The difference between Rupa and Kaya

[Bundokji]

I wouldn't say so, because the viññāṇakāyas are the six viññāṇas of DO. Also we have the nāmakāya and rūpakāya: both dependently originated.

There seems to be many different ways to differentiate the two. Viññāṇa is only one of the knowledge where the prefix "vi" seems to indicate lack of reliability. I am not sure if rūpa can be used accurately to describe a higher knowledge such as by practitioners who attained the Jhanas. For those who have gone beyond nama-rupa, rupa could be a mere appearance, or its primacy as a center of gravity or as a stable reference would be no longer relevant.

My conjecture is dependent on associating dhamma with kaya (truth body) rather than rupa.

I'm not an expert in Pāli, but the prefixes don't always mean something. I think viññāṇa is an example of this.

Maybe you are right. I had DN11 in mind where Viññanam anidassanam is taught. When the Buddha taught the monk how to frame his question correctly, he changed the sequence of the first two elements. I guess this marks a turning point in Buddhist insight where the practitioner is no longer stuck in the "either/or" dogmatic duality. As i believe that i am still stuck there, Viññāṇa that is held hostage/dependent on Sankhara (choices) would always present an either/or duality where Kaya appears to represent higher knowledge of the body than rupa.

[Ceisiwr]

There seems to be many different ways to differentiate the two. Viññāṇa is only one of the knowledge where the prefix "vi" seems to indicate lack of reliability. I am not sure if rūpa can be used accurately to describe a higher knowledge such as by practitioners who attained the Jhanas. For those who have gone beyond nama-rupa, rupa could be a mere appearance, or its primacy as a center of gravity or as a stable reference would be no longer relevant.

My conjecture is dependent on associating dhamma with kaya (truth body) rather than rupa.

I'm not an expert in Pāli, but the prefixes don't always mean something. I think viññāṇa is an example of this.

Maybe you are right. I had DN11 in mind where Viññanam anidassanam is taught. When the Buddha taught the monk how to frame his question correctly, he changed the sequence of the first two elements. I guess this marks a turning point in Buddhist insight where the practitioner is no longer stuck in the "either/or" dogmatic duality. As i believe that i am still stuck there, Viññāṇa that is held hostage/dependent on Sankhara (choices) would always present an either/or duality where Kaya appears to represent higher knowledge of the body than rupa.

One way to think of it is to look at who the Buddha was talking to. For ascetic Brahmins, like Yājñavalkya and his followers (the Buddha likely having met his followers, not Yājñavalkya himself) the ultimate is an undifferentiated and non-dual Viññāṇa that is free of conceptualisation. This is realised in meditation and is something one merges with upon death. To this the Buddha argued that entry into this meditation comes about due to intention and is sustained by intention until it falls away. What is true now will also be true in any similar realm after death. It's dependently originated, impermanent and so is still dukkha, even if subtly so. Ignorance then lies behind the intention, and intention is the basis for this supposed ultimate viññāṇa. Ignorance > formations > conciousness > name & form (or, in this case, just name) > death > suffering.

“It’s hard to see what they call the ‘uninclined’,
for the truth is not easy to see.
For one who has penetrated craving,
who knows and sees, there is nothing.”

- Ud 8.2

“For the dependent there is agitation. For the independent there’s no agitation. When there’s no agitation there is tranquility. When there is tranquility there’s no inclination. When there’s no inclination, there’s no coming and going. When there’s no coming and going, there’s no passing away and reappearing. When there’s no passing away and reappearing there’s no this world or world beyond or between the two. Just this is the end of suffering.” - Ud 8.4

[Bundokji]

One way to think of it is to look at who the Buddha was talking to. For ascetic Brahmins, like Yājñavalkya and his followers (the Buddha likely having met his followers, not Yājñavalkya himself) the ultimate is an undifferentiated and non-dual Viññāṇa that is free of conceptualisation. This is realised in meditation and is something one merges with upon death. To this the Buddha argued that entry into this meditation comes about due to intention and is sustained by intention until it falls away. What is true now will also be true in any similar realm after death. It's dependently originated, impermanent and so is still dukkha, even if subtly so. Ignorance then lies behind the intention, and intention is the basis for this supposed ultimate viññāṇa. Ignorance > formations > conciousness > name & form (or, in this case, just name) > death > suffering.

“It’s hard to see what they call the ‘uninclined’,
for the truth is not easy to see.
For one who has penetrated craving,
who knows and sees, there is nothing.”

- Ud 8.2

“For the dependent there is agitation. For the independent there’s no agitation. When there’s no agitation there is tranquility. When there is tranquility there’s no inclination. When there’s no inclination, there’s no coming and going. When there’s no coming and going, there’s no passing away and reappearing. When there’s no passing away and reappearing there’s no this world or world beyond or between the two. Just this is the end of suffering.” - Ud 8.4

Thank you for the reference

I guess most of the DN present teachings directed to ascetic Brahmins where Brahmajāla is translated as The All Embracing-Net of Views. As you stated, those ascetics have the first Jhana as their highest attainment or non-dual Viññāṇa that is free of conceptualization. This can be contrasted with the Buddha's teachings of the first Jhana where directed thoughts & evaluations still takes place. We are also presented with two types of cessations where psychic powers can still manifest in remembering ones own previous lives, and direct contact with higher beings. For ascetic Brahmins, direct knowledge of devas within kama loka is possible up to Maha Brahma, but not the Brahmins beyond the first Jhana. The grain that ascetic Brahmins go against is modernity whereas the grain that the Buddha dhamma goes against is traceability.

When i try to contemplate the meaning of the world between the two, death between two lives seems to be the best candidate in Brahmanism. Negating this middle through the teachings of the Buddha would bring the polarity of existence and non-existence into collapse.

