The causal mechanism behind kamma?

General discussion of issues related to Theravada Meditation, e.g. meditation postures, developing a regular sitting practice, skillfully relating to difficulties and hindrances, etc.
User avatar
Sasha_A
Posts: 319
Joined: Thu Apr 06, 2017 8:35 pm
Contact:

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by Sasha_A »

Ceisiwr wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 1:49 pm It’s not for me. I find some of what he writes to be interesting, but the salient points I find to be at variance with the suttas themselves. I don’t there is a translation issue either, since most translations are carried out by competent academics or those skilled in the language.
What good is a translator's regalia if he relies on dictionaries and commentaries based on a particular interpretation? All that can be said in such a case is that the translation compiled by such a translator in the target language is the most consistent with the traditional interpretation. The problem is also that the translation is always a bit of a retelling.

The question of the truth of one interpretation or another is not a question of regalia, authority, ancientity, popularity, etc. It is a question of being able to know something personally and directly as truth without having to rely on anyone else. Therefore, the only way to test a teaching is to apply it to oneself and look at the results, honestly, openly, unbiased.
User avatar
mjaviem
Posts: 2317
Joined: Wed Dec 16, 2020 5:06 pm

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by mjaviem »

Sasha_A wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 1:23 pm So unpleasant feelings and perceptions are the reason behind the wrong actions, but not the one's ignorance? And only behind one kind of actions – actions by mind?
...
Feelings and perceptions are part of the reason. It's a chain of conditionality leading to suffering which indeed includes not knowing to begin with. And while they are not only behind actions by mind, perceptions and feelings are said to condition the mind, they are cittasankhara.
Sasha_A wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 1:23 pm ...
So every time the one experiences agitation and shortening of breathing, the one is going on the kill spree? And again, are agitation and shortening of breath only affects body, but not mind or speech?
...
The breathing conditions the body, it's kayasankhara. I think the agitation in the breathing is proportional to the wrongness of the bodily actions being performed.
Sasha_A wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 1:23 pm ...
And such thinking only results in such actions by speech, and not by body or by mind?
...
Any actions are intention not only verbal actions. Such intentional thinking conditions the speech. It's vacisankhara.
Sasha_A wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 1:23 pm ...
Are actions by body, speech, and mind out of currently experienced feelings the same thing as acting by the very perceptions and feelings, by breathing, or by thinking and pondering?
...
There are no intentional actions without feeling. Acting conditioned by the breathing, and by the thoughts and pondering, and by the perceptions and feelings doesn't change this. It's just a fact that there is this conditioning going on. If only we could control the breathing, the thoughts and pondering and perceptions and feelings we could get rid of any intentions, I believe. Everything is underlain by intention but there is a way to get rid of all intention, to end intentional action, to cease the breathing that conditions the body, to cease the intentional thoughts and pondering that condition the speech, and to cease the perceptions and feelings that condition the mind.
Sasha_A wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 1:23 pm ...
And what about responsibility? Can one be responsible for the arising, changing and ceasing of perceptions and feelings? Or is one responsible only for one's actions by body, speech and mind on the account of perceptions and feelings that already are present and being experienced, but not for the very arising of those perceptions and feelings?
One is also responsible of making the effort to get rid of perceptions and feelings. One is responsible of making the effort to understand. Without the right effort there's no understanding.
Namo Tassa Bhagavato Arahato Sammā Sambuddhassa
User13866
Posts: 1238
Joined: Mon Jun 20, 2022 5:50 am

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by User13866 »

User13866 wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 11:52 am Let nobody say that i evade your questions
Sasha_A wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 7:11 am Can you give an example of a wholesome and unwholesome action by one's perceptions and feelings, breathig, and by thinking and pondering?
When a man gives attention perceiving the in & out breathing; mindful of the arising, persistence & cessation of thoughts, feelings & perceptions; that is wholesome kamma which is conducive to the undoing of existence and it is therefore an appropriate giving of attention.

