When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

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BrokenBones
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by BrokenBones »

SDC wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 1:24 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 11:13 pm
BrokenBones wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 10:57 pm This 'real', 'unreal' & moments business seems like a huge rabbit hole that one doesn't need to go down.
“Who neither goes too far nor lags behind,
who of the world has known, “All this is not real”;
a bhikkhu such leaves here and there
as a serpent sloughs its worn-out skin.”


- Snp 1.1

“Monks, all compounded things are as an illusion, a flame, ceasing in an instant; being not real they come (arise) and go (cease).”

- SA 273
C, who is the translator of that rendering of Snp 1.1?

That translation seems 'unique'.
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robertk
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by robertk »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 11:13 pm
BrokenBones wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 10:57 pm This 'real', 'unreal' & moments business seems like a huge rabbit hole that one doesn't need to go down.
“Who neither goes too far nor lags behind,
who of the world has known, “All this is not real”;
a bhikkhu such leaves here and there
as a serpent sloughs its worn-out skin.”


- Snp 1.1

“Monks, all compounded things are as an illusion, a flame, ceasing in an instant; being not real they come (arise) and go (cease).”

- SA 273
For the SA 273 do you know which sutta it is, I am not sure which collection the abbreviation refers to?
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Ceisiwr
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by Ceisiwr »

BrokenBones wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 2:20 am
SDC wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 1:24 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 11:13 pm

“Who neither goes too far nor lags behind,
who of the world has known, “All this is not real”;
a bhikkhu such leaves here and there
as a serpent sloughs its worn-out skin.”


- Snp 1.1

“Monks, all compounded things are as an illusion, a flame, ceasing in an instant; being not real they come (arise) and go (cease).”

- SA 273
C, who is the translator of that rendering of Snp 1.1?

That translation seems 'unique'.
K.R. Norman translates it the same, for that’s what the Pali says. It’s hardly unique.
IMG_4519.jpeg
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
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Ceisiwr
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by Ceisiwr »

robertk wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 2:30 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 11:13 pm
BrokenBones wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 10:57 pm This 'real', 'unreal' & moments business seems like a huge rabbit hole that one doesn't need to go down.
“Who neither goes too far nor lags behind,
who of the world has known, “All this is not real”;
a bhikkhu such leaves here and there
as a serpent sloughs its worn-out skin.”


- Snp 1.1

“Monks, all compounded things are as an illusion, a flame, ceasing in an instant; being not real they come (arise) and go (cease).”

- SA 273
For the SA 273 do you know which sutta it is, I am not sure which collection the abbreviation refers to?
It’s from the Sarvāstivādin version of SN. SĀ = Saṁyuktāgama. It’s the parallel to SN 35.93

https://suttacentral.net/sa273/en/choon ... ight=false
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
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dicsoncandra
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by dicsoncandra »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 9:37 pm
dicsoncandra wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 12:02 pm
I've read enough chapters of the MMK including the commentary by Buddhapalita to understand what it's all about and I can say that some refutations of the Abhidhamma (or 'Abhidharmikas' as they call it) are justified. In spite of this, the whole project mainly suffers from taking the premise of svabhāva as true, which is an Abhidhamma invention not found in the Suttas. It follows that the conclusions outlined further proliferate the wrong view, which is rather unfortunate.
Ven. Nagarjuna doesn’t take sabhava to be true. Rather he is refuting the notion. Sabhava isn’t something “out there”, intrinsic to things, but is rather a product of the Abhidhammikas mind. In other words, they are imputing true existence onto experience. This is what the Buddha’s contemporaries were doing. It’s something all unawakened beings do.
I said the premise of svabhāva as true [edit: that dhamma = svabhāva], which means the problem is in how the refutation was performed. The Abhidhammic notion of a dhamma (phenomenon) having intrinsic nature/existence should not be accepted in the first place to be the ground for refutation. Are you saying that a dhamma that is taken to be svabhāva is a product of (as in produced by) the mind? What is your view of the mind? Is it independent or dependent, or perhaps it's also unreal? An unreality that produces unreality?

