momentariness not in sutta?

[robertk]

I saw this from a thread: viewtopic.php?f=13&t=33539&start=15

As far as I know this Momentariness of which you seem to speak is not even in the Abhidhamma but is a sub-commentary development.

Well of course it is a key part of Theravada, and we see it spelled out in passages, not only sub-commentaries but Commentaries such as this:

From the Sāratthapakāsinī (Samyutta nikaya commentary by Buddhaghosa)
II 99,30-31
Ekasmiṃ hi accharā-kkhaṇe anekāni
citta-koṭi-sata-sahassāni uppajjanti
"in the timespan of a finger-snap many hundred
thousand of koṭis of minds arise and pass away."

Moreover, it is also clearly put in the Sutta-pitaka:
Mahāniddesa 42
Life, person, pleasure, pain — just these alone
Join in one conscious moment that flicks by.
Devas, though they live for eighty-four thousand kalpas,
Are not the same for two such moments....

Breakup of dhammas is foredoomed at their birth;
Those present decay, unmingled with those past.
They come from nowhere, break up, nowhere go;
Flash in and out, as lightning in the sky.

[robertk]

Nina Van Gorkom wrote about this
https://groups.yahoo.com/neo/groups/dha ... ics/113770
T
he Expositor deals with many meanings of the term arisen, uppanna.
We read:<Of these, all that is endowed with (instants of) genesis,
decay, and dissolution is termed ‘arisen as existing at the present
moment.’>

Thus, kha.na does not refer to life period, nor to serial presence.
It refers to moment in the ultimate sense, namely arising, presence,
and dissolution.

Text Vis. 190: (d) 'According to moment': what is included in the
trio of moments, [that is to say, arising, presence, and dissolution]
beginning with
arising is called 'present'. At a time previous to that it is 'future'.
At a time subsequent to that it is 'past'.
------------------------------
We read in the Dispeller of Delusion (p. 8): <And here only the
exposition beginning with the moment (kha.na) is literal
(nippariyaaya) (cf. M.A. I, 89). The rest are figurative (sapariyaaya).>

Conclusion: When we consider the meaning of kha.na, moment, we are
reminded that the processes of cittas succeed one another extremely
rapidly. In one process seeing arises, and it seems that we
immediately think of a concept of what is seen, of a person or thing.
However, several processes have elapsed before a concept is
experienced in a mind-door process. There is no person who can exert
control over the cittas that arise, perform each their own function
and then fall away immediately.
--------
It seems that cittas last, but the meaning of kha.na, moment, reminds
us of the impermanence of dhammas. As soon as a dhamma has arisen, it
is going towards its cessation, it is gone immediately. When paññaa
arises it does so for an extremely short moment and then it falls
away. However, a moment of paññaa is never lost, it is accumulated so
that there are conditions for its arising again. This exhorts us not
to waste the moments of which our life consists. There can be
accumulation of paññaa at this moment.
-------
Thus, kha.na does not refer to life period, nor to serial presence.
It refers to moment in the ultimate sense, namely arising, presence,
and dissolution.
-----------
Text Vis. 190: (d) 'According to moment': what is included in the
trio of moments, [that is to say, arising, presence, and dissolution]
beginning with
arising is called 'present'. At a time previous to that it is 'future'.
At a time subsequent to that it is 'past'.
------------------------------
N: the first three are sapariyaaya (figurative) and the last one is
nippariyaaya (literal).The last one is in the ultimate sense only.
There were examples: extent, addhaa: a lifespan. Present lifespan,
this is different from the present moment of citta, kha.na.
We can think of death in conventional sense, the end of this
lifespan. But actually there is all the time momentary death,
kha.nika marana, when the present citta falls away. Looking at death
as kha.nika is very realistic! Continuity or serial present
(santati): utu keeps on producing heat and this impinges on the body.
it is a serial presence, but still, the characteristic of heat can be
object of insight.

---------

The Tiika states that as regards feeling, the classifications
according to extent and period has not been spoken of. Feelings are
classified as past, future and present only according to continuity
and to moment.
--------
Text Vis. 197. In the classification (i)-(iii) into 'past', etc., the
past,
future, and present state of feeling should be understood according to
continuity and according to moment and so on.
---------
N: Feeling is naama, and as the Tiika states, naama is quick to
change (lahuparivattino aruupadhammaa).
******

[robertk]

SN 1.11 Nandana
Translated by Bhikkhu Bodhi

http://suttacentral.net/sn1.11/en/

Thus have I heard. On one occasion the Blessed One was dwelling at Savatthi in Jetas Grove, Anathapiṇḍikas Park. There the Blessed One addressed the bhikkhus thus: Bhikkhus!