When a man gives attention perceiving the in & out breathing; mindful of the arising, persistence & cessation of thoughts, feelings & perceptions, it is possible that various obsessions & perceptions tied to greed, aversion & delusion would assail that man. These perceptions are unwholesome, giving attention to these things is inappropriate and would be unwholesome kamma of bitter result.
This was overly verbose and not good enough.
Example 1 wrote:wholesome action by one's perceptions and feelings, breathig, and by thinking and pondering?
A person develops the perception of in & out breathing thinking, 'I will breathe in focusing on inconstancy.'
Example 2 wrote:unwholesome action by one's perceptions and feelings, breathig, and by thinking and pondering?
One eats garlic and being assailed with perception of ill-will, thinking 'let me annoy another with my bad breath', he proceeds to breathe another in the face as to annoy him.
User avatar
Sasha_A
Posts: 319
Joined: Thu Apr 06, 2017 8:35 pm
Contact:

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by Sasha_A »

mjaviem wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 2:27 pm ....
I have omitted most of your answer because, firstly, even one exception is enough to refute the generalisation "all" and, secondly, the root of the issue has already been made quite clear here:
mjaviem wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 2:27 pm One is also responsible of making the effort to get rid of perceptions and feelings. One is responsible of making the effort to understand. Without the right effort there's no understanding.
Taking responsibility for one's own kamma means being able to control the kamma one commits.

If one is responsible for experiencing perceptions and feelings, if the experience of perceptions and feelings is the committing of kamma, then this means that any bad experience that arises - again, not an action based on such an experience, but the experience itself - can, like any other bad kamma, lead to bad consequences, up to and including hell.
User13866
Posts: 1238
Joined: Mon Jun 20, 2022 5:50 am

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by User13866 »

Sasha_A wrote: Wed Feb 15, 2023 8:42 am
mjaviem wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 2:27 pm ....
I have omitted most of your answer because, firstly, even one exception is enough to refute the generalisation "all" and, secondly, the root of the issue has already been made quite clear here:
mjaviem wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 2:27 pm One is also responsible of making the effort to get rid of perceptions and feelings. One is responsible of making the effort to understand. Without the right effort there's no understanding.
Taking responsibility for one's own kamma means being able to control the kamma one commits.

If one is responsible for experiencing perceptions and feelings, if the experience of perceptions and feelings is the committing of kamma, then this means that any bad experience that arises - again, not an action based on such an experience, but the experience itself - can, like any other bad kamma, lead to bad consequences, up to and including hell.
When there is no doer of an action to be pinned down as a truth & reality then how responsibility?

There is thinking in terms of the doctrine of self & responsibility but these are abstract concepts used to make sense of what there is a thinking about. What is thought about is whatever it is except from what is thought about it.
visuddhimagga wrote:There is no doer of a deed
Or one who reaps the deed’s result;
Phenomena alone flow on—
No other view than this is right.
Even that which is called 'thinking' is whatever it is except from what is thought about it...
User avatar
Sasha_A
Posts: 319
Joined: Thu Apr 06, 2017 8:35 pm
Contact:

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by Sasha_A »

User13866 wrote: Wed Feb 15, 2023 12:10 pm When there is no doer of an action to be pinned down as a truth & reality then how responsibility?

ven. Nanavira wrote: SAKKĀYA
...
Sakkāyaditthi (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,300>) is sometimes explained as the view or belief (often attributed to a purely verbal misunderstanding)[c] that in one or other of the khandhā there is a permanent entity, a 'self'. These rationalized accounts entirely miss the point, which is the distinction (Khandha Samy. v,6 <S.iii,47>) between pañc'upādānakkhandhā (which is sakkāya) and pañcakkhandhā (which is sakkāyanirodha). To have ditthi about sakkāya is not an optional matter (as if one could regard sakkāya from the outside and form ditthi about it or not, as one pleased): sakkāya contains sakkāyaditthi (in a latent form at least) as a necessary part of its structure.[d] If there is sakkāya there is sakkāyaditthi, and with the giving up of sakkāyaditthi there comes to be cessation of sakkāya. To give up sakkāyaditthi, sakkāya must be seen (i.e. as pañc'upādānakkhandhā), and this means that the puthujjana does not see pañc'upādānakkhandhā as such (i.e. he does not recognize them—see MAMA [a] and cf. Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,511>). A puthujjana (especially one who puts his trust in the Commentaries) sometimes comes to believe that he does see pañc'upādānakkhandhā as such, thereby blocking his own progress and meeting with frustration: he cannot see what further task is to be done, and yet remains a puthujjana
...
[c]If avijjā were simply a matter of verbal misunderstanding, a maggot would be an arahat.
ven Thanissaro wrote: Selves & Not-self. THE BUDDHIST TEACHING ON ANATTĀ

The Buddha’s teaching on anattā, or not-self, is often mystifying to many Westerners. When we hear the term “not-self” we think that the Buddha was answering a question with a long history in our culture—of whether there is or isn’t a self or a soul—and that his answer is perverse or confusing. Sometimes it seems to be No, but the Buddha doesn’t follow through with the implications of a real No—if there’s no self, how can there be rebirth? Sometimes his answer seems to be No with a hidden Yes, but you wonder why the Yes is so hard to pin down. If you remember only one thing from these talks, remember this: that the Buddha, in teaching not-self, was not answering the question of whether there is or isn’t a self. This question was one he explicitly put aside.
...
The path begins with discernment—the factors of right view and right resolve—and discernment begins with this basic question about which actions are really skillful: “What, when I do it, will lead to long-term welfare and happiness?” [§8] The Buddha’s teaching on not-self—and his teaching on self—are, in part, answers to this question. To fit into this question, perceptions of self and perceptions of not-self are best viewed as kamma or actions: actions of identification and dis-identification. In the terms of the texts, the perception of self is called an action of “I-making” and “my-making (ahaṅkāra mamaṅkāra).” The perception of not-self is part of an activity called the “not-self contemplation (anattānupassanā).” Thus the question becomes: When is the perception of self a skillful action that leads to long-term welfare and happiness, when is the perception of not-self a skillful action that leads to long-term welfare and happiness?

This is the reverse of the way that the relationship between questions of kamma and not-self are usually understood. If you’ve ever taken an introductory course on Buddhism, you’ve probably heard this question: “If there is no self, who does the kamma, who receives the results of kamma?” This understanding turns the teaching on not-self into a teaching on no self, and then takes no self as the framework and the teaching on kamma as something that doesn’t fit in the framework. But in the way the Buddha taught these topics, the teaching on kamma is the framework and the teaching of not-self fits into that framework as a type of action. In other words, assuming that there really are skillful and unskillful actions, what kind of action is the perception of self? What kind of action is the perception of not-self?

So, to repeat, the issue is not, “What is my true self?” but “What kind of perception of self is skillful and when is it skillful, what kind of perception of not-self is skillful and when is it skillful?”
User13866
Posts: 1238
Joined: Mon Jun 20, 2022 5:50 am

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by User13866 »

Sasha_A wrote: Wed Feb 15, 2023 1:01 pm [c]If avijjā were simply a matter of verbal misunderstanding, a maggot would be an arahat.
This is the same exact argument as is made here
“Venerable sir, I remember identity view as a lower fetter taught by the Blessed One.
[...]

“Mālunkyāputta, to whom do you remember my having taught these five lower fetters in that way? Would not the wanderers of other sects confute you with the simile of the infant? For a young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘identity,’ so how could identity view arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to identity view lies within him.
https://suttacentral.net/mn64/en/bodhi? ... ight=false
However NV doesn't explain the underlying tendency as the fetter of sakkayaditthi.
User avatar
mjaviem
Posts: 2317
Joined: Wed Dec 16, 2020 5:06 pm

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by mjaviem »

Sasha_A wrote: Wed Feb 15, 2023 8:42 am ...
If one is responsible for experiencing perceptions and feelings...
Yes, good actions can lead to a heaven where only pleasant feelings arise, for example, ok.
Sasha_A wrote: Wed Feb 15, 2023 8:42 am ... if the experience of perceptions and feelings is the committing of kamma...
Perceptions and feelings are not the commiting. But commiting kamma leads to a hell or a heaven of unpleasant or pleasant experiences.
Sasha_A wrote: Wed Feb 15, 2023 8:42 am ... then this means that any bad experience that arises - again, not an action based on such an experience, but the experience itself - can, like any other bad kamma, lead to bad consequences, up to and including hell.
In my view, the experience or feeling is not kamma, it's not "intentional action". It's a sankhara or an "intentional making" as everything else. Both are intention. But when speaking of kamma we're talking about intention leading the actor to a destination like hells or heavens while sankhara is intention that builds the untrue of things. Perceptions and feelings are sankharas as well, of course. Everything is a sankhara because we "intentionally make those things up". But when speaking of sankharas we are not talking about heavens or hells, for this you need concrete action and not just the making up, we are speaking of delusion here.

It's always intention at play. Intention is the problem. What is intention and desire if not different degrees of a thirst or tanha we don't know how to quench?
Namo Tassa Bhagavato Arahato Sammā Sambuddhassa
User13866
Posts: 1238
Joined: Mon Jun 20, 2022 5:50 am

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by User13866 »

Sasha_A wrote: Wed Feb 15, 2023 1:01 pm
ven Thanissaro wrote: Selves & Not-self. THE BUDDHIST TEACHING ON ANATTĀ

The Buddha’s teaching on anattā, or not-self, is often mystifying to many Westerners. When we hear the term “not-self” we think that the Buddha was answering a question with a long history in our culture—of whether there is or isn’t a self or a soul—and that his answer is perverse or confusing. Sometimes it seems to be No, but the Buddha doesn’t follow through with the implications of a real No—if there’s no self, how can there be rebirth? Sometimes his answer seems to be No with a hidden Yes, but you wonder why the Yes is so hard to pin down.
We don't need Thanissaro to tell us how this stuff is taught, we know exactly how this is supposed to be taught & memorized.
"What do you think, Anuradha: Do you regard form as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard feeling as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard perception as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard fabrications as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard consciousness as the Tathagata?"

"No, lord."

"What do you think, Anuradha: Do you regard the Tathagata as being in form?... Elsewhere than form?... In feeling?... Elsewhere than feeling?... In perception?... Elsewhere than perception?... In fabrications?... Elsewhere than fabrications?... In consciousness?... Elsewhere than consciousness?"

"No, lord."

"What do you think: Do you regard the Tathagata as form-feeling-perception-fabrications-consciousness?"

"No, lord."

"Do you regard the Tathagata as that which is without form, without feeling, without perception, without fabrications, without consciousness?"

"No, lord."

"And so, Anuradha — when you can't pin down the Tathagata as a truth or reality even in the present life 
Last edited by User13866 on Wed Feb 15, 2023 2:19 pm, edited 3 times in total.
User13866
Posts: 1238
Joined: Mon Jun 20, 2022 5:50 am

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by User13866 »

User13866 wrote: Wed Feb 15, 2023 1:38 pm
Sasha_A wrote: Wed Feb 15, 2023 1:01 pm [c]If avijjā were simply a matter of verbal misunderstanding, a maggot would be an arahat.
This is the same exact argument as is made here
“Venerable sir, I remember identity view as a lower fetter taught by the Blessed One.
[...]

“Mālunkyāputta, to whom do you remember my having taught these five lower fetters in that way? Would not the wanderers of other sects confute you with the simile of the infant? For a young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘identity,’ so how could identity view arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to identity view lies within him.
https://suttacentral.net/mn64/en/bodhi? ... ight=false
However NV doesn't explain the underlying tendency as the fetter of sakkayaditthi.
It looks to me like he is a guy who was taught the fetter of sakkayaditthi in the wrong way and is arguing about the flaws of that incorrect teaching but is not actually comprehending the correct teaching.

