On the Abhidhamma

A discussion on all aspects of Theravāda Buddhism
asahi
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by asahi »

Substance = A particular kind of matter with uniform properties. Every pure element is a substance .

Precisely there are substances that there is a possibility of rebirth . If the sun and moon and other conditions as some kind of substances doesnt exists , you , wont be alive .
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Coëmgenu
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Coëmgenu »

The older usage of the term "substance" is identical to the modern meaning of the word "essence." If you read "substance" as "materiality" when you are supposed to be reading it as "essence," there will be a lot of confusion.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Coëmgenu »

Interestingly enough, the semantic transformation of the word "substance" reflects the pervasive influence of pseudo-scientific physicalism/materialism in our Western culture. To the physicalist, the material makeup of something is its "essence." Hence "essence" comes to be understood as "material makeup," and the meaning of "substance" shifts from "essence" to "material makeup." We've kept the essentialism, but simply replaced essence with particular configurations of matter.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
zan
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

Scabrella wrote: Sun Jan 29, 2023 4:38 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Jan 29, 2023 3:46 am The suttas and sutras are full of the denial of the existence of substance.
Hi. I tried to understand your thesis. If there is no physical substance, how does rebirth or reincarnation occur? Were all of those billions of past lives of the Buddha just hallucinations, similar to having billions of dreams? Thank you
If you believe well known and respected scholars of Theravada, you might consider Y. Karunadasa's thinking:
Most of the schools of Indian thought, notably the Sāṃkhya, the Vedānta, and the Medical Tradition as represented by Caraka and Suśruta, recognize five mahābhūtas, or elemental substances… In the Nikāyas they are defined in simple and general terms and are illustrated mostly with reference to the constituents of the human body. Earth-element is that which is hard (kakkhaḷa) and rigid (kharigata) —for example, hair of the head or body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, etc. Water-element is water (āpo), or that which is watery (āpogataṃ) —for example, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, tears, etc. Fire-element is fire or heat (tejo), or that which is fiery (tejogataṃ) —for example, the heat in the body that transmutes food and drink in digestion. Air-element is air (vāyo), or that which is airy (vāyogataṃ) —for example, “wind discharged upward or downward, wind in the abdomen or belly, vapors that traverse the several members, inhaling and exhaling of breath.” These definitions seem to suggest that from its very beginning Buddhism did not make a radical departure from the popular conception of the mahābhūtas.
I think he is plausible.

When we look at the suttas, the Buddha explains just about everything, except what precisely the four elements are. It is extremely unclear in the suttas. There are some vague, short lines about them, but, usually, when they are spoken of, it is as the foundation for other things. For example, in SN 12.2, we find the following: "The four great elements and the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form."

This may be because they were just assumed to be what people at the time assumed they were: substances. The only radical departure about the four elements would be that, in the Buddha's teaching, they do not possess any permanence, nor god, self, etc. but instead are all subject to eventual cessation through decay. The universe in the Buddha's teachings is in a constant cycle of disintegration and rebirth, as can be seen from suttas, like MN 4, which state that this system is one of "many aeons of world-contraction, many aeons of world-expansion," and suttas like the sermon of the Seven Suns, AN 7.66, which make clear the entire world will be destroyed over time, and presumably, this is at least one way in which the elements are temporary. Further, the Buddha clearly states that the earth element, at least, lasts for quite some time, as can be seen in this quote from MN 28: "“Now there comes a time when the water element is disturbed and then the external earth element vanishes. When even this external earth element, great as it is, is seen to be impermanent, subject to destruction, disappearance, and changeˌ what of this body, which is clung to by craving and lasts but a while? There can be no considering that as ‘I’ or ‘mine’ or ‘I am.’"

What becomes clear is that the Buddha didn't completely rule out the idea that the elements are substances, far from it, he implied that they are fairly substantial, albeit impermanent. The earth clearly is stated to last a lot longer than a human body, for example.

