Ceisiwr wrote: ↑Fri Feb 03, 2023 10:28 pm
The mahābhūta are also said to be dependently originated, so how are they independently existing substances?
Where in the suttas are the mahabhutas specifically said to be dependently originated? Not implied, or inferred, but openly stated "The four great elements are dependently originated, Bhikkhus." Or something similar? All I've seen is suttas where the Buddha kind of sidesteps discussion about some kind of reality by reiterating DO. Like the Kaccanagotta sutta. Everyone thinks he's saying all of reality is DO, but, if so, why didn't he say that? Instead, he suddenly starts listing off the twelve links of DO, which detail the birth of a being, and don't declare anything about the topic at hand directly.
ceisiwr wrote:
Well, if its a substance then it does really exist ontologically but it would have independent existence (for that is what substances are, by definition). That would mean it always is, which would mean you are viewing sense experience in terms of permanence and independence rather than impermanence and dependency. On substances, this is how they are laid out in Vaiśeṣika...
So, according to this orthodox strand of Brahminism, there are 10 substances the qualities of which we experience as colour, taste, smell and so on. The substances are eternal, because they have independent existence (for they do not rely on anything else, they aren't reducible to anything else), but their attributes do change and it is these attributes we experience via the senses. Substances then are independently existing realities which exist behind, but are the cause of, our sense experience. Now, of course, for the Buddha this is nonsense. Its nonsense because, for the Buddha, all we can know and experience are dependently originated dhammas. If there were substances, nothing would change, and its foolish, according to the Buddha, to speculate on things beyond our sense experience (which is where substances always are).
Again, the word "substances" and the definition you supply isn't found in the suttas. The word read as "substances" in the Phena sutta can also simply mean hollow, void, etc, and thus bares little resemblance to "substances" as you are using it. It might be best to forget the word "substances" all together, unless it can be shown that it is in the suttas in some consistent way that matches your usage. This is unlikely, since the Buddha didn't really teach about substances in that way, to my knowledge, but, rather, left that issue open.
ceisiwr wrote:
Form is dependent, and so it does not have independent existence. Not having an independent existence it then cannot be a substance. That would mean it can't be an atta, nor matter either.
Form as an aggregate of clinging is said to be dependently originated. It's entirely possible that the aggregates not subject to clinging are not DO. This is never clarified further in the suttas, but is left open.
Empty in the suttas is not necessarily dependently originated. It just means not having a self or what belongs to a self, as can be seen from my quote of Thanissaro, above.
So, hypothetically, if there were some thing that existed, like the cosmos, arising and ceasing over time in cycles of destruction and re arising, it wouldn't violate any sutta doctrine. Dependent origination is not required for things to lack self and permanence.
The thread I linked above gives details on the possibility that DO might only apply to the aggregates of clinging, not everything in the cosmos.
ceisiwr wrote:Well form is said to be dependently originated, and because of that it has no sāra (substance).
The word "sara," like "tuccho" does not necessarily mean "substance" in the way you're using it, but can also mean "essence" among other things. This, again, might just be refuting the soul/self/atta/god inside things. It does not necessarily mean things are without existence.
Sāra,[Vedic sāra nt.] 1.essential,most excellent,strong A.II,110; Vin.IV,214; J.III,368; Pug.53.-- 2.(m.) the innermost,hardest part of anything,the heart or pith of a tree (see also pheggu) M.I,111; J.I,331; Miln.413; most excellent kind of wood Vin.II,110; D.II,182,187; sattasārā the elect,the salt of the earth M.III,69.‹-› 3.substance,essence,choicest part (generally at the end of comp.) Vin.I,184; A.II,141; S.III,83,140; Sn.5,330,364; Dh.11 sq.; PvA.132,211 (candana°).sāre patiṭṭhito established,based,on what is essential M.I,31; A.II,183.-- 4.value Miln.10; appasāra of small value D.II,346.-- asāra worthless Sn.937; nissāra the same J.II,163 (pithless); mahāsāra of high value J.I,384,463.