Edit: pardon for the confusion, I meant to say the ‘premise of dhamma = svabhāva as true’.
Previously, you argued that 'substance'/'essence' must be what the Buddha meant by atta, given that the concept is used in the philosophies of his contemporaries. I'd argue that to give a special emphasis on this is mistaken because the 'enemy' is not this or that school of thought but '(personal) suffering' and so the misconception of equating substance/essence as atta in their philosophies is purely accidental.
Suffering is the issue. The Buddha realised that by taking things to be real, one is immersed in suffering. This is what the other ascetics were doing, to which he was responding. They claimed there was something which was independent and so substantial. From this they were trapped in either Eternalism (atthitā) or Annihilationism (natthitā). That something always exists (atthitā) or is destroyed (natthitā). The root is in ignorance, in thinking there really is something which always exists or subsequently does not. This is why the view of truly existing substances, things, is the first fetter to be given up at stream entry (sakkāya-diṭṭhi)
The root of suffering has been revealed by the Buddha in the Second Noble Truth as tanhā and the two extremes with regard to existence are bhavatanhā and vibhavatanhā, which strictly pertain to 'self' notions - mamamkara, ahamkara. To make an assertion against the reality of things (and for the unreality of things?) is to go beyond what is found in the Suttas, a dangerous move (and is a misreading as I perceive it).
There is experience and it is real as such (otherwise, what do you call it?). To acknowledge there being experience (which is the aggregates) is to acknowledge arisen/manifested phenomena: arising is manifest, ceasing is manifest, change-while-standing is manifest. To deny experience/the aggregates is absurd.
It’s not a denial of experiences. It’s a denial of there being anything real about them. When someone sees the dependent nature of dhammas then they also see the emptiness of those dhammas and the emptiness of arising, ceasing, change and persisting. Nibbana.

Monks, all compounded things are as an illusion, a flame, ceasing in an instant; being not real they come (arise) and go (cease).

“Therefore, monks, with regard to all empty compounded things you should know, rejoice in, and be mindful of (awake to) this:

“All empty compounded things are empty of any permanent, eternal, lasting, unchanging nature; they are empty of self and of belonging to self”. …
- SA 273
You don't deny experience but you deny its reality... how does this even work? We can say that experience is dependently arisen, but how does that make it unreal is my question. This is why I said the definition of dhamma having svabhāva is what needs to be rejected. Now you're running into a self-contradiction by acknowledging experience yet denying its reality at the same time.

I can't verify the translation of SA 273 you quoted since it is left untranslated in SuttaCentral, but I reckon it's a case of the translator imputing his/her own interpretation onto the text. However, its parallel is noted as SN 35.92 and SN 35.93 in SuttaCentral and they seem to discuss the sense bases and contact (not what you quoted). Edit: I found the English translation and it certainly isn't saying what you quoted https://suttacentral.net/sa273/en/choon ... ight=false
regarding the Buddha, if he says he was tired he would be referring to the body/the aggregates, that there is experience or perception of fatigue. What is not there is the sense of appropriation over the body in the conceited sense, nor the belief 'I am' as a 'master-controller' of his experience.
Kind of what I said, but in different words. He thinks thoughts of I am, but he doesn’t take them to be substantial.
I never said he thinks thoughts of 'I am'. To perceive bodily fatigue or other conditions requires no such thought internally - 'this body is fatigued', 'this stomach is hungry'. They can be outwardly expressed and communicated for another to understand by saying 'I am tired', 'I am hungry'.
arising is manifest;
ceasing is manifest;
change-while-standing is manifest.

Link to website: http://dicsonstable.blog/
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Ceisiwr
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by Ceisiwr »

