Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Exploring Theravāda's connections to other paths - what can we learn from other traditions, religions and philosophies?
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Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Coëmgenu »

"Does the eye see?" is a famous disagreement in Buddhist history that cuts right to the heart of our contemporary interpretations of Dharma, right down to the very meaning of the words used in extant textual redactions of the Dharma. Is the eye the physical organ of the eye, the orb of the eyeball, and perhaps also the biological material that constitutes the optic nerve, or is the eye the capacity of the mind to manifest visions, sounds in the case of "the ear," etc., due to the presence of functioning physical organs and the ability to recall and imagine? If I'm not mistaken, this debate comes up in the Kathāvatthu, where I believe the Theravādin argued that the eye itself does not see, but that the two, the eye and the mind, perform their functions together, stressing their mutual interdependence with regards to the field of vision. If anyone could find this that I'm remembering, please correct me if I am recalling this incorrectly. I do recall this being debated in the Kathāvatthu, but I also suspect that I may be conflating a commentarial exposition with material from the debate.

I would like to use a quote from Spiny Norman to kick this off, but please be aware that it is somewhat taken out of context (by virtue of me using it in this new context in this new thread). Its original context was not at all anything about this new issue that this thread is to address.

If there have been past threads on this and if anyone can find the links, please post them here. Thank you. With that, the quote that I'm using as a springboard.
Spiny Norman wrote: Wed Oct 05, 2022 3:18 pmDid Buddha teach connecting with "source consciousness" as the goal?
In the original context, unless I read it very wrong, this quote encourages another user to analyse his interpretations of the Teaching, as they seem to imply a consciousness that is the source of all. I've bolded two of the words, because they reminded me of the following historical Buddhist disagreement.

A historical trivium: there is/was a sort of consciousness in Buddhism, according to some sects, that "is/was" called the "root consciousness" (mūlavijñāna). That seems similar-enough a word to "source consciousness," but we oughtn't take me pointing this out as being in defense of the notion of a "source consciousness" as a Buddhist teaching. What Spiny_Norman was incredulous towards I find myself likewise incredulous towards. Consciousness has no singular source, being dependently originated. As such, we will see that "root consciousness" is not understood historically as the singular and particular "root of all consciousness" amongst those various groups who have held the doctrine over the course of Buddhist history. Rather than referring to a hifalutin "ground of consciousness," the term "mūlavijñāna" is a special name for the manovijñāna (Pāli: manoviññāṇa) in the East Asian Cittamātra tradition. I think that there is good ground to suspect that this usage is inherited from the former, now-extinct, Mahāsāṃghika sects. The next post I submit for this thread will address this hypothesis of mine. This alternative name references the manovijñāna's role in some non-Theravādin models of cognition, wherein the faculty itself neither perceives nor senses, and furthermore also wherein the bodily vijñānadhātus (Pāli: viññāṇadhātus) themselves neither perceive nor sense.

By "bodily vijñānadhātus," I refer to the cakkhuviññāṇa, the sotaviññāṇa, ghānadhātu, jihvaviññāṇa, and kāyaviññāṇa to the exclusion of the manoviññāṇa, otherwise known as the particular consciousnesses associated with the five bodily sensory faculties, the five being in Chinese and (dubiously back-translated) Sanskrit: 眼耳鼻舌身界 and *cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇajihvākāyadhātavaḥ.

In what sense do these five not sense and not perceive? After all, they are "senses." Surely senses sense, no?

Part of the exegesis of those sects which posit a mūlavijñāna is actually completely in-line and complementary to what the Therāvadin argues for in the aforementioned Kathāvatthu debate, inasmuch as I've recalled the Kathāvatthu material correctly.

To summarise salient points of similarity that I remember, the faculty is spoken of as lacking the consciousness and the consciousness as lacking the faculty. In the instance of the eye, the eye itself lacks the characteristic of being the mind that beholds. Thus the eye itself does not perceive, cannot perceive, nor does or can it "see," for "seeing" is a variety of fivefold bodily perception and refers to the conscious registration of sensory data. The eye has no mind of its own. The mind has no eye of its own. The eye is part of a conscious being, but is not itself a conscious being and is not that being's consciousness. Similarly, in the instance of eye-consciousness (cakkhuviññāṇa now, not just "the cakkhu"), the eye-consciousness itself is not the eye. The same principle still holds. How? In those schools wherein the language of "mūlavijñāna" is used, to the best of my knowledge, the term is framed in light of the below points of dissimilitude that contrast with the above similarities.