The Mahayana had no problem linguistically destroying the elements, just ask Nagarjuna. Hence, the Buddha could have, if he felt it was the correct thing to do. Any argument that he did refute them always relies on interpretation of his words, never on a direct, clear pronouncement made by the Buddha in the suttas. He never said: "The four great elements, Bhikkhus, are not substances!" Nor anything even close to that.

May he have implicitly ruled out some very specific delineation of what "substance" means per some esoteric defintion of the word? Sure, in fact, when we parse the suttas to esoteric definitions of words, a lot of things are true about them, and we end up with a lot of conflicting ideas. Yet, none of these things are true in a clear, commonsense reading.

See also, this thread: viewtopic.php?t=38752&hilit=elements
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Ceisiwr
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 4:44 pm What becomes clear is that the Buddha didn't completely rule out the idea that the elements are substances, far from it, he implied that they are fairly substantial, albeit impermanent. The earth clearly is stated to last a lot longer than a human body, for example.
A substance, by definition, has an independent existence rather than being dependent.
The Mahayana had no problem linguistically destroying the elements, just ask Nagarjuna. Hence, the Buddha could have, if he felt it was the correct thing to do. Any argument that he did refute them always relies on interpretation of his words, never on a direct, clear pronouncement made by the Buddha in the suttas. He never said: "The four great elements, Bhikkhus, are not substances!" Nor anything even close to that.
“Bhikkhus, suppose that this river Ganges was carrying along a great lump of foam. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and carefully investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a lump of foam? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of form there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in form?" - SN 22.95

The commentaries here understand it to mean that there is no substance, in the metaphysical sense, to form.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Mahabrahma »

There may be substance in your statement, body, and mind. There's substance to everything good. Does that mean it's all independent? Does that mean we all are independent, and well... How does not having an independently existing self work out there? Can we just rule it out as a misnomer, something that should have never happened in our imaginations in the first place?

Or does nothing have any substance?

And what about nothing, can Life be contained there?
That sage who has perfect insight,
at the summit of spiritual perfection:
that’s who I call a brahmin.

-Dhammapada.
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by cappuccino »

Ceisiwr wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:23 pm The commentaries here understand it to mean that there is no substance, in the metaphysical sense, to form.
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Ceisiwr »

Mahabrahma wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:29 pm There may be substance in your statement, body, and mind. There's substance to everything good. Does that mean it's all independent? Does that mean we all are independent, and well... How does not having an independently existing self work out there? Can we just rule it out as a misnomer, something that should have never happened in our imaginations in the first place?

Or does nothing have any substance?

And what about nothing, can Life be contained there?
There are different usages of the word "substance". We can say there is no substance to an argument, meaning there is no basis for it. We can also say there is no substance to form, meaning there is no ultimate substratum behind it. One is a more general use, the other is more philosophical. The general though borrows from the philosophical, since it means and argument has no underlying basis. In terms of metaphysics substances are said to be the ultimate basis for our sense experience. We experience characteristics or attributes, such as hot or red, and these characteristics belong to a substance which bears them, behind sense experience. Since substances are not attributes of anything else (for that would make them another characteristic) they have independent existence. They exist by themselves, without relying upon anything else, hidden behind our changing experiences of the senses. Most of the Buddha's religious and philosophical contemporaries were substance metaphysicians. The atta is the most well known of these substances, but others were also recognised. For example, below are the substances taught in Jainism. Now of course, the Buddha would have none of this. To him there are no substances, for all that we experience and can know are our changing experiences. For the Buddha there is dependency, rather than independent realities behind it all.
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Jainism substance.jpg
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Mahabrahma »

A tree is made of rain, sky elements, dirt elements, sunlight, it's genetic elements, it's own elements of emotions that come from it's psychology as a tree and the species of life that it was from past lives and current life as a tree, and all these things affect it in some way. Except in what way is the tree truly affected? Perhaps it stands tall, unaffected by any elements in it's Life-Force.
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at the summit of spiritual perfection:
that’s who I call a brahmin.