dicsoncandra wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 2:42 am
I said the premise of svabhāva as true, which means the problem is in how the refutation was performed. The Abhidhammic notion of a dhamma (phenomenon) having intrinsic nature/existence should not be accepted in the first place to be the ground for refutation. Are you saying that a dhamma that is taken to be svabhāva is a product of (as in produced by) the mind? What is your view of the mind? Is it independent or dependent, or perhaps it's also unreal? An unreality that produces unreality?
If you say the premise is true then you are saying the content of the premise is being taken as true. Ven. Nagarjuna doesn’t take sabhava to be true. In order to refute the claim of someone you have to engage with what they are saying. Sabhava is a product of the mind, yes. Is the mind real? No, because it’s dependently originated.
The root of suffering has been revealed by the Buddha in the Second Noble Truth as tanhā and the two extremes with regard to existence are bhavatanhā and vibhavatanhā, which strictly pertain to 'self' notions - mamamkara, ahamkara. To make an assertion against the reality of things (and for the unreality of things?) is to go beyond what is found in the Suttas, a dangerous move (and is a misreading as I perceive it).
When there is craving there is clinging. It is here that the underlying tendency towards reification begins. We grasp things as being independent, permanent and so a self. We take them as existing. At this point we then fabricate the views of either Eternalism or Annihilationism, that it exists and will always be or that it exists and will someday not be. If you see the dependent nature though of dhammas then you see their insubstantial nature. When you stop reifying them as existing then the two aforementioned views cannot arise. Why grasp something you don’t see as being real?
You don't deny experience but you deny its reality... how does this even work? We can say that experience is dependently arisen, but how does that make it unreal is my question. This is why I said the definition of dhamma having svabhāva is what needs to be rejected. Now you're running into a self-contradiction by acknowledging experience yet denying its reality at the same time.
The contradiction is in seeing reality in the momentary flux of dhammas. If our sense experiences were real then they would have an independent nature. If they had an independent nature then they would be permanent. If they had that, then nothing would change. That isn’t our experience though. Our experience is one of changing sense experiences. Because the dhammas arise one can’t say the world truly doesn’t exist (natthitā). Because they cease one can’t say the world truly exists (atthitā). They simply arise and cease dependently, relative to each other. Like long or short, or time. We have labels for these things, but we can’t say they are truly real. When we see a tree we can’t say it truly exists, independent of us, because then it wouldn’t ever cease. Yet, we do see trees. The experience is there but it’s like a dream. Unestablished, dependent, relative, fleeting. Realising that is awakening. When you see the dependent nature of experience then you also see nibbana, which is the emptiness of substance, arising, ceasing and “trees”. This is what it means to give up the view of sakkāyadiṭṭhi (View of truly existing substance). The same impulse that leads to the sense of an atta is the same impulse that leads to the doctrine of sabhava. What is true of the atta is true of other substances such as matter or mind.
I can't verify the translation of SA 273 you quoted since it is left untranslated in SuttaCentral, but I reckon it's a case of the translator imputing his/her own interpretation onto the text. However, its parallel is noted as SN 35.92 and SN 35.93 in SuttaCentral and they seem to discuss the sense bases and contact (not what you quoted). Edit: I found the English translation and it certainly isn't saying what you quoted
The original Chinese and the English translation are both there on SuttaCentral. I simply quoted the English version there. Both discuss the sense bases and contact etc and both say that our experiences are constantly changing. The Sarvāstivādin version adds that because of their incessant change, the dhammas are like an illusion.
I never said he thinks thoughts of 'I am'. To perceive bodily fatigue or other conditions requires no such thought internally - 'this body is fatigued', 'this stomach is hungry'. They can be outwardly expressed and communicated for another to understand by saying 'I am tired', 'I am hungry'.[/b]
In order to say “I am hungry” you have to think “I am hungry” even if it’s preceded by “this body is hungry”.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
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dicsoncandra
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by dicsoncandra »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 3:53 am
dicsoncandra wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 2:42 am
I said the premise of svabhāva as true, which means the problem is in how the refutation was performed. The Abhidhammic notion of a dhamma (phenomenon) having intrinsic nature/existence should not be accepted in the first place to be the ground for refutation. Are you saying that a dhamma that is taken to be svabhāva is a product of (as in produced by) the mind? What is your view of the mind? Is it independent or dependent, or perhaps it's also unreal? An unreality that produces unreality?