Instead of any one of the three that make mutual contact with one another, namely 1) the internal sense field, 2) the external object, and 3) the viññāṇadhātu, the faculty of the internal sense field, the consciousness, and the object collaboratively generate, via their contact, a stream of "bare cognition" that registers the difference between disparate bits of "raw sensory data" concerning the object specifically. To clarify this term that I've put into quotation marks, "raw sensory data," I need to explain that "raw sensory data" is my language. I'm not translating a technical term here. "Bare cognition," however, is being used by me here as a translation, one specifically of the term "純然注意," which can be translated more-literally as "the pure flowing mentations." This is what is produced by the meeting of the three insofar that the sensorial fields of the five bodily senses are concerned. The "bare cognition" is simply "the pure flowing mentations," which are none other than "only what is seen," "only what is smelt," "only what is tasted," "only what is heard," and "only what is felt," these five being the cognitions associated with the five bodily consciousnesses.

It is not being used in a completely-identical manner to the Theravādin usage of the term "bare cognition," which in the context of Theravāda often translates material akin to the Pāli term "viññātamatta," or "only the known" (see "...in what is seen..." from the Bāhiyasuttaṁ at Ud 1.10), but it gets strikingly close IMO.

From these "pure flowing mentations" of "bare cognition," the mūlavijñāna functions as the basis for conscious experience of this external world. The sense faculty, the object, and the consciousness are transformed into "flowing mentations." What, once again, are the "flowing mentations?" None other than the objects of the triple-meetings of the aforementioned five senses, with the important addition of the triple-meeting of the sixth base: manas.

In the sūtras to the Śrāvakasaṃgha known as variously "the EBTs," "the early sectarian canons," etc. including the Pāli Canon, dharmas are the object of the sixth base. However, all of the objects of all of the bases are also referred to as "dharmas" (Yes, even in the Pāli Canon!) even though they interact with diverse bases. Why is this? Why are all of the five sensual objects called dharmas when dharmas are also considered to be exclusively the object of one sense? Because they are, in addition to whatever else they may be, the objects of the sixth base.

The mūlavijñāna functions as the lynchpin of awareness, experience, and even what we might call "conscious experience inherent in being aware" in this regard. The cognition of the mūlavijñāna as the sixth base is not "bare" in the way that the cognitions of the five bodily senses were. It has the tendency to contain imputations, interpretations, and associations, and indeed even afflictions and poisons as well, in the case of the ordinary worldling. The afflictions and poisons that assail the worldling are afflictions and poisons of the sixth consciousness particularly, the mūlavijñāna, the manovijñāna, as the bodily sensory cognitions lack the sophistication and reflexivity to be "greedy" and suchlike. As such, there is one consciousness to be purified of affliction, the manovijñāna. The consciousnesses associated with the ear, eye, etc., are already pure. It is the complex of the manas that obsesses and fetishizes the senses. The senses do not do that of their own accord. Similarly, it is the complex of the manas that contains the necessary complexity for angst, specifically the angst associated with belief in, laudation of, and reliance upon the false doctrine of "the ātman."

Venerable Vasubadhu says that:
由假說我法  
有種種相轉
彼依識所變  
此能變唯三
Following the false doctrines of "the self" and "the dharmas,"
there come the manifestations of the proliferous nimittas.
Those (nimittas) depend upon and are transformed by consciousness,
and they can be transformed in only three ways.
(*Vijñaptimātratākārikāsiddhiśāstra T1585.1a7)
四煩惱常俱  
謂我癡我見
并我慢我愛  
及餘觸等俱
有覆無記攝  
隨所生所繫
阿羅漢滅定  
出世道無有
Four afflictions are always accompanying one another,
called "self-delusion" and "self-view"
and also "self-conception" and "self-attachment."
Continue this up to "accompanied by contact" and the rest.
They (i.e. the afflictions) are obscured and indeterminate.
Wheresoever the place of birth is, they are bound there.
In the case of the Arhats within the samāpatti of cessation
and those upon the world-transcending path, they do not exist.
(T1585.18c24)

The "they" in the last line here, at "they do not exist," refers to the four afflictions outlined at the outset of the first quatrain.
依止根本識
五識隨緣現
或俱或不俱
如濤波依水
[...]
是諸識轉變
分別所分別
由此彼皆無
故一切唯識
Depending on the basis of the root-consciousness,
five consciousnesses, according to their conditions, manifest
complete or incomplete,
like how the undulations of the waves are dependent upon their (respective) waters.
[...]
These manifold (five) consciousnesses transform
into manifestations of differentiation and into those things that are differentiated.
Following from these, those things are nonexistent.
This is the reason why it is said "only consciousness."
(T1585.37a6)

In the second-last line of the above quatrain, "those things" refers to the various differentiated manifestations of sensory cognition, i.e. "sensorial experiences." It refers to "the vision of the cat," and does not refer to the cat. The raw sensory data generated through the encounter between the cat and the senses meets with the mind as one of its objects: a dharma, or more precisely a stream of dharmas. The manifestations of sensorial experiences that are arisen dependent upon the meeting of the manodhātu, the dharmadhātu, and the manovijñānadhātu is referred to in the Chinese tradition as "似塵識," or "consciousness as the objects." They are contrasted with "external dharmas." These "internal dharmas," associated with "internal contact" and involving the mental manifestation of the sensorial objects of the five senses were arisen of those five bodily consciousnesses. These dharmas encounter the sixth consciousness, manas, and the consequence of this triple-meeting is the manifestation, within the mind, of that "differentiation" that delineates "the things that are differentiated." This is none other than what we conventionally refer to as "conscious (sentient) experience." The manovijñāna does double-duty, appearing both as 1) the manifestations of "consciousness as the objects" and 2) also serving as the source of the discursive, conceptual, reflexive, and interpretive associations that accompany these objects that consciousness appears (to itself) as.