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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by cappuccino »

Mahabrahma wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:58 pm emotions that come from it's psychology as a tree
trees probably don’t have emotions or psychology


which is why they are fine
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

Ceisiwr wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 9:23 pm
zan wrote: Thu Feb 02, 2023 4:44 pm What becomes clear is that the Buddha didn't completely rule out the idea that the elements are substances, far from it, he implied that they are fairly substantial, albeit impermanent. The earth clearly is stated to last a lot longer than a human body, for example.
A substance, by definition, has an independent existence rather than being dependent.
The Mahayana had no problem linguistically destroying the elements, just ask Nagarjuna. Hence, the Buddha could have, if he felt it was the correct thing to do. Any argument that he did refute them always relies on interpretation of his words, never on a direct, clear pronouncement made by the Buddha in the suttas. He never said: "The four great elements, Bhikkhus, are not substances!" Nor anything even close to that.
“Bhikkhus, suppose that this river Ganges was carrying along a great lump of foam. A man with good sight would inspect it, ponder it, and carefully investigate it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in a lump of foam? So too, bhikkhus, whatever kind of form there is, whether past, future, or present, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near: a bhikkhu inspects it, ponders it, and carefully investigates it, and it would appear to him to be void, hollow, insubstantial. For what substance could there be in form?" - SN 22.95

The commentaries here understand it to mean that there is no substance, in the metaphysical sense, to form.
Indeed, but we are not restrained by the commentaries in this subforum. I read that sutta as declaring all things temporary and not self/soul. Nothing in that sutta clearly refutes substance.

That aside, could you post the commentary for this sutta, I'd love to read it!

And you are correct in that your specific definition of substance is refuted by Buddhism. But a very common usage is more like just "stuff that is" without any debate attached, nor implied about independence or not. This is why I already stated that by a very specific definition, the suttas do refute substances. But, broadly speaking, they don't, and the mahabhutas are likely substances in the earliest texts, as stated by Karunadasa.
sub·stance
/ˈsəbstəns/

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noun
1.
a particular kind of matter with uniform properties.
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matter
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2.
the real physical matter of which a person or thing consists and which has a tangible, solid presence
Further, dependent origination might only apply to the aggregates of clinging. The Buddha called "the world" the world of experience, sometimes, and this may be what he meant when he equated it with dependent origination. Other times, he clearly is speaking of "the world" in a more common sense. "World" or "loka" is a polyseme. This means the mahabhutas could be a substance, and only the five aggregates of clinging are dependently originated.

See this post and the one below it:

viewtopic.php?p=536636#p536636

The "DO equals emptiness and all things are empty in that sense" view, I believe is a wild extrapolation and conflation by Nagarjuna, and is not supported by the suttas.

In the suttas, empty means empty of soul/self, not dependently originated. The DO sequence is about a being entering the womb, living and dying. It has nothing to do with all of reality. It only gets confused because of the polyseme use of "loka." Had the Buddha not used this poetic method of using "loka" in several ways, no one would think all of reality is DO, nor would they think DO refutes substances. It does not refute substances, not by a long shot.
...

This essay has for its purpose the simple but fundamental task of establishing what the 12-links formula is about (i.e., the subject matter broached in the canonical primary source texts). I would now contrast a few of the popular opinions on this matter, taking my motto from Charles Darwin’s Descent of Man: “False facts are highly injurious … for they often endure long; but false views… do little harm, for every one takes a salutary pleasure in proving their falseness…”.

Many of the leading interpretations are pointedly vague. The influential translator Bhikkhu Bodhi remarks: “In its abstract form the principle of dependent arising is equivalent to the law of the conditioned genesis of phenomena.” (Bodhi, 1980, q.v. exposition, 2nd paragraph) As anodyne as this may sound, I must repudiate it as a “false fact”: the subject of the doctrine is simply incarnation (inclusive of conception, the development of the embryo, and birth). While this may extend to include the hatching of snakes and the births of gods and demi-gods (as shown above, 1), the primary concern of the text is human life in its tangible form. The text is not about the origin of “phenomena” (neither in its dictionary denotation, nor in any other sense of the term I can construe here); I would reject any attempt to broaden the meaning of this particular set of source texts into an abstract statement on epistemology or metaphysics. The Pali canon contains many discourses concerning the function of the mind and perception, but this isn’t one of them. A huge bulk of pseudo-philosophical hyperbole written by modern authors must collapse on this simple point: the original text does not broach the subject of the “structural relatedness of phenomena” (as Bodhi puts it, idem. 7th paragraph).

