Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Exploring the Dhamma, as understood from the perspective of the ancient Pali commentaries.
sphairos
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Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by sphairos »

zan wrote: Thu Sep 09, 2021 11:44 pm
sphairos wrote: Thu Sep 09, 2021 5:21 pm No, it is never implied in the early sources.

Buddhist theory of atomism developed under the influence of Indian theories of atomism in the late Abhidharma period.

See
...

and Y. Karunadasa "Buddhist Analysis of Matter" (1967)

and in the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya there is a long discussion of the structure of "a Buddhist atom".


Thanks. Have you read the Karunadasa book? What is the authors position? Is he explaining orthodox abhidhamma? Or trying to disprove it or explain it differently than the orthodox positions as represented by the abhidhammattha sangaha and similar texts?

In other words, what is his angle? Is he promoting abhidhamma as dhamma realism? Or something else?
You are welcome.

Prof. Yakupitiyage Karunadasa is the biggest scholarly authority on Theravāḍa Abhidhamma, perhaps, ever.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Y._Karunadasa

I ve browsed through that book and I ve read his "Theravāda Abhidhamma" and other books.

I don't support your "realism" shtick in any way, shape or form, as you know from my previous posts, and find its attribution to Buddhism impossible and if made laughable. Among other points, it contradicts the middle way between "everything exists / everything doesn't exist".

Here is what the blurb to the "Theravāda Abhidhamma" says:

"The renowned Sri Lankan scholar Y. Karunadasa examines Abhidhamma perspectives on the nature of phenomenal existence. He begins with a discussion of dhamma theory, which describes the bare phenomena that form the world of experience. He then explains the Abhidhamma view that only dhammas are real, and that anything other than these basic phenomena are conceptual constructs. This, he argues, is Abhidhamma’s answer to common-sense realism—the mistaken view that the world as it appears to us is ultimately real."

https://www.amazon.de/-/en/Y-Karunadasa/dp/1614294534

He states that we in some way perceive the external objects, and external world in some way exists, but it (rūpa) is suñña , empty.

I don't know if you can align your "realism love" with that (actual Buddhist "view")
Last edited by sphairos on Fri Sep 10, 2021 1:29 pm, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by DooDoot »

sphairos wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 12:40 pm (rūpa) is suñña , empty.
:shrug:
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Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by zan »

sphairos wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 12:40 pm
zan wrote: Thu Sep 09, 2021 11:44 pm
sphairos wrote: Thu Sep 09, 2021 5:21 pm No, it is never implied in the early sources.

Buddhist theory of atomism developed under the influence of Indian theories of atomism in the late Abhidharma period.

See
...

and Y. Karunadasa "Buddhist Analysis of Matter" (1967)

and in the Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya there is a long discussion of the structure of "a Buddhist atom".


Thanks. Have you read the Karunadasa book? What is the authors position? Is he explaining orthodox abhidhamma? Or trying to disprove it or explain it differently than the orthodox positions as represented by the abhidhammattha sangaha and similar texts?

In other words, what is his angle? Is he promoting abhidhamma as dhamma realism? Or something else?
You are welcome.

Prof. Yakupitiyage Karunadasa is the biggest scholarly authority on Theravāḍa Abhidhamma, perhaps, ever.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Y._Karunadasa

I ve browsed through that book and I ve read his "Theravāda Abhidhamma" and other books.

I don't support your "realism" shtick in any way, shape or form, as you know from my previous posts, and find its attribution to Buddhism impossible and if made laughable. Among other points, it contradicts the middle way between "everything exists / everything doesn't exist".

Here is what the blurb to the "Theravāda Abhidhamma" says:

"The renowned Sri Lankan scholar Y. Karunadasa examines Abhidhamma perspectives on the nature of phenomenal existence. He begins with a discussion of dhamma theory, which describes the bare phenomena that form the world of experience. He then explains the Abhidhamma view that only dhammas are real, and that anything other than these basic phenomena are conceptual constructs. This, he argues, is Abhidhamma’s answer to common-sense realism—the mistaken view that the world as it appears to us is ultimately real."

https://www.amazon.de/-/en/Y-Karunadasa/dp/1614294534

He states that we in some way perceive the external objects, and external world in some way exists, but it (rūpa) is suñña , empty.