In the second-last line of the above quatrain, "these things" refers to the five cognitive processes underlying these diverse manifestations and the uniquely mental impressions and reactions that accompany them. The mūlavijñāna becomes the house, rhetorically-speaking, of "bare cognition," "cognition as objects," and "associative cognition concerning objects." Through housing these three, it becomes respectively the house of contact, vedanā (hedonic tone/feeling), and tṛṣṇā (craving/desire, lit. "thirst"). The residence of bare cognition becomes the residence of contact as five cognitions appear as dharmas at the mind-base. The residence of "cognition as objects" becomes the residence of vedanā because the experience of these objects/dharmas are differentiated principally according to bliss and agony or neither. The Dharma is for the ending of saṃsāric agony. Saṃsāric bliss is merely future agony, and is only blissful relative to agony. This "consciousness (appearing) as objects," alternatively phrased as "cognition as the objects," is for the purpose of ending the twin agonies of 1) the bliss that is subtle agony and 2) agony's coarse modality. The last correspondence, the residence of "associative cognition concerning objects" becomes the house of desire. Through association concerning the objects, we fetishize the subtle agony of bliss and differentiate it from the easily-recognizable coarse agony. Through association concerning the blissful and agonizing experiences, which is to say the blissful and agonizing cognitions that manifest as our "mind's eye" or "mind's mouth" (etc. for five senses), we come to hate the agonizing and love the blissful.

Reading the last two lines contextualized, we understand how this text is arguing that the manifestations of the external world that appear via the mind are unreal, are "only consciousness," are "consciousness appearing as objects," and have at their root merely the transformation of raw sensorial data from the bare cognition of the bodily sense fields into "an object," "a dharma," or "an experience" engaged with and manifested within the "mental sense field," i.e. the threefold complex of the contact associated with the manas.

The excerpt ends with "This is the reason why it is said 'only consciousness.'" It is because of the nonexistence of the mentally-experienced sensorial world that it is said "only consciousness." The term "consciousness" is being used by the author of the Vijñaptiśāstra, Venerable Vasubandhu as translated by Venerable Xuánzàng, as a mutually-exclusive opposite with the term "existence." If it is merely consciousness, it is not "an existent," meaning here "a true direct experience of an external existent thing." It is "direct experience" of the external world that is "nonexistent" according to the above. It is nonexistent because existing as an external object is not, in truth, "only consciousness." Rather than "only consciousness," the process of perceiving something that is "existing (as an external object)" is consciousness interacting with an object as much as it is "consciousness itself." The immaterial objects of the sixth consciousness, being entirely consciousness, being "only consciousness," and being entirely dharmas and being entirely not, in truth, the various visibles, olfactibles, tangibles etc. that served as the caused for their production, are the nonexistent in the above. This is quite subtly different from saying something like "There are no external objects!" or saying "External objects are always entirely generated by the mind!", which are two very trendy misunderstandings of Vijñaptimātratā that are proliferated greatly in various circles.

Now, the "Connection."

Contrary to all of the above, despite the shared hermeneutic of "the eye can't think and the mind can't see," we see something entirely different argued of viññāṇa by the Therāvadins:
Viññāṇa:"consciousness," is one of the 5 groups of existence (aggregates); one of the 4 nutriments; the 3rd link of the dependent origination; and the 5th in the sixfold division of the elements.

Viewed as one of the 5 groups, it is inseparably linked with the 3 other mental groups (feeling, perception, and formations) and furnishes the bare cognition of the object, while the other 3 contribute more specific functions. Its ethical and karmic character, and its greater or lesser degree of intensity and clarity, are chiefly determined by the mental formations associated with it.

Just like the other groups of existence, consciousness is a flux (viññāṇasotā, "stream of consciousness") and does not constitute an abiding mind-substance; nor is it a transmigrating entity or soul. The 3 characteristics, impermanence, suffering, and no-self, are frequently applied to it in the texts. The Buddha often stressed that "apart from conditions, there is no arising of consciousness" (M 38); and all these statements about its nature hold good for the entire range of consciousness, be it "past, future, or presently arisen, gross or subtle, in oneself or external, inferior or lofty, far or near" (S.XXII, 59).

