viññāṇa as divided knowing

[ssasny]

"Contact with outer sense-base, is not Phassa as in dependent origination context "

yes, you make a valid point.

quoting from the same piece by Ven. Nanavira:

"Phassa, 'contact', is defined (Salāyatana Samy. iv,10 <S.iv,67-9>) as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.
...
This interpretation of phassa is not invited by the Mahānidānasuttanta (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>), where nāmarūpapaccayā phasso is discussed without reference to salāyatana, and in terms of adhivacanasamphassa and patighasamphassa. These terms are more easily comprehensible when phassa is understood as 'contact between subject and object'. (It is an elementary mistake to equate patighasamphassa ['resistance-contact'] with five-base-contact [cakkhusamphassa &c.] and adhivacanasamphassa ['designation-contact'] with mind-contact [manosamphassa]. Adhivacana and patigha correspond to nāma and rūpa respectively, and it is clear from Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,190-1> that both nāma and rūpa are conditions for each of the six kinds of contact. "

[Ceisiwr]

yes, you make a valid point.

quoting from the same piece by Ven. Nanavira:

"Phassa, 'contact', is defined (Salāyatana Samy. iv,10 <S.iv,67-9>) as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.
...
This interpretation of phassa is not invited by the Mahānidānasuttanta (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>), where nāmarūpapaccayā phasso is discussed without reference to salāyatana, and in terms of adhivacanasamphassa and patighasamphassa. These terms are more easily comprehensible when phassa is understood as 'contact between subject and object'. (It is an elementary mistake to equate patighasamphassa ['resistance-contact'] with five-base-contact [cakkhusamphassa &c.] and adhivacanasamphassa ['designation-contact'] with mind-contact [manosamphassa]. Adhivacana and patigha correspond to nāma and rūpa respectively, and it is clear from Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,190-1> that both nāma and rūpa are conditions for each of the six kinds of contact. "

I don’t agree that contact is between a subject and object, if by that we imply that when there is no sense of self there is no contact at all. The Buddha still experienced pain, which arises from contact. Even if we provisionally accept Bhante’s argument it still falls, IMO, when we consider that the the Buddha would have still have had thoughts of “I”, so by Bhante’s own argument he would have still had contact.

[ssasny]

yes, your opinion has been duly noted.

(I actually intended my last post for a different person, sorry to not have been clear.)

[Ceisiwr]

yes, your opinion has been duly noted.

(I actually intended my last post for a different person, sorry to not have been clear.)

Ah, sorry. I thought it was for me.

[Jack19990101]

"Contact with outer sense-base, is not Phassa as in dependent origination context "

yes, you make a valid point.

quoting from the same piece by Ven. Nanavira:

"Phassa, 'contact', is defined (Salāyatana Samy. iv,10 <S.iv,67-9>) as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things.
...
This interpretation of phassa is not invited by the Mahānidānasuttanta (Dīgha ii,2 <D.ii,62>), where nāmarūpapaccayā phasso is discussed without reference to salāyatana, and in terms of adhivacanasamphassa and patighasamphassa. These terms are more easily comprehensible when phassa is understood as 'contact between subject and object'. (It is an elementary mistake to equate patighasamphassa ['resistance-contact'] with five-base-contact [cakkhusamphassa &c.] and adhivacanasamphassa ['designation-contact'] with mind-contact [manosamphassa]. Adhivacana and patigha correspond to nāma and rūpa respectively, and it is clear from Majjhima iii,8 <M.i,190-1> that both nāma and rūpa are conditions for each of the six kinds of contact. "

Mudita.

Half of the quoted text, is Pali. It is very hard for me.
But Yeah, I do agree Phassa is a key in forming I vs object.

[Joe.c]

the Buddha would have still have had thoughts of “I”, so by Bhante’s own argument he would have still had contact.

If you don't know, It is ok to say you don't know yet.

Don't misrepresent about Buddha experience that you don't know. You are blocking your own path more and more.

If one entered the samma samadhi, those "I" will be seen with freedom by wisdom and/or freedom with mind (free both way)

[ssasny]

I think we can all agree that there are multiple types of 'consciousness', some tainted by ignorance, some not.

The word 'viññāṇa' is clearly used in different contexts within the suttas, the word cannot mean the same exact thing in each instance.

[PeterC86]

Moreover, most people understand avijja as 'not-knowing', as in opposed to 'knowing'. So they think they have to gain knowledge to dissolve not-knowing. But there is no knowing without not-knowing, because what would one know if it wasn't opposed to not-knowing? It is like trying to say that there can be form without formless, existence without non-existence...So avijja can only be dissolved together with vijja.

Those people who try to gain knowledge by reading all these texts that proclaim to have knowledge, stuffing their bookshelfs with books, thinking "I have read a lot of books, so I am very knowledgeable, therefore I must be wise", instead all they have done is gaining self-view.

