Let's take a little baby as an example:
MN64:
For a little baby doesn’t even have a concept of ‘identity’, so how could identity view possibly arise in them? Yet the underlying tendency to identity view still lies within them.
So, here the questions:
Do that little baby without even a concept of sakkaya have the sense and the attitude to the things as of "my" and "for me"? And what about clinging and clinging aggregates? What about animals?
It is not "my" and "for me" because there is "myself", it is "myself" because there are "my" and "for me". "Myself" is the result of a later rationalization of these attitudes of "my" and "for me" in the form of some kind of a view. That's why to eliminate sakkayaditthi your have to find and understand the reason behind this underlying attitude of "my" and "for me" to the experience, to find and understand the root of any implied sakkaya in your attitude to the things. So, the implied sakkaya is never in the object of your attitude, but in the reason behind that attitude: it is not in
what you are looking at, it is
why you are looking at something as "my" and "for me" - why it is not "in the experience just the experience", but always "my experience" and "experience for me".
What is that "hidden" reason behind even the toddlers actions and attitudes? - For example, it is some currently present feeling on account an already present experience. By blindly acting out of feeling that baby
by the fact of that action implicitly
appropriates the aggregate of feelings as implied "myself", without any needs to create some concepts, without any kind of sakkayaditthi at all, but still totally ignorant, liable to dukkha right now and to the creation of sakkayaditthi in the future.
The ignorance is not about some concepts are not being real, it is about not knowing and not understanding the right concepts, and not sustaining mindfulness for the understanding of these right concepts enough for them to define any and all present attitudes to the experience.
See
SAKKĀYA by Ven. Nanavira, with all the links and footnotes.
Ven. Nanavira wrote:... Sakkāyaditthi (Majjhima v,4 <M.i,300>) is sometimes explained as the view or belief (often attributed to a purely verbal misunderstanding)[c] that in one or other of the khandhā there is a permanent entity, a 'self'. These rationalized accounts entirely miss the point, which is the distinction (Khandha Samy. v,6 <S.iii,47>) between pañc'upādānakkhandhā (which is sakkāya) and pañcakkhandhā (which is sakkāyanirodha). To have ditthi about sakkāya is not an optional matter (as if one could regard sakkāya from the outside and form ditthi about it or not, as one pleased): sakkāya contains sakkāyaditthi (in a latent form at least) as a necessary part of its structure.[d] If there is sakkāya there is sakkāyaditthi, and with the giving up of sakkāyaditthi there comes to be cessation of sakkāya. To give up sakkāyaditthi, sakkāya must be seen (i.e. as pañc'upādānakkhandhā), and this means that the puthujjana does not see pañc'upādānakkhandhā as such (i.e. he does not recognize them—see MAMA [a] and cf. Majjhima viii,5 <M.i,511>). A puthujjana (especially one who puts his trust in the Commentaries) sometimes comes to believe that he does see pañc'upādānakkhandhā as such, thereby blocking his own progress and meeting with frustration: he cannot see what further task is to be done, and yet remains a puthujjana.