I am gonna talk about a bit on another function of dependent origination.
To view Dependent origination, as a -
step by step walk through of rebirth.
It starts from falling into a coma, dying.
It covers from coma(avijja), sankhara(oscillation/fabrication by ripening kamma), conscious landing, physical birth, so on.
This is how one can get a detailed expose on process in picking up another body.
"Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
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Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
It seems the process were explaining , the intention and inclination of sentient beings which are established in lower sphere , would produce a regenerate bhava in future . The "future" should implies the next life .Alrac wrote: ↑Fri Oct 14, 2022 12:48 amLooking at the above, I couldn't find the word "jati" in the Pali text. Again, you are saying "jati" ("rebirth") is the cause for "bhava". The alternate translation at the link uses the word "the production" of renewed becoming. This alternate translation does not imply, as you are implying, that there is "rebirth" ("jati") causing new "becoming" ("bhava"). The alternative translation is simply saying there is the production of bhava.Ceisiwr wrote: ↑Thu Oct 13, 2022 6:43 pmhttps://suttacentral.net/an3.77/en/suja ... ript=latin“Sir, they speak of this thing called ‘continued existence’. How is continued existence defined?”
“If, Ānanda, there were no deeds to result in the sensual realm, would continued existence in the sensual realm still come about?”
“No, sir.”
“So, Ānanda, deeds are the field, consciousness is the seed, and craving is the moisture. The intention and aim of sentient beings—hindered by ignorance and fettered by craving—is established in a lower realm. That’s how there is rebirth into a new state of existence in the future.
It appears the future are not referring to upcoming moment onwards of present life .
As such it could link to a new birth ie jati , the emerging and manifestation of aggregates etc .
“Thus kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture. The intention & aspiration of living beings hindered by ignorance & fettered by craving is established in/tuned to a lower property. Thus there is the production of renewed becoming in the future.
“If there were no kamma ripening in the form-property, would form-becoming be discerned?”
Last edited by asahi on Fri Oct 14, 2022 4:27 am, edited 1 time in total.
No bashing No gossiping
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
SDC wrote: ↑Fri Oct 14, 2022 1:10 am You know what would be amazing? If you could maintain an account for an extended period (like years), where it was clear it actually mattered to you to be a productive member of a community, instead of imploding whenever the pressure gets too overwhelming. That would really be something. And with that, I’d be more apt to answer you seriously, rather than simply keep moving, which gets easier and easier.
Congratulations, everyone can spot you immediately and you’ve all but lost any chance of engaging in an honest conversation here. I hope it was worth it.
If we all just put him on ignore?
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
It seems to me that if one gains insight into the 5 aggregates, then they also gain insight into mentality and physicality, and through that can then gain an understanding of all of the links of dependent origination across lives and in the present moment.jankala wrote: ↑Tue Oct 11, 2022 4:45 am
While on the surface, this critique seems rather logical, it is in fact an instance of the common tendency to disregard the fact that the twelve-linked formula is merely an exposition, or full-length description, following the very same principle that the stream-enterer sees. Insight into the dependently co-arisen nature of the pañc'upādānakkhandhā is in fact insight into the 12 links. Paṭiccasamuppāda concerns the arising of the mass of dukkha, which is defined in brief as 'the five-clinging-aggregates' in the schema of the Four Noble Truths.
While it is true that an intellectual understanding of each individual link in the common 12-link formula is irrelevant to a true understanding of paṭiccasamuppāda (and it is rather likely that the majority of people who do see the Noble Norm do not see it in terms of the 12-links, but rather a particular instance of links, such as is listed in the case of the Sammā-diṭṭhi-sutta (MN 9). This does not mean, however, that the 12-link formula does not follow that very same principle, or that it is a separate phenomenon from the one witnessed by the stream-enterer. The 12-linked formula is, as mentioned above, merely a more complete exposition (of many possible expositions, some variations of which are in the suttas) of conditioned experience. A stream-enterer will in fact know and see this same principle, even if they have not memorized and studied the meaning of every particular link in the formula. Learning the links in the formula, following stream-entry, will simply provide a more formalized schema for the very same principle they have penetrated, and will in no way conflict or differ from that.
Theravāda would agree that birth is a condition for death. Having been born, there must be ageing and death. I've never seen it put that birth causes death in Classical Theravāda. I would also agree that ageing and death are to be born in mind, as future dangers. I wouldn't say however that is all they are, or that is the salient point about them. That they are phenomena present to conciousness. I find it strange when you say that the conditional relationship between birth and death is "not the concern of paṭiccasamuppāda", but then say it is a matter of "conditionality" after implying that conditionality is to do with causality. I don't quite follow you here. Do you think paṭiccasamuppāda is about conditionality or causality? Why do you say that the conditionality between birth and death is not a part of paṭiccasamuppāda, when paṭiccasamuppāda says that death arises depending upon birth?This seems to be a simple misunderstanding and a failure to comprehend the structural approach of the Ven. Ñāṇavīra. Claiming that the suttas refer to "actually being born, eventually growing old, and at some time, sooner or later, having to pass away" is a clear example of this misapprehension.
The time involved between jāti and jarāmaraṇa in the conventional sense is irrelevant to their specific conditionality (jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇa); one who is born must by necessity age and die. Conditioned by being born, aging and death is a present, enduring, and threatening phenomenon in the experience of the saṁsāric individual—so much so that it is one of the major impulses behind the Blessed One's search for freedom from them, along with most other spiritual seekers both within and without the Buddha's dispensation. While, generally, there is a time lapse between the literal moment of birth (which, as we will see, is itself a fallacious ideal) and the moment of death, the conditional relationship between the two phenomena is not the concern of paṭiccasamuppāda; it is not a matter of cause and effect, but rather a matter of conditionality, which is at no odds nor conflict with any temporal succession that may occur. No matter what amount of time lapses between the birth of a being and its death, the fact that it must age (and is ageing), and that it must die (and experience dying) is always the case until birth no longer applies to that being.
Saying that birth and death not being biologically born, ageing and dying (restricting ourselves to humans here) is a rather weak argument in light of what the texts say. When the links of birth, ageing, sickness and death are defined for us (meaning, this is how we are always to understand them in terms of DO) we see quite literally being born, ageing and dying is what was meant. For example, for ageingIn a similar vein, the very idea that jāti refers to a particular moment in time—a birth moment that is over in a flash—and that jarāmaraṇa refers to the biological process of ageing in any being—is at odds with the usage of the terms in the context of paṭiccasamuppāda. The Ven. Anālayo seems to have neglected to bring up the Ven. Ñāṇavīra's discussion of the fact that, as far as the suttas are concerned, the arahant does not die. This is, in fact, itself the goal of the holy life, and one of the most common epithets for Nibbāna—the Deathless—is it not?
"The ageing of beings in the various orders of beings, their old age, brokenness of teeth, greyness of hair, wrinkling of skin, decline of life, weakness of faculties—this is called ageing" - MN 9
This means literally getting old. How then do you support your claim that said dhammas are not defined in said manner in the suttas? On Buddhas and Arahants, they do die. The suttas talk of them "biding their time". The suttas also talk of Buddhas and Arahants getting sick, and ageing. On death we also have the following
"Young and old,
foolish and wise—
all go under the sway of death;
all are destined to die."
- Snp 3.8
Ultimately of course there is no one there to die. Death only occurs to the aggregates. It is only dhammas which arise and cease, but they do cease. When the āsavā are gone, there will be no more seeking for an existence (or non-existence) at death. There being no kamma, conciousness will not be established anywhere. Not being established, and with its current conditions falling away (at death), it will go out.
As you say, all of the links are dukkha. Birth is dukkha. Ageing is dukkha Death is dukkha. Pain is dukkha. Anything that is conditioned and impermanent is dukkha itself. When the āsavā are gone, furth birth and so future ageing and death will not come to be. There is liberation from them. In the current life however, there is still ageing and death to contend with. They are there because of past ignorance, and with ignorance as a condition those dhammas come to be. This is why Buddhas and Arahants still experience ageing and dying. They have to obey natural law (Dhamma).We must also recall that the final link—jarāmaraṇa sokaparidevadukkhadomanassa—is the most explicit link pointing to dukkha itself, and it arguably stands in for all dukkha in general. We see, for instance, in the Upanisā Sutta (SN 12.23), that jarāmaraṇa is entirely missing, and has been replaced with 'dukkha' itself, after the jāti link. While all the links can be understood as dukkha and as instances of it, the cessation of jarāmaraṇa for the arahant in the present life—diṭṭheva dhamme—is one of, if not the, most significant events (or phenomena) in the case of the arahant and the realization of Nibbāna.