Venerable sir! those bhikkhus replied. The Blessed One said this:

Once in the past, bhikkhus, a certain devata of the Tavatiṃsa host was revelling in Nandana Grove, < 11 > supplied and endowed with the five cords of celestial sensual pleasure, accompanied by a retinue of celestial nymphs. On that occasion he spoke this verse:

They do not know bliss
Who have not seen Nandana,
The abode of the glorious male devas
Belonging to the host of Thirty. [19]
When this was said, bhikkhus, a certain devata replied to that devata in verse:

Dont you know, you fool,
That maxim of the arahants?
Impermanent are all formations;
Their nature is to arise and vanish.
Having arisen, they cease:
Their appeasement is blissful.

[20]

[Srilankaputra]

For me momentariness is directly implied in the suttas. The blessed one never speaks about one single over arching consciousness but six different consciousnesses each cinditioned by internal and external ayatanas.

In MN43 it says its the mind or intellect consciousness that makes sense of all the inputs.

"Friend, these five faculties — each with a separate range, a separate domain, not experiencing one another's range & domain: the eye-faculty, the ear-faculty, the nose-faculty, the tongue-faculty, & the body-faculty — have the intellect as their [common] arbitrator. The intellect is what experiences [all] their ranges & domains."

It seems obvious to me for example to investigate something visually the eye consciousness and mind consciousness must arise and cease in rapid succession.

[robertk]

It seems obvious to me for example to investigate something visually the eye consciousness and mind consciousness must arise and cease in rapid succession.

[User1249x]

thanks robert, there is also this passage;

what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another.

As i understood it there are different interpretations of momentariness ranging from phenomena persisting for some amount of moments to extreme momentariness wherein the nature of phenomena is to change as they arise like the interpretation;

ie

the Sautrāntika subscribed to a doctrine of "extreme momentariness" that held that only the present moment existed.[6] They seem to have regarded the Sarvāstivādin position as a violation of the basic Buddhist principle of impermanence.[6] As explained by Jan Westerhoff, this doctrine of momentariness holds that each present moment "does not possess any temporal thickness; immediately after coming into existence each moment passes out of existence" and that therefore "all dharmas, whether mental or material, only last for an instant (ksana) and cease immediately after arising".[15] "
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sautr%C4%81ntika#Doctrine

[robertk]

thanks robert, there is also this passage;

what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another.

As i understood it there are different interpretations of momentariness ranging from phenomena persisting for some amount of moments to extreme momentariness wherein the nature of phenomena is to change as they arise like the interpretation;

ie

the Sautrāntika subscribed to a doctrine of "extreme momentariness" that held that only the present moment existed.[6] They seem to have regarded the Sarvāstivādin position as a violation of the basic Buddhist principle of impermanence.[6] As explained by Jan Westerhoff, this doctrine of momentariness holds that each present moment "does not possess any temporal thickness; immediately after coming into existence each moment passes out of existence" and that therefore "all dharmas, whether mental or material, only last for an instant (ksana) and cease immediately after arising".[15] "
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sautr%C4%81ntika#Doctrine

Yes, that is interesting.
Still the point is, is that momentariness is fundamental to Theravada , although I wouldn't be surprised if the "Early Buddhism" people dispute the Commentaries and probably find the sutta references to come from 'a later strand'.

[Volo]

I think momentariness doesn't contradict to the suttas. But the problem I have with the Abhidhamma's (or commentaries') interpretation of it is that one cannot be mindful about mind states the same moment they arise. For example, if I see an object, I experience, let's say, a certain feeling at the same time, but if I want to be mindful of this feeling I would need to take in the next mind moment this (already past) feeling as an object. So I cannot do both: have a feeling and be mindful of it. I think this interpretation of momentariness is not supported by the suttas.

[User1249x]

thanks robert, there is also this passage;

what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another.

As i understood it there are different interpretations of momentariness ranging from phenomena persisting for some amount of moments to extreme momentariness wherein the nature of phenomena is to change as they arise like the interpretation;

ie

the Sautrāntika subscribed to a doctrine of "extreme momentariness" that held that only the present moment existed.[6] They seem to have regarded the Sarvāstivādin position as a violation of the basic Buddhist principle of impermanence.[6] As explained by Jan Westerhoff, this doctrine of momentariness holds that each present moment "does not possess any temporal thickness; immediately after coming into existence each moment passes out of existence" and that therefore "all dharmas, whether mental or material, only last for an instant (ksana) and cease immediately after arising".[15] "
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sautr%C4%81ntika#Doctrine

Yes, that is interesting.
Still the point is, is that momentariness is fundamental to Theravada , although I wouldn't be surprised if the "Early Buddhism" people dispute the Commentaries and probably find the sutta references to come from 'a later strand'.

I agree with the general sentiment of your point. I will leave it at that unless you want to compare notes and notions on the exact interpretation of the Sutta passages.

