Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

[cappuccino]

If you don't identify with, attach to, or cling to the internal or external, then these "formations of craving" will not arise.

It’s about trying to delight in things

[mjaviem]

... you parroting Ñāṇavīra Bhikkhu's much-proliferated misunderstandings...

Not true. I've never read or listened to the venerable. But I guess if he understands there's simply "I am" and "I am because of" I think he understands correctly and is a teacher worth of hearing to...

[Coëmgenu]

... you parroting Ñāṇavīra Bhikkhu's much-proliferated misunderstandings...

Not true. I've never read or listened to the venerable. But I guess if he understands there's simply "I am" and "I am because of" I think he understands correctly and is a teacher worth of hearing to...

Whether you get these misunderstandings from him firsthand, from reading him; or secondhand, from a source like DooDoot or one of the various self-appointed representatives of Ñāṇavīra-style Dhamma on this forum; isn't really my concern, to be honest. These misunderstandings are not wise, are not correct, and are not worth listening to, in my opinion. I'm sure you disagree and think that the ideas you espouse are quite wise and that you correctly read the suttas when you make statements like "The Arhats don't experience, don't sense, don't think," etc. I disagree and have stated the substance behind my disagreement with your doctrines.

[Coëmgenu]

Ñāṇavīra Bhikkhu says that "contact is defined as the coming together of the eye, forms, and eye-consciousness (and so with the ear and the rest). But it is probably wrong to suppose that we must therefore understand the word phassa, primarily at least, as contact between these three things."

Compare that with the Buddha's word: "And what, bhikkhus, is the origin of suffering? In dependence on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises. The meeting of the three is contact. With contact as condition, feeling comes to be; with feeling as condition, craving. This is the origin of suffering."

Like in the case of your previously-quoted scriptural material, craving is the problem, not "internal and external."

Ñāṇavīra Bhikkhu states that it is "probably wrong" to consider the Buddha's exegesis of contact as "primary, at least." He would prefer if the Buddha had outlined it different, along his lines of thinking, wherein "contact" is between a falsely reified internal and a falsely reified external. The Buddha did not teach phassa like that. The monk states that contact is between "'I am' and 'things that are in contact with me.'" The Buddha did not teach contact in such a way. There is no 'I am' that participates in contact in the Buddha's teaching. The monk would prefer that the Buddha had taught of phassa as exclusively defiled and exclusively as within the domains of the worldlings.

Your exegesis, whether it was inherited directly or indirectly from him, is the same exegesis, and it is not the Buddha's exegesis.

[mjaviem]

...
Your exegesis, whether it was inherited directly or indirectly from him, is the same exegesis, and it is not the Buddha's exegesis.

This time the trigger of your annoyance and offence was when I said to Jacknumber "It's external when there's a view of self". Then you associated this with many things I haven't said. As usual you don't understand what I say.

[Coëmgenu]

If you think I've misrepresented your thought, you are invited to substantiate how, instead of presenting vague claims of misunderstanding and trying to divine whether or not I'm annoyed or triggered.

[mjaviem]

If you think I've misrepresented your thought, you are invited to substantiate how, instead of presenting vague claims of misunderstanding and trying to divine whether or not I'm annoyed or triggered.

I never said "internal and external is the problem rather than craving". I never said "the Buddha is probably wrong". Nor did I say I would have preferred a different exposition of paticca samupadha. I didn't say the Buddha taught contact as a self contacting things.

[Coëmgenu]

When I stated that nowhere in the Buddha's suttas does it say that "internal" and "external" are dependent upon self-view, as encapsulated in your statement of "It's external when there's a view of self," you quoted the Taṇhāsutta to me and argued that it supported your view that "external" depends upon self-view.

As to the rest of your objections, you seem to have a hard time differentiating when I point out that Ñāṇavīra Bhikkhu says something and when I say that you say something. Why on earth would I expect you to defend your shared thesis identically? You're still sharing the same thesis either way. You are quite free to outline what you feel are its ramifications separately.

[mjaviem]

When I stated that nowhere in the Buddha's suttas does it say that "internal" and "external" are dependent upon self-view, as encapsulated in your statement of "It's external when there's a view of self," you quoted the Taṇhāsutta to me and argued that it supported your view that "external" depends upon self-view.
...

Do you mean I should have say "It's external when there's the conceit I am" rather than using "self-view"? Good point I'll keep it in mind. Thank you.

...
As to the rest of your objections, you seem to have a hard time differentiating when I point out that Ñāṇavīra Bhikkhu says something and when I say that you say something. Why on earth would I expect you to defend your shared thesis identically? You're still sharing the same thesis either way. You are quite free to outline what you feel are its ramifications separately.

Because you speak in such an intellectual voice that I can't follow. It seems I don't know what 'exegesis' means. If you want to deliver a message you need to choose the right voice for each audience. In my case simple language explanations work best.

... you make statements like "The Arhats don't experience, don't sense, don't think," etc. I disagree and have stated the substance behind my disagreement with your doctrines.

Right, there's just sensing, just thinking, just that. And yes, no experience, only cessation, only Nibbana.