According to the 6 senses it divides into 6 kinds, viz. eye- (or visual) consciousness, etc. About the dependent arising of these 6 kinds of consciousness, Vis. M. XV, 39 says: "Conditioned through the eye, the visible object, light, and attention, eye-consciousness arises. Conditioned through the ear, the audible object, the ear-passage and attention, ear-consciousness arises. Conditioned, through the nose, the olfactive object, air and attention, nose-consciousness arises. Conditioned through the tongue, the gustative object, humidity and attention, tongue-consciousness arises. Conditioned through the body, bodily impression, the earth-element and attention, body-consciousness arises. Conditioned through the subconscious mind (bhavaṅgamano), the mind-object, and attention, mind-consciousness arises."
(from Buddhist Dictionary by Ñāṇatiloka Mahāthera)

Can anyone contextualize the traditional classical Theravādin POV concerning these bolded sections?
Last edited by Coëmgenu on Thu Oct 06, 2022 1:10 am, edited 18 times in total.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Jack19990101 »

I am not able to follow all, but I gonna comment one bold point -

External object is mind made.

imo -
An actual external object itself, is beyond our reach.
More over, 'an actual object' other than the perceived image, is already a fabrication by its entirety. No?

If this fabrication bares basis by chance? It is too beyond our reach.
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings Coemgenu,

Can you explain in brief what was explained in detail?

Metta,
Paul. :)
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Coëmgenu »

In Cittamātra and Mahāsāṃghika (Mahāsāṃghika-related material forthcoming), specifically the manoviññāṇa, referred to as "mūlavijñāna," has an extremely large and elaborate role. This role seems to maybe be spread out amongst the six viññāṇas comparatively more equally in the Pāli tradition.

Nonetheless, statements even in the Pāli tradition lay out an understanding of the mano/manas that is largely congruent to this "extremely large and elaborate role" that it plays in, for example, Cittamātra. We find an example in MN 43
“Reverend, these five faculties have different scopes and different ranges, and don’t experience each others’ scope and range. That is, the faculties of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body. What do these five faculties, with their different scopes and ranges, have recourse to? What experiences their scopes and ranges?”

These five faculties, with their different scopes and ranges, have recourse to the mind. And the mind experiences their scopes and ranges.”
(Ven Sujāto translation)

In the above, what is translated as "the mind" is this very same "manas." So we see a very similar situation laid out. The triple-meeting of manas, its object (any nonspecific dharma will work for our purposes here), and the arisen manas-consciousness not only processes and takes as object "dharmas (in general)," but also processes and takes as object the "dharmas" associated with non-manas sense fields, those being "dharmas" that are sights, smells, etc., the various things that constitute the "different scopes and ranges" of the other five sense fields as opposed to the typical scope and range of any normal sense field.

In contradistinction to the large role played specifically by manas, the Pāli dictionary quoted near the end of the OP says that any of the six viññāṇas can take on the role of that which "furnishes the bare cognition of the object." In the former, manas furnished the bare cognition, and the bare cognition was the sensory cognition associated with the bodily senses. In the later, even the consciousnesses associated with the physical body "furnish" the bare cognition.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Coëmgenu »

Coëmgenu wrote: Thu Oct 06, 2022 12:29 am...the Pāli dictionary quoted near the end of the OP says that any of the six viññāṇas can take on the role of that which "furnishes the bare cognition of the object." In the former, manas furnished the bare cognition, and the bare cognition was the sensory cognition associated with the bodily senses. In the later, even the consciousnesses associated with the physical body "furnish" the bare cognition.
I might have been misreading the term "furnishes" in the Theravādin reference dictionary. I was understanding "furnishes" as meaning "provides decoration." The "decoration" I was assuming to be cognitions that are in addition to the "bare" cognitions. Having looked up the word in a dictionary, it looks like I was wrong, and that it actually means something closer to "provides," with an additional refined sense of "provides the necessities" versus "provides decoration." Reading it this way, the dictionary is literally saying the same thing as the Cittamātra definition of bodily sensory cognitive processes and the bare mind-door (as opposed to the reflexive, associative, and analytic mind-door). Vijñāna itself would then be, generally speaking, "bare cognition," not saṃjñā as in other Buddhisms.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings,

It would appear there is either the eye faculty, or there is not. How does it matter what that eye-faculty is comprised of?

Does the answer or theories about it pertain in any way to dukkha, samudaya, nirodha, or magga?

:shrug:

Is this topic Dhamma or Buddhism?

:thanks:

Metta,
Paul. :)
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Coëmgenu »

I have an interest in "comparative buddhology" as much as I've an interest in religious studies and comparative religion. If you don't have an interest in that, I can certainly see how you'd see it as a tangential topic for the forum. Nonetheless, I think that that's more-or-less what the subforum is here for.
retrofuturist wrote: Fri Oct 07, 2022 2:17 amIt would appear there is either the eye faculty, or there is not. How does it matter what that eye-faculty is comprised of?
On terms of "does it matter," personally, I don't think it's "necessary," and because of that, one could certainly say that it ultimately "doesn't matter." I don't practice Buddhism according to the teachings of the Cittamātra tradition.
retrofuturist wrote: Fri Oct 07, 2022 2:17 amDoes the answer or theories about it pertain in any way to dukkha, samudaya, nirodha, or magga?
To the adherents of forms of Cittamātra-influenced Buddhism today, it certainly matters. Getting things right, getting "everything" right, so to speak, is the Ābhidharmika project that they believe to be either 1) naturally brought forth from the buddhaśāsana by any mind that truly and deeply penetrates it, or 2) straight out of the Buddha's mouth.

