"Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes

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nirodh27
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Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes

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Pulsar wrote: Mon Oct 17, 2022 12:49 pm
Thank you Pulsar, my "conceit I am" sense is tingling :jumping: :jumping:

:smile:
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Ceisiwr
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Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes

Post by Ceisiwr »

Ontheway wrote: Tue Oct 18, 2022 4:18 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Mon Oct 17, 2022 7:21 pm
jankala wrote: Mon Oct 17, 2022 6:18 pm
I am not interested in sectarian doctrines and interpretations of the suttas.
The three-lives model of dependent origination isn’t a sectarian doctrine of Theravāda. It is found amongst all early schools of Buddhism, both Sāvaka and Mahāyāna. Even Venerable Nāgārjuna accepted it. They all agree, because that is what the texts actually say. Ironically, it is yourself and Phenomenological Buddhism which are the sectarians here.
Then it is safe to say three times model of Paticca samuppada are agreeable to all schools and linked to the common ancestor (if we think in evolutionary pattern), the Buddha himself.
Yes.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
nmjojola
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Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes

Post by nmjojola »

There seems to be a recurring implication made in discussions such as these, and that is, presuming that one can account for the manner in which they interpret the suttas by citing the suttas themselves (“I see evidence for this!” or “I see no evidence for that!”), which amounts to giving no account at all; and on top of this, there is a liability to a lack of responsibility that comes into play when this mistake is made.

One’s attention, and one’s view, are activities of thought, actions of mind – and one is fully responsible for them. So, when one takes the situation as being a matter wherein there is a presumed possibility of finding evidence within the suttas to corroborate an argument on how to comprehend them, and allow this presumption to be one’s sole basis of reasoning, it can tempt one into making statements which in effect amount to nothing more than saying “It’s not my opinion, it’s simply what the texts say” (I’ve been guilty of having done this in the past myself even).

To many individuals it may seem counterintuitive to call it (what I’m calling a mistake) a mistake; that it feels, to them, like they read the texts first and then arrive at a position on account of it (“I think such is the case because this is what I read”) – but there is always a philosophical (back)ground, or base, or oriented view point, that can be traced around or within any and every opinion (so long as the opinion has a sufficient degree of coherency and consistency), presumed, supporting such opinion, and often taken for granted, perhaps even denied when addressed.

An example of failing to recognize the correct order of things in ones thinking appears in Analayo’s critique where he says:
Analayo wrote:The perceived need to counter the three-life explanation has at times led Nanavira Thera to adopting positions that are not particularly convincing. An example is the following assertion:
Nanavira wrote:Any interpretation of paticcasamuppada that involves time is an attempt to resolve the present problem by referring to past or future, and is therefore necessarily mistaken.
Analayo has it backwards, Nanavira’s assertion was not arrived at on account of an overhand rejection of temporal interpretation or a perceived need for said rejection, it was the other way around. It’s the assertion that comes first, as a result of something that can only be presently recognized. Now, I can’t convince anyone as to the validity of his assertion using sutta, nor should I want to, because I won’t make the mistake of misapprehending the situation at hand, or disorder what must be kept in the proper order.

It is a rather lazy excuse to write off Nanavira on the accusation of backreading into the suttas alien-to-Buddhist-thought philosophy as opposed to his own immediate experience and his attitude towards it, his attention as it was particularly oriented; and it’s a telling sign when one fails to pick up on that in virtue of the fact his reader shares the same predicament of existing his manner of thinking may have implications for the very reader himself. The fact that there was an established academic discipline which specialized in the study of the individual’s capacity to investigate things in light of their experiential background in that very way was entirely incidental, and their inclusion in The Notes was by no means necessary to make The Notes' point, they were in a way supplemental. I already made a post explaining this misconception earlier in this topic where I pointed out the difference between the academic field (Phenomenology with an upper-case P) and the exercise itself (phenomenology with a lower-case p), the apprehension which comes from not distinguishing between the two, and the aforementioned misconception which arises on account of said apprehension, and so there is no sense to press this point further here.

He accounted for his views with the vertiginous orientation of attention from which they stemmed, in The Notes themselves explicitly, he did not make the mistake I’m pointing out here, he provided the context in the preface very carefully, he let it out from the very start to stand the test of time on its own, just as he should have. One is making a mistake if they think his writings were an attempt to appeal to the texts themselves for their vindication as opposed to an appeal to the readers very existence.