If he does understand it then he is certainly explaining it poorly.
auto
Posts: 4657
Joined: Thu Dec 21, 2017 12:02 pm

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by auto »

retrofuturist wrote: Mon Feb 13, 2023 6:52 pm Greetings,
auto wrote: Mon Feb 13, 2023 3:06 pm
retrofuturist wrote: Mon Feb 13, 2023 4:20 am (I would actively discourage taking your understanding of kamma from commentarial stories, which present a very puerile take on kamma).
these stories are added by translators. Unless you mean Jataka stories, i don't know about them.
I'm not sure what stories you're referring to, but I had the Jataka stories and Dhammapada stories in mind.

Metta,
Paul. :)
ok, thanks, i initially thought something else as a stories for kamma.
User avatar
Ceisiwr
Posts: 22528
Joined: Sun Jan 11, 2009 2:36 am

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by Ceisiwr »

Sasha_A wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 1:58 pm

So why do you think you can understand Dhamma by applying your modern Western materialism to it?
I don't, and I don't know why you think I do?
Phenomenology as an approach to the study of experience cannot be Western or Eastern, the different kinds of classifications based on and within that approach, the set of terms and concepts, their names - yes, will differ according to culture, language and other local contexts, but not the approach itself.
Personally I don't see anything like Phenomenology in the Indian traditions. You can see its just the "study of experience" but that's a bit vague.
What good is a translator's regalia if he relies on dictionaries and commentaries based on a particular interpretation? All that can be said in such a case is that the translation compiled by such a translator in the target language is the most consistent with the traditional interpretation. The problem is also that the translation is always a bit of a retelling.

The question of the truth of one interpretation or another is not a question of regalia, authority, ancientity, popularity, etc. It is a question of being able to know something personally and directly as truth without having to rely on anyone else. Therefore, the only way to test a teaching is to apply it to oneself and look at the results, honestly, openly, unbiased.
Serious translators don't simply rely on tradition. A lot of academic leg work goes into what the words actually mean, and so how best to translate them. You've then gone from talking about how to translate texts to discussing how to know truth. You don't need to be awakened to find out what "sarīra" means.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
User avatar
Ceisiwr
Posts: 22528
Joined: Sun Jan 11, 2009 2:36 am

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by Ceisiwr »

Sasha_A wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 7:39 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 7:23 amA reasonable argument can be made that the sankharas of MN44 and that of dependent origination are two different kinds.
From "A LETTER ON SANKHĀRA" by Sāmanera Bodhesako:
Sāmanera Bodhesako wrote:Note also that you are too restrictive in limiting the M. 44 triad to nirodha-samāpatti[28]. The description is relevant also in particular to 2nd and 4th jhānas, in general to meditation, and sometimes even to non-meditative contexts — e.g. M. 117 (iii,73), and also M. 103 (ii,242), where we find vacī-sankhāra[29], quite evidently meaning vitakkavicārā[30], and where what is sankhata, namely vacī[31], is called a dhamma in opposition to the sankhāra. And in M. 43 (i,296) we find the same 3 sankhāras used in a strictly non-meditative sense (i.e. with regard to a corpse). If they can be used in as general a sense as this then there is no justification for asserting that the 3 paticcasamuppāda sankhārā are “a different set with the same name”. Also note that in M. 43 (āyu-) sankhārā[32] are distinguished from (vedaniyā) dhammā[33], and that the distinction made — specifically with reference to nirodha-samāpatti — supports precisely the view of sankhārā as “conditions”.
Sylvester made a good post on this some time ago
I wonder if Ven Ñānavīra ever attempted to reconcile his reading of sankhārā in DO with suttas such as SN 12.38 to SN 12.40. The 3 verbs being discussed in that series of suttas clearly point to volitional formations, ie intentions. These are ceteti, pakappeti and anuseti (intends, plans and lies with (an anusaya)). The sequel to any of these occurring is rebirth, which is pretty much the standard understanding of the relationship between kamma/intention and rebecoming as exemplified by the 2nd forward order nidāna of sankhārā and consciousness. This is in fact confirmed by a perusal of the 2 Chinese parallels to SN 12.39 and 12.40, where the connection between consciousness and name-&-form is made explicit in the passage and how this leads to the whole mass/mess of Suffering.