I don't know if you can align your "realism love" with that (actual Buddhist "view")

My ultimate position, or my "realism love" is precisely the exact same thing as the orthodox Theravada position:

What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas
is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognises
the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject
yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that

truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that
owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
-Y. Kunadasa, The Dhamma Theory, page 38
dhamma theory is best described as dhamma realism
-The Theravada Abhidhamma: Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality
By Y. Karunadasa, chapter 2
It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…

Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions…

...concretely produced matter...possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.

Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 26, 235, 260

My position is that things are conventionally real, as things generally are combinations of paramattha dhammas and pannatti but ultimately all that exists, truly objectively, and mind independent, are the paramattha dhammas. I've explained it in some really outlandish ways because it is assaulted from every possible angle, and so giving a broad range of wide reaching defenses made sense. I've defended realism broadly, as I stated in one of the other threads, rather than trying to defend the specific dhamma theory, for this reason. It is perfectly reasonable to explain it in these ways, using conventional speech and reasoning. The act of seeing, for example, relies on being able to see objects that ultimately exist, and this can be spoken about, even without specifying the dhammas. Ditto for everything else. Even the invisible laws of the dhamma exist ultimately.

...in order for there to be seeing there must be eye sensitivity, and there must be visible forms that really exist, are realities that genuinely exist, are personally experienced, and are ultimate reality.
-Mahasi Sayadaw, Manual of Insight, page 98
As pointed out by K.N. Jayatilleke in his Early Buddhist
Theory of Knowledge, one misconception about the Theravāda
version of double truth is that paramattha-sacca is superior to
sammuti-sacca and that “what is true in the one sense is false
in the other.”
[144] This observation that the distinction in
question is not based on a theory of degrees of truth will
become clear from the following free translation of the
relevant passages contained in three commentaries:
Herein references to living beings, gods, Brahmā, etc.,
are sammuti-kathā, whereas references to
impermanence, suffering, egolessness, the aggregates
of the empiric individuality, the spheres and
elements of sense perception and mind-cognition,
bases of mindfulness, right effort, etc., are paramatthakathā. One who is capable of understanding and
penetrating to the truth and hoisting the flag of
arahatship when the teaching is set out in terms of
generally accepted conventions, to him the Buddha
preaches the doctrine based on sammuti-kathā. One
who is capable of understanding and penetrating to
the truth and hoisting the flag of arahatship when the
teaching is set out in terms of ultimate categories, to
him the Buddha preaches the doctrine based on
paramattha-kathā. To one who is capable of awakening
to the truth through sammuti-kathā, the teaching is not
presented on the basis of paramattha-kathā, and
conversely, to one who is capable of awakening to
51
the truth through paramattha-kathā, the teaching is not
presented on the basis of sammuti-kathā.
There is this simile on this matter. Just as a teacher of
the three Vedas who is capable of explaining their
meaning in different dialects might teach his pupils,
adopting the particular dialect which each pupil
understands, even so the Buddha preaches the
doctrine adopting, according to the suitability of the
occasion, either the sammuti- or the paramattha-kathā.
It is by taking into consideration the ability of each
individual to understand the Four Noble Truths that
the Buddha presents his teaching either by way of
sammuti or by way of paramattha or by way of both.
Whatever the method adopted the purpose is the
same, to show the way to Immortality through the
analysis of mental and physical phenomena.
[145]
As shown from the above quotation, the penetration of the
truth is possible by either teaching, the conventional or the