If you don't think that the Theravādin Abhidhamma tradition is the bee's knee's, then you're not going have a particular affinity to the Dharma-exegesis of a different Ābhidharmika school, and a Mahāyāna one to boot. Abhidharma is still Abhidharma.

The Buddhist dictionary I cited, unless I'm wrong, generally defines doctrinal terms according to the so-called "classical teaching," meaning with the Abhidhamma in mind. Inasmuch as it is "classical," Theravāda is a Ābhidharmika school, and so this thread is basically comparing two rather diverse Abhidharma traditions.

Anyone with even a passing knowledge of these two traditions, speaking more here about Cittamātra and Theravāda than Mahāsāṃghika Buddhism which is quite more niche, knows that they are quite different, offhand we have 1) Mahāyāna buddhology and bodhisattvayāna-style understanding of the mārga that are absent in Abhidhamma, 2) the apparent subsumption of the functions of some of the Abhidhamma viññāṇas into the manas-base, 3) a seemingly-novel doctrine of unreal dharmas witnessed only-secondhand, 4) vinaya-recension, 5) sūtra-recension (they seem to have used either the Sarvāstivādin or Mahīśāsaka āgamas), and time.

By "time," I mean the fact that Theravādin Abhidhamma, claims about it being buddhavacana aside, is very old Abhidhamma. Cittamātra is from the 300s AD. It develops during a very different sort of period of Abhidharmaśāstra production. This alone makes comparing very interesting, and these comparisons can help us to get an informed picture about how Buddhists of different time periods approached and lived their Buddhism. Abhidharma is scholastic. They want to categorize and classify the world into their exhaustive and encyclopedic networks of matrices of ultimate realities. This results in inevitable scholasticism, because the Abhidharma project, if you don't consider the possibility that one of them actually came from the Buddha, is ultimately in some ways a doomed attempt to cram omniscience into a textual body of knowledge. The Dharmaskandhas are "all there is" to the Sarvāstivādin. The parāmaṭṭha dhammas are "all there is" to the Theravādin. Unreal manifestations of consciousness are "all there is" to the Cittamātrin. Understanding "all there is" was seen to be part of cultivating the view that tends towards Truth with a capital "T," i.e. the "True Dharma."

The Abhidharma texts are scholastic because of their desire to classify all there is, but at the end of the day, they are actually practice texts, and Cittamātra treatises are no different in this regard. Understanding this scholastic framework is considered, to the Ābhidharmika of whichever Abhidharma tradition, part-and-parcel to understanding the Buddha's Dharma, understanding how to practice the Buddha's Dharma, and "right view" even, although one sect's "right view" is another sect's schism.

You're not an Ābhidharmika. Cittamātra scholasticism is unlikely to convert you, quite unlikely. I imagine it seems like the same pointless elaboration and digression that you might find in the Pāli Abhidharma tradition. I don't speak for you however, obviously.

In the commentarial colophon of the Triṃśikāvijñaptimātratākārikā as composed by the translator, Venerable Xuánzàng, it summarizes the treatise thusly:
Here, in accordance with the Āryaśāsana and the principles of the truth,
“only consciousness” and the svabhāvas have been differentiated in meaning.
The virtuous merits of this work I dedicate to all living beings.
I vow that we together will ascend to Supreme Bodhi with haste.
The details are off, but it's clearly Abhidharma of an at-least-vaguely similar nature to the tradition preserved in Pāli. They've even got svabhāvas. Don't tell the Madhyamakas.
Next is the second variety of transformation,
and this is the consciousness known as “manas”
with the former (i.e. the first transformation) as its basis and object.
It has mentation as its svabhāva.
[...]
Next, the third variety of transformation
is differentiated into six kinds.
The cognition of objects is its svabhāva.
It can be skillful, unskillful, both, or neither.
I thought that I had found an interesting dissimilitude, but in turns out that my "observation" hinged upon interpreting the English word "furnishes." Not the strongest case.

Concluding, as I said, if you don't have a particular interest in comparative religion or this particular area of Buddhist history, you won't find the thread or topic terribly engaging. It's certainly not mandatory to have an interest in or even know about these things to follow the Buddhist path. What is relevant however is to actually know what the terms the Buddha uses mean. The Abhidharma and commentarial traditions are largely a traditional account of this, whether we agree with them or not.
Last edited by Coëmgenu on Fri Oct 07, 2022 7:14 am, edited 2 times in total.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by retrofuturist »

Greetings Coemgenu,

Thank you for the response. I do not have any questions about it, but wanted to express my appreciation for you having done so.

