Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional language?

Exploring the Dhamma, as understood from the perspective of the ancient Pali commentaries.
zan
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Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional language?

Post by zan »

Specifically, I'm looking for a defense that would stand up to modern arguments, and that doesn't rely on things beyond normal human understanding. So, for example, the Abhidhammattha Sangaha already perfectly explains the entire dhamma theory, and provides all the needed support for the Visuddhimagga position (see note 1), however, it relies on knowledge that goes beyond what a normal person could perceive, for instance, knowledge of the paramattha dhammas, which are subatomic in size, and only visible to the wise (see note 2), or knowledge of extreme momentariness (see note 2) that normal people cannot comprehend, and thus would not do as a defense of this position among people who only understand the conventional, and do not consider ultimate knowledge of the dhammas, due to lack of wisdom.

1.)
Therefore, just as a marionette is void, soulless and without curiosity, and
while it walks and stands merely through the combination of strings and wood, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness, so too, this mentality-
materiality is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands
merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had
curiosity and interestedness. This is how it should be regarded. Hence the
Ancients said:

The mental and material are really here,
But here there is no human being to be found,
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll—
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks.
Vism. XVIII.31
There is no doer of a deed
Or one who reaps the deed’s result;
Phenomena alone flow on—
No other view than this is right.

-Vism. XIX.20
2.)
Paramàõu was the ancient
term for the modern atom. According to the ancient belief
one rathareõu consists of 16 tajjàris, one tajjàri, 16 aõus;
one aõu, 16 paramàõus. The minute particles of dust seen
dancing in the sunbeam are called rathareõus. One paramàõu is, therefore, 4096th part of a rathareõu. This paramàõu was considered indivisible.
With His supernormal knowledge the Buddha analysed this so-called paramàõu and declared that it consists
of paramatthas—ultimate entities which cannot further be
subdivided.

A Manual of Abhidhamma, Narada Maha Thera, page 318
This is a temporal unit of such brief duration that, according to the commentaries, in the time that it takes for lightning to flash or the eyes to blink, billions of mind-moments can elapse.

-A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, Bhikkhu Bodhi, page 156
Last edited by zan on Sat Feb 19, 2022 6:46 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by Ceisiwr »

Ask them where this "doer" is?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
Ontheway
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by Ontheway »

Meditation experience perhaps? I don't think it is something we can "prove" to others, it is more like "come and see for yourself".

But there are many Suttas support that Visuddhimagga's quote, for example: Vajirāsutta and Anurādhasutta.
Hiriottappasampannā,
sukkadhammasamāhitā;
Santo sappurisā loke,
devadhammāti vuccare.

https://suttacentral.net/ja6/en/chalmer ... ight=false
Jack19990101
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by Jack19990101 »

Those position is context based. Argument about the position is not gonna work, as it is most likely true to many.
argument can only be made about the position's audience or its context, its status on the path.

with that said -
If one convinces there is a doer, then doer is. Vice versa.

Read it as an ontological statement, it does cause confusion in its audience though.
As the force of becoming or birth is not from an ontological dhamma.
The force is from citta with lust or aversion. An dhamma can merely show up, to finish the co-arising.
zan
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by zan »

Ontheway wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 6:43 pm Meditation experience perhaps? I don't think it is something we can "prove" to others, it is more like "come and see for yourself".

But there are many Suttas support that Visuddhimagga's quote, for example: Vajirāsutta and Anurādhasutta.
Thanks. It seems there must be some way to logically argue for this position though, no?

Those are great suttas, particularly relevant is the Vajira sutta, as this argument does apply to conventional thought and language: if we look at a human, and all of their parts, we do not find a being, any more than we find a chariot in all the parts of a chariot, and so we must admit that both are merely conventions, and ultimately there are no beings, selves, nor chariots, aside from the sum of their parts, which, while still entirely real, are temporary, and obviously not self. So, unless we found a part that is not made up of other parts, not dependent on other things, and that, even if totally separated from other parts is, in fact, the self or the doer, or whatever, there is no way to get around that argument.

SN 23.2 is another good one.
Last edited by zan on Sat Feb 19, 2022 7:12 pm, edited 1 time in total.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
Jack19990101
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by Jack19990101 »

There is some hesitation on 'no doer of deed, no reap of result.'
If this comes as an insight spontaneously within, it is all well. This will just confirm the positivity of the insight.
This insight will defy kamma.

If read this as a statement, we have to comprehend the implication. As this statement as a mantra does not defeat kamma.
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 7:07 pm
Ontheway wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 6:43 pm Meditation experience perhaps? I don't think it is something we can "prove" to others, it is more like "come and see for yourself".