ultimate, or by the combination of both. One method is not
singled out as superior or inferior to the other. It is like
using the dialect that a person readily understands, and
there is no implication that one dialect is either superior or
inferior to another. What is more, as the commentary to the
Aṅguttara Nikāya states specifically, whether the Buddhas
preach the doctrine according to sammuti or paramattha, they
teach only what is true, only what accords with actuality,
without involving themselves in what is not true
52
(amusā’va).
[146] The statement: “The person exists” (=
sammuti-sacca) is not erroneous, provided one does not
imagine by the person a substance enduring in time.
Convention requires the use of such terms, but as long as
one does not imagine substantial entities corresponding to
them, such statements are valid.
[147] On the other hand, as
the commentators observe, if for the sake of conforming to
the ultimate truth one would say, “The five aggregates eat”
(khandhā bhuñjanti), “The five aggregates walk” (khandhā
gacchanti), instead of saying: “A person eats,” “A person
walks,” such a situation would result in what is called
vohārabheda, i.e. a breach of convention resulting in a
breakdown in meaningful communication.
[148]
Hence in presenting the teaching the Buddha does not
exceed linguistic conventions (na hi Bhagavā samaññaṃ
atidhāvati),
[149] but uses such terms as “person” without
being led astray by their superficial implications
(aparāmasaṃ voharati).
[150] Because the Buddha is able to
employ such linguistic designations as “person” and
“individual” without assuming corresponding substantial
entities, he is called “skilled in expression” (vohārakusala).
[151] The use of such terms does not in any way
involve falsehood.
[152] Skilfulness in the use of words is the
ability to conform to conventions (sammuti), usages (vohāra),
designations (paññatti), and turns of speech (nirutti) in
common use in the world without being led astray by
them.
[153] Hence in understanding the teaching of the
Buddha one is advised not to adhere dogmatically to the
53
mere superficial meanings of words.
[154]
The foregoing observations should show that according to
the Theravāda version of double truth, one kind of truth is
not held to be superior to the other. Another interesting
conclusion to which the foregoing observations lead is that
as far as the Theravāda is concerned, the distinction
between sammuti-sacca and paramattha-sacca does not refer to
two kinds of truth as such but to two ways of presenting the
truth. Although they are formally introduced as two kinds
of truth, they are explained as two modes of expressing
what is true. They do not represent two degrees of truth of
which one is superior or inferior to the other. This explains
why the two terms, kathā (speech) and desanā (discourse),
are often used with reference to the two kinds of truth.
[155]
In this respect the distinction between sammuti and
paramattha corresponds to the distinction made in the earlier
scriptures between nītattha and neyyattha. For, as we saw
earlier, no preferential value-judgement is made between
nītattha and neyyattha. All that is emphasised is that the two
kinds of statement should not be confused. The great
advantage in presenting sammuti and paramattha in this way
is that it does not raise the problem of reconciling the
concept of a plurality of truths with the well-known
statement of the Suttanipāta: “Truth is indeed one, there is
no second” (ekaṃ hi saccaṃ na dutīyam atthi).
ibid pages 51-54
whether there is an arising of Tathagatas or no arising of Tathagatas, that element still persists, the stableness of the Dhamma, the fixed course of the Dhamma, specific conditionality. A Tathagata awakens to this and breaks through to it. Having done so, he explains it, teaches it, proclaims it, establishes it, discloses it, analyses it, elucidates it. And he says: ‘See! With ignorance as condition, bhikkhus, volitional formations.’
-SN 12.20
Mendicants, these four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise. What four? This is suffering’ …‘This is the origin of suffering’ …‘This is the cessation of suffering’ …‘This is the practice that leads to the cessation of suffering’ …These four things are real, not unreal, not otherwise.
-SN 56.20
If you find dhamma theory realism so laughable, why do you read all of these books about it? Or are you in agreement with dhamma theory realism? Are you a dhamma theory realist, and what you dislike is my personal defenses of realism?

