EBT-People Don't Have a Base. (An Evidence)

[Ṭhānuttamo]

Likewise... but I do care that your repeated interjections, disconnected from reality, and totally arbitrary, are invariably off-topic and disruptive. Please try harder to be on topic and aware of your surroundings so as to not interrupt topics.

Are you actually serious? ...

There is a way to deal with saṅgha issues as you both probably know that is often translated as "covering over as with grass". Although it doesn't fit quite squarely, the idea to cover something with grass, forget about it and move on seems applicable in this case. Just a thought ...

[mikenz66]

Likewise... but I do care that your repeated interjections, disconnected from reality, and totally arbitrary, are invariably off-topic and disruptive. Please try harder to be on topic and aware of your surroundings so as to not interrupt topics.

Are you actually serious? ...

There is a way to deal with saṅgha issues as you both probably know that is often translated as "covering over as with grass". Although it doesn't fit quite squarely, the idea to cover something with grass, forget about it and move on seems applicable in this case. Just a thought ...

Thanks Bhante, that's excellent advice.


Mike

[retrofuturist]

Greetings bhante,

There is a way to deal with saṅgha issues as you both probably know that is often translated as "covering over as with grass". Although it doesn't fit quite squarely, the idea to cover something with grass, forget about it and move on seems applicable in this case. Just a thought ...

Thank you. Yes, that is a good tradition.

I believe we've already moved on, but if Mike feels otherwise he's welcome to let me know.

Metta,
Paul.

[Eko Care]

Likewise... but I do care that your repeated interjections, disconnected from reality, and totally arbitrary, are invariably off-topic and disruptive. Please try harder to be on topic and aware of your surroundings so as to not interrupt topics.

Are you actually serious? ...

There is a way to deal with saṅgha issues as you both probably know that is often translated as "covering over as with grass". Although it doesn't fit quite squarely, the idea to cover something with grass, forget about it and move on seems applicable in this case. Just a thought ...

Thanks Bhante, that's excellent advice.


Mike

[frank k]

Today it is the interpretation of this scholar or that, and if it doesn't appeal, well, just make up your own interpretation that you like and makes sense to you (sometimes only you). As Theravādins, we have a wealth of explanations at our disposal, dozens and dozens of books, millennia of tradition, I rather go with that in most cases.

Bhante, how do you deal with the contradictions then, when that wealth of ancient Theravada commentary doesn't adequately explain them? You call it "making up an interpretation that you like", but in many cases it's not making up something new, but simply rejecting a later work contradicting an earlier work. Sure, the earlier work could be wrong (honest error in oral transmission), and the later one correct, but if the later work also assumed the earlier one is authentic and uncorrupted, then it's quite rational to reject the later one. In the thread where I split off for example, with Petakopadesa agreeing with sutta jhāna, I'm not "making up any new interpretations" there. I'm looking at 4 contradictory sources, find that two earlier ones agree, and two later ones contradict, and rejecting the contradictory ones. How is that unreasonable?

Your full message quoted below, was probably addressing wider concerns, but it would be good for you to share how you deal with clear cut situations like I describe above.

... but an an evolving collection of observations.

I agree. The confusion resulting from that, I observed, can be significant, with the wildest interpretations. The following is mostly based upon personal experience. Some doubt almost anything, some suggest to just regard the Dīghanikāya as authoritative, some even only the Aṭṭhakavagga. In the end, I believe, the modern-day Suttantikas comprise simply another sect which holds to a certain interpretation of what is Buddhavacana and how to understand it. But they don't see it that way of course; they think they are quite right and in a special position of knowing what the Buddha actually said. They say the same about us of course ... And so the quarrel continues probably until the end of the sāsana.

We are lucky to see the value in a tradition that has lasted in its present form possibly since the time of the Buddha himself and his aggasāvakas, containing all these deep insights by the great Theras of old into the teachings of the Buddha that are contained in the commentaries. Hence "Theravāda", the doctrine of the elders. Today it is the interpretation of this scholar or that, and if it doesn't appeal, well, just make up your own interpretation that you like and makes sense to you (sometimes only you). As Theravādins, we have a wealth of explanations at our disposal, dozens and dozens of books, millennia of tradition, I rather go with that in most cases.