He can’t be contended with solely on the basis of sutta, to attempt to do so is to miss his point entirely and end up shadowboxing an opponent who isn’t there, because it's ones manner of interpretation that he was primarily driving at; thus, to properly face him, one must confront him on the level of attitude, and the concern for strictly, as he put, “starting ones thinking from experience as the basic unit”.

Now, as for Bodhi or Analayo, to give them some credit, being the honest, professional, and exceptional scholars they are, they accounted for their positions to the extent of conceding that they were explaining their arguments in the context of the commentarial and traditional position, but to say that that position itself is without philosophical presumptions of its own, or a given, probably taken for granted, orientation of attention, would be patently wrong - and I have yet to read any commentarial or traditional viewpoint account for itself.

One might argue in response that Nanavira himself tried to argue for his manner of thinking from the suttas, for instance perhaps by quoting him from something like paragraph 7 of NoP:
Nanavira wrote:No doubt more such specific inadequacies and inconsistencies in the traditional interpretation…could be found, but since this is not a polemic we are not concerned to seek them out. There remains, however, a reason for dissatisfaction with the general manner of this interpretation. The Buddha has said (Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,191>) that he who sees the Dhamma sees paticcasamuppāda; and he has also said that the Dhamma is sanditthika and akālika, that it is immediately visible and without involving time (see in particular Majjhima iv,8 <M.i,265>)
But note this is offered after the disclaimer of the preface that actually argues for the manner by appealing to the experiential situation of the reader, the sutta citation here is offered in a "can you see it?" sense and not in a "this proves my point" sense. He wasn't trying to push it off onto the texts, he took personal responsibility; and before one can try to contend with what he’s saying they have to do the same, and stop thinking that the texts themselves, isolated from ones preceding point of view which determines the scope of their opinions (their presumptions), can prove one’s point. Nanavira did not entertain this false notion that the texts can essentially speak for themselves (i.e., that there is a universally shared background common to all individuals, detached from each individual, against which the suttas (and terms like 'dependent-origination') have meaning by default), because it was his hope that if understanding were to take place it would be on account of his readers attitude and direct experience in regards to their knowledge of the texts, not the texts “in and of themselves”, that would prove to the reader the correctness of his writing (though he did not doubt their validity he did question their sufficiency).

We can argue from the suttas in the context of how we are engaged with them, which governs our conception of their meaning; but we can’t cite the suttas to account for that very engagement, to account for what we think they mean.
Arguing from the basis of suttas for our comprehension of them is no argument at all, but a mere parrot-like echo*, it misconceives the task at hand, and risks grave irresponsibility.

*to borrow the phrase from Kierkegaard as quoted by Nanavira in footnote C of the preface to The Notes:
S. Kierkegaard wrote:Herein lies the lofty equanimity of the scholar and the comic thoughtlessness of his parrot-like echo.
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Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes

Post by Boris »

zerotime wrote: Tue Oct 11, 2022 8:37 pm
jankala wrote: Tue Oct 11, 2022 5:54 pm In brief, if the Buddha never talked about it, if he intentionally avoided it, if he was unfamiliar with the idea as far as all modern scholarship is concerned, if it only surfaced later and actually ended up causing all kinds of problems that then had to be reconciled (such as that of the Bhavanga and so on), if it is at odds with his extremely common dictum that things arise, change while standing, and cease, if it is impractical and also at odds with simple reality of experience, then it has nothing to do with the teaching in the suttas.

As has been said countless times by countless authors from every camp and the disciples of the Buddha himself, understanding paṭiccasamuppāda is equivalent to the Dhamma. How very shocking that the very nature of this is never at all discussed by the Buddha in the suttas, and yet we are to expect that an interpretation involving momentariness is somehow what he really meant but was too afraid to say because of other sects.

With mettā
"causing all kinds of problems" to the own understanding doesn't seem enough reason to reject it. Well, we could reject it for other reason, to be more comfortable with a simpler explanation. Although this is not enough to claim it is wrong.