Metta,
Paul. :)
"Whatever is true, whatever is noble, whatever is right, whatever is pure, whatever is lovely, whatever is admirable—if anything is excellent or praiseworthy—think about such things."
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Ceisiwr »

Coëmgenu wrote: Fri Oct 07, 2022 6:09 am Abhidharma is scholastic. They want to categorize and classify the world into their exhaustive and encyclopedic networks of matrices of ultimate realities. This results in inevitable scholasticism, because the Abhidharma project, if you don't consider the possibility that one of them actually came from the Buddha, is ultimately in some ways a doomed attempt to cram omniscience into a textual body of knowledge.
Not quite true for the Abhidhamma texts. If we take the Dhammasaṅgaṇī it takes a moment of conciousness and then lists dhammas that are experienced, but it also then says, "and whatever other dhammas there might be" For example, in a moment of Jhāna
Which are the states that are good?
When, that he may attain to the heavens of Form, he cultivates the way [thereto], suppressing the working of applied and sustained thinking, and so, by earth-gazing, enters into and abides in the Second Jhāna (the second rapt meditation), which is self-evolved, born of concentration, full of zest and ease, in that, set free from the working of applied and sustained thinking, the mind grows calm and sure, dwelling on high—then the contact, the feeling, the perception, the volition, the thought, the joy, the ease, the self-collectedness, the faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, insight, mind, happiness, and life, the right views, right endeavour, … the grasp, the balance that arises—these, or whatever other incorporeal, causally induced states that there are on that occasion—these are states that are good.

Summary
Now, on that occasion

the skandhas are four,
the spheres are two,
the elements are two,
the nutriments are three,
the faculties are eight,
the Jhāna is threefold,
the Path is fourfold,
the powers are seven,
the causes are three,
contact counts as a single factor,
etc., etc.
https://suttacentral.net/ds2.1.2/en/rhy ... ight=false

So, the very first book of the Abhidhamma isn't trying to exhaustively classify everything. It's best to read it as a guide to meditation. That is one of the Abhidhammas principle aims. To help us practice the Dhamma.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Coëmgenu »

We discussed this briefly before once. At the time, I had been half-remembering an article that argued that the various diverse matrices in the Abhidharmaśāstras of a given sect indicated that these matrices were not a closed system and were not understood as utterly exhaustive. Nonetheless, you did concede, as did the article I still haven't found again, that this is precisely how the matrices come to be treated: a closed system that is exhaustive and covers everything that is.

For instance, Abhidhammātthasaṅgaha opens with a matrix of paramārthas that is exhaustive, or at least is traditionally treated as such. Now, this is an Abhidharmaśāstra, like the Kośa or the Samuccaya, not "an Abhidharma text" if we are being precise, and that needs to be acknowledged certainly.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Ceisiwr »

Coëmgenu wrote: Sat Oct 08, 2022 12:26 am We discussed this briefly before once. At the time, I had been half-remembering an article that argued that the various diverse matrices in the Abhidharmaśāstras of a given sect indicated that these matrices were not a closed system and were not understood as utterly exhaustive. Nonetheless, you did concede, as did the article I still haven't found again, that this is precisely how the matrices come to be treated: a closed system that is exhaustive and covers everything that is.

For instance, Abhidhammātthasaṅgaha opens with a matrix of paramārthas that is exhaustive, or at least is traditionally treated as such. Now, this is an Abhidharmaśāstra, like the Kośa or the Samuccaya, not "an Abhidharma text" if we are being precise, and that needs to be acknowledged certainly.
They become closed in the later tradition, yes.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Coëmgenu »

That, and, generally speaking, the older the Abhidharmaśāstra is, the more likely it is to be significantly divergent and "nonstandard."

Abhidharmāmṛta and Abhidharmahṛdaya, two Sarvāstivādin Abhidharmaśāstras, are significantly more divergent when compared to one another than Abhidharmakośa and the Mahāvibhāṣa are when similarly compared. This obviously doesn't extend to Abhidharmakośabhāṣya however, it being a Sautrāntika treatise and all.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by auto »

here's the visuddhimagga quote,
pdf 80 wrote:53. (b) Now, as regards the virtue of restraint of faculties shown next to that in the
way beginning, “on seeing a visible object with the eye,” herein he is a bhikkhu
established in the virtue of Pátimokkha restraint. On seeing a visible object with the eye:
on seeing a visible object with the eye-consciousness that is capable of seeing visible
objects and has borrowed the name “eye” from its instrument.