I think the point of contention is that for a Phenomenological Buddhist, whilst birth is an event that happened, in terms of paṭiccasamuppāda it means that that birth is still a phenomenon in conciousness, and so colours the experience of the unawakened being. From a traditional perspective, as I mentioned earlier, whilst we are to bear in mind birth and the future threats of ageing and death the understanding is not that this is the principle meaning of them in terms of paṭiccasamuppāda. Rather we are to bear these dhammas in mind as natural events and processes that we are subject to due to our ignorance, and that they are dukkha. This is a different understanding to birth and death being timeless structures of one's unawakened experience.Similarly, regarding jāti, I would call the reader's attention to an article by the Ven. Nyanamoli, from Hillside Hermitage, regarding this very issue: https://www.hillsidehermitage.org/with- ... h-applies/. It addresses this particular issue directly and rather succinctly, though I do think there is quite a lot to address in regards to the matter on top of the explanation offered by the Venerable in this particular Buddhist climate (in time). The common trope or rhetorical claim that jāti and jarāmaraṇa are "literal" is simply a straw-man argument. As the Ven. Nyanamoli, to some degree, points out in his article, the experiential phenomenon of birth—of being born, of acquiring and carrying the burden of the sense-spheres and the aggregates, of being subjected to the consequences of old-age and dying by necessity and almost immediately upon emerging from the womb, is a present phenomenon that is no different at any point in time. The presence of this "literal" phenomenon is itself threatening—as the Buddha himself knew—and any instance of rebirth is no different than the exact same phenomenon of jāti present in a non-arahant's experience, repeated over. At no point in time—whether emerging from the womb or being 20 years old and in prime shape—is the phenomenon of jāti not present, and as such, it will not cease until it's requisite condition (namely, bhava) has ceased. Physical death will be no obstacle to this principle, and as such 'rebirth' is merely the natural consequence of jāti not having ceased—the phenomenon continues, and as such it's conditional counterpart—jarāmaraṇa does as well, repeatedly and consistently enduring in the experience of the saṁsāric being, infinitely re-surfacing and manifesting, until arahattaphala. Far from denying any definitions in the suttas, far from denying the doctrine of rebirth, the present, structural, and enduring nature of the phenomena of jāti (and likewise jarāmaraṇa) can serve for the sekha to see the connection between the two: their present dukkha on account of these phenomena, and the lack of cessation of it, even in the face of death, until they have completed their training and these phenomena have ceased here-and-now.
This is enough—though not at all a complete form of addressing the issue at hand—for the time being concerning this particular critique.
The Buddha never really addresses time in the suttas, other than to say there is a past, present and future. In terms of the Abhidhamma, time is a concept that is fashioned by the mind onto the flow of the sabhāva-dhammas. It is not the case then, according to Classical Theravāda, that dhammas occur in time. They do however arise and cease in succession, based on conditions. Knowledge then of the Dhamma occurs based on direct experience of the sabhāva-dhammas. Now this of course does not involve time, since time does not really exist, but that doesn't mean that dependent origination is a "timeless structure". I assume what you are referring to here is akāliko. What akāliko means is that it doesn't take time for the benefits of the Dhamma to be realised. Upon the extinguishment of the āsavā, the individual is immediately freed from emotional suffering (the 2nd dart) and from having to be born again. What is left are the dying embers of old kamma, slowly growing cold. On kamma, it is true that only certain individuals with psychic powers can see kamma and its effects (with Buddhas being able to understand the exact relationship between an intentional action and its effect). However, one can still gain knowledge of how conciousness exists in a dependent relationship with intentional action. This is part of insight into the Jhānas and formless attainments. The conditionality then between one's intentions and conciousness, when directly experienced, is understood in the same way that we understand death to be dependent upon being born.As far as the final quote, cited from the original critique authored by the Ven. Bhikkhu Bodhi, I again find this a red-herring or straw-man—perhaps both. Knowledge of the Dhamma cannot be epistemologically timeless if the thing being analyzed is itself occurring in time. The case of kamma and kammavipāka is itself irrelevant to the matter, because these are issues that must be taken on faith from the Buddha and Saṅgha until or unless the individual practitioner is to develop the abilities (such as the divine eye, knowledge of past lives, etc.) to witness these for themself; even still, the specific workings of kamma are said to be beyond fathoming and a pointless point of investigation, and as such clearly are not one of the aspects that the Buddha encourages practitioners to investigate and fully know for themselves—something that seems to be, for the most part, impossible. An understanding, founded on faith and perhaps some minimal experience that can serve as a reasonable grounds to assume that the proposal is true—while still not being a form of evidence or direct knowing, in the Buddhist sense of the term—is sufficient as far as kamma is concerned. The practitioner is to differentiate skilful from unskilful actions in terms of dukkha, which are supposed to correlate to kamma, the former of which is directly realizable (particularly by the sotāpanna), whereas the latter is generally not and falls under the epistemological category of faith, barring the aforementioned exceptions.
On kamma and akāliko, I've already addressed this above. On conditionality and causation, I don't see how it follows that if something arises by way of conditionality (there must be a necessary condition for it to arise) then it must be a timeless structure? Firstly, the suttas speak of dhammas arising due to conditions. If something arises and then ceases, it is not a timeless structure. Furthermore even without causality, conditionality can still involve events over time. There can be birth, and then at a later time death, with birth being the condition for but not the cause of death. In terms of the Abhidhamma, it seems to have more in mind the view of conditionality rather than a scientific like causality model. To quote Ācariya BuddhaghosaWith that out of the way, we return to the initial matter at hand: If paṭiccasamuppāda were a process akin to that of kamma and kammavipāka, and one which occurs across expanses of lifetimes, it cannot be epistemologically accessed timelessly, and as such, the Ven. Bodhi's remark that akālika is not one of the Dhamma itself but rather of the epistemology of the principle of it, falls short of a satisfactory defense of the traditional exegesis. There are many, many other issues regarding the cause-and-effect based models of paṭiccasamuppāda—too many to possibly address in this post. To briefly name a handful (in case comes to be relevant in later discussion), there is: the asymmetry of the model in its arising and cessation (anuloma vs. paṭiloma) modes, the lack of coherency with the underlying principle that the 12-link formula is an elaboration of (This being, this is; With the arising of this, this arises; This not being, this is not; With the cessation of this, this ceases)—which is itself clearly not one of cause and effect but rather of correlated conditions simultaneously present without reference to time. This should suffice for now—the issue of paṭiccasamuppāda being a succession of events is itself quite old and worn out by now, and quite evidently not the case as far as the suttas are concerned in my opinion.
Visuddhimagga - CHAPTER XVII The Soil of Understanding (conclusion): Dependent Origination68. As to “condition” (paccaya), the word-meaning here is this: It [the fruit] comes from that, depending thereon ((paþicca etasmá eti), thus that is a condition; (paccaya, see note 2) the meaning is, [a state] occurs by not dispensing with that. What is meant is: when a state is indispensable to another state’s presence or arising, the former is a condition for the latter. But as to characteristic, a condition has the characteristic of assisting; for any given state [533] that assists the presence or arising of a given state is called the latter’s condition. The words condition, cause, reason, source, originator, producer, etc., are one in meaning though different in the letter. So, since it is a cause in the sense of a root, and a condition in the sense of assistance, briefly a state that is assistantial in the sense of a root is a [root-]cause condition.
I must admit, I do not agree with Bhante here. Anyone can of course disagree with the commentaries if they wish. Personally, I don't find it hurtful when people do. What I do find amusing though is in how many will reject the Abhidhamma and commentaries, whilst then going on to construct an Abhidhamma and commentarial view all of their own, many times not even realising that they are doing so. This is why I call this Phenomenological Buddhism a new Abhidhamma, because that is exactly what it is. A system of technical and well-defined concepts and terms, which gives an overarching structure to understanding and practicing the Dhamma. A map of the Dhamma, as it were.Ven. Anālayo wrote: "Another problem with the approach adopted by Ñāṇavīra Thera is that it tends to involve a wholesale rejection of traditional exegesis. [...] Even if one finds this commentarial model not relevant to one’s personal concerns, why voice such a strongly worded dismissal, which can safely be expected to be experienced as hurtful by traditional Buddhists who find this model meaningful?"