The only valid reason would be a correction, to show the right explanation. However, we never see this event. There is only a rejection which sometimes is more proper to the blind faith of the semitic religion, like a wish for an infallibility of sacred scriptures gived by some God. Maybe sometimes an excuse to defend the own space or to create a seudo-schism to avoid the uncomfortable shadow of a sophisticated device difficult to decipher

Also, we should remember there are other arhants who taught the Dhamma instead Buddha himself. Should we reject all these Suttas because they were later "commentators"?. Where is the exact point of the "original teaching"?. Is this not an incoherence accepting the wisdom of the Canon's compilers only for the Suttas, and rejecting the same wisdom for other parts?

(...)
But surely we are in the middle of vicious circle which depends on the catch 22. No doubt it sounds very logical: "The only valid reason would be a correction, to show the right explanation." But either one is a puthujjana and doesn't see things as they are, or one sees by himself suffering and cessation of suffering, so jumping from verbal level into existential one we can say that if such explanation makes interlocutor an ariya, it is successful, but if not how can one be sure that it is due to deficiency of explanation and not deficiency of one who rejecs it? Because his judgement is made in the presence of avijja and avijja can be described as inability to see right explanation as right explanation. So perhaps things are little bit more complicated?

Let's than formulate this in the different words, just by asking you certain question:

Do you agree with this statement about D/O:
The Buddha’s purpose is to describe enough of the world to be able to show how suffering can be ended, not to produce full and detailed elaborations, which would be endless and arrive nowhere.
If you don't, than we can stop our exchange here. If you agree with it - and it was done by Ven Nanamoli Thera - let's say this:

If idea of momentariness, whatever it means, is necessary to see directly "this is suffering", "this is cessation of suffering", than to investigate it is also neccesary. But if seeing directly what  nibbana is, can be realised without introducing such concept, than it isn't at all neccesry to boder with such thing as momentariness. I hope that with this you agree, the point is that you seem to think that it is absolutely necessary in order to see anatta or impermanence. ( I assume that you are aware that to see impermanence, or to see anatta, or to see dependent arising are all synonymous terms.)

Than it is up to you, whether do you take such possiblity, into account or not, namely that introduction of the very concept of momentariness is not only unnecessary, but it is done by one not free from ignorance, and positively prevents one to see things as they are. Of course I do not say that the abandoning of such concept as a tool to understand Dhamma will result in seeing it now and here, avijja has many aspects, but at least there will be one obstacle less.

And of course I don't say it is so, nor I am very interested to convince you that it is so. It depends whether you are satisfied with your present state of knowledge or not. If you Indeed are satisfied that's fine. Than of course you can classified my inability to see momentariness as an aspect of my avijja. As a matter of fact, I used to play chess - three minutes per game - and at such time I really had some experience of momentariness, things went very quickly, but it didn't increase my understanding of Dhamma.

You say:
However, when nobody can deny the existence of Time also nobody can deny the existence of moments for the arising of dhammas. Because it would contradict anicca.
Someone told me that Nagarjuna logically proved that time doesn't exist (I am not interested in Nagarjuna, so not sure whether it is true information that he made such performance, ) but if so, to take it ironically, one is tempted to ask: how much time took him to proved it?

But perhaps, at least seeing from certain angle perception of time has something in common with ignorance, as following sutta seem to suggest:
Bhikkhus, these are the three times, What three? Past time, future time, and present time. These, bhikkhus, are the three times?

Perceiving what can be expressed through concepts,
Beings take their stand on what is expressed.
Not fully understanding the expressed,
They come under the bondage of Death.

But by fully understanding what is expressed
One does not misconceive the speaker.
His mind has attained to freedom,
The unsurpassed state of peace.

Understanding what is expressed,
The peaceful one delights in the peaceful state.
Standing on Dhamma, perfect in knowledge,
He freely makes use of concepts
But no more enters into concept's range.
Itv Addhā Sutta

"All being is limited and particularized—if I am at all, I am in a spatial world." (Nanavira) which of course neseciates also time. Momentariness? Well, for god who lives let's say 1000000000000 years yours existence limited to about 100 years may seem momentary. But I wonder whether your problem of suffering is that despite of some clever idea of momentariness, you don't have yet direct experience of knowledge of such momentariness. Perhaps your problem is of different nature, namely self-identification with things which have past and future, that is sankhata dhamma? And what happens with perception of time, when asankhata dhatu is not only recognised, as in the case with sotapanna, but in the case of arahat? Consider following passage:
‘I was’ is not for me, not for me is ‘I shall be’;
Determinations will un-be: therein what place for sighs?
Pure arising of things, pure series of determinants –
For one who sees this as it is, chieftain, there is no fear.
Theragāthā 715, 716