But today, we often find the following scenario: This vinaya rule is offensive and misogynistic, well, let's drop it (well, just let's get rid of the whole Word Commentary, not even knowing if it is from the Buddha or Upāli). That discourse tastes too much like Abhidhamma, well, it's probably late. Well, we, as Theravādins, don't do such things; we leave things as they are, even if it costs something at times. This is one of our greatest strengths and a hallmark of ours. As far as I am concerned, I better go with that and with the Thera's of old rather than this confused state of affairs nowadays, often breeding disrespect or even outright animosity for the ancient communities (again speaking from personal experience), even going so far as calling them power hungry and/or misogynistic. Saṅghānussati looks different to me ... How inclusive is that?

In any case, we also need to grant them that they still can attain to magga-phala even when just following the Dīghanikāya without commentary as much as they need to grant us that we are also able to attain just the same following the commentaries and the Abhidhamma. The Theravāda, we must remember, already stood the test of time, having surely produced plenty of arahants along the way. Everyone needs to decide for him- or herself ...

[Eko Care]

AN 5.28, DN 2, MN 39, jhāna simile commentary – physical!
abhidhamma book 2 vibhanga 12 body gets redefined as “body of mental aggregates”

The above can be the most immature approach to the Pali words/phrases, I have ever seen.

Buddhadatta Dictionary:
Kāya = a heap; a collection; the body.

eg:
'Deva-kaya' = a group/heap/body of Devas. ; Mahasamaya Sutta
'Ratha-kaya' = a group/heap/body of Vehicles.; Ratthapala Sutta, Attarakkhita Sutta, Dutiyasangama Sutta

Bahū tattha hatthikāyā assakāyā rathakāyā pattikāyā; Ratthapala Sutta

PTS dictionary:
Kāya = [der. probably fr. ci, cinoti to heap up, cp. nikāya heaping up, accumulation or collection; Sk. kāya group, heap, collection, aggregate, body. -- Definitions and synonyms. -- SnA 31 gives the foll. synonyms and similes of kāya: kuṭī, guhā (Sn 772), deha, sandeha (Dh 148=Th 1, 20), nāvā (Dh 369), ratha (S iv.292) dhaja, vammīka (M i.144), kuṭikā (Th 1, 1);

Nyanatiloka Dictionary:
Kāya = (lit: accumulation): 'group', 'body', may either refer to the physical body (rūpa-kāya) or to the mental body (nāma-kāya). In the latter case it is either a collective name for the mental groups (feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness; s. khandha), or merely for feeling, perception and a few of the mental formations (s. nāma), e.g. in kāya-lahutā, etc. (cf. Tab. II). Kāya has this same meaning in the standard description of the 3rd absorption (jhāna, q.v.) "and he feels joy in his mind or his mental constitution (kāya)", and (e.g. Pug. 1-8) of the attainment of the 8 deliverances (vimokkha, q.v.); "having attained the 8 deliverances in his mind, or his person (kāya)." - Kāya is also the 5th sense-organ, the body-organ; s. āyatana, dhātu, indriya.

[tharpa]

Where does it say EBT person must believe in a permanent self/soul? Do you think Ajahn Brahm or Bhante Sujato believe in a permanent self/soul? If you do, you'd be wrong. They don't.

I remember reading a book by Ven. Mahaboowa in 1991. A Western scholarly monk asked me what I thought of it. I said it seemed like he believed in an atta, and the monk agreed with me. I remember Mahaboowa advocating in the book that the student eradicate the false self until the only thing left was the true self. And neither the monk nor I accepted the Commentaries as authoritative on what the Buddha actually taught.

[mikenz66]

Where does it say EBT person must believe in a permanent self/soul? Do you think Ajahn Brahm or Bhante Sujato believe in a permanent self/soul? If you do, you'd be wrong. They don't.