ceisiwr wrote:Consider that back in Ancient or Medieval India it would be the likes of Nyāya who would argue that there are real "pots" which undergo change over time. Do you think Nyāya understood the Dhamma better than Buddhists did, at the time? With that said, there was a school of Buddhism which argued absolutely for the ontological existence of not pots but rather dhammas. This was the Sarvāstivādins. The pot doesn't really exist of course, but the dhammas that make it up do. There are atoms which, although existing momentarily, give rise to forms which we perceive. When we see a pot then, whats really there are atoms. There is an atom which bears "long", and atom for "black" and so on. The problem there is that for their system to work, they had to argue that the dhammas are substances. They had to do that, because in order to establish the ontological reality of anything you need substance. That is why they always exist, in the three times. This is why their name literally means "the all exists school". This of course would mean that the dhammas have an independent existence, and so its hard to see how they can also be dependently originated. Their reply was that although the dhammas always exist, they have to rely on each other to discharge their effects across time, into the present, and so are dependently arisen in that way. Doesn't make sense to me, to be honest, but
No, I don't think the Nyaya understood the dhamma better than Buddhists, but the Sarvastivadins may have been onto something. That said, though, I don't agree with them, either. Personally, I think the four elements in the suttas are semi permanent so long as the cosmos lasts, and then as it contracts, they are destroyed, and reborn again with the next cosmos. Thus, they are not dependently originated, that's only for beings, but they are impermanent, and lack self.
So, for all intents and purposes, there are such things as matter, and the four elements, in the suttas. They are not DO, but they are temporary, and not self.
ceisiwr wrote:based on our past conversations I know how important realism is to you, and I do wonder if you might not be more at home with the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma based on what you have argued here and elsewhere. Sadly, of course, there is no living school to follow today.
The only reason realism is important to me is because I spent many years as an idealist, and, over time, I read more and more about these ideas, and discovered that philosophies that try to build themselves up on idealism and other such things are, by their own definition, merely imaginary. They always, without exception, have fatal internal contradictions that cause them to collapse. This is innate in such systems. It cannot be avoided. Attacking too much of, or all of existence necessarily causes self destruction.
Interestingly, the Madhyamaka were either consciously aware of this, or subconsciously aware of it, because some of them developed robust defenses against idealism, and presented strong cases for the reality of the conventional world. This is probably why they have two truths in the first place. Some of them were very intelligent (Chandrakirti was probably a literal genius), and saw that their opponents in other schools were making sense when they pointed out the logical fallacies and self refutation inherent in their views, and realized that simply saying, as Nagarjuna did, that their position or view isn't a position, nor a view, isn't enough, and isn't a particularly convincing way out of self refutation. Saying EVERYTHING is dependently originated leads to a vicious infinite regression, and other logical problems, and we end up with a non existent existence (or the emptiness of emptiness). For the faithful, this is no problem, it is the mystery of the dharma. However, for the secular, which is what I generally am, this does not stand, and so I have to look at the dharma/dhamma in ways that do not collapse like that.
Here is one of their very firm defenses of the reality of the conventional:
In the following, conventional means "roughly what philosophers nowadays call common sense or
the folk theory of the world (Jay Garfield, Is Moonshadows Lunacy?):
"[l]f there were no place for conventional phenomena, the existence of which is established by the epistemic instruments, these phenomena would be like the snake - that is,
the rope grasped as a snake - of which no cause or effect is possible. . . .
[l]f one were forced to maintain that there is no place for bondage, liberation, etc in the
meaning of “conventional existence/’ and that these must be placed only in the erroneous perspective, that would be a great philosophical error.
Even worse, as long as convention is conceived [as entirely nonexistent], since there
would be no role for the epistemic instruments, neither the proposition maintained nor
the person who maintains it nor the proof - including scriptural sources and reasoning - could be established by epistemic instruments. So it would be ridiculous to maintain
that there are no genuine phenomena delivered by the epistemic instruments.” {Ocean
30-31 )15
Tsong khapa makes it plain here that conventional phenomena, unlike the snake
thought to be perceived when one sees a rope, have causes and effects, and are
actual. Moreover, he argues that the repudiation of the reality of the conventional
would undermine the possibility of epistemic authority, undermining even the abil-
ity to argue cogently that the conventional does not exist. Such a position would
be self-refuting.