If you consider how the suttas maps out things like the senses and how they describe how mental dhammas arise together, and further still that we can only experience 1 vedanā at a time, then we can begin to see the embryonic form of momentariness. I still have to fully flesh this out on another post of mine. When I do, I'm sure we can discuss more in depth there. I think we should also consider that momentariness is not a quirk of the Theravādin tradition but, based on what we know, seems to have been found in every single early school.This final remark by the Ven. Anālayo is rather ill-informed of the structural model of paṭiccasamuppāda—somewhat appallingly so. As Ven. Anālayo has many times pointed out in his books, public interviews, and research papers, the doctrine of mind-moments and momentariness is a later development that has nothing to do with the historical Buddha's teaching and which is not found in the suttas. The suggestion that this difference in interpretations is somehow resolved by the commentarial momentary model of paṭiccasamuppāda simply disregards the entirety of the Ven. Ñāṇavīra's intentions and interpretation. It is simply impossible that it was the original teaching of the Buddha, considering the idea of momentariness did not exist during his lifetime nor did he teach it, let alone as the principle exemplification of his Dhamma (paṭiccasamuppāda—considering it encompasses all 4 noble truths in fuller detail, and insight into its principle is itself stream-entry). This is simply too obvious of a non-response and a poor attempt of rectification, and any further discussion of it seems unnecessary and quite self-evident.
The problem here is that, so far, you have not shown how the traditional model is at odds with paṭiccasamuppāda?The same is true for the latter section of the quote regarding the tetralemma. Not only is the identification of a mind-moment based interpretation of paṭiccasamuppāda with the principle behind Ven. Ñāṇavīra's explanation simply a blatant misunderstanding, but the notion that it can somehow be rectified with, and validate, the 3-lifetime model disregards the entirety of the arguments that demonstrate the latter (and former, for that matter) models failure to comply with the epistemological descriptions of paṭiccasamuppāda, and, more importantly, with the very underlying principle of conditionality behind the formula.
Once again, for Orthodox Theravāda dependent origination doesn't occur across time. This is a strawman on your part. It's also not the case that it is a strict cause & effect model for Theravāda.The latter point is an appropriate segue for the conclusion of this initial post. Despite the venerable authors Bhikkhu Bodhi and Bhikkhu Anālayo's attempts at defending the traditional exegesis by finding fault in the presentation of Ven. Ñāṇavīra, both have failed to address the actual important issue at hand. No amount of fault finding with minor particulars of the original presentation is a valid form of addressing the fact that paṭiccasamuppāda is, in whatever particular exemplificaiton it finds itself, be it with 12 links or not, is an exemplification of a structural principle of conditionality, not a sequential explanation of cause-and-effect occurring across time.
They are free from ageing and death, but they still have to experience ageing and death. The freedom is from not having to be born again. Not being born, how can they die?Or perhaps Nibbāna should not be called amata if in fact the Buddha and the arahants were not free of jarāmaraṇa.
I didn't read anywhere in your quote where Venerable Anālayo said the Tathāgata was real? I would agree though that ultimately the Buddha does not exist. It is merely a concept applied to certain dhammas in a certain state.This section of the article seems to be full of contradictions and/or a miscomprehension of the Ven. Ñāṇavīra's position (and that of the suttas, in the case of the Tathāgata). The implication that the Tathāgata is in fact "real," but is simply hard to fathom, is not only at odds with the Ven. Ñāṇavīra's position, but also with the suttas themselves.
For someone who argues so passionately against causality, you seem to have causality in mind when you think of its cessation. On a strict causality model when ignorance goes, formations go. When formations go, conciousness immediately goes. Rather, in terms of conditionality, when ignorance goes then none of the other links will arise again. What is left are conditions which exist because of past ignorance.The notion that the ceased, or paṭiloma, formulation of paṭiccasamuppāda does not refer to an arahant is also quite confusing. It would seem, then, that avijjā only ceases with the moment of fruition, and not after the fact. We are told that with the cessation of avijjā, sankhārās cease, and because viññāṇa is conditioned by sankhārās, it is therefore impossible for it not to cease along with the cessation of avijjā. Craving (taṇhā) itself is dependent upon viññāṇa—no matter which interpretation of paṭiccasamuppāda one takes—and as such must follow the law or principle as taught by the Buddha: imasmiṁ asati, idaṁ na hoti; imassa nirodhā, idaṁ nirujjhati, that is, "this not being, this is not; with the cessation of this, this ceases." Given this undeniable (if one reads the suttas authentically) principle, viññāṇa in the paṭiccasamuppāda formula is conditioned by avijjā and sankhārā, and as such is not referring to the neutral, remaining viññāṇakhandha of the arahant which has nothing to do with avijjā and which, as the Ven. Anālayo has pointed out, can be called "unestablished," and so on. The ceased consciousness and unestablished consciousness are merely syonyms as far as paṭiccasamuppāda terminology (in the suttas) is concerned. As some who adopt an all-too-simple misunderstandings of this principle occasionally argue: "The arahant does not go unconscious at arahantship,"—a mere referral back to word of the Buddha: "avijjāya tveva asesavirāganirodhā sankhāranirodho, sankhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho, ..." would make rather clear, again, that that is not the claim. Similarly, a mere repetition of the Ven. Ñāṇavīra's own repetition of expositions in suttas such as the Yamaka Sutta should make quite clear that any identification of an arahant being conscious or having consciousness—taken too seriously—is a case of self-view.
I don't see how those suttas support what you are trying to argue. Contact will exist whenever there is a sense base and an object, with a conciousness to cognise. All that only ceases forever at the Arahants death. Whilst alive, they still experience those things. The dispassion and cessation of the eye is the giving up of lust etc in relation to it, so that at death it will finally cease forever.Briefly, this is another case of reading past and disregarding the point raised in the Ven. Ñāṇavīra's argument regarding phassa. More apparent though, is the fact that it reads past the arguments raised in the suttas themselves. The mention that an arahant somehow experiences contact because they can undergo physical abuse is, again, somewhat baffling—as though the fact that the Buddha and his arahant disciples were not unconscious of all sensory experience throughout the remainder of their lives did not occur to Ven. Ñāṇavīra when discussing the cessation of contact. The cessation of contact is mentioned several times in the discourses as something to be realized here-and-now in this very life, and rightfully so, because the term phassa can only be used in truth in the case of the non-arahant [quoes suttas AN 6.63, Snp 3.12, SN 35.155]
It isn't really the subject-object experience which is the problem (apart from it being dukkha, of course). The Buddha would have still thought in terms of "I am doing this" and so would still have the subject-object distinction in his experience. The problem is in taking the I to be substantial, and in thinking the objects of the senses are substantial entities and craving them.These final excerpts from the same paragraph in the article seem to offer a good place to close for now. Firstly, the idea that "the subject-object duality is not problematized" is somewhat shocking at first glance. I would call forth such suttas the MN 1—the Mūlapariyāya Sutta—which is all about the conceiving of a subject in relation to conceptual objects and the resulting problems that spring forth. I would call to forth the countless suttas that equate the ridding of all residual forms of conceit—that is, the notion of "am," a subject, in relation to external objects—with the realization of Nibbāna. I would call forth the suttas equating the utter detachment and cessation of the clinging aggregates in the arahant with the lack of any referent or subject for whom there can appear objects—part of which was addressed in our section concerning the nature of the Tathāgata. There are too many cases to possibly cite to debunk this statement by the Ven. Anālayo—something which I would chalk up to a misreading, mistake, and reading-past of the Ven. Ñāṇavīra's positions as repeatedly done beforehand, and which offers a very smooth transition into the next point.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
Greetings, Ceisiwr!
Thank you for your reply. It is nice that you responded in a more thoughtful way for the sake of dialogue rather than merely arguing
I'm not going to give an extended reply because I've been spending quite a lot of time in the past couple days editing this post and turning it into a more formal essay on the subject. When I finish that, I will post it here. My reply to the article, as I said before writing it, was to begin a discussion of things and was written in the moment/on the day of reading through the article. There were also some typos, which is a segue for the next topic.
The line in the post that refuted the conditionality of jāti and jarāmaraṇa was just a typc . I addressed it elsewhere in this comment section when someone asked about it. I think clarifying, briefly, what I meant would respond to most of your other comments which seem to have been based somewhat on that typo. What I meant to say was that the delineation of an event in time, calling it jāti, and another event called and maraṇa, and then referring to time passing between them, has nothing to do with the conditional relationship between thequit dhammas/phenomena of jāti and jarāmaraṇa.