But the Ancients (poráóá)
said: “The eye does not see a visible object because it has no mind. The mind does not
see because it has no eyes. But when there is the impingement of door and object he
sees by means of the consciousness that has eye-sensitivity as its physical basis. Now,
(an idiom) such as this is called an ‘accessory locution’ (sasambhárakathá), like ‘He shot
him with his bow,’ and so on. So the meaning here is this: ‘On seeing a visible object
with eye-consciousness.’”14
vibhanga
https://suttacentral.net/vb16/en/thittila?reference=none&highlight=false wrote: The five types of sense consciousness are not cognitive;
by the five types of sense consciousness one discriminates no state whatever other than mere falling in (i.e., entry of the object);
even immediately following the five types of sense consciousness one discriminates no state whatever;
by the five types of sense consciousness one makes no posture whatever;
even immediately following the five types of sense consciousness one makes no posture whatever;
..
Pañca viññāṇā anābhogā.
Pañcahi viññāṇehi na kañci dhammaṁ paṭivijānāti aññatra abhinipātamattā. Variant: kañci → kiñci (bj, mr)
Pañcannaṁ viññāṇānaṁ samanantarāpi na kañci dhammaṁ paṭivijānāti.
Pañcahi viññāṇehi na kañci iriyāpathaṁ kappeti.
Pañcannaṁ viññāṇānaṁ samanantarāpi na kañci iriyāpathaṁ kappeti.
..
when object falls in, one sees(paṭivijānāti) it. Other words, one becomes aware. And yes, it is me(self) who is seeing. As the text says mind does not see because it has no eyes and eyes does not see because it has no mind. Thus, self is not the mind, mind is the consciousness that has eye-sensitivity as its physical basis.
Visuddhimagga could have written here eye sees instead of 'me' to be in accord with nowadays no-selfers. A'la eye sees the object by means of the consciousness that has.. but it doesn't say.
wrote:But when there is the impingement of door and object he
sees by means of the consciousness that has eye-sensitivity as its physical basis.
I think what Vasubhandu means by false doctrines of self is the taking of the eye-consciousness as self. Which nowadays no-selfers thinking therefore there is no self at all.
https://suttacentral.net/vb16/en/thittila?reference=none&highlight=false wrote: The five types of sense consciousness..
are grasped (by craving and false view)

are objects of the defilements; are objects of the fetters; are objects of the ties; are objects of the floods; are objects of the bonds; are objects of the hindrances; are objects of the perversions;
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Coëmgenu »

auto wrote: Sat Oct 08, 2022 2:54 pm here's the visuddhimagga quote,
pdf 80 wrote:[...]
But the Ancients (poráóá)
said: “The eye does not see a visible object because it has no mind. The mind does not
see because it has no eyes.
But when there is the impingement of door and object he
sees by means of the consciousness that has eye-sensitivity as its physical basis. [...]
vibhanga
https://suttacentral.net/vb16/en/thittila?reference=none&highlight=false wrote: The five types of sense consciousness are not cognitive; by the five types of sense consciousness one discriminates no state whatever other than mere falling in (i.e., entry of the object)[...]
Thank you. This is very relevant. It certainly seems like there are significant parallels here between the Theravādin and the Cittamātrin exegeses of the five senses versus the manas. Very good choice of quotations.
auto wrote: Sat Oct 08, 2022 2:54 pmI think what Vasubhandu means by false doctrines of self is the taking of the eye-consciousness as self. Which nowadays no-selfers thinking therefore there is no self at all.
If you look at Verse 5 in the context of Verse 2, you'll see that Venerable Vasubandhu says that it is the repository consciousness (阿賴耶識 ālayavijñāna) that is taken as self by the manas (識名末那 manonāma vijñāna). The ālaya is the principle object of the manas, as stated in Verse 5. It is the misconceiving of the ālaya as the "self," not the cakṣur as the "self," that brings about and maintains the four afflictions spoken of in Verse 6.

Verse 1 explains that the opening of the treatise will outline three "transformations" (變 pariṇāma) that apply to the "manifestations of the proliferous nimittas" (種種相轉).

These three "transformations" are the ālaya, the manas (referred to as "kliṣṭamanas" in the commentarial tradition), and the objects appearing via the sixfold vijñāna that is rooted in manas. The ālaya, the kliṣṭamanas, and the nimittas associated with the six vijñānas rooted in the manas are "the three transformations" that the treatise outlines.

Below, in Verse 2, it is stated that these three that are outlined in Verse 1 (once again, referring to 1) the ālaya, 2) the kliṣṭamanas, and 3) the cognition that produces the nimittas corresponding to sixfold vijñāna) are also respectively vipāka (the ālaya accumulates karmas as "seeds"/bījāni), manana (the process of the mental accumulation of associative reflections upon manifestations viewed within the mind, otherwise "surmisation"), and viṣayavijñapti (the manifestation, via cognition, of objects within the mind).

So we can see that it is not "the eye taken as self" that this treatise is concerned with addressing directly. Certainly, the eye can be taken as self (that and things like that are outlined as bases for affliction in various suttas, treatises, etc.), but it is "the ālaya taken as self" that Venerable Vasubandhu identifies as the root of the four afflictions of self-delusion, self-view, self-conception, and self-attachment.