[Coëmgenu]

Do you mean I should have say "It's external when there's the conceit I am" rather than using "self-view"? Good point I'll keep it in mind. Thank you.

Since this new re-statement of your view is identical to the old statement of it, save for new phrasing, I'd consider this new phrasing equally wrong, for the same reasons as stated above when I disagreed with your older phrasing of your view.

If you have difficulty with something I've said, you can always ask me to clarify. An "exegesis" is an "explanation or interpretation of a text." Exegesis, exposition, explanation, interpretation, etc., all of these things are what forum members do here when they argue that X sutta has Y meaning, such as when you suggested that the Taṇhāsutta supports your contention that there is the "external" only when there is a "sense of self."

Do you feel that "when there's the conceit 'I am'" and "when there's self-view" are significantly different? If so, why?

Right, there's just sensing, just thinking, just that. And yes, no experience, only cessation, only Nibbana.

Sensing and thinking are experiences. When you don't sense and you don't think, you don't experience. I suppose you have some completely different take to give the forum, wherein "just sensing" and "just thinking" aren't "just experiencing?"

[mjaviem]

...
Do you feel that "when there's the conceit 'I am'" and "when there's self-view" are significantly different? If so, why?
...

The difference I see is that with stream entry the self view is removed but not the conceit I am. I guess then that with stream entry the conceiving of the external and the internal has not disappeared. At least until there's no more "I am" and "I am because of".

...
Sensing and thinking are experiences. When you don't sense and you don't think, you don't experience. I suppose you have some completely different take to give the forum, wherein "just sensing" and "just thinking" aren't "just experiencing?"

No, they become experiences when there's contact. But sensing and thinking are still possible with no need of phassa. I understand experience as vedana and of course the associated sañña and viññana. I already gave you an example of sensing heat of the sun in another thread. Sensing and thinking doesn't need to develop into an experience. In my view, the Arahant doesn't get any pleasant nor unpleasant "taste in the mouth" at any situation, they aren't involved at all. They're simply not there nor anywhere.

[Coëmgenu]

...
Do you feel that "when there's the conceit 'I am'" and "when there's self-view" are significantly different? If so, why?
...

The difference I see is that with stream entry the self view is removed but not the conceit I am. I guess then that with stream entry the conceiving of the external and the internal has not disappeared. At least until there's no more "I am" and "I am because of".

I come from a very different tradition of Buddhism that considers the fetters quite differently. I'm willing to conceded that the difference you outlined might actually have considerably more weight to it and mean a lot more than what I got from it. By my reckoning, if there's a "conceit of 'I am,'" then there's self-view. It might be more subtle than coarse, but there's self-view nonetheless IMO. I'm quite open to that which I've said is my opinion being potentially very "unsuttic," and I don't mind that being pointed out if that's the case.

I understand experience as vedana and of course the associated sañña and viññana.

It's already been pointed out to you that, according to the Pāli suttas, Arhats have vedanā. To experience in Buddhism is pratisaṃvedayati. I'm open to there being more terms. Buddhism however is not limited to technical vocabulary from Indic languages. Are you using "experience" as a technical Buddhist term or as a general English term?

[mjaviem]

... Are you using "experience" as a technical Buddhist term or as a general English term?

I think that majority of people don't understand what the five aggregates are. This is my belief so far. I use the word 'experience' to refer to vedana (and to viññana and sañña) to express what these aggregates are about. I think this word can show that vedana is how we are "shaken" by a situation or the "taste" a situation "leaves in our mouth".

[Coëmgenu]

So you're using "experience" for "vedanā" and you're just ignoring that, according to the Pāli suttas, Arhats have vedanā?

Your statement is utterly indefensible. No need to double-down, clinging to this view, when the evidence before your eyes, the evidence from the Pāli suttas you pay lip-service to, proves it wrong.

The last time I showed you this evidence, your response was to try to undermine my credibility as someone who can read a sutta, telling me that I need to familiarize myself with the Pāli suttas. It's evident from this dialogue unfolding that it is, in truth, you who should be doing so, so that you can rid yourself of incorrect doctrines such as "Arhats have no experience/vedanā." This false doctrine is something that it easily proven wrong.

[mjaviem]

So you're using "experience" for "vedanā"...

Yes, like this: "‘Vedana, vedana’ is said, friend. With reference to what is ‘vedana’ said? ‘It experiences, it experiences,’ friend; that is why ‘experience’ is said. What does it experience? It experiences pleasure, it experiences pain, it experiences neither-pain-nor-pleasure. ‘It experiences, it experiences,’ friend, that is why ‘experience’ is said."

... you're just ignoring that, according to the Pāli suttas, Arhats have vedanā?

Your statement is utterly indefensible. No need to double-down, clinging to this view, when the evidence before your eyes, the evidence from the Pāli suttas you pay lip-service to, proves it wrong.

When I requested you your physiology suttas about responsiveness and suttas about arahants "having experiences" you didn't quote any. It's just your interpretation of the pali suttas that understands what I say as wromg.