Jarāmaraṇa is quite obviously not a moment in time or specific event, but rather a general phenomenon within experience. I don't think any traditional understanding of this nidāna would say otherwise besides the momentary renderings of it which do not fit the definitions in the suttas. Jarāmaraṇa is also connected most clearly to all the dukkha in one's experience (hence the addendum sokaparidevadukkhadomanassa). In SN 12.23, for instance, we see the jarāmaraṇa link has been replaced with just 'dukkha'. Like I said (and you noted), all of the nidānas are dukkha; but jarāmaraṇa sokaparidevadukkhadomanassa is the most clear and obvious 'dukkha' link which is kind of a final statement: that all of these conditions are the structure for dukkha, death, etc. If the ending of jarāmaraṇa sokaparidevadukkhadomanassa, i.e. arahantship, meant the ending of future jāti, then it would be jarāmaraṇanirodhā jātinirodho. But rather, we read that it is jātinirodhā jarāmaraṇanirodho. Similarly, if rebirth were the result of death, it would read jarāmaraṇapaccayā jāti.
Take a look at SN 12.33 and SN 12.34. Jāti and jarāmaraṇa are said to be present phenomena that one discerns in experience and sees for oneself via insight. From there, they can infer these phenomena to apply to the past and future. In MN 9, discerning jāti is just as valid for discerning taṇhā and gaining right view. In SN 12.68, jāti and jarāmaraṇa are seen for oneself without logic, inference, tradition, etc. by someone who is not an arahant yet. Rebirth in the suttas is actually renewed future existence. My argument is that jāti is a phenomenon within experience and discerning it is essential for understanding jāti. Once one understands the phenomenon/experience of jāti, they can then infer the presence of that phenomenon in the future (as per SN 12.33, etc.) so long as the requisite condition (bhava) is not removed. We may not remember some specific moment in time when we came out of the womb, but we can recognize what it feels like to be born, to act out birth in an order of sentient beings, to have the aggregates and sense-fields and our clan, family, etc. and the aging-and-death that we are equally subject to on account of that. We can then infer that as a future phenomenon and a past phenomenon based on our knowledge of the presence of it in the present.
A being that exists (bhava) must, by the nature/workings of saṁsāra, be born and undergo the consequence of birth, which is the destruction of that built up structure. I see jāti and jarāmaraṇa as two opposing but necessarily dependent 'forces' that mark the essential fact of dukkha within the context of samsaric existence (bhava). That is, jāti is the kind of positive, driving force; jarāmaraṇa is the opposing force that grinds down and erodes that, until eventually breaking it and, so long as there is still ignorance and craving with consciousness established upon nāmarūpa, there will be a renewal of that same existence elsewhere, which implies the same phenomena of jāti and jarāmaraṇa. They directly map onto itthabhāvaññathābhava—turning from a this-ness into an otherwise-ness, which is true of all 'things,' but which amounts to being born and decaying/dying when that very same concept is applied to sentient life. The primary thisness is birth, and turning otherwiseness is decay and death. This makes sense, of course, as they are dependent on bhava—the notion of being in general.SN 12.33 wrote: A noble disciple understands old age and death, their origin, their cessation, and the practice that leads to their cessation. This is their knowledge of the present phenomenon.
With this present phenomenon that is seen, known, immediate, attained, and fathomed, they infer to the past and future.
(similarly with jāti, etc.)
Another thing to consider is that the definitions of jāti and jarāmaraṇa are largely physical (and rightly so, to describe the gruesome reality and inspire saṁvega for freedom from them, as is the point of the Buddhadhamma; it is not meant to be descriptivist-- like much later Abhidhamma-- but rather prescriptivist and show how to go beyond these concepts and descriptions and transcend them to the point where they no longer apply). However, both of the definitions specifically talk about them as they apply to sentient beings (satta). How does the Buddha define a sentient being, though?
Interesting how what makes one a sentient being is equivalent, essentially, to upādāna—often equated to desire and lust for the aggregates themselves. When there is no desire and lust for these things, that is, when there is no upādāna, then there is no satta, but similarly, we know from the law of dependent co-arising that when there is no upādāna there is no bhava.SN 23.2 wrote: ‘A being,’ it’s said. To what extent is one said to be ‘a being’?”
“Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Rādha: when one is caught up [satta] there, tied up [visatta] there, one is said to be ‘a being [satta].’
“Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for feeling… perception… fabrications [sankhārā]… “Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for consciousness, Rādha: when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be ‘a being.’
When there is no bhava, there is no jāti, which the definition says applies to the various sentient beings and orders of sentient beings. And likewise, jarāmaraṇa says it is the decay and decrepitude and death of sentient beings. But there is no sentient being if there is no upādāna, just like there is no bhava with no upādāna. Interesting how this would then overlap, no? No bhava, no jāti. No satta, no jāti.
Take a look at the follow reply from the arahant bhikkhuṇī Vajirā, in case there is any doubt that an arahant is not a sentient being (and as such, bhava cannot apply to them; because bhava is ceased, jāti and jarāmaraṇa cannot apply to them)
Clearly then, without upādāna there is no bhava and likewise no satta. Without satta or bhava, there can be no jāti or jarāmaraṇa. As suttas such as SN 12.33 and 12.34 tell us, jāti and jarāmaraṇa in reference to the past and future is inferential knowledge that one can infer and assume based on discerning those phenomena in their present experience, without doubt. There's a lot more to go into this, but like I said I'll explain it in further detail and so on in due time.SN 5.10 wrote: Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘sentient being’?
Māra, is this your theory?
This is just a pile of conditions,
you won’t find a sentient being here.
As for the final parts of your comment about the cessation mode of paṭiccasamuppāda not being causal, I understand it clearly as one of dependency and conditionality, not causality. As I mentioned above, the reference to conditionality with jāti was a typo. My description of the cessation mode may seem causal to you because language is linear and I am trying to describe it in some detail. Funnily enough, the fact that you read it as implying a kind of linear causal sequence shutting down due to how I described it is rather apt at understanding why and how the Buddhist schools understood paṭiccasamuppāda in the same way as they analyzed and memorized the descriptions of the 12-link "chain" from the discourses. When avijjā ceases, dukkha ceases. When the floor is gone, the table falls. It is not one moment after the other, and my description was not describing rapid successions of cessation, but rather describing some of the details of the individual nidānas ceasing, assuming based on my post that it would be understood not to be a sequential description.
With mettā!
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
Thank you for this very helpful elaboration. I'm happy to see that this thread has recovered from the sniping and bickering.
One quick post script - your quoting of Saṃyutta Nikāya 23.2, 'Sattasutta', might require a gloss as there is a pun present in the Pāli.
So the Buddha is punning on how one who is 'caught up' is a 'satta'. And yes, this is directly related to the word 'upādāna', which has the literal sense of 'to take up'.
(PPS this is how confusion arose with the word 'bodhisatta' and the back-translated Sanskrit word 'bodhisattva'.)
One quick post script - your quoting of Saṃyutta Nikāya 23.2, 'Sattasutta', might require a gloss as there is a pun present in the Pāli.
In Pāli, the verb sajjati, to be 'caught up with', 'stuck on', 'fixed upon', has a past participle 'satta', which has a homonym in the word for 'being' - 'satta'.when one is caught up [satta] there, tied up [visatta] there, one is said to be ‘a being [satta].’
So the Buddha is punning on how one who is 'caught up' is a 'satta'. And yes, this is directly related to the word 'upādāna', which has the literal sense of 'to take up'.
(PPS this is how confusion arose with the word 'bodhisatta' and the back-translated Sanskrit word 'bodhisattva'.)
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
I would agree that once you see the horror of conditioned phenomena, then you will never crave for them again. You will never crave for them again because of the total absence of the deep-seated mental afflictions which are the basis of us craving for this or that. Of course, people can know that drinking bleach can kill them, and they can say that right now they will not drink it, but people can then go on to drink the bleach when their conditions change. I think what you and I would agree on is that there can be a case where someone never drinks the bleach, because the fundamental condition for them being able to do such an action doesn't exist anymore. With no root condition, to borrow an Abhidhammic term, there will be no said event. I would argue that this also occurs at death. The Arahant can be sure that there is no more rebirth, because the Arahant understands that conciousness is dependent in some fundamental sense upon one's desires. With the root-condition gone, there is no more desire. With no more desire, the basis for establishing conciousness does not exist and so the Arahant knows that rebirth will not occur, in the same way he knows that he will never desire sex nor engage in it (willingly at least) again. The issue you seem to be having is in not understanding this conditionality between the āsavā, intention and conciousness. Consciousness isn't passive in Buddhadhamma. Its quite active, and of course it is a reality.nirodh27 wrote: ↑Wed Oct 12, 2022 12:10 pm
Hi Ceisiwr,
I can be certain that I will not drink a bottle when I see that there's a label on the bottle that says "venom" or "bleach" on it...