If you say the premise is true then you are saying the content of the premise is being taken as true. Ven. Nagarjuna doesn’t take sabhava to be true. In order to refute the claim of someone you have to engage with what they are saying. Sabhava is a product of the mind, yes. Is the mind real? No, because it’s dependently originated.
In my edit I corrected my statement saying ‘taking the premise of dhamma having svabhāva as true’. The Buddha approached question regarding self/no-self by way of the aggregates and not directly for a reason because the former questions already assume a ‘self’ (a subject).
The root of suffering has been revealed by the Buddha in the Second Noble Truth as tanhā and the two extremes with regard to existence are bhavatanhā and vibhavatanhā, which strictly pertain to 'self' notions - mamamkara, ahamkara. To make an assertion against the reality of things (and for the unreality of things?) is to go beyond what is found in the Suttas, a dangerous move (and is a misreading as I perceive it).
When there is craving there is clinging. It is here that the underlying tendency towards reification begins. We grasp things as being independent, permanent and so a self. We take them as existing. At this point we then fabricate the views of either Eternalism or Annihilationism, that it exists and will always be or that it exists and will someday not be. If you see the dependent nature though of dhammas then you see their insubstantial nature. When you stop reifying them as existing then the two aforementioned views cannot arise. Why grasp something you don’t see as being real?
A dhamma being dependently arisen doesn’t mean it’s unreal. Why defer to a flawed definition rather than investigating the experience as you encounter it?
You don't deny experience but you deny its reality... how does this even work? We can say that experience is dependently arisen, but how does that make it unreal is my question. This is why I said the definition of dhamma having svabhāva is what needs to be rejected. Now you're running into a self-contradiction by acknowledging experience yet denying its reality at the same time.
The contradiction is in seeing reality in the momentary flux of dhammas. If our sense experiences were real then they would have an independent nature. If they had an independent nature then they would be permanent. If they had that, then nothing would change. That isn’t our experience though. Our experience is one of changing sense experiences. Because the dhammas arise one can’t say the world truly doesn’t exist (natthitā). Because they cease one can’t say the world truly exists (atthitā). They simply arise and cease dependently, relative to each other. Like long or short, or time. We have labels for these things, but we can’t say they are truly real. When we see a tree we can’t say it truly exists, independent of us, because then it wouldn’t ever cease. Yet, we do see trees. The experience is there but it’s like a dream. Unestablished, dependent, relative, fleeting. Realising that is awakening. When you see the dependent nature of experience then you also see nibbana, which is the emptiness of substance, arising, ceasing and “trees”. This is what it means to give up the view of sakkāyadiṭṭhi (View of truly existing substance). The same impulse that leads to the sense of an atta is the same impulse that leads to the doctrine of sabhava. What is true of the atta is true of other substances such as matter or mind.
The mistake is in accepting a definition of reality that is synonymous with independent nature. Under Ven. Nāgārjuna’s system, there can be no distinction between the individual (the set of pancakkhanda) and personhood (atta) and this is its fundamental mistake - refuting atta requires the abolishment of the individual, which is mistaken.
I can't verify the translation of SA 273 you quoted since it is left untranslated in SuttaCentral, but I reckon it's a case of the translator imputing his/her own interpretation onto the text. However, its parallel is noted as SN 35.92 and SN 35.93 in SuttaCentral and they seem to discuss the sense bases and contact (not what you quoted). Edit: I found the English translation and it certainly isn't saying what you quoted
The original Chinese and the English translation are both there on SuttaCentral. I simply quoted the English version there. Both discuss the sense bases and contact etc and both say that our experiences are constantly changing. The Sarvāstivādin version adds that because of their incessant change, the dhammas are like an illusion.
I can see that the rendering is very different. Edit: ok I see it, and this is not aligned with the Sutta parallel. You say this is the Sarvāstivādin version?
I never said he thinks thoughts of 'I am'. To perceive bodily fatigue or other conditions requires no such thought internally - 'this body is fatigued', 'this stomach is hungry'. They can be outwardly expressed and communicated for another to understand by saying 'I am tired', 'I am hungry'.[/b]
In order to say “I am hungry” you have to think “I am hungry” even if it’s preceded by “this body is hungry”.
When there is hunger, there is consciousness of hunger i.e. hunger as perception is perceived. With the perception of hunger, there is the awareness ‘there is hunger’. Sure, there can be the thought ‘I am hungry’ as thinking-and-pondering is speech-determination, but the key point is that the absence of (the significance of) appropriation is arahatship and this requires no denial of reality. Rather, the denial of reality is a misconceiving.
arising is manifest;
ceasing is manifest;
change-while-standing is manifest.

