'jīvā seeing the world through the sense-doors as if looking through a window'.
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by Ceisiwr »

Spiny Norman wrote: Thu Oct 06, 2022 8:35 am

You mean we can only experience the qualities (characteristics?) of objects, and not the essence/substance?

Is this similar to the sutta distinction between derived form (ie sense objects) and the four great elements?
According to the Abhidhamma and associated commentaries, all that we can really know about an apple are its qualities and apart from the qualities no apple can be found. There is no substance which bears the qualities of the apple. This is a form of phenomenalism. In the west, Phenomenalism is an anti-realist philosophy. We do not directly perceive objects "out there". All we know are qualities, or "sense-data". It's quite close to Idealism, as a doctrine. The Abhidhamma is usually called a phenomenalism, but strangely a realist phenomenalism. If there can be such a thing, or if the Abhihdhamma really is phenomenalist (I think it probably is) is what I was getting at. I was just reading something Ledi Sayadaw wrote on this topic
ANALYSIS OF THE EARTH ELEMENT
The earth element (paṭhavī-dhātu), in the ultimate sense, is the mere property of hardness. By earth is not meant any substance—not even a hundred-thousandth part of an atom. It lacks shape, mass, form, core, or solidity. Therefore, this element exists in very clear spring water or river water; in all forms of light, including sunlight, moonlight, and even the lustre of gems; in all sounds, including the vibrant sounds of gongs or pagoda bells; in moving air, from the softest breeze to a gale ; and in smells, good or bad, that spread near and far. The reason for this peculiar property lies in the state of inseparability (avinibbhoga-vutti) of the four great elements. For as the Buddha says:

“Depending on one of the great elements, the remaining three arise. Depending on three of them, the remaining one arises. Depending on two of them, the remaining two arise.”
Ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭicca tayo mahābhūtā; Tayo mahābhūte paṭicca ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ; Dve mahābhūte paṭicca dve mahābhūtā.
(Paṭṭhāna I § 53)

The Commentaries explain that it is the function (sampaṭicchana-rasā) of the earth element to receive the three other co-nascent elements of water, wind, and fire. The water, wind, and fire elements have a nature such that they cannot exist without the earth element as their basis. Therefore, it should be understood that in all forms of water, colour, sound, wind, and smell, this earth element invariably exists...When hundreds of thousands of crores of the earth element—by themselves the mere property of hardness—happen to be held together by the element of cohesion or the water element (āpodhātu), a form appears, which is given the name “atom.” When thousands of crores of such atoms come together, certain forms of life come into being, beginning with tiny insects. As the materiality increases, all kinds of beings with varying sizes, up to the Lord of the fallen spirits (asurinda), whose height is forty-eight hundred yojanas, take form. As regards external things, this phenomenon of materiality can assume a form as large as Mount Meru, which is 168,000 yojanas high, or even the Great Earth itself which has a thickness of 240,000 yojanas.

It is the earth element with its property of hardness that serves as the basis of all forms of materiality, animate or inanimate, from atoms and insects to the entire universe. No other element has the property of assuming form or shape. The three other elements of water, wind, and fire depend on earth for their existence. Thus, one must realize the importance of earth as the basic element in all materiality. If you want to contemplate the earth element as an ultimate reality in Mount Meru or in this great earth, you concentrate only on the property of hardness, which lacks substance. As you concentrate only on its function (giving support to all forms of materiality,) it will be seen as a reflection in a mirror on the surface of clear water, without the obstruction of the tiniest substance, not even an atom. If there remains the faintest idea of substance or form or solid mass, even as much as an atom, your view is not on the ultimate truth of earth. It is not free from the conventionally accepted concept of form. This conventional truth stands in the way of understanding the true characteristics—arising and vanishing—of materiality
https://www.bps.lk/olib/bp/bp426s_Ledi_ ... -Light.pdf
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

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On the Abhidhammas anti-substance view
The inter-connection and inter-dependence of these dhammas are not explained on the basis of the dichotomy between substance and quality. Consequently, a given dhamma does not inhere in another as its quality, nor does it serve another as its substance. The so-called substance is only a product of our imagination. The distinction between substance and quality is denied because such a distinction leaves the door open for the intrusion of the doctrine of a substantial self (attavāda) with all that it entails. Hence it is with reference to causes and conditions that the interconnection of the dhammas should be understood. The conditions are not different from the dhammas, for it is the dhammas themselves that constitute the conditions.
How each dhamma serves as a condition (paccaya) for the origination of another (paccayuppanna) is explained on the basis of the system of conditioned genesis (paccay·k·ra-naya).18 This system, which consists of twenty-four conditions, aims at demonstrating the inter-dependence and dependent co-origination (pa˛iccasamupp·da) of all concomitance.
-Y. Karunadasa
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by cappuccino »

Ceisiwr wrote: Thu Oct 06, 2022 9:06 pm
The distinction between substance and quality is denied because such a distinction leaves the door open for the intrusion of the doctrine of a substantial self (attavāda) with all that it entails. Hence
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: Theravada is a Direct realism?