Verse 2
謂異熟思量  
及了別境識
初阿賴耶識  
異熟一切種
These (three) are called “vipāka,” “surmisation,”
and "distinguishing the cognitions of objects.”
The first (transformation) is that of the repository consciousness,
which is vipāka and all of the seeds.
Verse 5
次第二能變  
是識名末那
依彼轉緣彼  
思量為性相
Next is the second variety of transformation,
and this is the consciousness named “manas.”
With the former (i.e. the first transformation) as its basis and object,
it has surmisation as its svabhāva.
Venerable Xuánzàng comments, quoting a gāthā:
由自心執著  
心似外境轉
彼所見非有  
是故說唯心
The mind attaches to itself.
The mind appears as the transformations of the external objects.
That which is seen does not exist.
This is the reason why it is said "only consciousness."
Verse 6
四煩惱常俱  
謂我癡我見
并我慢我愛 [...]
Four afflictions are always accompanying one another,
called "self-delusion" and "self-view"
and also "self-conception" and "self-attachment." [...]
The presence of the four afflictions in Verse 6 is a result of what Venerable Xuánzàng calls "the mind attaching to itself" (自心執). It is not specifically or particularly the eye that it attaches to. It misconceives itself. The transformation that is the kliṣṭamanas misconceives of the ālaya as the ātman.

While I do appreciate the parallels from the Vibhaṅga and Visuddhimagga, and while I do agree that what they have to say about the difference between bodily sensory consciousnesses and manas is largely functionally-identical, I really hope that what I'm about to share with you doesn't become a hinderance for you, something you get stuck on.

Venerable Vasubandhu doesn't believe in "the self." He's what you would call a "no selfer." This is very easily substantiable from looking at pretty much any of his writings. In the one quoted here, he refers to "the self" as a "false doctrine" and also as a complex of "four afflictions." It's literally right there in the first quatrain of the Triṃśikā, the first quotation in the OP.

Furthermore, more from the commentary of Venerable Xuánzàng:
七真如者:
一流轉真如謂有為法流轉實性、
二實相真如謂二無我所顯實性、
三唯識真如謂染淨法唯識實性、
四安立真如謂苦實性、
五邪行真如謂集實性、
六清淨真如謂滅實性、
七正行真如謂道。
The seven suchness are:
1. The suchness of transmigration, which is to say the true nature of conditioned dharmas in transmigration.
2. The suchness of the true aspect, which is to say the true nature as clarified by the twofold anātman.
3. The suchness of "only consciousness," which is to say the nature of (both) the defiled and the pure dharmas that knowns as "only consciousness."
4. The suchness of the basis, which is to say the true nature of (the truth of) suffering.
5. The suchness of wrong practice, which is to say the true nature of (the truth of) origination.
6. The suchness of purity, which is to say the true nature of (the truth of) cessation.
7. The suchness of right practice, which is to say the true nature of the (truth of the) path.
The two varieties of anātman that are the twofold anātman are 1) pudgalanairātmya and 2) dharmanairātmya. What does this mean? It means that, in both the pudgala and the dharmas, there is no self to be found.

Hopefully we can put this off-topic ātmavāda-advocacy to the side for now, as it is deeply unskillful and also rather off-topic, and continue to keep the thread focussed on the matter of contemporary and also historical Buddhist teachings concerning cognition.

That being said, I do also want to stress that I appreciate the relevant and on-topic quotations from the Theravādin sources, as they are quite relevant to the opening post, and are also good contextualization for readers of it who are not as familiar with Classical Theravāda.

Note: I've adjusted the previous rendering of one of the translations. I found an error that I corrected on the document on my computer but neglected to correct on the DhammaWheel post: "mentation" should have been rendered as "surmisation" in the translated sections.
Last edited by Coëmgenu on Sat Oct 08, 2022 6:38 pm, edited 2 times in total.
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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Re: Does the eye see? "Mūlavijñāna" in Mahāsāṃghika and Cittamātra Thought

Post by Coëmgenu »

One of the sections from the Kathāvatthu referenced in the OP:
Controverted Point: That we see visible objects with the eye.

Theravādin: Then you hold that we see matter by matter … You deny. But think! And if you now assent, you imply that matter is able to distinguish matter. You deny. But think! And if you now assent, you imply that matter is mind … .

Again, you are implying that the eye can “advert” or reflect, co-ordinate, will, etc., albeit you agree that the contrary is true.

These arguments hold good for similar claims put forward by you for the other four senses.

Mahāsaṅghika: But was it not said by the Exalted One:

“Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu sees objects with the eye, hears sounds, and so on”?

Hence surely we see visible objects with the eye and so on.
(Kv 18.9 as translated by Shwe Zan Aung & C.A.F. Rhys Davids)
What is the Uncreated?
Sublime & free, what is that obscured Eternity?
It is the Undying, the Bright, the Isle.
It is an Ocean, a Secret: Reality.
Both life and oblivion, it is Nirvāṇa.
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