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mikenz66
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by mikenz66 »

BrokenBones wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 2:20 am
SDC wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 1:24 am
Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 11:13 pm

“Who neither goes too far nor lags behind,
who of the world has known, “All this is not real”;
a bhikkhu such leaves here and there
as a serpent sloughs its worn-out skin.”


- Snp 1.1

“Monks, all compounded things are as an illusion, a flame, ceasing in an instant; being not real they come (arise) and go (cease).”

- SA 273
C, who is the translator of that rendering of Snp 1.1?

That translation seems 'unique'.
Actually, looking at Bhikhu Sujato's notes, it's the usual translation. His is different.
They have not run too far nor run back,
Yo nāccasārī na paccasārī,
for they know that nothing in the world is what it seems.
Sabbaṁ vitathamidanti ñatva loke; [Variant: ñatva → ñatvā (sya-all, pts-vp-pli1, mr)]
Sujato wrote:Bodhi, Norman, and Ṭhānissaro all render vitatha as “unreal”. This seems overly idealistic for early Buddhism, so I take the prefix vi in the sense of “distorts”, “twists”.
https://suttacentral.net/snp1.1/en/suja ... ript=latin
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by BrokenBones »

mikenz66 wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 5:28 am
BrokenBones wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 2:20 am
SDC wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 1:24 am

C, who is the translator of that rendering of Snp 1.1?

That translation seems 'unique'.
Actually, looking at Bhikhu Sujato's notes, it's the usual translation. His is different.
They have not run too far nor run back,
Yo nāccasārī na paccasārī,
for they know that nothing in the world is what it seems.
Sabbaṁ vitathamidanti ñatva loke; [Variant: ñatva → ñatvā (sya-all, pts-vp-pli1, mr)]
Sujato wrote:Bodhi, Norman, and Ṭhānissaro all render vitatha as “unreal”. This seems overly idealistic for early Buddhism, so I take the prefix vi in the sense of “distorts”, “twists”.
https://suttacentral.net/snp1.1/en/suja ... ript=latin
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Mike
The Buddha often compares sankaras as 'like' an illusion which invites investigation. He doesn't say things are an illusion or unreal which invites a plethora of rabbit holes to be run down. And its 'unreality' lies in HOW we relate to it.
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by robertk »

BrokenBones wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 6:17 am

The Buddha often compares sankaras as 'like' an illusion which invites investigation. He doesn't say things are an illusion or unreal which invites a plethora of rabbit holes to be run down....
Yes. The khandhas are real, but momentary and conditioned. What is not real in the ultimate sense are people etc.
SN22:94 Flowers:
"And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as
existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent,
suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree
upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.
Feeling ...Perception...Volitional formations...Consciousness that is
is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in
the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by mikenz66 »

BrokenBones wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 6:17 am The Buddha often compares sankaras as 'like' an illusion which invites investigation. He doesn't say things are an illusion or unreal which invites a plethora of rabbit holes to be run down. And its 'unreality' lies in HOW we relate to it.
It seems that Sujato agrees with you.

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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by pops »

robertk wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 6:24 am
BrokenBones wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 6:17 am

The Buddha often compares sankaras as 'like' an illusion which invites investigation. He doesn't say things are an illusion or unreal which invites a plethora of rabbit holes to be run down....
Yes. The khandhas are real, but momentary and conditioned. What is not real in the ultimate sense are people etc.
SN22:94 Flowers:
"And what is it, bhikkhus, that the wise in the world agree upon as
existing, of which I too say that it exists? Form that is impermanent,
suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in the world agree
upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.
Feeling ...Perception...Volitional formations...Consciousness that is
is impermanent, suffering, and subject to change: this the wise in
the world agree upon as existing, and I too say that it exists.

Of course other people are real. The question is how one perceives other persons. That differs of course and mostly other people are seen as the cause for suffering (and also joy).

Friend Sāriputta, some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that suffering is created by oneself; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that suffering is created by another; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that suffering is created both by oneself and by another; some ascetics and brahmins, proponents of kamma, maintain that suffering has arisen fortuitously, being created neither by oneself nor by another. Now, friend Sāriputta, what does the ascetic Gotama say about this? What does he teach? How should we answer if we are to state what has been said by the ascetic Gotama and not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact? And how should we explain in accordance with the Dhamma so that no reasonable consequence of our assertion would give ground for criticism?”
“Friends, the Blessed One has said that suffering is dependently arisen. Dependent on what? Dependent on contact. If one were to speak thus one would be stating what has been said by the Blessed One and would not misrepresent him with what is contrary to fact; one would explain in accordance with the Dhamma, and no reasonable consequence of one’s assertion would give ground for criticism.
https://suttacentral.net/sn12.24/en/bod ... ight=false