This is equivalent to say that the Buddha will never crave for sensuality, existence or non-existence again because he understood "that delight is the root of suffering". The label on every conditioned thing has been placed by the Buddha when he reflected on the drawbacks of sensuality and inconstant things in general. So delighting for a Buddha would actually be alike to have desire to live and stay well and still drink the poison knowing that it is poison. A trainee could still do that because his comprension that delight is the root of suffering is both incomplete and with a sati (memory) that have lapses, but not an Arahant of course, even less a Buddha. This is the kind of certainty that one can have, as long as the faculties are intact, one will not drink poison.
The other certainty is that when he doesn't drink the poison, the suffering of being poisoned is not there. A Direct observation that about the four noble truths that is important, since non-delight/non-drink is for your welfare. You have drinked poison before in a quantity that didn't kill you (human realm), but sufficient to make you feel bad and act. You know how it feels now and you remember how it feels two hours later and you can easily imagine that another sip will have the same result. You want to do something. So it is actually you that put the label to the bottle so not to drink it anymore. This non-suffering must be enjoyed and will reinforce itself.
For a consciousness that is in some unclear ways is connected to Ceisiwr to arise in the future, instead, we cannot know because it is actually a fact that it is out of your domain to know because you are not dead yet, it is an unobservable fact just being sure that the sun will rise tomorrow. It is probable, but not certain. It is something that is about the facts of nature that are indifferent to your thoughts, not a subjective mind-act of deciding to drink poison or not. (We could even discuss the the "hard problem of consciousness" here). This is why I take in strong consideration that the aggregates of/with clinging are Dukkha, while the aggreates without clinging are not there in the first noble truth and suggests a subjective reading of the Dhamma. The subjective relationship with the aggregates is the key.
You can have your son dear or not dear, that it is something that is possible for you to decide: you can maintain attachment or abandon it. Actions are the only thing that you own in a sense. How you can you be sure that consciousness will not propel to another body before you will be dead? That comment of mine is for suggesting to you (and also the parts of the canon that speaks about consciousness like a self that transmigrates from one body to another, I already conceded it many times) that when you reason in that way you still see/do a form of conceit "I am" in consciousness, albeit a very subtle one.
Well, at the very least I take a momentary view of immaterial dhammas. I don't see then how I can be accused of taking conciousness to be some kind of substantial entity which transmigrates? I assume you know my views on substance theories by now. The connection between this life and the past one is similar to the connection between my 20-year-old self and my now 34-year-old self. I wouldn't say that I've condemned another to x, y and z. That would be the wrong view of annihilationism. Due to some past mistakes in my 20's, I now have some health problems. I'm not though some separate being which is suffering it, inflicted by some other being 8 years ago. That would be the wrong way to look at such things.You seem to think consciousness as something that persists in some form (and I would be glad to understand in which form: the tradition spoke about stream of consciousness, citta-santāna, ālāyavijñāna, etc), I see that the consciousness of five minutes ago is been destroyed and now there's another, now another, etc. There is no connection whatsoever from this consciousness of now in which you are Ceisiwr and a supposed consciousness in the next life. Different bodies, but most important different consciousness, different contacts, even different memories linked to different bodies, the thing that now links baby-Ceisiwr to adult-Ceisiwr (Actually, only adult-Ceisiwr survives and takes baby-ceisiwr's memory as a former "I was", I hope just as a manner of speech or else you could suffer for something that happened in the past for no reason). If actions persists from one life to another, It could even be said that experientially/subjectively if you did bad kamma you've condemned another subjectivity to the hungry ghost realms while "you" are enjoying non-existence unless some subjective link is found. Else, experience would be unrelated. And Dukkha can be felt by you/me only in experience.
There's no subjective part of you that you can observe right now (the body will be different, the wills will be different, consciousness will be different, the mind will be different) that will experience that suffering of going to an hungry ghost realm in the next life. Unless you think that consciousness is something that persist from one life to another. If you see consciousness persist, I would say to look again: consciousness of this morning has been destroyed and the body is the thing that persist for longer for the Buddha, since mind arises as one thing and ceases as another very fast, so fast that is hard to find a metaphor for his speed in arising and ceasing.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
Retro wrote
Gombrich points to this initial mistake by the sectarians.
and
Keep up the good work, Dear Retro.
andMoreover, that the Dhamma of the Buddha describes the arising of phenomena.
beginning with changing the definition of Rupa, of Nama-Rupa, In "What the Buddha Thought" RichardTradition turned it into a hodge-podge of phenomena, events, speculation, pseudo-science, superstition, metaphysics, ontology, rites and rituals etc.
Gombrich points to this initial mistake by the sectarians.
and
Visiting the thread, your comments give me great solace, that someone out there understands. Phenomena arise in the mind, instigated by previous consciousness. Consciousness is relentlessly born anew as long as craving remains. Rupa of original Buddhism belongs to this category. Arising rupa offers a home for the continuation of consciousness.Mention of phenomenology is simply about remaining disciplined in awareness of framing the Dhamma per that first paragraph, without drifting into and becoming entangled in the flotsam and jetsam of the second.
Keep up the good work, Dear Retro.
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
Is that what he says? Could you quote the relevant part from his book which states this? He does say that the Buddha defined nāmarūpa as the organism in which conciousness resides. I can't remember him calling that a mistake though?
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
In my earlier comments I was highlighting how the most well-known proponents of this Phenomenological Abhidhamma have been strongly influenced by western philosophy. I was also taking issue with the rather arrogant claim that traditional Buddhism is just useless, Asian Buddhists having just not understood their own religion for over 2000 years.
In the Visuddhimagga Ācariya Buddhaghosa, making use of the analysis of the Paṭṭhāna, explains that birth is a condition for death by way of it being a decisive-support condition. More specifically, a natural-decisive support condition. These types of conditions can be separate in time but are fundamental one to the other. What is meant here is that birth as a past event is a fundamental condition for death, a future event. Because one is born, one will have to die at some point. That is the conditional relationship between these two distant dhammas. The analysis then on the Abhidhamma is not that birth and death are in a conditional relationship because they are distant events, one from the other, but rather one is absolutely necessary for the other and with the one, the other will be.The line in the post that refuted the conditionality of jāti and jarāmaraṇa was just a typc . I addressed it elsewhere in this comment section when someone asked about it. I think clarifying, briefly, what I meant would respond to most of your other comments which seem to have been based somewhat on that typo. What I meant to say was that the delineation of an event in time, calling it jāti, and another event called and maraṇa, and then referring to time passing between them, has nothing to do with the conditional relationship between thequit dhammas/phenomena of jāti and jarāmaraṇa.
Whilst we are to bear in mind ageing and death, we are to do so in the sense of understanding that these are real dhammas which will occur and that they occur due to conditions. Dukkha is of two types. There is the dukkha of conditioned phenomena and emotional dukkha. The dukkha of conditioned phenomena is the intrinsic dukkha of pain (or unpleasantness) and of their impermanence, thus being unsatisfactory. Ageing is dukkha because it involves intrinsic dukkha and, for worldly folk, emotional dukkha (the 1st and 2nd darts). The same for death. Soka is sorrow. Parideva is lamentation. Dukkha is both mental and physical pain (or unpleasantness) whilst domanassa is emotional dukkha, usually translated as "grief". In SN 12.23 we have birth followed by dukkha. Dukkha here refers to all of the above. That would include ageing, sickness, death and sokaparidevadukkhadomanassa. When there is birth there will be sickness, ageing, death and in-between all sorts of physical and mental pain in one's life. They are all rather clear and obvious types of dukkha. It's not that they are the structure for dukkha. They are dukkha itself. Physical pain, for example, is dukkha itself. The reason why we do not see jarāmaraṇanirodhā jātinirodho or jarāmaraṇapaccayā jāti is because of the nature of insight into dependent origination. Very often the suttas present insight into dependent origination as occurring in the reverse order. The Buddha started with what he was subject to, namely ageing and death. That dukkha will occur. He then asks what is the condition for it? Well, you have to age and die because you were born. Birth is the decisive support condition, in Abhidhammic terms. He then looks to the next predominant condition. Why are we born? Because there is the coming into existence in this world. Why is there coming into existence? Because of clinging. Why do we cling? Because we crave and so on backwards. The root problem arrived at is of course ignorance. When there is ignorance, there will be defiled intentional activity. With kamma as the basis, conciousness will be established again at death. The reason we do not see jarāmaraṇanirodhā jātinirodho or jarāmaraṇapaccayā jāti then is because paṭiccasamuppāda looks at the principal condition for each state, working backwards. That doesn't though mean that at death there won't again be birth.Jarāmaraṇa is quite obviously not a moment in time or specific event, but rather a general phenomenon within experience. I don't think any traditional understanding of this nidāna would say otherwise besides the momentary renderings of it which do not fit the definitions in the suttas. Jarāmaraṇa is also connected most clearly to all the dukkha in one's experience (hence the addendum sokaparidevadukkhadomanassa). In SN 12.23, for instance, we see the jarāmaraṇa link has been replaced with just 'dukkha'. Like I said (and you noted), all of the nidānas are dukkha; but jarāmaraṇa sokaparidevadukkhadomanassa is the most clear and obvious 'dukkha' link which is kind of a final statement: that all of these conditions are the structure for dukkha, death, etc. If the ending of jarāmaraṇa sokaparidevadukkhadomanassa, i.e. arahantship, meant the ending of future jāti, then it would be jarāmaraṇanirodhā jātinirodho. But rather, we read that it is jātinirodhā jarāmaraṇanirodho. Similarly, if rebirth were the result of death, it would read jarāmaraṇapaccayā jāti.
Visuddhimagga - CHAPTER XVII The Soil of Understanding (conclusion): Dependent OriginationOr again, ignorance here as “no theory” and “wrong theory” (see §52) befogs beings as a cataract does the eyes; the fool befogged by it involves himself in formations that produce further becoming, as a cocoon-spinning caterpillar does with the strands of the cocoon; consciousness guided by formations establishes itself in the destinies, as a prince guided by a minister establishes himself on a throne; [death] consciousness conjecturing about the sign of rebirth generates mentality-materiality in its various aspects in rebirth-linking, as a magician does an illusion; the sixfold base planted in mentality-materiality reaches growth, increase and fulfilment, as a forest thicket does planted in good soil; contact is born from the impingement of the bases, as fire is born from the rubbing together of fire sticks; feeling is manifested in one touched by contact, as burning is in one touched by fire; craving increases in one who feels, as thirst does in one who drinks salt water; one who is parched [with craving] conceives longing for the kinds of becoming, as a thirsty man does for drinks; that is his clinging; by clinging he clings to becoming as a fish does to the hook through greed for the bait; when there is becoming there is birth, as when there is a seed there is a shoot; and death is certain for one who is born, as falling down is for a tree that has grown up.
I think you are reading later ideas into the text. Birth is not a present phenomenon, nor are ageing and death. Birth is a natural event which has ceased, whilst ageing and death are natural events that are to come. In the present moment one fully understands birth, ageing and death and the conditionality between them but you can do that without having to subscribe to some kind of Phenomenology. In SN 12.33 it is saying that knowledge of dependent origination is known in the same way, at any time, by anyone who begins to understand it. SN 12.34 is saying that the conditionality between dhammas is always the same, and that it always exists.Take a look at SN 12.33 and SN 12.34. Jāti and jarāmaraṇa are said to be present phenomena that one discerns in experience and sees for oneself via insight. From there, they can infer these phenomena to apply to the past and future. In MN 9, discerning jāti is just as valid for discerning taṇhā and gaining right view. In SN 12.68, jāti and jarāmaraṇa are seen for oneself without logic, inference, tradition, etc. by someone who is not an arahant yet. Rebirth in the suttas is actually renewed future existence. My argument is that jāti is a phenomenon within experience and discerning it is essential for understanding jāti. Once one understands the phenomenon/experience of jāti, they can then infer the presence of that phenomenon in the future (as per SN 12.33, etc.) so long as the requisite condition (bhava) is not removed. We may not remember some specific moment in time when we came out of the womb, but we can recognize what it feels like to be born, to act out birth in an order of sentient beings, to have the aggregates and sense-fields and our clan, family, etc. and the aging-and-death that we are equally subject to on account of that. We can then infer that as a future phenomenon and a past phenomenon based on our knowledge of the presence of it in the present.
I don't understand what you mean by birth and death being "forces" here? Certainly birth, ageing and death are also viewed as being universal characteristics or natures of conditioned dhammas. Classical Theravāda also recognises that too. On itthabhāvaññathābhava it occurs a handful of times in the texts. Some instances include Iti 15, Iti 95 and Iti 105 as well as Snp 3.12.A being that exists (bhava) must, by the nature/workings of saṁsāra, be born and undergo the consequence of birth, which is the destruction of that built up structure. I see jāti and jarāmaraṇa as two opposing but necessarily dependent 'forces' that mark the essential fact of dukkha within the context of samsaric existence (bhava). That is, jāti is the kind of positive, driving force; jarāmaraṇa is the opposing force that grinds down and erodes that, until eventually breaking it and, so long as there is still ignorance and craving with consciousness established upon nāmarūpa, there will be a renewal of that same existence elsewhere, which implies the same phenomena of jāti and jarāmaraṇa. They directly map onto itthabhāvaññathābhava—turning from a this-ness into an otherwise-ness, which is true of all 'things,' but which amounts to being born and decaying/dying when that very same concept is applied to sentient life. The primary thisness is birth, and turning otherwiseness is decay and death. This makes sense, of course, as they are dependent on bhava—the notion of being in general.
These are all Sujato's translations but looking at the texts it does look like itthabhāvaññathābhava is referring to rebirth. Ācariya Dhammapāla has the following to say, when commenting upon Iti 95This was said by the Buddha, the Perfected One: that is what I heard.
“Mendicants, I do not see a single fetter, fettered by which people wander and transmigrate for a long time like the fetter of craving. Fettered by craving, people wander and transmigrate for a long time.”
The Buddha spoke this matter. On this it is said:
“Craving is a person’s partner
as they transmigrate on this long journey.
They go from this state to another,
but don’t escape transmigration.
Knowing this danger,
that craving is the cause of suffering—
rid of craving, free of grasping,
a mendicant would wander mindful.”
- Iti 15
“Mendicants, there are these three ways of being provided with sensual pleasures. What three? Some sensual pleasures are simply present; some are for those who love to create; and some are for those who control the creations of others. These are the three ways of being provided with sensual pleasures.”
The Buddha spoke this matter. On this it is said:
“Sensual pleasures that are simply present,
Gods Who Control the Creations of Others,
Gods Who Love to Create,
and others who indulge in sensual pleasures—
They go from this state to another,
but don’t escape transmigration.
Knowing this danger
in sensual indulgence, an astute person
would reject all sensual pleasures,
both human and divine.
Having cut the stream so hard to pass,
that’s tied to pleasant seeming things,
they become completely quenched,
completely transcending suffering.
Seers of the noble truths, knowledge masters,
the astute, understanding rightly,
directly know the ending of rebirth,
they come not back to future lives.”
- Iti 95
This was said by the Buddha, the Perfected One: that is what I heard.
“Mendicants, there are four things that give rise to craving in a mendicant. What four? For the sake of robes, almsfood, lodgings, or rebirth in this or that state. These are the four things that give rise to craving in a mendicant.”
The Buddha spoke this matter. On this it is said:
“Craving is a person’s partner
as they transmigrate on this long journey.
They go from this state to another,
but don’t escape transmigration.
Knowing this danger,
that craving is the cause of suffering—
rid of craving, free of grasping,
a mendicant would wander mindful.”
Iti 105
“Suppose, mendicants, they questioned you thus: ‘Could there be another way to contemplate the pairs?’ You should say, ‘There could.’ And how could there be? ‘All the suffering that originates is caused by ignorance’: this is one contemplation. ‘With the utter cessation of ignorance there is no origination of suffering’: this is the second contemplation. When a mendicant meditates in this way they can expect enlightenment or non-return.” Then the Teacher went on to say:
“Those who journey again and again,
transmigrating through birth and death;
they go from this state to another,
destined only for ignorance.
For ignorance is the great delusion
because of which we have long transmigrated.
Those beings who have arrived at knowledge
do not proceed to a future life.”
- Snp 3.12
"With its existence here and its existence otherwise (Itthabhāvaññathābhāvaṁ): "existence here and existence otherwise" is existence here and existence otherwise; since it possesses this, it is "with its existence here and its existence otherwise", viz. saṃsāra - that [Saṃsāra with its existence here and its existence otherwise]. Herein: "existence here" is the human state, "existence otherwise" the remaining abodes of beings [other] than this. Or, alternatively, "existence here" is the present existence of this and that being, "existence otherwise" the existence yet to come. Or else "existence here" is any other existence of such a form, "existence otherwise" one not of such a form." - Ācariya Dhammapāla
The explanation for Iti 95 is much the same. On Iti 105 it isn't commented upon. The commentary to Snp 3.12 (not Ācariya Dhammapāla's) reads it as this existence being the human one, other existence being any of the other types of existence. So, whilst of course including birth and death it means more different types of existences beings can take. Devas, humans, animals etc.