I think one of the most unfortunate legacies of the Ven's ideas on the term sankhārā is his not seeing that SN 12 contains another 3-fold scheme of sankhārā that cannot be reconciled with the MN 44 schema. The SN 12.25 scheme clearly identifies the 3 "formations" as being kammically reactive formations that lead to effects felt as feelings. SN 12.25 uses a very archaic Vedic verb abhisaṅkharoti to describe what exactly is happening in relation to each of the 3 formations; can be Comy be wrong about this, when SN 12.25 makes explicit that sankhāra in DO is intention?
viewtopic.php?t=23332&hilit=k%C4%81yasa ... o&start=30
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
User avatar
Sasha_A
Posts: 319
Joined: Thu Apr 06, 2017 8:35 pm
Contact:

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by Sasha_A »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Feb 19, 2023 6:26 pm Sylvester made a good post on this some time ago
I wonder if Ven Ñānavīra ever attempted to reconcile his reading of sankhārā in DO with suttas such as SN 12.38 to SN 12.40.
...
viewtopic.php?t=23332&hilit=k%C4%81yasa ... o&start=30
DO is about dukkha here and now as a result of ignorance here and now and without the involvement of time, rebirth is about why a person is reborn to experience dukkha here and now.
Ven. Nanavira wrote:9. It will be convenient to start at the end of the paticcasamuppāda formulation and to discuss jāti and jarāmarana first. To begin with, jāti is 'birth' and not 're-birth'. 'Re-birth' is punabbhavābhinibbatti, as in Majjhima v,3 <M.i,294> (MN43) where it is said that future 'birth into renewed existence' comes of avijjā and tanhā; and it is clear that, here, two successive existences are involved. It is, no doubt, possible for a Buddha to see the re-birth that is at each moment awaiting a living individual who still has tanhā—the re-birth, that is to say, that is now awaiting the individual who now has tanhā. If this is so, then for a Buddha the dependence of re-birth upon tanhā is a matter of direct seeing, not involving time. But this is by no means always possible (if, indeed, at all) for an ariyasāvaka, who, though he sees paticcasamuppāda for himself, and with certainty (it is aparapaccayā ñānam), may still need to accept re-birth on the Buddha's authority.[c] In other words, an ariyasāvaka sees birth with direct vision (since jāti is part of the paticcasamuppāda formulation), but does not necessarily see re-birth with direct vision. It is obvious, however, that jāti does not refer straightforwardly to the ariyasāvaka's own physical birth into his present existence; for that at best could only be a memory, and it is probably not remembered at all. How, then, is jāti to be understood?
If a person has not been reborn, how can he experience dukkha? But a person who has been reborn and is experiencing dukkha can eliminate dukkha once and for all if he eliminates ignorance right here and now.

Here, for example, is a passage where various kinds of bad actions and their consequences, that is, kamma, are mentioned in direct connection with DO, but not as part of DO itself and as a process outside of DO:
DN15
So it is, Ānanda, that feeling is a cause of craving. Craving is a cause of seeking. Seeking is a cause of gaining material possessions. Gaining material possessions is a cause of assessing. Assessing is a cause of desire and lust. Desire and lust is a cause of attachment. Attachment is a cause of ownership. Ownership is a cause of stinginess. Stinginess is a cause of safeguarding.
Owing to safeguarding, many bad, unskillful things come to be: taking up the rod and the sword, quarrels, arguments, and disputes, accusations, divisive speech, and lies.