I am in full agreement with dhamma realism, and wanted to ensure that Karunadasa wasn't trying to refute it in the book in question, meaning that "The Dhamma Theory" would be him reporting on the position of the Theravada without personal input, and "A Buddhist Analysis of Matter" would be his personal position which disagrees with the orthodox. I didn't want to waste my money on it if it was trying to refute it. This seemed unlikely, but a few available selections, with insufficient context due to them being previews, made it unclear and seemed possibly like it went in that direction, so I wanted to be sure before wasting money on something I wouldn't read.

If you are a realist and accept dhamma realism and the mind independent, objective status of the dhammas, then please disregaurd the following, as it is written under the assumption that you are something other than a realist, dhamma realist or otherwise. If you are a realist of any kind, then it doesn't apply to you. If that is the case, please let me know which kind of realism you ascribe to, as I'd be interested in reading more about it.

If you're a dhamma realist, then I'd like to know that too, and hopefully my clarification of my views shows that we are ultimately in agreement! :smile: :heart:

Regardless, personally, I do not engage those I find laughable. I find that someone who holds a position that is so silly as to be laughable is not something that anyone who values their time would address. And, indeed, this is borne out as true in general observation of the world; people who talk utter nonsense are usually ignored, and laughed at, not engaged in discussion. Thus, the fact that you are engaging me in conversation about the topic you ostensibly find so laughable is a testament to the fact that it had an effect on you so strong that you felt the need to bring it up again, and this is a good thing and evinces your intelligence and discriminating tastes. If you truly found it to be just some goofy nonsense to be laughed off, you wouldn't be bringing it up and feel the need to address it. Your need to address it is particularly striking because, unless I'm mistaken, I didn't speak to you even once in the two most recent threads where I presented my position on this issue, and so you bringing it up unbidden just shows that, whether you realize it or not, my presentation of my positions on realism had an effect on you, and for the better. You read through both threads and even commented on each, so clearly they were worth your time. If you'll say, in order to save face, that you didn't actually read them, only commented, then you throw out your credibility and invalidate your own opinion on my positions, as you haven't actually read them in sufficient detail. If you'll say you read them all, but laughed the whole time, you admit your time has little value, as they were verbose, and repetitive, and your addressing me here points to you having taken them seriously, for the reason listed at the beginning of this paragraph. But, again, your very act of bringing this up betrays the idea that your time has little value and that you found my position merely laughable. Quite the opposite; this demonstrates that you took them seriously and that you value your time.

You're probably starting to think about, or perhaps even subconsciously turning toward the obvious and inescapable paradox inherent in a Buddhism that is anything but realist or positionless. Coupled with the fact that the Buddha absolutely trashed the positionless in DN 1, this leaves only realism. This is because if Buddhism teaches that things are other than real, it itself is not real either, and thus cannot be believed, and certainly it would be quite silly to discuss seriously a religion that one believes is not real.

If I am wrong about all of the positive traits I attempted to draw out about you above, and you find this truly laughable, prove it by shaking it off. React as you would if seeing a chattering monkey that made you laugh at the zoo and just walk on to the next amusement. If you cannot do this, and it sticks with you, and especially if you need to refute this and address it further, or, perhaps especially, if you feel the need to bring it up in another thread at a later date, as you did above, you'll be tacitly agreeing that my position has affected you and made you question your anti realism, nominalism, idealism, or whatever thing other than realism that you likely hold. And you'll be confirming the obvious fact that you find my position to be anything but laughable, and, quite the opposite, you take it seriously enough to read through multiple threads on it, and bring it up later, and then perhaps bring it up yet another time.
If everyday experience poses no threat to you, then you may persist in this denial of the evidence provided by such experience. Quarrel with the evidence of everyday experience, and afterward we will rely on the winner.
-Chandrakirti
Last edited by zan on Fri Sep 10, 2021 4:33 pm, edited 2 times in total.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
sphairos
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Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by sphairos »

zan wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 4:26 pm ...
:lol: :clap:

viewtopic.php?p=629101#p629101
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How true are your ways?
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Posts: 1402
Joined: Sun Aug 28, 2016 1:57 pm

Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by zan »

sphairos wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 4:31 pm
zan wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 4:26 pm ...
:lol: :clap:

viewtopic.php?p=629101#p629101
Thanks for confirming that I was right by posting a reply :heart:

As to your position on the raft simile, please see the following:
“What would the sensible thing to do be? Here monks, he has crossed over to the far
bank he thinks: „this raft was very helpful to me in crossing the flood, now let me haul it up
to dry ground, or sink it in the water, and be on my way.‟ That, monks, is the sensible way to
act towards the raft. Just so, monks, I have taught the Dhamma as like a raft for ferrying, for
getting across.24 Monks, through understanding the Dhamma in terms of this parable, you
should renounce things, and more-so non-things.”


The last sentence is problematic. It tells us to reject dhammā and more so adhammā (both in the plural):
dhammāpi vo pahātabbā pageva adhammā. The words dhammā and adhammā have evoked a variety of
renderings. MA ii.109 says that „dhamma‟ here means calm and insight (samatha-vipassanā), specifically
craving for calm and insight, but this does not make a great deal of sense, someone on the other shore has no
craving to give up and one cannot abandon the raft before getting across. No modern exegetes seem to accept
Buddhaghosa‟s suggested interpretation. Horner interpreted the phrase as suggesting that we up morality at the
futher shore (see Keown 1992: 93). Horner‟s (1954) translation is “you should get rid even of (right) mental
objects, all the more of wrong ones.” (p.173-4). Gethin (2008) interprets dhammā/adhammā as “good
practices and bad practices” (p.161), which echos Buddhaghosa but is less specific. However „practice‟ is
hardly a usual translation for dhamma (one might even say it is a mistranslation).
Ñānamoli and Bodhi (2001) opt for the “teachings and things contrary to the teachings” which is at least a
possible translation. I am doubtful about dhammā in the plural being interpreted in the sense of „teaching‟ (I‟ll
continues…
5