I remember reading a book by Ven. Mahaboowa in 1991. A Western scholarly monk asked me what I thought of it. I said it seemed like he believed in an atta, and the monk agreed with me. I remember Mahaboowa advocating in the book that the student eradicate the false self until the only thing left was the true self. And neither the monk nor I accepted the Commentaries as authoritative on what the Buddha actually taught.

Here's an old post from Ven Dhammanando on this topic:

In your experience, is this concept of a primordial citta common in the Ajahn Mun and Chah forest traditions?

I think "common" would be a bit of an understatement. The primordial citta conception and similar strains of thinly disguised soul theory and semi-eternalism are ubiquitous in these traditions.

Can you say say who is well-known from those traditions who espouse it and those who don't?

Among the Thai ajahns I don’t know of any who don’t teach this.

As for the non-Thai (i.e. mostly western) ajahns, with these you can predict it with a fairly high degree of accuracy from the monk’s biography. The non-eternalists for the most part comprise those who had some background in relatively orthodox strains of Theravada Buddhism before they got mixed up with the forest tradition. Examples would include Ajahns Khemadhammo, Tiradhammo and Sujāto, who all began as Mahasi practitioners; Ajahn Viradhammo, who began as a Ñāṇavīra enthusiast after Sāmaṇera Bodhesako introduced him to the man’s teachings; and Ajahn Brahmavamso, who began with the Samatha Trust, a British group that combines samatha meditation with Abhidhamma study. All of these appear to have avoided the semi-eternalist error that’s endemic to the Thai forest tradition. But those monks who had no previous background in Buddhism before they stumbled across the Thai forest tradition have for the most part not avoided it.

Mike

[auto]

AN 5.28, DN 2, MN 39, jhāna simile commentary – physical!

AN-a 5, 1. paṭhamapaṇṇāsakaṃ, 3. pañcaṅgikavaggo, 8. pañcaṅgikasuttavaṇṇanā, para. 1 ⇒
(geoff shatz trans.)
imameva kāyan-ti imaṃ karajakāyaṃ.
“This very body:” this body born of action [i.e. born of kamma].
Abhisandetī-ti temeti sneheti,
“He drenches:” he moistens,
sabbattha pavatta-pīti-sukhaṃ karoti.
he extends joy and pleasure everywhere.
Parisandetī-ti samantato sandeti.
“Steeps:” to flow all over.
Paripūretī-ti vāyunā bhastaṃ viya pūreti.
“Fills:” like filling a bellows with air.
Parippharatī-ti samantato phusati.
“Permeates:” to touch all over.
sabbāvato kāyassāti assa bhikkhuno
“His whole body:” in this monk’s body,
sabbakoṭṭhāsavato kāyassa kiñci upādinnakasantatipavattiṭṭhāne
with all its parts, in the place where acquired [material] continuity occurs there is not even the smallest part consisting of
Chavi-maṃsa-lohit-ānugataṃ
skin, flesh, and blood
aṇumattampi ṭhānaṃ paṭhamaj-jhāna-sukhena a-phuṭaṃ nāma na hoti.
that is not-permeated with the pleasure of the first-jhāna.

you are using simile body and the body in 3rd jhana as it would be the same.

there is difference between knowing a feeling(consciousness) because of sensual organ and its object, and whether the body is generated by the mind(perception born) and it touches the body and from that touch you know breath.

there are plenty of options to consider, no need to rush for deadpan conclusions

[Eko Care]

Here's an old post from Ven Dhammanando on this topic:

The non-eternalists for the most part comprise those who had some background in relatively orthodox strains of Theravada Buddhism before they got mixed up with the forest tradition. Examples would include .. who all began as Mahasi practitioners; .. who began as a Ñāṇavīra enthusiast ..; and .., who began with the Samatha Trust, a British group that combines samatha meditation with Abhidhamma study. All of these appear to have avoided the semi-eternalist error that’s endemic to the Thai forest tradition. But those monks who had no previous background in Buddhism before they stumbled across the Thai forest tradition have for the most part not avoided it.

It is true that the EBT advocators appear to have avoided the semi-eternalist error.

But, not other errors.

[Ṭhānuttamo]

AN 5.28, DN 2, MN 39, jhāna simile commentary – physical!
AN-a 5, 1. paṭhamapaṇṇāsakaṃ, 3. pañcaṅgikavaggo, 8. pañcaṅgikasuttavaṇṇanā, para. 1 ⇒
Chavi-maṃsa-lohit-ānugataṃ
skin, flesh, and blood [...]

Vism is contradicting Theravada commentary on this issue. That's the question you keep avoiding and trying to deflect with irrelevant red herrings [...]
Which ancient sangha do you believe? The Tv commentators who interpret DN 2 jhāna similes as a physical body in jhāna, or the Vism. Sangha who came a few hundred years later and redefined jhāna, kāya as a "body of mental aggregates"?

There is not doubt that kāya can refer to the mental body (nāmakāyo) also in the suttas. For example in the context of the eight liberations (aṭṭha vimokkhā), of which it is said: "He dwells in the eight liberations, having touched (or 'felt', 'experienced') with the body" (AN 4.87; aṭṭha ca vimokkhe kāyena phusitvā viharati). The commentary explicitly states that the mental body is what is meant here. Again in a context where it is mentioned that they are immaterial, a bhikkhu wishes: "That which are these peaceful liberations, formless, having surpassed corporeality, may I dwell [therein], having experienced these with the [mental] body (MN 6; ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā, te kāyena phusitvā vihareyyaṃ).

As to the passage you adduced to point out a discrepancy within the tradition, that is:

idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi ... pe ... paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. so imameva kāyaṃ vivekajena pītisukhena abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati; nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphuṭaṃ hoti.

“Here, secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters and dwells in the first jhāna, which consists of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by thought and examination. He makes the rapture and happiness born of seclusion drench, steep, fill, and pervade this body, so that there is no part of his whole body that is not pervaded by the rapture and happiness born of seclusion" (Bodhi: AN 5.28).

The commentary explains "whole body" as you stated, but the respective ṭīkā lets us know, in explaining the commentary's "nothing [of the body], indeed, is unpermeated" (aphuṭaṃ nāma na hoti; referring to the skin, flesh, blood as indicated: chavimaṃsalohita) that this is so "since consciousness-produced materiality is that which pervades wherever there is kamma-produced materiality (i.e. the physical body) (yattha yattha kammajarūpaṃ, tattha tattha cittajarūpassa abhibyāpanato. So, what we are down to again is which explanation we trust? Your own interpretation of kāya or that of the commentaries and/or ṭīkās?

[Ṭhānuttamo]

Bhante, how do you deal with the contradictions then, when that wealth of ancient Theravada commentary doesn't adequately explain them? You call it "making up an interpretation that you like", but in many cases it's not making up something new, but simply rejecting a later work contradicting an earlier work. Sure, the earlier work could be wrong (honest error in oral transmission), and the later one correct, but if the later work also assumed the earlier one is authentic and uncorrupted, then it's quite rational to reject the later one. In the thread where I split off for example, with Petakopadesa agreeing with sutta jhāna, I'm not "making up any new interpretations" there. I'm looking at 4 contradictory sources, find that two earlier ones agree, and two later ones contradict, and rejecting the contradictory ones. How is that unreasonable?

Dear Frank,
I mean I grant people who try to understand the suttas without the commentaries and the Abhidhamma that they of course also are cogent in their own field quite often, but that doesn't mean that the commentaries and Abhidhamma do not contain perhaps even more accurate and ancient descriptions. Rupert Gethin (The Buddhist Path to Awakening, Introduction) spoke along the lines that the tradition (incl. the mentioned genres) actually are at least as cogent as (m)any modern attempts in interpreting buddhavacana. I personally haven't come across any passage that cannot stand in harmony with the other portions of the Tipiṭaka, such as the four main nikāyas. I just recently finished a somewhat lengthy (ca. 90 pages) paper on saṃvega, where I dug quite a bit into all of Pāḷi literature, and I haven't noticed actually any major contradictions (if at all) regarding this term (!) ... Now, I do not know these traditional texts' take on the jhānas and what role the physical body plays therein very intimately, but from a quick glance which I shared in another reply to you and my own more or less casual reading, their interpretation is, again, quite well founded.

But even if there are contradictions, why are we so focused on them and use them to reject this vast textual body (pun intended) as a whole? I mean it is just likely that the theras of old (inlc. the aggasāvakas) answered questions of their students (it is well attested that they had numerous ones even at the time of the Buddha), the bulk of which is still extant in the Pāḷi commentaries, I believe. But since it had not issued directly from the Buddha, we must expect some level of contradiction. We also don't look down upon Ven. Sāriputta and ignore his teachings just because he (and some other arahants) made mistakes, not possessing the all-encompassing wisdom the Buddha had. I, for my part, put more weight to these texts rather than modern scholars' interpretations, which also often have their place of course. However that may be, we must ask ourselves if we gave these traditional texts all of our attention in trying to understand what they are saying and how it can fit into the picture before we reject them, especially in their entirety. Unfortunately, I found this hasn't been done all too often, speaking from personal experience.

I also had a look into your research work, which I find very thorough in its approach and nice. However, what I was actually missing is the same depth concerning the commentarial layers. You have done in-depth research on a how a Pāḷi term is occurring in the main nikāyas primarily, but didn't seem to be too interested in seeing what the commentaries have to say; I mean all of them, if possible, not just one or two occurrences ...

[frank k]

...

I also had a look into your research work, which I find very thorough in its approach and nice. However, what I was actually missing is the same depth concerning the commentarial layers. You have done in-depth research on a how a Pāḷi term is occurring in the main nikāyas primarily, but didn't seem to be too interested in seeing what the commentaries have to say; I mean all of them, if possible, not just one or two occurrences ...

My fluency in pāḷi is not yet up to the level where I can read the commentaries unaided.
It's not that I lack interest or dismiss them without even considering, I'm just not yet able to understand what (untranslated) commentary is saying.
If someone would provide the translations, then I would definitely read them, consider them, and compare to a straight sutta reading.

[Ṭhānuttamo]

My fluency in pāḷi is not yet up to the level where I can read the commentaries unaided.
It's not that I lack interest or dismiss them without even considering, I'm just not yet able to understand what (untranslated) commentary is saying.
If someone would provide the translations, then I would definitely read them, consider them, and compare to a straight sutta reading.

[frank k]

I did some detailed study and analysis on this. I can provide links if interested.
Sujato justifies (erroneously) his 3rd jhāna "sukhaṁ ca kāyena patisamvedeti" as "personally experienced" (effectvely removing any possibility of the physical body), by using the 8 vimokkha similar to what you allude to below.

The problem is, the third jhāna does not say "kāya sakkhi" or "kāyena phustiva", in which there would be stronger case to translate "kāyena sukhaṁ ca patisamvedeti" the same way one does for the former two.

If Sujato translated all 3 phrases literally, then there would be no problem. "body witness", "touched with body", etc. And if commentarial literature then stipulated what it believed body meant in each instance, then that's fine. But by overtranslating and overinterpreting according to his agenda (and Sujato is not basing his interpretation on the authority of the cmy), he is hypocritcally violating his own translation standards on principle of least meaning.

As I argued in detail in my essay, just as 'dhamma eye' arising, one 'seeing 5 aggregates as empty', etc., already there is much precedent that the hearer (of on oral tradition) or reader in the modern era is expected to be able to know the difference between figurative and literal.