You first say that birth and death are not meant to be "descriptivist" (whatever this means) but rather "prescriptivist" (whatever that means) but then you say they are descriptions. I don't understand what you are saying here? You also seem to imply that they are to be understood as merely concepts, and that liberation is where the concepts no longer apply. You make it sound like birth and death only really apply when there is an atta notion, and that liberation from birth and death simply means birth and death, as concepts, no longer apply to the living Arahant. If that is your angle, I think it is mistaken. Certainly, we can say that ultimately an Arahant is not born, does not age and does not die because ultimately there is no such thing as an Arahant. There are only the aggregates arising and ceasing, and to which one day death comes. Ultimately Buddhas and Arahants do not die, but conventionally they do. Ultimately it is only conditioned dhammas which awaken and then cease forever, but conventionally its Venerable Ananda who awakens and then dies never to be born again. On SN 23.2 I would read it as when there is clinging, then the aggregates will be. Like yourself I would read it in conjunction with SN 5.10, which you go on to discussAnother thing to consider is that the definitions of jāti and jarāmaraṇa are largely physical (and rightly so, to describe the gruesome reality and inspire saṁvega for freedom from them, as is the point of the Buddhadhamma; it is not meant to be descriptivist-- like much later Abhidhamma-- but rather prescriptivist and show how to go beyond these concepts and descriptions and transcend them to the point where they no longer apply). However, both of the definitions specifically talk about them as they apply to sentient beings (satta). How does the Buddha define a sentient being, though?
SN 23.2 wrote:
‘A being,’ it’s said. To what extent is one said to be ‘a being’?”
“Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for form, Rādha: when one is caught up [satta] there, tied up [visatta] there, one is said to be ‘a being [satta].’
“Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for feeling… perception… fabrications [sankhārā]… “Any desire, passion, delight, or craving for consciousness, Rādha: when one is caught up there, tied up there, one is said to be ‘a being.’
Interesting how what makes one a sentient being is equivalent, essentially, to upādāna—often equated to desire and lust for the aggregates themselves. When there is no desire and lust for these things, that is, when there is no upādāna, then there is no satta, but similarly, we know from the law of dependent co-arising that when there is no upādāna there is no bhava.
When there is no bhava, there is no jāti, which the definition says applies to the various sentient beings and orders of sentient beings. And likewise, jarāmaraṇa says it is the decay and decrepitude and death of sentient beings. But there is no sentient being if there is no upādāna, just like there is no bhava with no upādāna. Interesting how this would then overlap, no? No bhava, no jāti. No satta, no jāti.
I read SN 5.10 as saying that a "being" is merely a convention we use when certain conditions, namely the aggregates, come together. SN 23.2 is saying that when there is clinging, then there will be the aggregates which we conventionally call a "being". They are complimentary, but I don't see how they support what you are saying. SN 5.10 of course being the main sutta Ābhidhammikas point to support the argument that there is a conventional reality (you, I, houses etc) and an ultimate reality (the sabhāva-dhammas). It is true that without clinging, there will be no aggregates and so there will be no conventional concept of "sentient being". For the Arahants, there is no clinging. With no clinging, there will be no future existence and so no future birth and death. For the Arahant however, they still have this existence (bhava) to contend with, human existence, because of their past ignorance. When there is ignorance, there has to be existence in some form. That is so, until the Arahant dies.Take a look at the follow reply from the arahant bhikkhuṇī Vajirā, in case there is any doubt that an arahant is not a sentient being (and as such, bhava cannot apply to them; because bhava is ceased, jāti and jarāmaraṇa cannot apply to them)
SN 5.10:
Why do you believe there’s such a thing as a ‘sentient being’?
Māra, is this your theory?
This is just a pile of conditions,
you won’t find a sentient being here.
Clearly then, without upādāna there is no bhava and likewise no satta. Without satta or bhava, there can be no jāti or jarāmaraṇa. As suttas such as SN 12.33 and 12.34 tell us, jāti and jarāmaraṇa in reference to the past and future is inferential knowledge that one can infer and assume based on discerning those phenomena in their present experience, without doubt. There's a lot more to go into this, but like I said I'll explain it in further detail and so on in due time.
My understanding of Theravādin doctrine is that once ignorance goes, none of the other links will ever arise again. That isn't a model of causality at all. It's also what the suttas say. When this is not, that does not arise at all. What is left is the dukkha which still exists because of past ignorance, until death finally comes. Then, finally, all dukkha ceases forever.As for the final parts of your comment about the cessation mode of paṭiccasamuppāda not being causal, I understand it clearly as one of dependency and conditionality, not causality. As I mentioned above, the reference to conditionality with jāti was a typo. My description of the cessation mode may seem causal to you because language is linear and I am trying to describe it in some detail. Funnily enough, the fact that you read it as implying a kind of linear causal sequence shutting down due to how I described it is rather apt at understanding why and how the Buddhist schools understood paṭiccasamuppāda in the same way as they analyzed and memorized the descriptions of the 12-link "chain" from the discourses. When avijjā ceases, dukkha ceases. When the floor is gone, the table falls. It is not one moment after the other, and my description was not describing rapid successions of cessation, but rather describing some of the details of the individual nidānas ceasing, assuming based on my post that it would be understood not to be a sequential description.
These two Nibbāna-elements were made known
By the Seeing One, stable and unattached:
One is the element seen here and now
With residue, but with the cord of being destroyed;
The other, having no residue for the future,
Is that wherein all modes of being utterly cease.
Having understood the unconditioned state,
Released in mind with the cord of being destroyed,
They have attained to the Dhamma-essence.
Delighting in the destruction (of craving),
Those stable ones have abandoned all being.
- Iti 44
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
Greetings, Pulsar!Pulsar wrote: ↑Wed Oct 12, 2022 11:39 am Are you referring to the entirety of teachings of the Buddha, inclusive of Samyutta nikaya/Samyukta
agama, that Buddha has not shown how Mindfulness is responsible for getting rid of Avijja and Dukkha? or just the suttas used by Nirodh27. I have not had time to follow this particular thread carefully.
With love
I'm sorry I didn't reply to this earlier— I was unaware of it.
Briefly, no, I am not (at all) suggesting that mindfulness is not one of the main tools for getting rid of avijjā and dukkha. My point is that some modern teachers say that when you are properly mindful, avijjā and dukkha cease temporarily. Sometimes it is more along the lines of adopting an attitude of "being the knowing" dispels all avijjā and dukkha temporarily in a non-dualistic awareness. I think that is nonsensical from the point of view of the suttas. While I certainly agree (how could I not) that being mindful and adopting a non-judgmental awareness, letting go of papañca, etc. are very useful tools and can make one much less bothered by dukkha, it certainly does not make avijjā "cease temporarily" which is impossible. Avijjā ceases when the āsavās cease, and the āsavās cease when avijjā ceases, which is only with the fruition of arahantship.
Even when someone adopts an attitude of sati-sapajañña and "pure awareness," there are still plenty of underlying tendencies to conceit, views, etc. and even deeper avijjā in that, otherwise they would become arahants then and there. Avijjā cannot temporarily disappear, because its disappearance is unshakable— otherwise arahantship would be some temporary state that arises and ceases with a certain attitude or awareness. To put it simply, adopting such an awareness, while helpful, is still undermined by one's own avijjā which cannot be escaped by turning to a form of knowing; that knowing, while perhaps "pure" from the perspective of the normal every-day awareness of the worldling, is still within the domain of avijjā.
The development of insight and wisdom is a separate issue, and one that culminates in the cessation of avijjā, but not one that requires it immediately. It is a gradual process. Eventually, proper mindfulness—based in right view, right intention, sīla, right effort, and culminating in right samādhi—will provide the conditions for seeing things clearly as they have come to be (yathābhūtañāṇadassana), leading to disenchantment and dispassion, and ultimately liberation. Anything before that is not a temporary arahant-equivalent state.
With mettā!
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
jankala wrote: ↑Sun Oct 16, 2022 8:36 pmGreetings, Pulsar!Pulsar wrote: ↑Wed Oct 12, 2022 11:39 am Are you referring to the entirety of teachings of the Buddha, inclusive of Samyutta nikaya/Samyukta
agama, that Buddha has not shown how Mindfulness is responsible for getting rid of Avijja and Dukkha? or just the suttas used by Nirodh27. I have not had time to follow this particular thread carefully.