-Jay Garfield, Taking Conventional Truth Seriously
And here is Chandrakirti, refuting idealism, and defending the reality of the conventional against the idealist position:
The word “only” has no capacity to negate the objective component of knowledge (jneya).
“(87)…the Lankavatara sutra substitutes “mind alone” for “mind alone is preeminent in the context of everyday experience.” The meaning of this scripture is not to be understood as a negation of form.”
…When the scripture says “mind alone exists; form does not,” this is taught to deny the importance of form and so forth, not to negate their very existence…
(88) If he intended to deny the existence of objective reality wen he said that [the world] is mind alone, then why would the mahatma declare, in the same text, that mind is produced from delusion (moha) and volitional action (karman)?
What sensible person would look at a passage from this same [Dasabhumikasutra] and imagine that consciousness exists as an independent thing (vastutah)? A notion like this is nothing more than dogmatic opinion. It follows that the expression “mind only” serves only to clarify that mind is the most significant element [in experience] This text should not be understood to assert that there is no objective form (rupa).
(90a-b) Even though objective form does indeed exist, it is not, like mind, an agent
This means that objective form is inert.
(90c-d) Therefore, denying any other agent besides mind is not the same as negating objective form altogether.
Some people take (the Samkhya) idea of “matter” (pradhana) and such things as agent, others believe it is mind, but everyone agrees that objective form is not an agent. To prevent pradhana and so forth from being taken as agent, it is explained that they do not have any such characteristic. Seeing that it has the capacity to serve as agent, one declares that mind alone is the agent, and in doing so one gains the high ground in any debate concerning the agency of pradhana and so forth. It is as if two kings desire power in a single land, and one of the two rivals is expelled while the other assumes control of the country. No matter who wins, the citizens are indispensable and would suffer no harm. So it is here, because objective form is indispensable to both, it suffers no loss. One can certainly maintain that objective form exists. Therefore, continuing in the same manner, the text declares:
(91) Within the context of everyday affairs, all five psychophysical constituents taken for granted in the world do exist. However, none of the five appears to a yogi who pursues illuminating knowledge of reality.
Therefore, seeing as this is so,
(92a-b) If form does not exist, then do not cling to the existence of mind; and if mind exists, then do not cling to the nonexistence of form.
When, for some reason, one does not admit the existence of form, then the existence of both is equally unreasonable and one must admit the nonexistence of mind, as well. And when one admits the existence of mind, then it is necessary to admit the existence of form, for both are conventionally real.
...
One can certainly maintain that objective form exists.
...
[Refutation of a noncognized entity (reflexive awareness) as the ultimate truth]
(72) If this “dependent entity” exists in the absence of both subject and object, then who is aware of its existence? It would be unacceptable to assert that it exists unapprehended.
(73) It is not proven that [a cognition] is aware of itself. Nor can this be proven by using the subsequent memory [of a previous event as evidence], for in this case the thesis intended to substantiate your claim itself embodies an unproven premise, and therefore it cannot be admitted [as valid proof].
(76) Therefore, without [this notion of] reflexive awareness who (or what) will apprehend your dependent [form]? The actor, the object [of the action], and the action are not identical, and for this reason it is illogical to maintain that [a cognition] apprehends itself.
(77) However, if the entity which is [a manifestation of this] dependent form (paratantrarupavastu) exists without ever having been produced or cognized, then why should our opponent insist that [belief in] the son of a barren woman is irrational? What harm could the son of a barren woman inflict on him [that he has not already suffered through belief in his concept of dependent form]?
(78) And in the event that this dependent [form] in no way whatsoever exists, then what will function as the cause for the screen [of conventional truth]? All the ordered structure of everyday experience is laid waste by this clinging to a real substance inherent in our opponents philosophical views.