For less important thing, you say:
Also, we should remember there are other arhants who taught the Dhamma instead Buddha himself. Should we reject all these Suttas because they were later "commentators"?. Where is the exact point of the "original teaching"?. Is this not an incoherence accepting the wisdom of the Canon's compilers only for the Suttas, and rejecting the same wisdom for other parts?
First objection is not valid since the very presence of the Sutta in canon means that it was authorized by the Buddha or arahats, of course even in this there is element of faith, since I can't be certain but if Suttas are my authority and I claim to be ready to abandon any view which contradicts Suttas, I am not in position to doubt them. When I start to remove Suttas that contradict my ideas, since it is me who is not free from ignorance, it is very likely that I am in fact protecting my own ignorance from arising of the right view.

Also I know that bhikkhus from whom I have learned lots of important things had the same attitude, and as far as my value judgement goes they were more intelligent than me, I do trust them.

But one thing has to be noticed. Controversion abhidhamma / suttas for most of Asian monks is only that of respectability, they do not emphasize intellectual approach, they simply are hurt that others do not recognize certain text as holy texts.

I was told that most of Sri Lanka Abhidhamma believers actually haven't read it, at best some shortened version of it. But for one who emphasizes intellectual understanding, such distinction has to be done from practical point of view. Sometimes understanding of certain word influences our entire vison of Dhamma, and problem arises when such word is defined in Abhidhamma quite differently than in Suttas. As you may observed there is tendency to adjust Suttas to one's own understanding. Nanavira's approach is: "I am wrong, Suttas are right". But neither he nor Ven Nanamoli had any such confidence in other Pali texts.

Such approach certainly reduces number of people with whom one can discuss Dhamma since it is as trying to play chess with one who doesn't agree with all rules of the game.

Such reduction of the texts, is evidently the act of faith, but it is simply unavoidable, ideas have consequences and one who says "but such other texts should also be included" is perfectly right to do so, it is his own responsibility. And if his approach to Dhamma is also intelectual, his own selection of texts which he consider as trustworthy, no doubt will influence his understanding.
In existence faith isn't optional, we use it all the time. Even suspension of judgement as in agnosticism*, is a certain action or choice which will have consequences (and since it is done in the presence of avijja, I tend to classify as an act of faith.) Faith in fact is a tool which has to be used while avijja is present in our experience and as such can be seen as related to understanding:
In the Buddha’s words, “A bhikkhu who possesses understanding founds his faith in accordance with that understanding” (SN 48:45), to which words may be added also those of the venerable Sāriputta: “There are two conditions for the arising of right view: another’s speech and reasoned attention” (MN 43). From this it emerges that an ordinary man has need of a germ of “mother wit” in order to know where to place his faith and a germ of unsquandered faith in order to believe he can develop his understanding. That is the starting position.

* Three forms of agnosticism: (1) I am certain (know) that this is impossible for anyone else to know. (2) I am uncertain (do not know at present) whether this which I don’t know now, can be known by me or by anyone at some time. (3) I am certain (know) that this which I do not know, can be known sometime.
Nanamoli Thera

Ortega y Gasset:
Surprising condition, this, of our existence! To live is to feel ourselves fatally obliged to exercise our liberty, to decide what we are going to be in this world. Not for a single moment is our activity of decision allowed to rest. Even when in desperation we abandon ourselves to whatever may happen, we have decided not to decide.

It is, then, false to say that in life “circumstances decide”. On the contrary, circumstances are the dilemma, constantly renewed, in presence of which we have to make our decision; what actually decides is our character.
I emphasize the role of faith in existence, since quite often it is used but it is mistaken as knowledge. Things are so certain and evident! Do they? Philosophers say: "Whoever is curious about how to measure his stupidity should count the number of things that seem obvious to him."

Or Le Bon: One of the superiorities of the savant over ignoramus is that the savant senses where mystery begins.

Now, I don't directed such nice quotes particularly to you, just it seems to me that one of greatest obstacles in understanding things as they are, is the problem that most people aren't able to understand that they don't understand, which after all should not be surprising if really at certain point of history Socrates was recognised as the wisest, and Socrates "merely" knows, that he doesn't know.

