What precisely is the problem with the so-called "three lives" model?
Let's try to state the same question in different terms, perhaps in this way things become more clear.
What precisely is the problem to "understand" the second noble truth as "three lives" model?
“And what, friends, is the noble truth of the origin of suffering? It is craving, which brings renewal of being, is accompanied by delight and lust, and delights in this and that; that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for being, and craving for non-being. This is called the noble truth of the origin of suffering."
Enough?
If not, the second noble truth can be expressed also in the terms of person (sakkaya):
five aggregates of holding and person (sakkaya) or burden are synonyms: “Lady, person, person’ is said. What is called person by the Blessed One?”“Friend Visākha, these five aggregates affected by clinging are called person by the Blessed One (MN 44)
First noble truth: Person (sakkaya) = suffering.
Second noble truth: Person is dependently arisen.
Third noble truth: Cessation of person = nibbana
Forth noble truth: There is the way leading to cessation of person.
Of course we know that these four noble truths are in fact one structure, so if one of these truths is seen - all other truths are seen.
So what precisely is the problem with the so-called "three lives" model, with introducing the past and future or so called momentariness?
And for such question the proper answer is that the state of being (bhava), considering oneself as a person living in the world is a state of dukkha now and here, and it depends on present condition, namely ignorance, and it is only by seeing now and here, what has come to being as such, one can practice and follow the path leading to the cessation of what has come to being, or more precisely to the cessation of person (sakkaya). Without such direct knowledge where immediate dependnce of bhava (being) on ignorance is directly known now and here, one must remain a puthujjana, victim of upadana, imprisoned in the dialectic: to be or not to be*.
So one who says that "apart from faith, apart from personal preference, apart from oral tradition, apart from reasoned reflection, apart from acceptance of a view after pondering it, I know this, I see this: ‘Nibbāna is the cessation of being.” and then teaches us that dependent arising describes the process of samsara extended to three existences, two existences, one existence, existence from moment to moment, in fact contradicts himself, since as ven Nanamoli says:
Dependent arising is not a logical proposition, nor is it a temporal cause-result chain. Such an approach makes an understanding of it impossible. (From Thinker's notebook)
But things are somehow more complicated. In certain period of time - I believe he has stopped to do so long time ago - Ven Ajahan Sumedho used writings of Ven Buddhadasa. While his version sounded much better and had some practical applications, it had no direct relation with dependent arising. And yet in his teaching about abandoning of sakkayaditthi he teaches Dhamma precisely in terms as we could expect from one who has direct knowledge of dependent arising: when this is - ignorance- this is - "I am"; when this is not - ignorance - this is not -"I am".
In terms of Ven Nanamoli, it looks like Ven Ajahn Sumedho sees that:
Being is a member of the paṭicca-samuppāda as arising which contains ignorance. Being is only invertible by ignorance. The destruction of ignorance destroys the illusion of being. When ignorance is no more, then consciousness no longer can attribute being (pahoti) at all. But that is not all; for when consciousness is predicated of one who has no more ignorance then it is no more indicatable (as it was indicated in MN 22).
Explanation for this apparent inconsistency lies in fact that strictly and precisely dependent arising is relation between the two things: when this is - this is. Notion of selfhood is associated with perception of permanence, so attavadin doesn't see his own being (bhava) as sankhata dhamma. And this is what precisely knowledge of dependent arising is : when this is (sankhara or determination - this is (sankhata dhamma or thing dependently arisen). In fact whatever exemplification of dependent arising we see in Suttas, it is always timeless relation sine qua non between sankhara and sankhata dhamma. And of course in such chain sankhata dhamma is itself sankhara for the next member.
Nanavira Thera:
In any case, the patticcasamuppāda formulation (as I see it) does not admit of alternative interpretations—there is one and one only. I do not see that anyone offering a number of different interpretations as equally valid can possibly be right in any of them. (It is quite possible that someone actually reaching sotāpatti, and therefore seeing patticcasamuppāda for himself, might still hesitate before deciding on the meaning of the expanded—twelve term—formulation, since what he sees for himself is Imasmim sati idam hoti, etc., and not its expansion in terms—avijjā, sankhārā, and so on—whose meaning he may not know. But one thing is certain: whatever interpretation he gives will be in conformity with his private knowledge, Imasmim sati…, and since he has already grasped the essence of the matter he will not look around for alternative interpretations.)
L 4
“Bhikkhus, there are two kinds of (wrong) view, and when deities and human beings are in their grip, some hang back and some over-reach; it is only those with vision that see. (...)
And how do those with vision see? Here a bhikkhu sees whatever has come to being as come to being. By seeing it thus he has entered upon the way to dispassion for it, to the fading and ceasing of lust for it. That is how one with vision sees.” Iti. 49
* “Bhikkhus, there are these two views: the view of being and the view of non-being. Any recluses or brahmins who rely on the view of being, adopt the view of being, accept the view of being, are opposed to the view of non-being. Any recluses or brahmins who rely on the view of non-being, adopt the view of non-being, accept the view of non-being, are opposed to the view of being.1707. “Any recluses or brahmins who do not understand as they actually are the origin, the disappearance, the gratification, the danger, and the escape in the case of these two views are affected by lust, affected by hate, affected by delusion, affected by craving, affected by clinging, without vision, given to favouring and opposing, and they delight in and enjoy proliferation. They are not freed from birth, ageing, and death; from sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair; they are not freed from suffering, I say.
(...)
“Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of clinging... MN 11
Summarise: immortality can be reached now and here, just by seeing that death is impermanent, determined and dependently arisen on the present condition, namely ignorance. Introducing temporal relation between the members of dependent arising destroys sine qua non relationship between members, so:
as to those recluses and brahmins who are unskilled in this world and the other world, unskilled in Māra’s realm and what is outside Māra’s realm, unskilled in the realm of Death and what is outside the realm of Death—it will lead to the harm and suffering for a long time of those who think they should listen to them and place faith in them.
MN 34
And that may be the main problem with the so-called "three lives" model.
The man who wants to avoid grotesque collapses should not look for anything to fulfill him in space and time.
Nicolás Gómez Dávila