But there are many Suttas support that Visuddhimagga's quote, for example: Vajirāsutta and Anurādhasutta.
Thanks. It seems there must be some way to logically argue for this position though, no?

Those are great suttas, particularly relevant is the Vajira sutta, as this argument does apply to conventional thought and language: if we look at a human, and all of their parts, we do not find a being, any more than we find a chariot in all the parts of a chariot, and so we must admit that both are merely conventions, and ultimately there are no beings, selves, nor chariots, aside from the sum of their parts, which, while still entirely real, are temporary, and obviously not self. So, unless we found a part that is not made up of other parts, not dependent on other things, and that, even if totally separated from other parts is, in fact, the self or the doer, or whatever, there is no way to get around that argument.

SN 23.2 is another good one.
I think when the Buddha argued against the self, he did so on the basis of reductio ad absurdum. Atta theories at that time were based on the 5 aggregates. It was claimed that the atta was permanent and blissful. The Buddha showed that none of the aggregates were permanent and blissful, so where is the basis for this atta? You can do the same today. When someone says there is a self, ask them to define it and go from there. Eventually you will show that it is an absurd proposition.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
Jack19990101
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Joined: Wed Jun 09, 2021 4:40 am

Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by Jack19990101 »

Best position for this, is to see it as an insight, recognition on the path, a raft.
The defense about a path, is its fruition, or by faith.

It is not part of nibbana, thus not the ultimate truth. Nibbana 'bolishes' path as path itself is sankhara.
zan
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by zan »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 7:46 pm
zan wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 7:07 pm
Ontheway wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 6:43 pm Meditation experience perhaps? I don't think it is something we can "prove" to others, it is more like "come and see for yourself".

But there are many Suttas support that Visuddhimagga's quote, for example: Vajirāsutta and Anurādhasutta.
Thanks. It seems there must be some way to logically argue for this position though, no?

Those are great suttas, particularly relevant is the Vajira sutta, as this argument does apply to conventional thought and language: if we look at a human, and all of their parts, we do not find a being, any more than we find a chariot in all the parts of a chariot, and so we must admit that both are merely conventions, and ultimately there are no beings, selves, nor chariots, aside from the sum of their parts, which, while still entirely real, are temporary, and obviously not self. So, unless we found a part that is not made up of other parts, not dependent on other things, and that, even if totally separated from other parts is, in fact, the self or the doer, or whatever, there is no way to get around that argument.

SN 23.2 is another good one.
I think when the Buddha argued against the self, he did so on the basis of reductio ad absurdum. Atta theories at that time were based on the 5 aggregates. It was claimed that the atta was permanent and blissful. The Buddha showed that none of the aggregates were permanent and blissful, so where is the basis for this atta? You can do the same today. When someone says there is a self, ask them to define it and go from there. Eventually you will show that it is an absurd proposition.
Thanks, any further examples, articles or other works are welcome.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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robertk
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by robertk »

Jack19990101 wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 7:09 pm There is some hesitation on 'no doer of deed, no reap of result.'
If this comes as an insight spontaneously within, it is all well. This will just confirm the positivity of the insight.
This insight will defy kamma.

No such phrase in Theravada. Perhaps you misquoted visuddimagga given by Zan earlier:

There is no doer of a deed
Or one who reaps the deed’s result;
Phenomena alone flow on—
No other view than this is right.

-Vism. XIX.20

Thus there is kamma and result. But not a self.
ToVincent
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by ToVincent »

The "doer" is supposed to be satta in AN 6.38.

Satta is (supposed to be) the existing (sat) been made* (sat-ta/sat kata), [out of the khandhas].
Kata - fr. √ kṛ = made, as in "accomplished" (RV.) - as in completed, brought to an end.
But as seen below, this is not the case. No more than what is called atta in paṭiccasamuppāda, is the real self.

-------
“Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘the existing been made’?
“Kiṁ nu sattoti paccesi,
...
This is just a pile of coactions,
Suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṁ,
you won’t find an "existing been accomplished" here.
nayidha sattupalabbhati.
SN 5.10
There is no such "existing been made" comprised in the saḷāyatana nidāna and below nidānā (https://justpaste.it/9rusd).
While real, this satta cannot be the "existing been accomplished", because of its inherent nature of being both "impermanent" and "not one's own".
"It’s only suffering that comes to be;
Suffering that exists (tiṭṭhati) and disappears (veti)".
"Dukkhameva hi sambhoti,
dukkhaṁ tiṭṭhati veti ca".