Dragomir:
First I ask, and then I find out the answer. But what about the origin of the question? The question seeks to obtain an answer, but that answer is not its origin. The question comes out of a state of questioning, which is also an inner disposition that stops the daily flow of my life. Why does it stop it?

Because it requires me to admit that I do not know, and when I admit that I do not know, then life no longer flows as it did before. In ordinary life I am aware that I know some things and do not know others. But in daily life I am not in a state of questioning: in daily life I do not dam the torrent of life in which I am caught up, and which carries me like a river in spate; I do not recognize that I do not know and that I have to ask in order to know. The state of questioning, then, is the third inner disposition, together with leaving of oneself and wonder, that makes possible the emergence of science in our lives. (...)

The question that led to the essential condition of ‘knowing that I do not know’ set European thinking on solid ground. The essential thing is that I should have no illusions. Any method must have its origin here: starting from the fact that he knows that he does not know, man builds something, goes back to zero and finds his way forward. This is what Socrates originated. And where the mind refuses to be exposed and does not build on initial ignorance, there appears dogmatism.
From The world we live in.

***
Perhaps it could be of some interest to you that both Nanamoli and Nanavira Thera were interested in question: "What is time?" Of course any intelligent man understands that in famous paradox Achilles and the tortoise, there must be some hidden wrong assumption, since in real life Achilles has no any problems and wins competition with the tortoise, here there is solution proposed by Nanavira:
As to Achilles and the tortoise, the problem as stated by Russell on p. 88 makes the assumption that all ‘places’ are the same size. But if Achilles is going faster than the tortoise each ‘place’ that he goes to must be correspondingly larger (i.e. longer) than the tortoise’s ‘places’.

There is thus no paradox. But there is also the assumption that one can be in a ‘place’ in a ‘point-instant’ of time—i.e. no time at all. This is really the root of the trouble, both for Zeno and for Russell—they assume that time (or being, or existence) is made up of instants of no time, which is a misunderstanding. However many instants of no time you add together (or put contiguously) you still get no time. So Russell, seeing this, says (p. 82) ‘there is no such thing as the next moment’, which means that though his moments are ‘in time’ they are not ‘part of time’. But he does not go on to explain what ‘time’ is.

The fact is, that one cannot use the word ‘be’ in connexion with a point-instant of time, and one cannot say that Achilles, or the Arrow, ‘is’ in a particular place at each ‘moment’ (understood as a point-instant).

(The solution to the problem of time, as I suggest in Fundamental Structure, lies in a hierarchy of ‘moments’, each understood as a ‘unit of time’, and each with a sub-structure of a plurality of similar moments but of a lesser order.) But as to the problem of Achilles and the tortoise, all we need to say is that during each second of time both Achilles and the tortoise are within the boundaries of a certain extent or strip of ground, but since Achilles is moving faster than the tortoise his successive strips of ground (each occupied for one second) are longer than the tortoise’s.

So Achilles catches the tortoise. But note that since we decide upon one second of time (or whatever it may actually be) as the limit to the fineness of our perception, we are unable to find out what Achilles or the tortoise is doing within each second. We know that during any given second Achilles is occupying a certain strip of ground (he is in that strip), but we are not entitled to say whether he is moving or stationary. (This does not say what movement is—which needs a more elaborate discussion—, but it does solve Zeno’s problem, or at least indicates the solution.)
L 89

But do notice that such solution, even if proper, it is entirely on puthujjana's level who apart his own being (and subjectivity is associated with notion of permanence) doesn't know anything really permanent or eternal (as asankhata dhatu). But due to distorted perception he projects that subjective permanence on impermanent things by self-identification with them or taking them as "mine". Then he hears from the Buddha that things are impermanent and not-self, and since he doesn't understand his own experience as much as that of arahat - the very state of being (bhava) which is synonymous with notion "I am" = suffering, and nibbana as cessation of conceit "I am" - he, due to avijja doesn't understand that the very his being is the state of dukkha, and he doesn't understand that while presence of impermanent things in space and time is undeniable reality which does not depend on ignorance, his own being in space and time depends on self-identification with such things. In other words he doesn't understand that pointing to impermanent and not-self nature of things Lord Buddha encourages attavadin (and every puthujjana is attavadin) to abandon such self-identification and see things as: "this is not mine, "this I am not, this is not my self ".
The man who wants to avoid grotesque collapses should not look for anything to fulfill him in space and time.

Nicolás Gómez Dávila
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