[Srilankaputra]

For example, if I see an object, I experience, let's say, a certain feeling at the same time, but if I want to be mindful of this feeling I would need to take in the next mind moment this (already past) feeling as an object. So I cannot do both: have a feeling and be mindful of it. I think this interpretation of momentariness is not supported by the suttas.

Hi volo,

I think it is;

The Blessed One said, "Monks, Sariputta is wise, of great discernment, deep discernment, wide... joyous... rapid... quick... penetrating discernment. For half a month, Sariputta clearly saw insight[1] into mental qualities one after another. This is what occurred to Sariputta through insight into mental qualities one after another:

"There was the case where Sariputta — quite secluded from sensuality, secluded from unskillful qualities — entered & remained in the first jhana: rapture & pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by directed thought & evaluation. Whatever qualities there are in the first jhana — directed thought, evaluation, rapture, pleasure, singleness of mind, contact, feeling, perception, intention, consciousness, desire, decision, persistence, mindfulness, equanimity, & attention — he ferreted them out one after another. Known to him they arose, known to him they remained, known to him they subsided. He discerned, 'So this is how these qualities, not having been, come into play. Having been, they vanish.' He remained unattracted & unrepelled with regard to those qualities, independent, detached, released, dissociated, with an awareness rid of barriers. He discerned that 'There is a further escape,' and pursuing it there really was for him.

……..
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

I guess we would need lots and lots of parami to see to that level.

[Virgo]

Great thread. One for the abhidhamma.org archives methinks.

Kevin...

[robertk]

I think momentariness doesn't contradict to the suttas. But the problem I have with the Abhidhamma's (or commentaries') interpretation of it is that one cannot be mindful about mind states the same moment they arise. For example, if I see an object, I experience, let's say, a certain feeling at the same time, but if I want to be mindful of this feeling I would need to take in the next mind moment this (already past) feeling as an object. So I cannot do both: have a feeling and be mindful of it. I think this interpretation of momentariness is not supported by the suttas.

As well as the very apposite citation provided by Srilankaputra we also see suttas saying that consciousness arises dependent on an object:
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

Consciousness, monks, is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms is classified simply as eye-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the ear & sounds is classified simply as ear-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the nose & aromas is classified simply as nose-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the tongue & flavors is classified simply as tongue-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the body & tactile sensations is classified simply as body-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the intellect & ideas is classified simply as intellect-consciousness.

"Just as fire is classified simply by whatever requisite condition in dependence on which it burns — a fire that burns in dependence on wood is classified simply as a wood-fire, a fire that burns in dependence on wood-chips is classified simply as a wood-chip-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on grass is classified simply as a grass-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on cow-dung is classified simply as a cow-dung-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on chaff is classified simply as a chaff-fire; a fire that burns in dependence on rubbish is classified simply as a rubbish-fire — in the same way, consciousness is classified simply by the requisite condition in dependence on which it arises. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the eye & forms is classified simply as eye-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the ear & sounds is classified simply as ear-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the nose & aromas is classified simply as nose-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the tongue & flavors is classified simply as tongue-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the body & tactile sensations is classified simply as body-consciousness. Consciousness that arises in dependence on the intellect & ideas is classified simply as intellect-consciousness.

so we see that consciousness doesn't have 2 objects at the same time - say hearing and seeing at the very same moment - although because of the rapidity of the rise and fall they may alternate and appear at roughly the same time.

In the same way it couldn't be that, for example, anger and the awareness of anger, arise at exactly the same moment, although the awareness of the anger can (and indeed does, if insight occurs) in the immediately following mindstates.

[robertk]

Great thread. One for the abhidhamma.org archives methinks.

Kevin...

[Volo]

As well as the very apposite citation provided by Srilankaputra

In addition also this:

Here, Ānanda, for the Tathāgata feelings are known as they arise, as they are present, as they disappear; perceptions are known as they arise, as they are present, as they disappear; thoughts are known as they arise, as they are present, as they disappear.

we also see suttas saying that consciousness arises dependent on an object:
https://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitak ... .than.html

Yes, this is a good point. Obviously it is possible to think of a mode of arising of feelings, etc which won't contradict to both suttas, but I don't want to speculate on it. But the point is the other suttas are there...

[auto]

https://suttacentral.net/an4.162/pli/ms

Katamā ca, bhikkhave, dukkhā paṭipadā dandhābhiññā? Idha, bhikkhave, ekacco pakatiyāpi tibbarāgajātiko hoti, abhikkhaṇaṃ rāgajaṃ dukkhaṃ domanassaṃ paṭisaṃvedeti.