Post by zerotime »

Ceisiwr wrote: Thu Oct 06, 2022 7:56 pm According to the Abhidhamma and associated commentaries, all that we can really know about an apple are its qualities and apart from the qualities no apple can be found. There is no substance which bears the qualities of the apple. This is a form of phenomenalism. In the west, Phenomenalism is an anti-realist philosophy. We do not directly perceive objects "out there". All we know are qualities, or "sense-data". It's quite close to Idealism, as a doctrine. The Abhidhamma is usually called a phenomenalism, but strangely a realist phenomenalism. If there can be such a thing, or if the Abhihdhamma really is phenomenalist (I think it probably is) is what I was getting at. I was just reading something Ledi Sayadaw wrote on this topic
a frequent problem in this issue is when we forget the Buddhist doctrine is an already closed system. This is not like the Western Philosophy. in where the nature of Reality is an open speculative field.

In Buddhism the problem is not that because the nature is already known and defined, anatta. The philosophical problem in Buddhism is about to find the best intellectual development to link atta with anatta. And the Abhidhamma was the best development in that sense.

There is the anatta nature of Reality. And because there is ignorance on that, then arise the formations and the whole atta delusion and dukkha, the atta world we should experience. This atta experience is made of realities. The anatta nature don't annihilate these realities but the anatta nature is the end of the delusion regarding its anatta nature. This is like a loop existing inside ourselves, which arise mediated by the perception of a -self ("my mind") caused by the arising of the individuation delusion in both "I" and the Reality.
Ceisiwr wrote: Thu Oct 06, 2022 9:06 pm On the Abhidhammas anti-substance view
The inter-connection and inter-dependence of these dhammas are not explained on the basis of the dichotomy between substance and quality. Consequently, a given dhamma does not inhere in another as its quality, nor does it serve another as its substance. The so-called substance is only a product of our imagination. The distinction between substance and quality is denied because such a distinction leaves the door open for the intrusion of the doctrine of a substantial self (attavāda) with all that it entails. This system, which consists of twenty-four conditions, aims at demonstrating the inter-dependence and dependent co-origination (pa˛iccasamupp·da) of all concomitance.
-Y. Karunadasa
it sounds fully right. Because a similar reason we find the controversies around the existence of Time in 3 times (past, present, future) developed by the Personalists, Sarvastivada and others. And basically all were rejected with the argument about the formations (sankhara) are the Time. Which is fully right: the building of the atta delusion is the building of Time. Because on the contrary, it would mean a substantiation of Time which would contradict anatta. The Time in Buddhism is born dependent from the arising of -self and the atta world. Only exist in dependence of that. The Time is a dimension dependent of the intellect like the classical western thinkers also claimed.

And added difficulty is when he hear in our times many things about the nature of the Time. None of these things are empirical but just pure theory, although the goal is to inoculate a concrete cosmic position.

The origin of the contemporary substantiation of Time appeared with the Einstein theories. From there, we have in our culture many popular deliriums about travelling through the Time, or the Time is like a chewing gum, and similar ones. These imaginations are only pure theory and never were demonstrated. No proof. One should know the mathematical world can be developed in a logical way from some theoretical foundation, despite it can be an imagination without any empirical experience behind. However, after this is started, it is able to produce new theoretical findings even with some reflection in the Nature. No strange thing there, because the logics of Mathematics is developed with mind objects grasped and slavered inside the same atta delusion built with Space and Time. Mathematics is not other thing than a language to describe the atta Universe and it include the atta mind objects like the mathematical ones.

Fortunately, at those ancients times of the Abhidhamma discussions the only concern was to find the best intellectual development for the Buddhist doctrine. Even if we think in a competence between schools with other implications, those discussions were developed with logical arguments which should be able to be imposed over the rest. This is something that anyone can appreciate when reading those discussions.

Differently, in the metaphysical deliriums developed by the Science at the end of 19th century, the scenery was very different. Both the Jesuits and the financial interests for a market-science conditioned a new path for the Physics. This was not caused by any new empirical discovering but precisely because the panic in front the empirical findings of Michelson and Morley about the ether. That nature of the ether was a complete taboo for those powers trying to condition the cosmological position that we should have, and the theoretical relativity ideas were imposed despite the rejection of many important names like Tesla and others.

Today, the holes and failures caused after 100 years of those past intrigues and manipulations, finally has caused quite attempts in Science to rescue again the ether, although using different names in order to avoid the Scientific Inquisition devices or just to cover the past botched History. This fact is another reflection from one of the worse age for this civilization in all the human kind History. We cannot find in the whole History an epoch with so many victims of atrocities and so many lies like the developed in the past 20th century.

Just I comment these things because I believe in these days one should do a double effort to keep an open mind, able to question many things of the last 100 years, even when the whole world still remain linked to the same errors and lies.

The substantiation of Time is one of these errors. Believing in Time like something existing in an independent way from the -self, it's an absurdity which contradict the common sense and anatta in a fundamental way. Maybe in our times the historical origin was an error, a covering, a lie to sustain other issue in the world, or an idea to feed the power of some people. Who knows. Anyway, in this Path one should be linked with the Truth, and it doesn't care if the whole world is repeating thousand times the Time is a chewing gum and similar things. The absurd things are absurd despite billion people can repeat the same.
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