“Lady, it is said, ‘Own body, own body.’ Now, lady, what is called ‘own body’ by the Lord?” “Friend Visākha, these five groups of grasping are called ‘own body’ by the Lord, that is to say, the group of grasping after material shape, the group of grasping after feeling, the group of grasping after perception, the group of grasping after the habitual tendencies, the group of grasping after consciousness. These five groups of grasping, friend Visākha, are called ‘own body’ by the Lord.”
“It is good, lady,” and the lay follower Visākha, having rejoiced in what the nun Dhammadinnā had said, having thanked her, asked the nun Dhammadinnā a further question: “Lady, it is said, ‘The uprising of own body, the uprising of own body.’ Now, lady, what is called ‘the uprising of own body’ by the Lord?” “Whatever, friend Visākha, is the craving connected with again-becoming, accompanied by delight and attachment, finding delight in this and that, namely the craving for sense-pleasures, the craving for becoming, the craving for annihilation, this, friend Visākha, is called ‘the uprising of own body’ by the Lord.”
“Lady, it is said, ‘The stopping of own body, the stopping of own body.’ Now, lady, what is called ‘stopping of own body’ by the Lord?” “Whatever, friend Visākha, is the stopping, with no attachment remaining, of that self-same craving, the giving up of it, the renunciation of it, the release from it, the doing away with it, this, friend Visākha, is called ‘The stopping of own body’ by the Lord.”
“Lady, it is said, ‘The course leading to the stopping of own body, the course leading to the stopping of own body.’ Now, lady, what is called ‘the course leading to the stopping of own body’ by the Lord?” “This ariyan eightfold Way itself, friend Visākha, is called ‘the course leading to the stopping of own body’ by the Lord, that is to say perfect view, perfect thought, perfect speech, perfect action, perfect way of living, perfect endeavour, perfect mindfulness, perfect concentration.”
https://suttacentral.net/mn44/en/horner ... ight=false


Note to the translated term 'own body'. Another translation suggests 'selfidentity' the next one 'embodiment'. Those suggestions can be seen as representations of a better understanding of what we call 'a person'. In the way Buddha explainend dukkha, other persons, people and beings do exist.
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by Sasha_A »

robertk wrote: Fri Nov 24, 2023 4:53 amThe way, as I see it, is breaking down what we took as "something", into what is really present. And what is present is merely these elements.
Before we get to the existence of the composites, let's go back to the rate of change of components.
What if you take a microscope with a higher magnification, where you can't see the cells anymore? For example, at what rate do dhammas change - 10^15 per second? That's how many times slower than 6.2⋅10^34? 19 orders of magnitude? Doesn't this mean that whatever these dhammas are, there is something that changes even faster, something more fundamental than the dhammas, and therefore the dhammas don't exist either?

So in the end we have this:
Firstly, the doctrine of the composite nature of the objects of the world and their rapidly changing nature is quite ordinary and common knowledge. Moreover, since a Buddha is not needed to discover such knowledge, it is completely wrong to say that this is the kind of knowledge that only Buddhas can discover and teach, i.e. that such knowledge is Dhamma. Do you agree?

Secondly, since even from the point of view of mundane knowledge, the stated rate of change of the dhammas is many tens of orders of magnitude, not even many times, lower than the known threshold of rate of change known from the same physics, it would again be wrong to say that the dhammas are the only thing that exists because there is something that changes faster. Do you agree?

Thirdly, the switching of attention from one object, the perception of which by a person in ignorance may lead to the arising of bad states that have not yet arisen or to the maintenance of bad states that have already arisen, to another object, the perception of which does not cause such states, does not in itself lead to the uprooting of such bad states, i.e. to the supramundane, and the so-called dhammas themselves in this case only fulfil the role of one of such neutral objects for the switching of attention, nothing more. Do you agree?
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Now to composites and their components.
robertk wrote: Fri Nov 24, 2023 4:53 amThe way, as I see it, is breaking down what we took as "something", into what is really present. And what is present is merely these elements.
But is it not the same as someone looking at a rose through a microscope and declaring, that since the rose is not visible through the microscope and only the cells of which it is composed are visible, the rose does not exist?