return to this). Bodhi‟s footnote (p. 1209, n.255) acknowledges the ambiguity, and justifies his translation with
a pious homily. Thanissaro (2010) does not translate the key terms: “you should let go even of Dhammas, to
say nothing of non-Dhammas." The capitalisation implies that he understands „teachings‟, as dhammā as
„things‟ is seldom capitalised and he therefore has the same problem as Ñānamoli and Bodhi. Piya (2003) also
avoids committing himself: “you should abandon even the dharmas, how much more that which is not
dharmas” [sic]; and refers to MA and Bodhi‟s footnote for an explanation.
Richard Gombrich (1996) has weighed in with support for translating „teachings‟ and „non-teachings‟
however: “The Buddha concludes that his dhammā, his teachings are to be let go of, let alone adhammā. The
occasion for this whole discourse is given by Ariṭṭha, who obstinately declared that he understood the
Buddha‟s teaching in a certain [wrong] sense.” (p.24). The argument that dhammā in the last sentence is not
the dhamma referred to in the earlier parts of the passage Gombrich declares to be “sheer scholastic literalism”
(p.24), but I have been unable to locate another passage in which the Buddha uses dhammā in the plural to
describe his teachings. Gombirch comments on the irony of taking literally a text preaching against literalism
(p.22), with the implication that Ariṭṭha – to whom he emphasises the sutta was directed – is guilty of
literalism, or of clinging to the Dhamma. Arriṭṭha was guilty of subbornly refusing to relinquish a completely
wrong interpretation. He is not a literalist, but a fudger – his problem is that he does not take the Buddha‟s
injunction literally enough! That the simile of grasping the snake at the wrong end, which immediately
preceeds the raft simile, applies to Ariṭṭha we cannot doubt – he has misunderstood the teaching. The simile of
the raft appears to be talking about something entirely different, and unrelated to Ariṭṭha. I am inclined to
agree with Keown who speculates that the sutta is a composite of originally separate sections (p.96).
Jonardon Ganeri has attempted to problematise the idea of abandoning the teachings – basing his
discussion solely on Ñānamoli and Bodhi‟s translation. Firstly he says that if we take dhammā to mean
teachings then the teachings only have instrumental value (p.132). Ironically this is not really a problem from
a Buddhist point of view. His other argument, which relies on interpreting the Buddha‟s word as „Truth‟ is that
for one on the other side “truth ceases altogether to be something of value” (p.132). Again this is not really an
issue for Buddhism as truth as expressed in language is always provisional. The „Truth‟ (if there is such a
thing) is experiential, and on experiencing bodhi and vimutti one does not need provisional truth anymore.
Ganeri seems to misunderstand the pragmatic way Buddhism values truth – truth is whatever is helpful. This is
epitomised in two now cliched passages: in the Kesamutti Sutta (A i.188ff) where the Buddha tells the Kālāma
people to trust their own experience in determining right and wrong conduct; and at Vin ii.10 where the
Buddha tells his aunt Mahāpajāpatī that the Dhamma is whatever conducive to nibbāna.
If we accept Ñānamoli and Bodhi‟s „teachings and thngs contrary to the teachings‟ then we must state the
standard caveat, which is that one only abandons the teachings after reaching the further shore. Too often this
passage is used to attack doctrine being applied on this shore, or in the flood. There is no suggestion but that
we absolutely need the raft until we are safely on the other side.
Thus from various reputable scholars we get the full range of possibilities for translating dhammā:
„teaching, morality, things, mental objects‟.
This parable is also examined in depth by Keown (1992), where he points out that this is the only mention
of abandoning the raft (p.95) and that in other texts “it is made perfectly clear that sīla along with samādhi and
paññā are part of the further shore and are not left behind on the near side after enlightenment.” (p.95). As
Keown points out that in some texts the further shore is morality (e.g. A v.232, and v.252f ). I would add that
this idea that one abandons the Dhamma after enlightenment is flatly contradicted in the Gārava Sutta “I will
reverence, pay my respects, and dwell in subordination to that very thing [i.e. dhamma] to which I have fullyawakened” (Yaṃnūnāhaṃ yvāyaṃ dhammo mayā abhisambuddho tameva dhammaṃ sakkatvā garuṃ katvā
upanissāya vihareyyanti) S i.139. The Buddha himself does not give up on Dhamma, why should anyone else?
This militates against interpreting dhammā as „teachings‟. Keown‟s tentative translation is “…good things
(dhammā) must be left behind, much more so evil things (adhammā)” though he affirms the ambiguity.
However Keown notes that in other places where dhammā and adhammā are contrasted they seem to mean
good things and bad things (p.101). He concludes that the simile has two purposes: 1. to affirm that the
dhamma is for the purpose of salvation and no other purpose (this being the main point of the first part of the
Alagaddūpama Sutta); and 2. that we must not become emotionally attached to particular doctrines, practices,
teachings or philosophical views, and that none should assume a disproportionate status. But that things which
are unambiguously evil must certainly be rejected (p.102). Keown is at least thorough and pays attention to the
text, and tries to take the text on its own terms.
Despite this plethora of interpretations I have yet another. In light of the following discussion in the text of
things which exist (sati) or don‟t exist (asati), under my heading „Torment‟, I suggest that dhammā here is
„things‟ (that exist) and adhammā is „non-things‟ (things that don‟t exist). That is to say we must abandon
attachment to what we have, and to what we wish to have.
No single view of this simile appears to be unproblematic.
-The Snake Simile Discourse
Alagaddūpama Sutta, Majjhima Nikāya 22 (M i.130).
Jayarava Nov 2010
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
sphairos
Posts: 966
Joined: Mon Jun 21, 2010 4:37 am
Location: Munich, Germany

Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by sphairos »

zan wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 4:39 pm ...
viewtopic.php?p=637823#p637823
How good and wonderful are your days,
How true are your ways?
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Joined: Sun Aug 28, 2016 1:57 pm

Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by zan »

sphairos wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 4:31 pm
zan wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 4:26 pm ...
:lol: :clap:

viewtopic.php?p=629101#p629101
That said, I actually do have better things to do with my time, and I actually do find your insulting speech and mocking emojis laughable, and I find the position of anything but realism to be unreal, and thus not something possible to discuss at all, which means I've no more reason to engage you. Though, I'm very glad to see that behind your facade of laughing and mockery is the undoubted reality that you are being swayed and bothered enough by my position to continue thinking about it and replying to it! This is sincerely wonderful. I hope you keep thinking and get on track to the true orthodox Theravada dhamma position of realism! The two truths help here, because the paramattha dhammas are unpalatable for some, but, as the above texts quoted explain, the conventional can point to the truth as well. Always remember: positionlessness is valid (though the Buddha rejected it in DN 1), but positions other than realism or positionlessness self refute, as you've declared your own position unreal, and so end up positionless anyway, as you have no real position. Good luck! And if you ever want to talk without mocking me and calling my serious positions laughable, I'll be around :smile:
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
sphairos
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Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by sphairos »

zan wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 4:52 pm ...
I didn't mean to offend you, I respect and love you. It's just your view on realism I find nonsensical and untenable. I think the language and concepts are illusion, and I think it's a basic Buddhist understanding, so the hyperconcept "dhamma-realism" is hyper-illusion.
How good and wonderful are your days,
How true are your ways?
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Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by zan »

sphairos wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 5:08 pm
zan wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 4:52 pm ...
I didn't mean to offend you, I respect and love you. It's just your view on realism I find nonsensical and untenable. I think the language and concepts are illusion, and I think it's a basic Buddhist understanding, so the hyperconcept "dhamma-realism" is hyper-illusion.
Faire enough. Thank you. No hard feelings. :smile:

And, in closing, it's not my view, but the view of the entire orthodox Theravada school. My personal explanations have taken some weird turns, due to them being conventional language based explanations of my thoughts. All I meant to do was use conventional language to rule out the possibility of anything but realism and positionlessness, but my ultimate view, and technical explanations and understanding are identical with the orthodox.