...

My conclusion is, simply, that the 12-links formula is unambiguously an ancient tract that was originally written on the subject of the conception and development of the embryo, as a sequence of stages prior to birth; in examining the primary source text, this is as blatant today as it was over two thousand years ago, despite some very interesting misinterpretations that have arisen in the centuries in-between.

-Unpopular facts about one of Buddhist philosophy’s most popular doctrines, Eisel Mazard
According to the American monastic Thanissaro Bhikku:
Emptiness as a quality of dharmas, in the early canons, means simply that one cannot identify them as one's own self or having anything pertaining to one's own self
-Wikipedia on Sunyata
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
zan
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

Ok, found the commentary:

"... lump of foam ... For what substance could there be in form?"

Bhikkhu Bodhi: Spk explains at length how form (i.e. the body) is like a lump of foam (phenapinda). I give merely the highlights: as a lump of foam lacks any substance, so form lacks any substance that is permanent, stable, a self; as the lump of foam is full of holes and fissures and the abode of many creatures, so too form; as the lump of foam, after expanding, breaks up, so does form, which is pulverized in the mouth of death.
This coupled with some sutta quotes, including a part from this very sutta, the Phena sutta, makes clear that the very specific definition of "substance" being denied is not the definition that means nothing exists.
That is what the Buddha said. Then the Holy One, the Teacher, went on to say:

“Form is like a lump of foam;
feeling is like a bubble;
perception seems like a mirage;
choices like a banana tree;
and consciousness like a magic trick:
so taught the kinsman of the Sun.

However you contemplate them,
examining them carefully,
they’re void and hollow
when you look at them closely.

Concerning this body,
he of vast wisdom has taught
that when three things are given up,
you’ll see this form discarded.

Vitality, warmth, and consciousness:
when they leave the body,
it lies there tossed aside,
food for others, mindless.

Such is this process,
this illusion, cooed over by fools.
It’s said to be a killer,
for no substance is found here.
-Phena sutta, SN 22.95
All too soon, this body
will lie on the ground
cast off,
bereft of consciousness,
like a useless scrap
of wood.
-Dhp 41
So, clearly something of substance in the common definition is left behind after consciousness ceases. Form is not non existent. It is "insubstantial" insofar as it has no soul/self in it, and is temporary. Nothing in the suttas says that it doesn't exist, is merely mind, or anything like that. A mind independent form, left over after death, is not some metaphysically non existent thing, but rather is something ontologically real.

Form being insubstantial just means not permanent and without soul/self. Just like river foam, which exists, but when you pick it apart it has no core, and is merely the sum of its parts, so the same is true of human form.

The phena sutta is refuting the same thing the suttas always do: self.
“Why now do you assume ‘a being’?
Mara, is that your speculative view?
This is a heap of sheer formations:
Here no being is found.

“Just as, with an assemblage of parts,
The word ‘chariot’ is used,
So, when the aggregates exist,
There is the convention ‘a being.’

“It’s only suffering that comes to be,
Suffering that stands and falls away.
Nothing but suffering comes to be,
Nothing but suffering ceases.”

Then Mara the Evil One, realizing, “The bhikkhuni Vajira knows me,” sad and disappointed, disappeared right there.
-SN 5.10
We are the sum of our parts, we are empty of self/soul and permanence.

Finally, none of this declares anything about the mahabhutas. Form may be insubstantial, as in hollow and temporary, empty of self/soul, precisely because it is made of the mahabhutas, which are temporary, and not self, and arise and cease, as explained in MN 28. But, they are still substances in a loose sense, as explained by Karunadasa above.