Also, see here:
viewtopic.php?p=667421#p667421
viewtopic.php?p=667443#p667443
what is "impermanent" (anicca) and "not one's own" (anicca) — (as in SN 44.2, etc. ) .
“What do you think, Anurādha?,
Is form permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?”
“Suffering, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and liable to fall apart, is it fit to be regarded thus:
‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?”
“No, sir.”

"Taṁ kiṁ maññasi, anurādha
rūpaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti?
“Aniccaṁ, bhante”.
“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vā taṁ sukhaṁ vā”ti?
“Dukkhaṁ, bhante”.
“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vipariṇāmadhammaṁ, kallaṁ nu taṁ samanupassituṁ:
‘etaṁ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’”ti?
“No hetaṁ, bhante”.
SN 44.2
------

This satta — that is an unaccomplished existence, who yet exists and is real in some deceptive way — has the element of initiative (ārabbhadhātū). There is no self in it (anatta); its existence is incomplete (not permanent (anicca), and not one's own (anicca)) - yet, this satta can instigate (initiate).

You could see the bad side of this shebang as "playing on the evil one's ground" (temptation/subjugation - not one's own) — and playing on the evil one's ground with the evil one (element of initiative).
A definite nuance.
.
.
In this world, there are many people acting and yearning for the Mara's world; some for the Brahma's world; and very few for the Unborn.
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Ceisiwr
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by Ceisiwr »

ToVincent wrote: Sun Feb 20, 2022 8:47 am The "doer" is supposed to be satta in AN 6.38.

Satta is (supposed to be) the existing (sat) been made* (sat-ta/sat kata), [out of the khandhas].
Kata - fr. √ kṛ = made, as in "accomplished" (RV.) - as in completed, brought to an end.
But as seen below, this is not the case. No more than what is called atta in paṭiccasamuppāda, is the real self.

-------
“Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘the existing been made’?
“Kiṁ nu sattoti paccesi,
...
This is just a pile of coactions,
Suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṁ,
you won’t find an "existing been accomplished" here.
nayidha sattupalabbhati.
SN 5.10
There is no such "existing been made" comprised in the saḷāyatana nidāna and below nidānā (https://justpaste.it/9rusd).
While real, this satta cannot be the "existing been accomplished", because of its inherent nature of being both "impermanent" and "not one's own".
"It’s only suffering that comes to be;
Suffering that exists (tiṭṭhati) and disappears (veti)".
"Dukkhameva hi sambhoti,
dukkhaṁ tiṭṭhati veti ca".


Also, see here:
viewtopic.php?p=667421#p667421
viewtopic.php?p=667443#p667443
what is "impermanent" (anicca) and "not one's own" (anicca) — (as in SN 44.2, etc. ) .
“What do you think, Anurādha?,
Is form permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?”
“Suffering, sir.”
“But if it’s impermanent, suffering, and liable to fall apart, is it fit to be regarded thus:
‘This is mine, I am this, this is my self’?”
“No, sir.”

"Taṁ kiṁ maññasi, anurādha
rūpaṁ niccaṁ vā aniccaṁ vā”ti?
“Aniccaṁ, bhante”.
“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vā taṁ sukhaṁ vā”ti?
“Dukkhaṁ, bhante”.
“Yaṁ panāniccaṁ dukkhaṁ vipariṇāmadhammaṁ, kallaṁ nu taṁ samanupassituṁ:
‘etaṁ mama, esohamasmi, eso me attā’”ti?
“No hetaṁ, bhante”.
SN 44.2
------

This satta — that is an unaccomplished existence, who yet exists and is real in some deceptive way — has the element of initiative (ārabbhadhātū). There is no self in it (anatta); its existence is incomplete (not permanent (anicca), and not one's own (anicca)) - yet, this satta can instigate (initiate).

You could see the bad side of this shebang as "playing on the evil one's ground" (temptation/subjugation - not one's own) — and playing on the evil one's ground with the evil one (element of initiative).
A definite nuance.
.
.
And this is something the average Joe on the street would understand, which is something the OP was asking for?
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
auto
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Joined: Thu Dec 21, 2017 12:02 pm

Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by auto »

robertk wrote: Sun Feb 20, 2022 6:23 am
Jack19990101 wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 7:09 pm There is some hesitation on 'no doer of deed, no reap of result.'
If this comes as an insight spontaneously within, it is all well. This will just confirm the positivity of the insight.
This insight will defy kamma.

No such phrase in Theravada. Perhaps you misquoted visuddimagga given by Zan earlier:

There is no doer of a deed
Or one who reaps the deed’s result;
Phenomena alone flow on—
No other view than this is right.

-Vism. XIX.20

Thus there is kamma and result. But not a self.
pali,
https://www.tipitaka.org/romn/ wrote: ‘‘Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako;
Suddhadhammā pavattanti, evetaṃ sammadassanaṃ.
Doer(kārako) and feeler(vedako). Visuddhimagga says there is no doer or feeler apart from the doing and feeling and that they are conventional or common language.

It doesn't negate the knower or someone who knows about it happening what the OP is trying to justify as not existing.
https://suttacentral.net/mn118/en/sujato?layout=sidebyside&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin wrote:When breathing in heavily they know: ‘I’m breathing in heavily.’ When breathing out heavily they know: ‘I’m breathing out heavily.’
Dīghaṁ vā assasanto ‘dīghaṁ assasāmī’ti pajānāti, dīghaṁ vā passasanto ‘dīghaṁ passasāmī’ti pajānāti;
If to read visuddhimagga, it is covered in earlier chapters, for example the saw simile,
p274 wrote:“Suppose there were a tree trunk placed on a level piece of ground, and a man
cut it with a saw. The man’s mindfulness is established by the saw’s teeth where
they touch the tree trunk, without his giving attention to the saw’s teeth as they
approach and recede, though they are not unknown to him as they do so; and he
manifests effort, carries out a task, and achieves an effect.
auto
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Joined: Thu Dec 21, 2017 12:02 pm

Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by auto »

Ontheway wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 6:43 pm Meditation experience perhaps? I don't think it is something we can "prove" to others, it is more like "come and see for yourself".

But there are many Suttas support that Visuddhimagga's quote, for example: Vajirāsutta and Anurādhasutta.
how much is convention convention?
https://suttacentral.net/sn5.10/en/sujato?layout=sidebyside&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin wrote: So too, when the aggregates are present
Evaṁ khandhesu santesu,
‘sentient being’ is the convention we use.
hoti sattoti sammuti.
if you think a being is just a convention then does that also remove the aggregates? or is that being a mere reflection of the real? i mean it still a reflection, not just an idea.
zan
Posts: 1402
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Re: Where might I find the most robust defense of the Visuddhimagga position on lack of doer, etc. in conventional langu

Post by zan »

auto wrote: Sun Feb 20, 2022 6:02 pm
robertk wrote: Sun Feb 20, 2022 6:23 am
Jack19990101 wrote: Sat Feb 19, 2022 7:09 pm There is some hesitation on 'no doer of deed, no reap of result.'
If this comes as an insight spontaneously within, it is all well. This will just confirm the positivity of the insight.
This insight will defy kamma.

No such phrase in Theravada. Perhaps you misquoted visuddimagga given by Zan earlier:

There is no doer of a deed
Or one who reaps the deed’s result;
Phenomena alone flow on—
No other view than this is right.

-Vism. XIX.20

Thus there is kamma and result. But not a self.
pali,
https://www.tipitaka.org/romn/ wrote: ‘‘Kammassa kārako natthi, vipākassa ca vedako;
Suddhadhammā pavattanti, evetaṃ sammadassanaṃ.
Doer(kārako) and feeler(vedako). Visuddhimagga says there is no doer or feeler apart from the doing and feeling and that they are conventional or common language.

It doesn't negate the knower or someone who knows about it happening what the OP is trying to justify as not existing.
https://suttacentral.net/mn118/en/sujato?layout=sidebyside&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin wrote:When breathing in heavily they know: ‘I’m breathing in heavily.’ When breathing out heavily they know: ‘I’m breathing out heavily.’
Dīghaṁ vā assasanto ‘dīghaṁ assasāmī’ti pajānāti, dīghaṁ vā passasanto ‘dīghaṁ passasāmī’ti pajānāti;
If to read visuddhimagga, it is covered in earlier chapters, for example the saw simile,
p274 wrote:“Suppose there were a tree trunk placed on a level piece of ground, and a man
cut it with a saw. The man’s mindfulness is established by the saw’s teeth where
they touch the tree trunk, without his giving attention to the saw’s teeth as they
approach and recede, though they are not unknown to him as they do so; and he
manifests effort, carries out a task, and achieves an effect.
Therefore, just as a marionette is void, soulless and without curiosity, and
while it walks and stands merely through the combination of strings and wood, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness, so too, this mentality-
materiality is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands
merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had
curiosity and interestedness. This is how it should be regarded. Hence the
Ancients said:

The mental and material are really here,
But here there is no human being to be found,
For it is void and merely fashioned like a doll—
Just suffering piled up like grass and sticks.
Vism. XVIII.31
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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