[The true meaning of teachings on “mind alone”]
(79) There is no means of finding peace for those walking outside the path trodden by the master Nagarjuna. Such people have strayed from the truth of the screen and from the reality [expressed in the truth of the highest meaning], and on account of this they will never be free.
(80) Conventional truth is the means, the truth of the highest meaning is the goal, and one who does not appreciate the distinction between these two treads a wrong path through his reified concepts.
(81) We [Madhyamikas] do not have the same attitude toward our [concept of] the screen as you [Yogacarins] have toward your [concept of] dependent being (paratantrabhava). With reference to the nature of everyday experience, we say: “Even though things do not exist, they exist” - and this is done for a specified purpose.
(82) [The things of the world] do not exist for the saints who have abandoned the pyschophysical aggregates and found peace. If, in a similar manner, they did not exist in the context of everyday experience, then we would not maintain that they do - even in this qualified sense.
(83) If everyday experience poses no threat to you, then you may persist in this denial of the evidence provided by such experience. Quarrel with the evidence of everyday experience, and afterward we will rely on the winner.
-Chandrakirti, Madhyamakavatara
And here is Garfield on Nagarjuna:
I will argue that this nihilistic reading of Nagarjuna is unjustified, and that Nagarjuna is
in fact a robust realist, offering an analysis, not a refutation of existence.
-Madhyamaka is Not Nihilism
Jay L Garfield
Smith College
University of Melbourne
Central University of Tibetan Studies
So, there's even a case for realism in at least some of the Mahayana. I am not alone. But, generally speaking, most Mahayana schools are idealist, or otherwise incompatible with realism, as are the Mahayana sutras. Further, the Madhyamaka are all over the place, and, ultimately, fall into the trap of self refutation, unless one considers only the conventional as true, and conventional reality is just commonsense reality, which, of course, is a form of realism. Some find this palatable, but this is a little redundant in my view. Though I do see great wisdom in the final conclusion of the Madhyamakins like Chandrakirti, that over analysis of anything causes it to break down, and become incoherent, which necessitates seeing conventional reality as true, in at least some sense, I think the steps to get there are superfluous to the extent of being ridiculous. This is why I don't claim to be a Mahayanist. See below for an example of this type of argument.
I begin by noting two prima facie reasons for treating conventional truth as a truth in
the work of both CandrakTrti and Tsong khapa.7 First, there is a very important sense
in which the conventional truth is the only truth that there is. There are two ways of
making this point. First, as we noted above, the two truths are, in some sense, identi-
cal. If that is true, then even ultimate truth is only conventional. The second way to
make this point is this, though: the ultimate truth is emptiness, the absence of true, or
inherent, existence in things. The ultimate truth is thus the fact that they are merely
conventionally existent. Neither Tsong khapa nor CandrakTrti would put the point
this way. Tsong khapa argues, following CandrakTrti very closely, that the ultimate
truth - emptiness - is an external negation, a mere elimination of any intrinsic ex-
istence in things, and of any conceptualization (Ocean 52-23). But this in the end
amounts to the same thing, since to be merely existent is to lack any intrinsic identity.
The ultimate e truth is, hence, even for Tsong khapa, that the conventional truth is all
that there is.
-Taking Conventional Truth Seriously: Authority
Regarding Deceptive Reality
Jay L. Garfield
If the Buddha of the suttas said all the exact same stuff as the Buddha of the Mahayana sutras, actually declaring "All is mind, nothing exists, etc. etc." I wouldn't be a Buddhist at all. I wouldn't try to find realism and non contradiction within. I'm not smart enough to come up with the textual and logical gymnastics like Chandrakirti to somehow make the sutras not idealist lol! Just like I don't call myself an Advaita Vedantist, or a Kantian philosopher, and try to claim they are realist philosophies lol! I'm not gripping onto some pipe dream version of Buddhism, I'm looking at it broadly, and accepting that the suttas don't necessitate reading them as idealist, nor do they rule out realism. If anything, they rule out idealism, and they are certainly open to things existing, at least in some way. Further, as I'm sure you're aware, the orthodox Theravada is a realist system. However, since you're implying that I am alone in holding that Theravada is realist, and you are implying the only Buddhist system that is realist is Sarvastivadin, which would be the only place for a Buddhist realist, I'll assume maybe you forgot, and I'll post some quotes demonstrating this, below.