[nirodh27]

I think that this really must stay in this thread as well:

From "The Fundamental Teachings of Early Buddhism" of Choong Mun-keat :

5. The aggregate of consciousness (viiiiiii.Q.a ~)
Both versions of the first account equate this with six bodies of
consciousness (cha viiiiiii.Q.a-kiiyii A~$t), as follows: l ?

eye-consciousness (cakkhu-viiiiiii.Q.a l!& ~
ear-consciousness (sota-vififiii.Q.a 1}~
nose-consciousness (ghiina-viiiiiii.Q.a .. ~)
tongue-consciousness Givha-vifiiiii.Q.a %~
body-consciousness (kiiya-viiiiiii.Q.a $t~)
mind-consciousness (mano-vififiii.Q.a ~~)

In the second account, the SN version explains consciousness thus: 18

One distinguishes (vijiiniiti), bhiksus, that is why it is called
consciousness (viiiiiii.Q.a). What does one distinguish? One
distinguishes sour or bitter, acrid or sweet, alkaline or non-alkaline,
saline or non-saline. One distinguishes, bhiksus, that is why it is
called consciousness.

Its SA counterpart states: 19

The characteristic of distinguishing (3~ %l ;f§) is the aggregate of
consciousness with attachment. What is one conscious of (~? One is
conscious of visible forms, sounds, odours, tastes, tangibles, mental
objects. That is why it is called the aggregate of consciousness with
attachment.

The word "distinguishes" (or "is conscious of', vijanati) in SN is similar -in
meaning to "characteristic of distinguishing" and "is conscious of' in SA.
Thus, although the SN version of the second account mentions only flavours
as the objects, the two versions agree in teaching that consciousness is a sort
of becoming aware of objects.
This section has shown the two versions largely in agreement in defining
the five aggregates in two different ways: (1) by listing the components of
each aggregate, and (2) by giving a mainly etymological derivation of each
of the five terms.

The discrepancy is a little more tricky from the parallels, since the Pali actually make examples about discrimination (alkaline vs non-alkaline, sour or bitter etc), while the SA is way more about "being conscious of".

[Joe.c]

Moreover, most people understand avijja as 'not-knowing', as in opposed to 'knowing'. So they think they have to gain knowledge to dissolve not-knowing. But there is no knowing without not-knowing, because what would one know if it wasn't opposed to not-knowing? It is like trying to say that there can be form without formless, existence without non-existence...So avijja can only be dissolved together with vijja.

Dude, Not possible for anyone to self awaken now. This is a Samma sambuddha period. So your argument falls flat. You also don’t know the path or have any knowledge do you know that?

One who still works, have family, attached to money, have sex won’t be able to understand the complete path/knowledge.

One needs to hear true dhamma from ariya and practice from hearing the dhamma. Can’t read alone as well.

Knowledge can only be gained from practice and put the true dhamma that you heard into practice.

Those people who try to gain knowledge by reading all these texts that proclaim to have knowledge, stuffing their bookshelfs with books, thinking "I have read a lot of books, so I am very knowledgeable, therefore I must be wise", instead all they have done is gaining self-view.

Not necessarily. But just won’t be able to break through to higher teaching. Lower teaching is possible.

[Joe.c]

Vinnana for human there are 6 vinnana.

One needs to shut down 5 vinnana (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) and gain access to 1 mano vinnana. But this means one has developed samma sati/samadhi. Well needs to take a while for some.

If you are still working, attach to family. Not possible to understand it.

Also if one hasn’t heard about true dhamma and perfected precepts and perfected senses restraint, it also not possible to gain access the mano vinnana yet.

If one can shutdown 5 vinnana, basically the mind is always in samadhi. One has let go kamasanna (sensual pleasure for good).

[Ceisiwr]

Moreover, most people understand avijja as 'not-knowing', as in opposed to 'knowing'. So they think they have to gain knowledge to dissolve not-knowing. But there is no knowing without not-knowing, because what would one know if it wasn't opposed to not-knowing? It is like trying to say that there can be form without formless, existence without non-existence...So avijja can only be dissolved together with vijja.

Those people who try to gain knowledge by reading all these texts that proclaim to have knowledge, stuffing their bookshelfs with books, thinking "I have read a lot of books, so I am very knowledgeable, therefore I must be wise", instead all they have done is gaining self-view.

I don’t think anyone thinks they will awaken just by reading books on the Dhamma, but you have to start somewhere. Not being Buddhas we have to hear (or read) and conceptually understand the Dhamma first.

[nirodh27]

I think we can all agree that there are multiple types of 'consciousness', some tainted by ignorance, some not.

Hi Ssasny,

Exactly, this is both in the Nikayas and the agamas. There is ignorance-contact that is different by simple contact, and of course comes from a consciousness that is tainted by ignorance as well since "contact" is simply a shortcut of consciousness that arises/lands somewhere:

“And what, bhikkhus, is the origin of the world? In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact.

So we have examples about ignorance contact and we can derive also by those what ignorance is: "Identity view and asmi-mana" since his effect is to destroy "I am" (identity) thoughts and scents.