I digress, back to 4 jhānas and 8 vimokkha, and 8 abhi ayatana.
Where the 4 jhānas map into the 8v and 8ay,
and then all the statements that say "kayena phusitva", don't overlap. AFAIK you can't find any suttas that say the 4 jhānas in reference to "kayena phusitva". You only see "kayena phusitva" when it's talking about formless attainments, such as MN 70.

3rd jhāna's "sukhaṁ ca kāyena patisamvedeti" is clearly using the same device as when suttas, cmy, and abhidhamma contrast "kāya" against "citta", or "mano", or "cetasika". That is, it's emphasizing the sukha is physical.

That the tika tries to harmonize the commentary "flesh and blood" kāya in the jhānas with Vism. "mind only kāya", if you read carefully, is still saying the Buddha's third jhāna formula is talking about a physical body.
In other words, the buddha doesn't talk about Vism.'s mind only jhāna body in the 3rd jhāna formula. The tika is only explaining how BOTH physical and mental body experience pleasure, but it doesn't say the Buddha in his words of the 3rd jhāna formula is referring to 'mind only body'. That's why you can claim there's no contradiction.

The question you should be asking yourself, if the Buddha has already established the precedent of using 'nama-kāya', why doesn't he use it in the 3rd jhāna formula? And remember, the disciples of the buddha didn't have a time machine for the tika guys to explain the Buddha also intended a mind only body for jhāna. They only have the benefit of hearing about the physical body pleasure.

AN 5.28, DN 2, MN 39, jhāna simile commentary – physical!
AN-a 5, 1. paṭhamapaṇṇāsakaṃ, 3. pañcaṅgikavaggo, 8. pañcaṅgikasuttavaṇṇanā, para. 1 ⇒
Chavi-maṃsa-lohit-ānugataṃ
skin, flesh, and blood [...]

Vism is contradicting Theravada commentary on this issue. That's the question you keep avoiding and trying to deflect with irrelevant red herrings [...]
Which ancient sangha do you believe? The Tv commentators who interpret DN 2 jhāna similes as a physical body in jhāna, or the Vism. Sangha who came a few hundred years later and redefined jhāna, kāya as a "body of mental aggregates"?

There is not doubt that kāya can refer to the mental body (nāmakāyo) also in the suttas. For example in the context of the eight liberations (aṭṭha vimokkhā), of which it is said: "He dwells in the eight liberations, having touched (or 'felt', 'experienced') with the body" (AN 4.87; aṭṭha ca vimokkhe kāyena phusitvā viharati). The commentary explicitly states that the mental body is what is meant here. Again in a context where it is mentioned that they are immaterial, a bhikkhu wishes: "That which are these peaceful liberations, formless, having surpassed corporeality, may I dwell [therein], having experienced these with the [mental] body (MN 6; ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā, te kāyena phusitvā vihareyyaṃ).

As to the passage you adduced to point out a discrepancy within the tradition, that is:

idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi ... pe ... paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. so imameva kāyaṃ vivekajena pītisukhena abhisandeti parisandeti paripūreti parippharati; nāssa kiñci sabbāvato kāyassa vivekajena pītisukhena apphuṭaṃ hoti.

“Here, secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters and dwells in the first jhāna, which consists of rapture and pleasure born of seclusion, accompanied by thought and examination. He makes the rapture and happiness born of seclusion drench, steep, fill, and pervade this body, so that there is no part of his whole body that is not pervaded by the rapture and happiness born of seclusion" (Bodhi: AN 5.28).

The commentary explains "whole body" as you stated, but the respective ṭīkā lets us know, in explaining the commentary's "nothing [of the body], indeed, is unpermeated" (aphuṭaṃ nāma na hoti; referring to the skin, flesh, blood as indicated: chavimaṃsalohita) that this is so "since consciousness-produced materiality is that which pervades wherever there is kamma-produced materiality (i.e. the physical body) (yattha yattha kammajarūpaṃ, tattha tattha cittajarūpassa abhibyāpanato. So, what we are down to again is which explanation we trust? Your own interpretation of kāya or that of the commentaries and/or ṭīkās?