Might I say "Dust is insubstantial, it cannot support the weight of a person trying to walk on it." In response to a magic show where the magician walks on a cloud of dust? Certainly this is correct, and without denying that the dust exists, and has substance in another sense, in that it is made of earth, which exists.
There comes a time when the exterior water element flares up. At that time the exterior earth element vanishes. So for all its great age, the earth element will be revealed as impermanent, liable to end, vanish, and perish. What then of this ephemeral body appropriated by craving? Rather than take it to be ‘I’ or ‘mine’ or ‘I am’, they still just consider it to be none of these things.
-MN 28
So, clearly the earth element exists as support for other elements, much longer than the human body. Such a long lasting thing is not insubstantial in all senses, but only a very narrow definition. This also mitigates against reading the phena sutta so literally. It is negating self by comparing the human form to foam. That is a far cry from declaring that the earth element is non existent or only mind.

To my knowledge, no sutta ever declares the mahabhuta to be insubstantial, as in non existent, illusory, or anything like that.

We might also look to the word "insubstantial."
Seeing it, observing it, properly examining it, it would appear to him to be empty (ritta), unsubstantial (tuccha), without essence (asaara). What essence, bhikkhus, could there be in a lump of froth?
It is "tuccha" in Pali, and clearly need not mean anything like "substance" in the way you think it does:
The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary
Tuccha, (adj.) (Sk. tuccha, prob. rel. to Lat. tesqua deserted place, see Walde, Lat. Wtb. s. v. ) empty, vain, deserted; very often combined with ritta D. I, 55; III, 53 (°kumbhi); M. I, 207; J. I, 209 (°hattha, empty-handed); VI, 365; Sn. 883; Pug. 45, 46; Miln. 5 (+palāpa), 10 (id.), 13; DhA. II, 43; PvA. 202; Sdhp. 431. (Page 304)
Form is tuccha (deserted, empty), like foam. Not insubstantial in some very specific metaphysical way that refutes all ontological reality.

This is demonstrated also by looking at another sutta where this word clearly denotes something that exists being empty of contents, not itself insubstantial metaphysically:
“Mendicants, there are these four pots.
“Cattārome, bhikkhave, kumbhā.
What four?
Katame cattāro?

Covered but hollow,
Tuccho pihito,
uncovered but full,
pūro vivaṭo,
uncovered and hollow, and
tuccho vivaṭo,
covered and full.
pūro pihito—
These are the four pots.
Ime kho, bhikkhave, cattāro kumbhā.
-AN 4.103
The pot is tuccho, hollow. Not metaphysically insubstantial in a way that means the pot itself is non existent. Just as foam is tuccho, hollow, in the same way. Pots and foam exist, but are tuccho, hollow, there's nothing inside these outer shells, no soul.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Pulsar »

Zan wrote
This also mitigates against reading the phena sutta so literally. It is negating self by comparing the human form to foam.
Are you sure Buddha in the original Buddhism (not under the influence of Abhidhamma), taught the first aggregate to be the human form?.
Think of the Fire Sermon. What does it compare rupa with?
In the original buddhism, the first aggregate referred to the mental forms arising due to the sights seen, sounds heard, etc.
Just as sight is the form of the eye, sound is the form of the ear, taste is the form of the tongue. It is the mental images (forms) of sights and sounds seen, heard etc. which arise in the proliferating mind, that Buddha compared to foam.
Form is like foam
in Phena Sutta.
Repeated recollection of sights seen, sounds heard etc, and the resulting papanca, is what gets us involved in the "Origination of Suffering"
Recall the advice to Bahia and Malunkyaputta.
"you are neither in the seen, heard, sensed and cognized"
Original Buddha Dhamma in a nutshell.
I don't blame you for your misunderstanding. I recall Dr. Gombrich saying abhidhamma misinterpreted the first aggregate (intentionally or unintentinaly). Rupa of the five aggregates is translated as physical form in many suttas.
Dependent origination is about mentally created suffering, not physically created suffering.
If you want to further investigate how Abhidhamma altered the foundation of Buddhism check out Dr. Erich Frauwallner's "Studies in Abhidhmma Literature, and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical systems" Even V. Sujato recommended reading this, on Sutta Central.
It is a lot to read and understand, but worth every minute spent on it.
He is the most brilliant scholar I have come across, in recent history, when it comes to such analysis.
With love :candle:
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Fri Feb 03, 2023 12:17 am
Indeed, but we are not restrained by the commentaries in this subforum. I read that sutta as declaring all things temporary and not self/soul. Nothing in that sutta clearly refutes substance.
The atta is a type of substance.
And you are correct in that your specific definition of substance is refuted by Buddhism. But a very common usage is more like just "stuff that is" without any debate attached, nor implied about independence or not. This is why I already stated that by a very specific definition, the suttas do refute substances. But, broadly speaking, they don't, and the mahabhutas are likely substances in the earliest texts, as stated by Karunadasa.
We do make use of substance in our everyday speech for we always speak in terms of nouns, verbs and adjectives. Of "Paul and his blue ball". In that sentence we have two substances. We have "Paul" who owns a "ball" which bears the characteristic of "blue". In terms of Jainism, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya and others this is actually one of the proofs for substances, that its in our very language, and so there are substances such as the atta (Paul) and matter (ball). Of course, to the Buddha this is not so. Yes, we talk in terms of substances but this is only conventional. Ultimately there are no substances, because all we can know and experience is dependently originated. Substances are the opposite of being dependently originated. They have independent and eternal existence. As for your quote, its worth noting that science assumes substance in order to do science. It assumes matter, a substance.
This means the mahabhutas could be a substance, and only the five aggregates of clinging are dependently originated.
The mahābhūta are also said to be dependently originated, so how are they independently existing substances?
The "DO equals emptiness and all things are empty in that sense" view, I believe is a wild extrapolation and conflation by Nagarjuna, and is not supported by the suttas.

In the suttas, empty means empty of soul/self, not dependently originated. The DO sequence is about a being entering the womb, living and dying. It has nothing to do with all of reality. It only gets confused because of the polyseme use of "loka." Had the Buddha not used this poetic method of using "loka" in several ways, no one would think all of reality is DO, nor would they think DO refutes substances. It does not refute substances, not by a long shot.
I agree that dependent origination is about rebirth but also consider that when someone has insight into dependent origination, they then have insight into nibbāna which, we can say, is an emptiness of substance. Also consider this sutta:
When this was said, the Venerable Gavampati said to the elder bhikkhus: “Friends, in the presence of the Blessed One I have heard and learnt this: ‘Bhikkhus, one who sees suffering also sees the origin of suffering, also sees the cessation of suffering, also sees the way leading to the cessation of suffering. One who sees the origin of suffering also sees suffering, also sees the cessation of suffering, also sees the way leading to the cessation of suffering. One who sees the cessation of suffering also sees suffering, also sees the origin of suffering, also sees the way leading to the cessation of suffering. One who sees the way leading to the cessation of suffering also sees suffering, also sees the origin of suffering, also sees the cessation of suffering.’”
viewtopic.php?p=701987&hilit=sees+depen ... on#p701987

When then one sees dependent origination they also see, at the same time, suffering, path and nibbāna. By seeing dependent origination, you also see nibbāna. The Madhyamakas argued that insight is all at once, naturally, and so does Theravāda. Against this we have the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika, who argued that its gradual.
This coupled with some sutta quotes, including a part from this very sutta, the Phena sutta, makes clear that the very specific definition of "substance" being denied is not the definition that means nothing exists.
Well for Theravādins it means there is no substance, of the metaphysical and Jain/Vaiśeṣika/Nyāya kind but what remains is the characteristic itself. The "redness" and so on, and those raw experiences are real.
So, clearly something of substance in the common definition is left behind after consciousness ceases. Form is not non existent. It is "insubstantial" insofar as it has no soul/self in it, and is temporary. Nothing in the suttas says that it doesn't exist, is merely mind, or anything like that. A mind independent form, left over after death, is not some metaphysically non existent thing, but rather is something ontologically real.
Well, if its a substance then it does really exist ontologically but it would have independent existence (for that is what substances are, by definition). That would mean it always is, which would mean you are viewing sense experience in terms of permanence and independence rather than impermanence and dependency. On substances, this is how they are laid out in Vaiśeṣika:
pṛthivyāpastejo vāyurākāśaṃ kālo digātmā mana iti dravyāṇi || 1.1.5 ||