Let's take the rose and take it apart. Or better yet, instead of a rose, let's take something that is much easier to visualise and discuss in parts - a car, for example. Let its individual parts, like wheels, pistons, bolts, etc. - these will be the ultimate and indivisible parts.

What do you think, if we take all the components of a car and just pile them up, is this pile of parts a car or a pile of parts?

Can you give a definition of a car at the level of parts?
robertk wrote: Fri Nov 24, 2023 4:53 am
Sasha_A wrote: Fri Nov 24, 2023 10:24 pm What about infants or animals who don't even have the ability to form any concepts yet or at all: are they, too, absorbed in the world of concepts?
What about the presence of greed and anger in them?
Conceptualising happens well before any naming has time to occur. Even infants and animals who have no linguistic abilities are fully involved in processes of conceptualising.
Actually, I was referring to this:
MN64
For a young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘identity,’ so how could identity view arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to identity view lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘teachings,’ so how could doubt about the teachings arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to doubt lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘rules,’ so how could adherence to rules and observances arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to adhere to rules and observances lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘sensual pleasures,’ so how could sensual desire arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to sensual lust lies within him. A young tender infant lying prone does not even have the notion ‘beings,’ so how could ill will towards beings arise in him? Yet the underlying tendency to ill will lies within him.
robertk wrote: Fri Nov 24, 2023 4:53 amA dog knows 'this is food' even without any thinking in words. Certainly they have greed and aversion arising quite often.
So you mean that someone who is not immersed in the world of concepts cannot even distinguish food from anything else?

And does a little baby or animal really need to know that "this is food" in order to try to grab and taste something, or is a pleasant smell or appearance enough for a little baby or animal to try to eat it?
robertk wrote: Fri Nov 24, 2023 4:53 am
Sasha_A wrote: Fri Nov 24, 2023 10:24 pm I'll repeat my question again:
If the dhammas exist and are true, then to the same extent does what is made of them exist and is true?
You mean like a human?
Visuddhimagga XVIII 31

Therefore, just as a marionette is void, soulless and without curiosity, and
while it walks and stands merely through the combination of strings and wood,
[595] yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness, so too, this mentality-materiality
is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands
merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had
curiosity and interestedness.
If a person is just a marionette made up of components, how can he do actions, how can he do kamma? In the case of a marionette, how can we even talk about kamma, skillful and unskillful choices, application of effort, diligence, training, intention, and so on?

And how can a marionette deny its marionette nature without affirming the opposite? How can one claim the absence of ownership and control over oneself when the very fact of such a claim implies the presence of that ownership and control?
robertk wrote: Fri Nov 24, 2023 4:53 am
Visuddhimagga XVIII 31This is how it should be regarded. Hence the
Ancients said:
The mental and material are really here,
But here there is no human being to be found,
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll—
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks
How can one deny one's existence when the very fact of the possibility of such a denial would be impossible in such a case? How can you deny your own existence if in order to do so you must first exist?
See the question above about the definition of a car.
It is merely dukkha that comes into being, dukkha that stands and disappears,
Nothing apart from dukkha comes into being, nothing other than dukkha ceases.
- SN5.10
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by pops »

Sasha_A wrote: Sun Nov 26, 2023 9:48 am
robertk wrote: Fri Nov 24, 2023 4:53 am
Visuddhimagga XVIII 31This is how it should be regarded. Hence the
Ancients said:
The mental and material are really here,
But here there is no human being to be found,
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll—
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks
How can one deny one's existence when the very fact of the possibility of such a denial would be impossible in such a case? How can you deny your own existence if in order to do so you must first exist?
See the question above about the definition of a car.

The forming of such concepts could come from craving to non existence (of an unsconsciously believed self).
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Sasha_A
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Re: When & why did the teaching on momentariness emerge?

Post by Sasha_A »

pops wrote: Sat Nov 25, 2023 9:02 pm The shift of attention seems to me to be another one. There would be more compassion and less arousement and overall less possibilities of falling into certain emotions.
It is merely dukkha that comes into being, dukkha that stands and disappears,
Nothing apart from dukkha comes into being, nothing other than dukkha ceases.
- SN5.10
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