With love
I'm sorry I didn't reply to this earlier— I was unaware of it.
Briefly, no, I am not (at all) suggesting that mindfulness is not one of the main tools for getting rid of avijjā and dukkha. My point is that some modern teachers say that when you are properly mindful, avijjā and dukkha cease temporarily. Sometimes it is more along the lines of adopting an attitude of "being the knowing" dispels all avijjā and dukkha temporarily in a non-dualistic awareness. I think that is nonsensical from the point of view of the suttas. While I certainly agree (how could I not) that being mindful and adopting a non-judgmental awareness, letting go of papañca, etc. are very useful tools and can make one much less bothered by dukkha, it certainly does not make avijjā "cease temporarily" which is impossible. Avijjā ceases when the āsavās cease, and the āsavās cease when avijjā ceases, which is only with the fruition of arahantship.
Even when someone adopts an attitude of sati-sapajañña and "pure awareness," there are still plenty of underlying tendencies to conceit, views, etc. and even deeper avijjā in that, otherwise they would become arahants then and there. Avijjā cannot temporarily disappear, because its disappearance is unshakable— otherwise arahantship would be some temporary state that arises and ceases with a certain attitude or awareness. To put it simply, adopting such an awareness, while helpful, is still undermined by one's own avijjā which cannot be escaped by turning to a form of knowing; that knowing, while perhaps "pure" from the perspective of the normal every-day awareness of the worldling, is still within the domain of avijjā.
The development of insight and wisdom is a separate issue, and one that culminates in the cessation of avijjā, but not one that requires it immediately. It is a gradual process. Eventually, proper mindfulness—based in right view, right intention, sīla, right effort, and culminating in right samādhi—will provide the conditions for seeing things clearly as they have come to be (yathābhūtañāṇadassana), leading to disenchantment and dispassion, and ultimately liberation. Anything before that is not a temporary arahant-equivalent state.
With mettā!
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
Greetings, Ceisiwr!
I typed out quite a lengthy reply addressing your response and with some different things to think about.
Right before sending it, though, it was lost to the forum! Lol. Such are conditioned things.
I'm not going to take the time to re-write all of it, so I think I'll just briefly respond which a handful of comments.
Prescriptivism vs. Descriptivism:
Early Buddhism being prescriptivist does not mean it doesn't give descriptions. It means that the descriptions it gives are the for sake of (yāvadeva) something other than for the sake of describing. The descriptions prescribe and instruct certain actions in order to transcend the need for descriptions. They are mere stepping stones, a raft, or a snake to be picked up with care.
The distinction between jāti (or jarāmaraṇa, etc.) being "concepts" vs. "physical realities" is unnecessary and not at all one that the arahant is bound by or inclined to believe. Distinguishing such things may be helpful for the sekha in removing papañca and whatnot, but the arahant—who is nippapañca—has no need whatsoever to make such a distinction which does not really exist. I summed up my now-deleted post with the word tathatā: Suchness. I find this is much more appropriate and essential for understanding what we're talking about here.
When the Buddha described jāti: did he mean it as a concept or as a physical reality?? The need to distinguish between these two is the real problem. A physical reality is itself a concept. A concept is a physical reality. They cannot be pulled or pried apart. Fully understanding saṁsāra amounts to realizing the insubstantiality of the whole thing, the emptiness in it. And even that emptiness is not grasped or clung to, because that is a realization within saṁsāra itself.
The other thing I'd say briefly (which could be described in length, as I somewhat did lol) is that you seem to contradict yourself.
I get the impression that you have come to certain conclusions, discerned or recognized certain things, etc. And yet you are forced to reconcile that with certain commentarial descriptions. You recognize that an arahant does not die because they are not the aggregates. But you assert, elsewhere, they do in fact die quite puzzlingly, as if to reconcile a certain view or position you've held (that they do die) with another one (that it makes no sense to say they really do).
If saying an arahant dies is nothing more than a convention reality, then it would seem that you take jarāmaraṇa to be a concept, ironically. "The reality is that they don't, but conceptually they kind of do in a conventional sense"-type of reasoning isn't what the Buddha seems to have been teaching generally to me here.. I don't think I agree with your interpretation of paṭiccasamuppāda; the Buddha was not just giving a description of conventional concepts and falsehoods. He was describing reality. He described it quite literally, and the definitions are literal. The fact that you take it conceptually and to all be metaphorical is alarmingly strange. The arahant dying is just a literal concept? I don't think we should take it that way. Jāti is literal. And the arahant literally is not born. This seems perhaps to be some influence from Abhidhamma and/or commentaries where the aggregates are an ultimate truth and the arahant is a conventional one. I would personally suggest setting that aside as it is not what the Buddha taught. Everything in saṁsāra is conventional.
Similarly, the jump from "present upādāna to future bhava" is just some left-over understanding that doesn't at all fit with the discussion and what the suttas have shown. There's no doubt that there's future bhava and renewed bhava. The point is that that is an inferential understanding based on the present bhava, not present knowledge of future bhava. It's become quite a tangle of illogical conclusions that, to me, contradict other conclusions you have or would otherwise come to reasonably.
Finally, I'd close with the fact that you've made a mistake in interpreting SN 12.33-34. The sutta does not say that one discerns the conditional relationship between jāti and jarāmaraṇa in the present. It says that one discerns the present phenomenon of jāti itself in the present, and they then infer that about the past or future. This seems to be a mix-up based on the English translation and phrasing perhaps, or just a misinterpretation. You may need to set aside the commentarial view to re-assess this, otherwise there's going to be a lot of cognitive dissonance with what the sutta actually says (which there seems to be a little bit of, correct me if I'm wrong). This is not referring to present knowledge of future jāti, nor present knowledge of the relationship between jāti and jarāmaraṇa. It's referring to knowledge of present jāti/bhava/upādāna/etc.
I think the commentaries may have offered plenty of value to some practitioners, and many of the venerable commentators may have understood the suttas quite well. That said, any interpretative lens that one uses to read the suttas is going to have some kind of flaws in it. They may have just based certain ideas and views (note: certain, not all) on things that are not reconcilable with other suttas, and these things went unnoticed and were then ignored or just kind of taken as an exception or mis-interpreted in line with the earlier established lens. We have to be willing to always reconcile any view or interpretative lens we have built up to understand the suttas: it can change with a single one. This doesn't mean, if it does change, the old one was wrong or all trash. It just means we have to adapt, take the good stuff, leave behind the stuff that seems to no longer fit with the suttas as we understand them, and move forward for the sake of emancipation.
That is what this is all for: emancipation. Getting stuck on views is the last thing it's for—something I'm sure we can all agree on. That's all for now because this is a big topic and lots to discuss. The main thing I'd like to emphasize is that we shouldn't feel the need to reconcile what we come to understand, read, or discern with previous models that we respected. We also don't need to throw out those models, we just need to know the limitation of any and all models whatsoever, no matter how sutta-based, and focus on freedom from the need for them at all, and the need for any Dhamma teachings whatsoever.
With mettā!
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
I disagree that it’s at odds with what the Buddha taught. This is also a Theravādin forum, so you shouldn’t be surprised that the Abhidhamma and commentaries are referred to. Your point about all of saṁsāra being conventional is very good Mahāyāna but bad Theravāda. I don’t think it’s supported by the earliest texts either. That said there are a lot of crypto-Mahāyānists on this forum, despite the forum description.jankala wrote: ↑Sun Oct 16, 2022 10:39 pm
This seems perhaps to be some influence from Abhidhamma and/or commentaries where the aggregates are an ultimate truth and the arahant is a conventional one. I would personally suggest setting that aside as it is not what the Buddha taught… Everything in saṁsāra is conventional
Well, I’m one of those heretical Theravādins who takes it that there are sabhāva-dhammas and concepts. That will give you some idea as to where I am coming from. To the rest, I’ll reply when I have time.If saying an arahant dies is nothing more than a convention reality, then it would seem that you take jarāmaraṇa to be a concept, ironically.
“The teacher willed that this world appear to me
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
as impermanent, unstable, insubstantial.
Mind, let me leap into the victor’s teaching,
carry me over the great flood, so hard to pass.”
Re: "Clearing the Path Continues": Ven. Anālayo's critique of Ven. Ñāṇavīra's Notes
It is funny that many peoples took and mixed ultimate reality and applies it on conventional realities without realising that the path doesnt works that way , that the trainings is gradual where the ultimate sense doesnt apply until one attains arahantship . Not taking the trainings working back to front .
No bashing No gossiping