pṛthivī—earth; āpas—waters; tejas—fire; vāyuḥ—air; ākāśam—Ether; kālaḥ—time; dik—direction, space; ātmā—Self; manas—mind; iti—only; dravyāṇi—substances.

5. Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Ether, Time, Space, Self, and Mind (are) the only Substances.

rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśaḥ—Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch; saṃkhyāḥ—Numbers; parimāṇāni—Measures, Extensions; pṛthaktvam—Separateness; saṃyoga-vibhṅgau—Conjunction and Disjunction; paratvāparatve—Priority and Posteriority; budbhayaḥ—Understandings; sukha-duḥkhe—Pleasure and pain; icchā-dveṣau—Desire and Aversion; prayatnāḥ—Volitions; ca—And; gaṇāḥ—Attributes.

6. Attributes are Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Numbers, Measures, Separateness, Conjunction and Disjunction, Priority and Posteriority, Understandings, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, and Volitions.
https://www.wisdomlib.org/hinduism/book ... 27559.html

So, according to this orthodox strand of Brahminism, there are 10 substances the qualities of which we experience as colour, taste, smell and so on. The substances are eternal, because they have independent existence (for they do not rely on anything else, they aren't reducible to anything else), but their attributes do change and it is these attributes we experience via the senses. Substances then are independently existing realities which exist behind, but are the cause of, our sense experience. Now, of course, for the Buddha this is nonsense. Its nonsense because, for the Buddha, all we can know and experience are dependently originated dhammas. If there were substances, nothing would change, and its foolish, according to the Buddha, to speculate on things beyond our sense experience (which is where substances always are).
Form being insubstantial just means not permanent and without soul/self. Just like river foam, which exists, but when you pick it apart it has no core, and is merely the sum of its parts, so the same is true of human form.
Form is dependent, and so it does not have independent existence. Not having an independent existence it then cannot be a substance. That would mean it can't be an atta, nor matter either.
To my knowledge, no sutta ever declares the mahabhuta to be insubstantial, as in non existent, illusory, or anything like that.

We might also look to the word "insubstantial."

"Seeing it, observing it, properly examining it, it would appear to him to be empty (ritta), unsubstantial (tuccha), without essence (asaara). What essence, bhikkhus, could there be in a lump of froth?"

It is "tuccha" in Pali, and clearly need not mean anything like "substance" in the way you think it does:

The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary
Tuccha, (adj.) (Sk. tuccha, prob. rel. to Lat. tesqua deserted place, see Walde, Lat. Wtb. s. v. ) empty, vain, deserted; very often combined with ritta D. I, 55; III, 53 (°kumbhi); M. I, 207; J. I, 209 (°hattha, empty-handed); VI, 365; Sn. 883; Pug. 45, 46; Miln. 5 (+palāpa), 10 (id.), 13; DhA. II, 43; PvA. 202; Sdhp. 431. (Page 304)