[Jack19990101]

IMO -

Rupa is within domain of senses.
Kaya is domain of language.

Without language, there is no kaya, yet Rupa remains.

[Ceisiwr]

As you stated, those ascetics have the first Jhana as their highest attainment or non-dual Viññāṇa that is free of conceptualization. This can be contrasted with the Buddha's teachings of the first Jhana where directed thoughts & evaluations still takes place.

I think that for Yājñavalkya and those who followed in his footsteps (such as the Brahmins in the Pārāyanavagga) it was the formless they were interested in. Likely the ākiñcaññāyatana and the nevasaññānāsaññāyatana, but possibly the vijñānānantyāyatana too.

[Bundokji]

I think that for Yājñavalkya and those who followed in his footsteps (such as the Brahmins in the Pārāyanavagga) it was the formless they were interested in. Likely the ākiñcaññāyatana and the nevasaññānāsaññāyatana, but possibly the vijñānānantyāyatana too.

You might be technically correct, but i doubt that the Brahmins had the same understanding of the elements as the Buddha sangha, hence their concentration practices might be different. I guess the intersection between the two practices is explained in AN 4.45 where the Buddha declared:

"I tell you, friend, that it is not possible by traveling to know or see or reach a far end of the cosmos where one does not take birth, age, die, pass away, or reappear. But at the same time, I tell you that there is no making an end of suffering & stress without reaching the end of the cosmos. Yet it is just within this fathom-long body, with its perception & intellect, that I declare that there is the cosmos, the origination of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos."

The above also might explain why the form and formless properties can be clung to. To keep this discussion relevant to the OP, going beyond kama loka in Buddhist cosmology is called rupa loka rather than kaya loka. In DN11, the monk described the elements as "properties" whereas the Buddha called them simply as water, earth, fire and air. I guess they are perceived as properties as long as nama-rupa is understood as mind and body. For Brahmins, the mind is the air/formless property, whereas in Buddha dhamma, the notion of mind ends by entering the second Jhana.

[samsarayoga]

Isn't this Mahayana?

[Coëmgenu]

Isn't this Mahayana?

Nope. This is home-grown DhammaWheel inventiveness.

[Coëmgenu]

There seems to be many different ways to differentiate the two. Viññāṇa is only one of the knowledge where the prefix "vi" seems to indicate lack of reliability.

Unfortunately, you're getting mostly disagreement from me, but at least it's civil!

Consider two English words: consciousness and aggression. Both of these feature redundant prefixes. Redundant prefixes are very normal in human language. They start out as not redundant, but become redundant as the meanings of words change.

Consciousness has "com" like in compassion. It comes out as an "N" due to English phonetic rules. "Com/con," as you may know, is technically "with." That which is consciousness is "with sciō," sciō meaning knowledge.

Aggression is "ad gradior." "Ad" is a prefix meaning "towards." Gradior insignifies walking. The resultant "dg" consonant cluster is simplified into a geminated G (i.e. "gg"). "Aggression" once meant "walking towards someone." It no longer means that, just as consciousness doesn't actually exactly mean "with knowledge" anymore.

This is how a prefix can be both meaningful and meaningless. It's historically meaningful, but semantically meaningless.

We have no guarantee that the "vi-" was still semantically functional at the time of the Buddha. In fact, because viññāṇa/vijñāna is such an old word, by the time the Buddha was using it, it had already drifted quite a bit, like how aggression drifts from "walking towards" to "walking towards with ill intent or threateningly" until the sense of "walk" is entirely gone. At one point in the history of this term, the "vi-" will be functional, but oftentimes at such a comparatively early stage that the word often means something entirely different. In fact:

Worldly or profane knowledge, knowledge derived from worldly experience (opp. jñāna which is 'knowledge of Brahma or Supreme Spirit'); ज्ञानं तेऽहं सविज्ञानमिदं वक्ष्याम्यशेषतः (jñānaṃ te'haṃ savijñānamidaṃ vakṣyāmyaśeṣataḥ) Bhagavadgītā (Bombay) 7.2;3.41;6.8; (the whole of the 7th Adhyāya of Bg. explains jñāna and vijñāna).

It was "vi+jñāna" because it was manifold knowledge of the manifold world, not the singular knowledge of the singular or non-composite Ātman. Simplex knowledge of the non-manifold truth was simply "jñāna." Vijñāna is "divided" only inasmuch as it deals with that which is dual (the loka), not non-dual (like Brahman/Ātman).

So I wouldn't say that the "vi-" is there to indicate a lack of reliability. It's there because it's a fossil, a remnant, of an earlier, now defunct, meaning.

We also have the term "visaññutta." Is that due to a "lack of reliability" regarding the Arhat's ability to be unphased by vedanā? Unlikely, IMO. That's how they "feel" vedanā BTW: visaññutta, or "disconnected."

My conjecture is dependent on associating dhamma with kaya (truth body) rather than rupa.

"Truth body," AFAIK, is how some Japanese Buddhists translate the term "Dharmakāya." Where are you coming from when you say "truth body?"

[Bundokji]

"Truth body," AFAIK, is how some Japanese Buddhists translate the term "Dharmakāya." Where are you coming from when you say "truth body?"

We have the following from SN 22.87:

"Enough, Vakkali! What is there to see in this vile body? He who sees Dhamma, Vakkali, sees me; he who sees me sees Dhamma. Truly seeing Dhamma, one sees me; seeing me one sees Dhamma."

The term Dharmakāya might be commonly translated as truth-body among some Mahayanists, but it seems to make sense when each term can be translated separately as truth and body.