“Thus this way of regarding things and the notion ‘I am’ have not vanished in him. As ‘I am’ has not vanished, there takes place a descent of the five faculties—of the eye faculty, the ear faculty, the nose faculty, the tongue faculty, the body faculty. There is, bhikkhus, the mind, there are mental phenomena, there is the element of ignorance. When the uninstructed worldling is contacted by a feeling born of ignorance-contact, ‘I am’ occurs to him; ‘I am this’ occurs to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these occur to him. “The five faculties remain right there, bhikkhus, but in regard to them the instructed noble disciple abandons ignorance and arouses true knowledge. With the fading away of ignorance and the arising of true knowledge, ‘I am’ does not occur to him; ‘I am this’ does not occur to him; ‘I will be’ and ‘I will not be,’ and ‘I will consist of form’ and ‘I will be formless,’ and ‘I will be percipient’ and ‘I will be nonpercipient’ and ‘I will be neither percipient nor nonpercipient’—these do not occur to him.”

The agamas are even more clear distinguishing from an ignorance-contact and a wise-contact that are clearly born by a consciousness tainted by ignorance (which is identity view and asmi-mana) and a cosciousness that it is not tainted by ignorance.

“The foolish untaught common person has ignorance therefore arise: the experience of existence, the experience of non existence, the experience of existence and non existence, the experience that I am superior, the experience that I am equal, the experience that I am inferior, the experience that I know, the experience that I see, the experience that I know like this and the experience that I see like this. These are all from the six sense organs.

“Therefore the well-learned noble disciple, having given up ignorance regarding these six sense organs and wisdom arises and: the experience of existence, the experience of non existence, the experience of existence and non existence, the experience that I am superior, the experience that I am equal, the experience that I am inferior, the experience that I know, the experience that I see, the experience that I know like this and the experience that I see like this, do not arise. The ignorant contact which had arisen before is destroyed and thereafter wise contact and experience arise.”

[User13866]

I think this idea of explaining vinnana as divided knowing is very bad..

It opens up for there being two types vinnana as to divided and undivided, alternatively defiled and undefiled.

This would be akin to deriving the meaning of consciousness from it's etymology which is rather analogical to the etymology of consciousness and the latin conscĭentĭa

con-

word-forming element meaning "together, with," sometimes merely intensive; it is the form of com- used in Latin before consonants except -b-, -p-, -l-, -m-, or -r-. In native English formations (such as costar), co- tends to be used where Latin would use con-.

conscious (adj.)

c. 1600, "knowing, privy to" (poetic), from Latin conscius "knowing, aware," from conscire "be (mutually) aware," from assimilated form of com "with," or "thoroughly" (see con-) + scire "to know" (see science). The Latin word probably is a loan-translation of Greek syneidos.

The sense of "knowing or perceiving within oneself, sensible inwardly, aware" is from 1630s, perhaps a shortening of conscious to oneself (1620s). Also compare the Latin sense evolution in conscience. From 1650s as "aware (of a fact)." Sense of "active and awake, endowed with active mental faculties" is from 1837

-ness 

word-forming element denoting action, quality, or state, attached to an adjective or past participle to form an abstract noun, from Old English -nes(s), from Proto-Germanic *in-assu- (cognates: Old Saxon -nissi, Middle Dutch -nisse, Dutch -nis, Old High German -nissa, German -nis, Gothic -inassus), from *-in-, originally belonging to the noun stem, + *-assu-, abstract noun suffix, probably from the same root as Latin -tudo (see -tude).

https://www.etymonline.com/word/consciousness

As you can see it's rather analogical and if we do it with vinnana we can do it with consciousness.

If we assert that there is a divided consciousness and an undivided consciousness based merely on this etymology it would be analogical to asserting that;
Understanding is of two types, standing under something and standing otherwise (perhaps above something).

This is of course fallacious because now we have made the word understand to mean something disconnected from it's semantic property which ought to overlap with knowing, comprehension, etc

If we do this with vinnana we are likewise changing the semantic target and are talking about somerhing else, perhaps even related but we are off target.

As far as i can tell people who like the "two consciousness model" do so because they use it to understand what means 'cessation of consciousness' in the texts. They assert that this means that a purification of consciousness has occured such that there is no longer any defiled consciousness, only remnant pure consciousness rather than an altogether cessation of consciousness.

This is analogical to explaining that 'absence of understanding' is not an altogether absence of understanding but rather that one's understanding is purified because we aren't standing under [a bridge for example].

It changes what we are talking about entirely.

[User13866]

It would be foolish to deny that there is standing under something and not standing under something.

Likewise it is foolish to deny that mind, intellect, consciousness can be divorced from delusion and not divorced from delusion.

However it is foolish to assert that 'understanding' when asserted to be semantically conjoined with knowing & comprehension denotes whether we are standing under a thing or not.

Similarly it is foolish to assert that 'cessation of consciousness' in the context of attaining cessation of perception & feeling denotes whether that which is called mind or intellect is purified of delusion or not.

You are then talking about something else entirely.