Form is tuccha (deserted, empty), like foam. Not insubstantial in some very specific metaphysical way that refutes all ontological reality.
Well form is said to be dependently originated, and because of that it has no sāra (substance).
The pot is tuccho, hollow. Not metaphysically insubstantial in a way that means the pot itself is non existent. Just as foam is tuccho, hollow, in the same way. Pots and foam exist, but are tuccho, hollow, there's nothing inside these outer shells, no soul.
Consider that back in Ancient or Medieval India it would be the likes of Nyāya who would argue that there are real "pots" which undergo change over time. Do you think Nyāya understood the Dhamma better than Buddhists did, at the time? With that said, there was a school of Buddhism which argued absolutely for the ontological existence of not pots but rather dhammas. This was the Sarvāstivādins. The pot doesn't really exist of course, but the dhammas that make it up do. There are atoms which, although existing momentarily, give rise to forms which we perceive. When we see a pot then, whats really there are atoms. There is an atom which bears "long", and atom for "black" and so on. The problem there is that for their system to work, they had to argue that the dhammas are substances. They had to do that, because in order to establish the ontological reality of anything you need substance. That is why they always exist, in the three times. This is why their name literally means "the all exists school". This of course would mean that the dhammas have an independent existence, and so its hard to see how they can also be dependently originated. Their reply was that although the dhammas always exist, they have to rely on each other to discharge their effects across time, into the present, and so are dependently arisen in that way. Doesn't make sense to me, to be honest, but based on our past conversations I know how important realism is to you, and I do wonder if you might not be more at home with the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma based on what you have argued here and elsewhere. Sadly, of course, there is no living school to follow today.
Last edited by Ceisiwr on Fri Feb 03, 2023 11:01 pm, edited 1 time in total.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Ceisiwr
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

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To quote 4 masters as recorded in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma Mahāvibhāṣa Śāstra on the nature of the substantial (dravya) dhammas:
The Venerable Dharmatrāta says that there is change in mode of being (bhāva- anyathātva). The Venerable Ghoṣaka says that there is change in characteristic (lakṣaṇa-anyathātva). The Venerable Vasumitra says that there is change in state (avasthā-anyathātva). The Venerable Buddhadeva says that there is change in [temporal] relativity (anyathā-anyathātva).

[1] The advocate of “change in mode of being” asserts that when dharmas operate (pra-√vṛt) in time, they change on account of their modes of existence/being (bhāva); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of breaking up a golden vessel to produce another thing—there is just a change in shape, not in varṇa- rūpa. It is also like milk, etc., turning into curds, etc.—just the taste, digestibility, etc., are given up, not the varṇa-rūpa. Similarly, when dharmas enter into the present from the future, although they give up their future mode of existence and acquire their present mode of existence, they neither lose nor acquire their substantial essence (AKB: dravya-bhāva). Likewise, when they enter the past from the present, although they give up the present mode of existence and acquire the past mode of existence, they neither give up nor acquire their substantial nature.

[2] The advocate of “change in characteristic” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they change on account of characteristic (lakṣaṇa); there is no change in substance. A dharma in each of the temporal periods has three temporal characteristics; when one [temporal] characteristic is conjoined, the other two are not severed. This is like the case of a man being attached to one particular woman— he is not said to be detached from other women. Similarly, when dharmas abide in the past, they are being conjoined with the past characteristic but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics. When they abide in the future, they are being conjoined with the future characteristic but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics. When they abide in the present, they are being conjoined with the present characteristic, but are not said to be severed from the characteristics of the other two temporal characteristics.

[3] The advocate of “change in state” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they change on account of state (avasthā); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of moving a token [into different positions]. When placed in the position (avasthā) of ones, it is signified as one; placed in the position of tens, ten; placed in the position of hundreds, hundred. While there is change in the positions into which it is moved, there is no change in its substance. Similarly, when dharmas pass through the three temporal states, although they acquire three different names, they do not change in substance. In the theory proposed by this master, there is no confusion as regards substance, for the three periods are differentiated on the basis of activity (kāritra).

[4] The advocate of “change in [temporal] relativity” asserts that when dharmas operate in time, they are predicated differently [as future, present, or past], relative to that which precedes and that which follows (cf. AKB: pūrvāparam apekṣyānyo’nya ucyate avasthāntarato na dravyāntarataḥ); there is no change in substance. This is like the case of one and the same woman who is called “daughter” relative to her mother, and “mother” relative to her daughter. Similarly, dharmas are called “past” relative to the succeeding ones, “future” relative to the preceding ones, “present” relative to both.
Notice that in all 4 theories the dhammas never lose their existence. They always are, because they are substances. They have independent existence, although the Sarvāstivādins would of course deny this.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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