Anyway, thanks for the book info! I think I will buy it after your assurance that it is orthodox.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by Coëmgenu »

zan wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 6:19 pmAll I meant to do was use conventional language to rule out the possibility of anything but realism and positionlessness [...]
What does it mean for you to "rule out the possibility of anything but realism and positionlessness?"
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
zan
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Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by zan »

Coëmgenu wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 10:03 pm
zan wrote: Fri Sep 10, 2021 6:19 pmAll I meant to do was use conventional language to rule out the possibility of anything but realism and positionlessness [...]
What does it mean for you to "rule out the possibility of anything but realism and positionlessness?"
Either things are, at least in some sense real in a conventional way, and thus it is true that realism is correct in at least this sense, or self refutation is inevitable.
"[l]f there were no place for conventional phenomena, the existence of which is established by the epistemic instruments, these phenomena would be like the snake - that is,
the rope grasped as a snake - of which no cause or effect is possible. . . .
[l]f one were forced to maintain that there is no place for bondage, liberation, etc in the
meaning of “conventional existence/’ and that these must be placed only in the erroneous perspective, that would be a great philosophical error.
Even worse, as long as convention is conceived [as entirely nonexistent], since there
would be no role for the epistemic instruments, neither the proposition maintained nor
the person who maintains it nor the proof - including scriptural sources and reasoning - could be established by epistemic instruments. So it would be ridiculous to maintain
that there are no genuine phenomena delivered by the epistemic instruments.” {Ocean
30-31 )15

Tsong khapa makes it plain here that conventional phenomena, unlike the snake
thought to be perceived when one sees a rope, have causes and effects, and are
actual. Moreover, he argues that the repudiation of the reality of the conventional
would undermine the possibility of epistemic authority, undermining even the abil-
ity to argue cogently that the conventional does not exist. Such a position would
be self-refuting.
-Jay Garfield, Taking Conventional Truth Seriously
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: Does the Buddha in the suttas ever state or strongly imply that the four elements are microscopic?

Post by SecretSage »

zan wrote: Thu Sep 09, 2021 3:18 am If it's not in the suttas, where does this notion come from? Is it just because it was a standard assumption at the time the Buddha lived, and, so, he didn't need to specify?
I can't find anything in the suttas claiming the four elements are microscopic.

There are discourses when things are categorized in much more than four elements. In modern times scientists characterize things using atomic elements.

MN 140 and other suttas explain what The Buddha means by the four elements:
And what is the earth element? The earth element may be interior or exterior. And what is the interior earth element? Anything hard, solid, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This includes head hair, body hair, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, diaphragm, spleen, lungs, intestines, mesentery, undigested food, feces, or anything else hard, solid, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This is called the interior earth element. The interior earth element and the exterior earth element are just the earth element. This should be truly seen with right understanding like this: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’ When you truly see with right understanding, you reject the earth element, detaching the mind from the earth element.

And what is the water element? The water element may be interior or exterior. And what is the interior water element? Anything that’s water, watery, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This includes bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, grease, saliva, snot, synovial fluid, urine, or anything else that’s water, watery, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This is called the interior water element. The interior water element and the exterior water element are just the water element. This should be truly seen with right understanding like this: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’ When you truly see with right understanding, you reject the water element, detaching the mind from the water element.

And what is the fire element? The fire element may be interior or exterior. And what is the interior fire element? Anything that’s fire, fiery, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This includes that which warms, that which ages, that which heats you up when feverish, that which properly digests food and drink, or anything else that’s fire, fiery, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This is called the interior fire element. The interior fire element and the exterior fire element are just the fire element. This should be truly seen with right understanding like this: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’ When you truly see with right understanding, you reject the fire element, detaching the mind from the fire element.

And what is the air element? The air element may be interior or exterior. And what is the interior air element? Anything that’s air, airy, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This includes winds that go up or down, winds in the belly or the bowels, winds that flow through the limbs, in-breaths and out-breaths, or anything else that’s air, airy, and appropriated that’s internal, pertaining to an individual. This is called the interior air element. The interior air element and the exterior air element are just the air element. This should be truly seen with right understanding like this: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’ When you truly see with right understanding, you reject the air element, detaching the mind from the air element.
- MN 140
MN 140 actually speaks of 6 elements including space and consciousness.

Speculations about the world are discouraged though and things leading towards arahantship are encouraged.
"You yourselves must strive; the Buddhas only point the way"
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