And what’s the painful practice with slow insight? It’s when someone is ordinarily full of acute greed, hate, and delusion. They often feel the pain and sadness that greed, hate, and delusion bring.

above the abhikkhanam is translated to often.

http://dictionary.sutta.org/browse/k/khana

khana：The 3 phases in a moment of consciousness，i．e．uppāda ，ṭhiti ，bhaṅga ，are probably mentioned for the first time in the commentaries； but there is a close parallel in two sutta texts which may have been the source for that teaching of a three-phased moment of consciousness：

＂There are 3 characteristics of what is conditioned （saṅkhatassa lakkhaṇā）：an arising （uppādo） is apparent，a passing away （vayo） is apparent，a change in the existing （ṭhitassa aññathattaṃ ：Com．= ageing） is apparent＂ （A．III，47）．The same 3 phases are mentioned in S．XXII，37，where they are applied to each of the 5 khandha ．

http://dictionary.sutta.org/browse/l/lakkhaṇa

lakkhaṇa：'characteristics'．For the 3 ch．of existence，s．ti-lakkhaṇa．
lakkhaṇa：[nt．] a sign； mark； characteristic； a prognosticative mark； a quality．

Lakkhaṇa，（nt．） [Vedic lakṣman nt．sign； adj．lakṣmaṇa； later Sk．lakṣmaṇa nt．In the defn of grammarians syn．with aṅka brand，e．g．Dhtp 536 “aṅka lakkhaṇe lakkha dassane，” or Dhtm 748 “lakkha=dassanaaṅke”； cp．J．I，451 lakkhaṇena aṅketi to brand．‹-› The Sk．Np．Lakṣmaṇa appears also in Prk．as Lakkhaṇa：Pischel，Prk．Gr．§ 312] 1．sign，characteristic，mark； esp．a sign as implying something extraordinary or pointing to the future，therefore a prognosticative mark （cp．talisman），a distinguishing mark or salient feature，property，quality （as Rh．D．in Dial．I．19 somewhat lengthily，after Bdhgh，trsls lakkhaṇa by “signs of good & bad qualities in the foll..．

distinguished mark, salient feature.

The 3 properties （tilakkhaṇaṁ） of existing things or of the phenomenal world are anicca，dukkha，anatta，or impermanence，suffering，unreality：thus at J．I，48 （dhamma-desanā ti-l-°muttā），275； III，377 （through contemplating them arises vipassanā & pacceka-bodhi-ñāṇa）．-- Abl．lakkhaṇato “by or qua characteristic，” “in its essential qualification，” often found in exegetical analysis in Commentary style combd with var．similar terms （atthato，kamato，nimittato etc．），e．g．Vism．351，363，495，528； VbhA．46，76，83，131，261 （where Vism．351 has paripācana for uṇhatta）； SnA 343．-- Cp．upa°，vi°，sa°．--āhata affected with a mark （of punishment or disgrace），branded Vin．I，76； VvA．66．--kusala clever at interpreting bodily marks or at fortune-telling from signs （cp．nemittaka） M．I，220； J．I，272．--kusalatā cleverness at （telling people’s fortune by） signs VvA．138．--paṭiggāhaka one who reads the signs，a soothsayer，wise man J．I，56．--pāṭhaka an expert in （interpreting） signs，fortune-teller J．I，455； II，194； V，211．--manta the secret science of （bodily） marks Sn．690 （but expld at SnA 488 as “lakkhaṇāni ca vedā ca，” thus taking it as Dvandva）； DhA．III，194．--sampatti excellency of marks J．I，54．--sampanna endowed with （auspicious） signs Sn．409； J．I，455．

the existing, phenomenal world characteristics are anicca, dukkha, anatta, whilst anatta is translated as unreality. hmm is it the phenomenal as phenomenal world what exist is seen because of the outstanding marks existence exhibits and the khandhas don't, hence the anatta, dukkha, anicca(want but can't have).

http://dictionary.sutta.org/browse/k/khandha

Khandha，[Sk．skandha] -- I．Crude meaning：bulk，massiveness （gross） substance．

II．Applied meaning．--A．（-°） the body of，a collection of，mass，or parts of； in collective sense “all that is comprised under”； forming the substance of．‹-› （a） dukkha° all that is comprised under “dukkha，” all that goes to make up or forms the substance，the idea of “ill．” Most prominent in phrase kevalassa dukkhakhandhassa samudaya and nirodha （the origin & destruction of all that is suffering）

-
http://dictionary.sutta.org/browse/d/dhā
dhā，1./ dadh（巴dhā），=put=放置 2.=suck=吸吮
dhā，（梵dhā，dadh）﹐【字根I.】放（to put），忍受（to bear）。

http://dictionary.sutta.org/browse/k/khāda
Khāda，（nt．） eating，in --kāraṇa the reason of eating

so if khadhas doesn't have what the phenomenal world have then that gives a hidden or underlying motivation or urge to act, to grab.
if it is opposite then sukha rises hence secluded from world delighting in solitude.