‘Owing to safeguarding, many bad, unskillful things come to be: taking up the rod and the sword, quarrels, arguments, and disputes, accusations, divisive speech, and lies’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.
Suppose there were totally and utterly no safeguarding for anyone anywhere. When there’s no safeguarding at all, with the cessation of safeguarding, would those many bad, unskillful things still come to be?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason for the origination of those many bad, unskillful things, namely safeguarding.

‘Stinginess is a cause of safeguarding’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.
Suppose there were totally and utterly no stinginess for anyone anywhere. When there’s no stinginess at all, with the cessation of stinginess, would safeguarding still be found?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of safeguarding, namely stinginess.

‘Ownership is a cause of stinginess’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.
Suppose there were totally and utterly no ownership for anyone anywhere. When there’s no ownership at all, with the cessation of ownership, would stinginess still be found?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of stinginess, namely ownership.

‘Attachment is a cause of ownership’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.
Suppose there were totally and utterly no attachment for anyone anywhere. When there’s no attachment at all, with the cessation of attachment, would ownership still be found?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of ownership, namely attachment.

‘Desire and lust is a cause of attachment’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.
Suppose there were totally and utterly no desire and lust for anyone anywhere. When there’s no desire and lust at all, with the cessation of desire and lust, would attachment still be found?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of attachment, namely desire and lust.

‘Assessing is a cause of desire and lust’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.
Suppose there were totally and utterly no assessing for anyone anywhere. When there’s no assessing at all, with the cessation of assessing, would desire and lust still be found?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of desire and lust, namely assessing.

‘Gaining material possessions is a cause of assessing’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.
Suppose there were totally and utterly no gaining of material possessions for anyone anywhere. When there’s no gaining of material possessions at all, with the cessation of gaining material possessions, would assessing still be found?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of assessing, namely the gaining of material possessions.

‘Seeking is a cause of gaining material possessions’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.
Suppose there were totally and utterly no seeking for anyone anywhere. When there’s no seeking at all, with the cessation of seeking, would the gaining of material possessions still be found?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of gaining material possessions, namely seeking.

‘Craving is a cause of seeking’—that’s what I said. And this is a way to understand how this is so.
Suppose there were totally and utterly no craving for anyone anywhere.
That is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for continued existence, and craving to end existence. When there’s no craving at all, with the cessation of craving, would seeking still be found?”

“No, sir.”

“That’s why this is the cause, source, origin, and reason of seeking, namely craving.
And so, Ānanda, these two things are united by the two aspects of feeling.
User avatar
Sasha_A
Posts: 319
Joined: Thu Apr 06, 2017 8:35 pm
Contact:

Re: The causal mechanism behind kamma?

Post by Sasha_A »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Feb 19, 2023 5:56 pm
Sasha_A wrote: Tue Feb 14, 2023 1:58 pm So why do you think you can understand Dhamma by applying your modern Western materialism to it?
I don't, and I don't know why you think I do?
I apologise, I should have bracketed that question as it was an attempt to show that your question can be returned to you on exactly the same grounds, just by changing phenomenology to materialism.
Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Feb 19, 2023 5:56 pmPersonally I don't see anything like Phenomenology in the Indian traditions.
But do you want to see that?
Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Feb 19, 2023 5:56 pmSerious translators don't simply rely on tradition. A lot of academic leg work goes into what the words actually mean, and so how best to translate them.
Why, then, are there so many different translations and endless arguments over many of the most fundamental concepts of Dhamma? Are all these translators and academics just not serious enough?
Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Feb 19, 2023 5:56 pmYou've then gone from talking about how to translate texts to discussing how to know truth.
Translation is a bit more complicated than simply replacing words from one language with explicit alternatives from another language.

Without knowledge of Dhamma as truth, there is no way of knowing that what one knows as Dhamma is actually Dhamma.
Post Reply