It's also worth noting that the definition you have in mind for "realism" is probably not what I mean when I say it. I simply mean there are at least some things that are mind independent. That's it, at a minimum. I don't think things exist in and of themselves, like Platonism. I don't think there is a "tableness" to tables. I literally just mean that things aren't imaginary, in at least some sense. This could be the sense of the Madhyamakins who defend conventional, commonsense, folk theory realism, or Garfield's take on Nagarjuna as a type of realist, or the orthodox Theravada who have a realist system built upon other ideas, or how Y. Karunadasa sees the suttas as clearly realist, or any other system or idea that states that things are not merely imaginary, or non existent. I accept the view that things are in some sense real, and mind independent, as valid. The only other position I consider valid is extreme Ajnana style skepticism, where one literally takes no position whatsoever, and just says "I don't know." in response to questions about realism, and so on. Not like Nagarjuna's being ostensibly without a position, where there is clearly a position of dependent origination, emptiness, and so on (as demonstrated very well by Stafford L. Betty), but literally no position whatsoever.
At the very least, I would concede that my personal ideas about the suttas may be wrong, but the fact remains that the orthodox Theravada school is realist, and so, it will always be compatible with my thinking, in at least that one respect, despite disagreeing on all of my other ideas about DO, and so on.
The final end of philosophy, for me, may very well be in agreement with the final Madhyamaka position as articulated by Garfield, echoing Chandrakirti and Tsong Khapa, yet I would sidestep endless arguing about how everything simply MUST be empty and DO. I would say, we can argue literally every point, including arguing against DO and emptiness. There is always a counter argument, no exceptions. We can refute each other until there is nothing even coherent to be said. Regardless, though, of these arguments, the conventional world is unavoidable. Even if the idealist (or whatever position that denies commonsense reality) triumphs and defeats the realist in debate, they still have to eat, pay their bills, and so on. Even if the realist triumphs in debate, they still have to contend with their thoughts, dreams, anxiety, and so on. Both exist conventionally, and there is simply no way of getting around this. None.
Quarrel with the evidence of everyday experience, and afterward we will rely on the winner.
So, I will always practice jhana, and follow the eightfold path, because these things have efficacy in conventional reality, as studies show meditation is good for us, following the precepts is good, and, frequently, keeping the precepts is legally required (in case any readers are moral relativists). All of these are also efficacious in regards to ultimate reality, if there is such a thing.
Following are quotes demonstrating that orthodox Theravada is realism:
Regarding their theory of sense perception and the nature of the cognitive object, the Theravāda Abhidhamma view is a kind of direct realism that says we do perceive external physical objects.
Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 149.
"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters. The whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, which has the attainment of Nibbana as its final goal, is based on the recognition of the material world and the conscious living beings living therein.
Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp.172;
This theory ensures that the object of direct and immediate
perception is not an object of mental interpretation but something that is
ultimately real.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 149.
Thus the Theravādins were able to establish the theory
of direct perception of the external object despite their recognizing the
theory of momentariness.
-ibid. page 146
What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas
is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognises
the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject
yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that
truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that
owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
-Y. Kunadasa, The Dhamma Theory, page 38
dhamma theory is best described as dhamma realism
-The Theravada Abhidhamma: Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality
By Y. Karunadasa, chapter 2
It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…
…
Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions…
…
…the commentaries consummate the dhamma theory by supplying the formal definition of dhammas as “things which bear their own intrinsic nature” (attano sabhavam dharenti ti dhamma).
…
…concretely produced matter…possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.
…
Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 15, 26, 235, 260
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.
"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa