On the Abhidhamma

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Ceisiwr
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Fri Feb 03, 2023 4:54 pm ...
We also see this view in the suttas, which is denied by the Buddha
“Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does the view arise: ‘There are these seven substances that are not made, not derived, not created, without a creator, barren, steady as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. They don’t move or deteriorate or obstruct each other. They’re unable to cause pleasure, pain, or both pleasure and pain to each other. What seven? The substances of earth, water, fire, air; pleasure, pain, and the soul is the seventh. These seven substances are not made, not derived, not created, without a creator, barren, steady as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. They don’t move or deteriorate or obstruct each other."
https://suttacentral.net/sn24.8/en/suja ... ript=latin

If I were to guess, I would say we are looking at a follower of proto-Vaiśeṣika here. The view arises due to clinging. When we cling to sense experience we view it in terms of permanence, in terms of enduring substances.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
zan
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

Ceisiwr wrote: Fri Feb 03, 2023 10:28 pm

The mahābhūta are also said to be dependently originated, so how are they independently existing substances?
Where in the suttas are the mahabhutas specifically said to be dependently originated? Not implied, or inferred, but openly stated "The four great elements are dependently originated, Bhikkhus." Or something similar? All I've seen is suttas where the Buddha kind of sidesteps discussion about some kind of reality by reiterating DO. Like the Kaccanagotta sutta. Everyone thinks he's saying all of reality is DO, but, if so, why didn't he say that? Instead, he suddenly starts listing off the twelve links of DO, which detail the birth of a being, and don't declare anything about the topic at hand directly.



ceisiwr wrote: Well, if its a substance then it does really exist ontologically but it would have independent existence (for that is what substances are, by definition). That would mean it always is, which would mean you are viewing sense experience in terms of permanence and independence rather than impermanence and dependency. On substances, this is how they are laid out in Vaiśeṣika...



So, according to this orthodox strand of Brahminism, there are 10 substances the qualities of which we experience as colour, taste, smell and so on. The substances are eternal, because they have independent existence (for they do not rely on anything else, they aren't reducible to anything else), but their attributes do change and it is these attributes we experience via the senses. Substances then are independently existing realities which exist behind, but are the cause of, our sense experience. Now, of course, for the Buddha this is nonsense. Its nonsense because, for the Buddha, all we can know and experience are dependently originated dhammas. If there were substances, nothing would change, and its foolish, according to the Buddha, to speculate on things beyond our sense experience (which is where substances always are).
Again, the word "substances" and the definition you supply isn't found in the suttas. The word read as "substances" in the Phena sutta can also simply mean hollow, void, etc, and thus bares little resemblance to "substances" as you are using it. It might be best to forget the word "substances" all together, unless it can be shown that it is in the suttas in some consistent way that matches your usage. This is unlikely, since the Buddha didn't really teach about substances in that way, to my knowledge, but, rather, left that issue open.
ceisiwr wrote:
Form is dependent, and so it does not have independent existence. Not having an independent existence it then cannot be a substance. That would mean it can't be an atta, nor matter either.
Form as an aggregate of clinging is said to be dependently originated. It's entirely possible that the aggregates not subject to clinging are not DO. This is never clarified further in the suttas, but is left open.

Empty in the suttas is not necessarily dependently originated. It just means not having a self or what belongs to a self, as can be seen from my quote of Thanissaro, above.


So, hypothetically, if there were some thing that existed, like the cosmos, arising and ceasing over time in cycles of destruction and re arising, it wouldn't violate any sutta doctrine. Dependent origination is not required for things to lack self and permanence.

The thread I linked above gives details on the possibility that DO might only apply to the aggregates of clinging, not everything in the cosmos.



ceisiwr wrote:Well form is said to be dependently originated, and because of that it has no sāra (substance).
The word "sara," like "tuccho" does not necessarily mean "substance" in the way you're using it, but can also mean "essence" among other things. This, again, might just be refuting the soul/self/atta/god inside things. It does not necessarily mean things are without existence.
Sāra,[Vedic sāra nt.] 1.essential,most excellent,strong A.II,110; Vin.IV,214; J.III,368; Pug.53.-- 2.(m.) the innermost,hardest part of anything,the heart or pith of a tree (see also pheggu) M.I,111; J.I,331; Miln.413; most excellent kind of wood Vin.II,110; D.II,182,187; sattasārā the elect,the salt of the earth M.III,69.‹-› 3.substance,essence,choicest part (generally at the end of comp.) Vin.I,184; A.II,141; S.III,83,140; Sn.5,330,364; Dh.11 sq.; PvA.132,211 (candana°).sāre patiṭṭhito established,based,on what is essential M.I,31; A.II,183.-- 4.value Miln.10; appasāra of small value D.II,346.-- asāra worthless Sn.937; nissāra the same J.II,163 (pithless); mahāsāra of high value J.I,384,463.
ceisiwr wrote:Consider that back in Ancient or Medieval India it would be the likes of Nyāya who would argue that there are real "pots" which undergo change over time. Do you think Nyāya understood the Dhamma better than Buddhists did, at the time? With that said, there was a school of Buddhism which argued absolutely for the ontological existence of not pots but rather dhammas. This was the Sarvāstivādins. The pot doesn't really exist of course, but the dhammas that make it up do. There are atoms which, although existing momentarily, give rise to forms which we perceive. When we see a pot then, whats really there are atoms. There is an atom which bears "long", and atom for "black" and so on. The problem there is that for their system to work, they had to argue that the dhammas are substances. They had to do that, because in order to establish the ontological reality of anything you need substance. That is why they always exist, in the three times. This is why their name literally means "the all exists school". This of course would mean that the dhammas have an independent existence, and so its hard to see how they can also be dependently originated. Their reply was that although the dhammas always exist, they have to rely on each other to discharge their effects across time, into the present, and so are dependently arisen in that way. Doesn't make sense to me, to be honest, but
No, I don't think the Nyaya understood the dhamma better than Buddhists, but the Sarvastivadins may have been onto something. That said, though, I don't agree with them, either. Personally, I think the four elements in the suttas are semi permanent so long as the cosmos lasts, and then as it contracts, they are destroyed, and reborn again with the next cosmos. Thus, they are not dependently originated, that's only for beings, but they are impermanent, and lack self.

So, for all intents and purposes, there are such things as matter, and the four elements, in the suttas. They are not DO, but they are temporary, and not self.
ceisiwr wrote:based on our past conversations I know how important realism is to you, and I do wonder if you might not be more at home with the Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma based on what you have argued here and elsewhere. Sadly, of course, there is no living school to follow today.
The only reason realism is important to me is because I spent many years as an idealist, and, over time, I read more and more about these ideas, and discovered that philosophies that try to build themselves up on idealism and other such things are, by their own definition, merely imaginary. They always, without exception, have fatal internal contradictions that cause them to collapse. This is innate in such systems. It cannot be avoided. Attacking too much of, or all of existence necessarily causes self destruction.

Interestingly, the Madhyamaka were either consciously aware of this, or subconsciously aware of it, because some of them developed robust defenses against idealism, and presented strong cases for the reality of the conventional world. This is probably why they have two truths in the first place. Some of them were very intelligent (Chandrakirti was probably a literal genius), and saw that their opponents in other schools were making sense when they pointed out the logical fallacies and self refutation inherent in their views, and realized that simply saying, as Nagarjuna did, that their position or view isn't a position, nor a view, isn't enough, and isn't a particularly convincing way out of self refutation. Saying EVERYTHING is dependently originated leads to a vicious infinite regression, and other logical problems, and we end up with a non existent existence (or the emptiness of emptiness). For the faithful, this is no problem, it is the mystery of the dharma. However, for the secular, which is what I generally am, this does not stand, and so I have to look at the dharma/dhamma in ways that do not collapse like that.

Here is one of their very firm defenses of the reality of the conventional:

In the following, conventional means "roughly what philosophers nowadays call common sense or
the folk theory of the world (Jay Garfield, Is Moonshadows Lunacy?):
"[l]f there were no place for conventional phenomena, the existence of which is established by the epistemic instruments, these phenomena would be like the snake - that is,
the rope grasped as a snake - of which no cause or effect is possible. . . .
[l]f one were forced to maintain that there is no place for bondage, liberation, etc in the
meaning of “conventional existence/’ and that these must be placed only in the erroneous perspective, that would be a great philosophical error.
Even worse, as long as convention is conceived [as entirely nonexistent], since there
would be no role for the epistemic instruments, neither the proposition maintained nor
the person who maintains it nor the proof - including scriptural sources and reasoning - could be established by epistemic instruments. So it would be ridiculous to maintain
that there are no genuine phenomena delivered by the epistemic instruments.” {Ocean
30-31 )15

Tsong khapa makes it plain here that conventional phenomena, unlike the snake
thought to be perceived when one sees a rope, have causes and effects, and are
actual. Moreover, he argues that the repudiation of the reality of the conventional
would undermine the possibility of epistemic authority, undermining even the abil-
ity to argue cogently that the conventional does not exist. Such a position would
be self-refuting.
-Jay Garfield, Taking Conventional Truth Seriously
And here is Chandrakirti, refuting idealism, and defending the reality of the conventional against the idealist position:
The word “only” has no capacity to negate the objective component of knowledge (jneya).

“(87)…the Lankavatara sutra substitutes “mind alone” for “mind alone is preeminent in the context of everyday experience.” The meaning of this scripture is not to be understood as a negation of form.”

…When the scripture says “mind alone exists; form does not,” this is taught to deny the importance of form and so forth, not to negate their very existence…

(88) If he intended to deny the existence of objective reality wen he said that [the world] is mind alone, then why would the mahatma declare, in the same text, that mind is produced from delusion (moha) and volitional action (karman)?

What sensible person would look at a passage from this same [Dasabhumikasutra] and imagine that consciousness exists as an independent thing (vastutah)? A notion like this is nothing more than dogmatic opinion. It follows that the expression “mind only” serves only to clarify that mind is the most significant element [in experience] This text should not be understood to assert that there is no objective form (rupa).

(90a-b) Even though objective form does indeed exist, it is not, like mind, an agent

This means that objective form is inert.

(90c-d) Therefore, denying any other agent besides mind is not the same as negating objective form altogether.

Some people take (the Samkhya) idea of “matter” (pradhana) and such things as agent, others believe it is mind, but everyone agrees that objective form is not an agent. To prevent pradhana and so forth from being taken as agent, it is explained that they do not have any such characteristic. Seeing that it has the capacity to serve as agent, one declares that mind alone is the agent, and in doing so one gains the high ground in any debate concerning the agency of pradhana and so forth. It is as if two kings desire power in a single land, and one of the two rivals is expelled while the other assumes control of the country. No matter who wins, the citizens are indispensable and would suffer no harm. So it is here, because objective form is indispensable to both, it suffers no loss. One can certainly maintain that objective form exists. Therefore, continuing in the same manner, the text declares:

(91) Within the context of everyday affairs, all five psychophysical constituents taken for granted in the world do exist. However, none of the five appears to a yogi who pursues illuminating knowledge of reality.

Therefore, seeing as this is so,

(92a-b) If form does not exist, then do not cling to the existence of mind; and if mind exists, then do not cling to the nonexistence of form.

When, for some reason, one does not admit the existence of form, then the existence of both is equally unreasonable and one must admit the nonexistence of mind, as well. And when one admits the existence of mind, then it is necessary to admit the existence of form, for both are conventionally real.

...

One can certainly maintain that objective form exists.

...

[Refutation of a noncognized entity (reflexive awareness) as the ultimate truth]

(72) If this “dependent entity” exists in the absence of both subject and object, then who is aware of its existence? It would be unacceptable to assert that it exists unapprehended.

(73) It is not proven that [a cognition] is aware of itself. Nor can this be proven by using the subsequent memory [of a previous event as evidence], for in this case the thesis intended to substantiate your claim itself embodies an unproven premise, and therefore it cannot be admitted [as valid proof].

(76) Therefore, without [this notion of] reflexive awareness who (or what) will apprehend your dependent [form]? The actor, the object [of the action], and the action are not identical, and for this reason it is illogical to maintain that [a cognition] apprehends itself.

(77) However, if the entity which is [a manifestation of this] dependent form (paratantrarupavastu) exists without ever having been produced or cognized, then why should our opponent insist that [belief in] the son of a barren woman is irrational? What harm could the son of a barren woman inflict on him [that he has not already suffered through belief in his concept of dependent form]?

(78) And in the event that this dependent [form] in no way whatsoever exists, then what will function as the cause for the screen [of conventional truth]? All the ordered structure of everyday experience is laid waste by this clinging to a real substance inherent in our opponents philosophical views.

[The true meaning of teachings on “mind alone”]

(79) There is no means of finding peace for those walking outside the path trodden by the master Nagarjuna. Such people have strayed from the truth of the screen and from the reality [expressed in the truth of the highest meaning], and on account of this they will never be free.

(80) Conventional truth is the means, the truth of the highest meaning is the goal, and one who does not appreciate the distinction between these two treads a wrong path through his reified concepts.

(81) We [Madhyamikas] do not have the same attitude toward our [concept of] the screen as you [Yogacarins] have toward your [concept of] dependent being (paratantrabhava). With reference to the nature of everyday experience, we say: “Even though things do not exist, they exist” - and this is done for a specified purpose.

(82) [The things of the world] do not exist for the saints who have abandoned the pyschophysical aggregates and found peace. If, in a similar manner, they did not exist in the context of everyday experience, then we would not maintain that they do - even in this qualified sense.

(83) If everyday experience poses no threat to you, then you may persist in this denial of the evidence provided by such experience. Quarrel with the evidence of everyday experience, and afterward we will rely on the winner.
-Chandrakirti, Madhyamakavatara
And here is Garfield on Nagarjuna:
I will argue that this nihilistic reading of Nagarjuna is unjustified, and that Nagarjuna is
in fact a robust realist, offering an analysis, not a refutation of existence.
-Madhyamaka is Not Nihilism
Jay L Garfield
Smith College
University of Melbourne
Central University of Tibetan Studies
So, there's even a case for realism in at least some of the Mahayana. I am not alone. But, generally speaking, most Mahayana schools are idealist, or otherwise incompatible with realism, as are the Mahayana sutras. Further, the Madhyamaka are all over the place, and, ultimately, fall into the trap of self refutation, unless one considers only the conventional as true, and conventional reality is just commonsense reality, which, of course, is a form of realism. Some find this palatable, but this is a little redundant in my view. Though I do see great wisdom in the final conclusion of the Madhyamakins like Chandrakirti, that over analysis of anything causes it to break down, and become incoherent, which necessitates seeing conventional reality as true, in at least some sense, I think the steps to get there are superfluous to the extent of being ridiculous. This is why I don't claim to be a Mahayanist. See below for an example of this type of argument.


I begin by noting two prima facie reasons for treating conventional truth as a truth in
the work of both CandrakTrti and Tsong khapa.7 First, there is a very important sense
in which the conventional truth is the only truth that there is. There are two ways of
making this point. First, as we noted above, the two truths are, in some sense, identi-
cal. If that is true, then even ultimate truth is only conventional. The second way to
make this point is this, though: the ultimate truth is emptiness, the absence of true, or
inherent, existence in things. The ultimate truth is thus the fact that they are merely
conventionally existent. Neither Tsong khapa nor CandrakTrti would put the point
this way. Tsong khapa argues, following CandrakTrti very closely, that the ultimate
truth - emptiness - is an external negation, a mere elimination of any intrinsic ex-
istence in things, and of any conceptualization (Ocean 52-23). But this in the end
amounts to the same thing, since to be merely existent is to lack any intrinsic identity.
The ultimate e truth is, hence, even for Tsong khapa, that the conventional truth is all
that there is.
-Taking Conventional Truth Seriously: Authority
Regarding Deceptive Reality
Jay L. Garfield

If the Buddha of the suttas said all the exact same stuff as the Buddha of the Mahayana sutras, actually declaring "All is mind, nothing exists, etc. etc." I wouldn't be a Buddhist at all. I wouldn't try to find realism and non contradiction within. I'm not smart enough to come up with the textual and logical gymnastics like Chandrakirti to somehow make the sutras not idealist lol! Just like I don't call myself an Advaita Vedantist, or a Kantian philosopher, and try to claim they are realist philosophies lol! I'm not gripping onto some pipe dream version of Buddhism, I'm looking at it broadly, and accepting that the suttas don't necessitate reading them as idealist, nor do they rule out realism. If anything, they rule out idealism, and they are certainly open to things existing, at least in some way. Further, as I'm sure you're aware, the orthodox Theravada is a realist system. However, since you're implying that I am alone in holding that Theravada is realist, and you are implying the only Buddhist system that is realist is Sarvastivadin, which would be the only place for a Buddhist realist, I'll assume maybe you forgot, and I'll post some quotes demonstrating this, below.

It's also worth noting that the definition you have in mind for "realism" is probably not what I mean when I say it. I simply mean there are at least some things that are mind independent. That's it, at a minimum. I don't think things exist in and of themselves, like Platonism. I don't think there is a "tableness" to tables. I literally just mean that things aren't imaginary, in at least some sense. This could be the sense of the Madhyamakins who defend conventional, commonsense, folk theory realism, or Garfield's take on Nagarjuna as a type of realist, or the orthodox Theravada who have a realist system built upon other ideas, or how Y. Karunadasa sees the suttas as clearly realist, or any other system or idea that states that things are not merely imaginary, or non existent. I accept the view that things are in some sense real, and mind independent, as valid. The only other position I consider valid is extreme Ajnana style skepticism, where one literally takes no position whatsoever, and just says "I don't know." in response to questions about realism, and so on. Not like Nagarjuna's being ostensibly without a position, where there is clearly a position of dependent origination, emptiness, and so on (as demonstrated very well by Stafford L. Betty), but literally no position whatsoever.

At the very least, I would concede that my personal ideas about the suttas may be wrong, but the fact remains that the orthodox Theravada school is realist, and so, it will always be compatible with my thinking, in at least that one respect, despite disagreeing on all of my other ideas about DO, and so on.

The final end of philosophy, for me, may very well be in agreement with the final Madhyamaka position as articulated by Garfield, echoing Chandrakirti and Tsong Khapa, yet I would sidestep endless arguing about how everything simply MUST be empty and DO. I would say, we can argue literally every point, including arguing against DO and emptiness. There is always a counter argument, no exceptions. We can refute each other until there is nothing even coherent to be said. Regardless, though, of these arguments, the conventional world is unavoidable. Even if the idealist (or whatever position that denies commonsense reality) triumphs and defeats the realist in debate, they still have to eat, pay their bills, and so on. Even if the realist triumphs in debate, they still have to contend with their thoughts, dreams, anxiety, and so on. Both exist conventionally, and there is simply no way of getting around this. None.
Quarrel with the evidence of everyday experience, and afterward we will rely on the winner.
So, I will always practice jhana, and follow the eightfold path, because these things have efficacy in conventional reality, as studies show meditation is good for us, following the precepts is good, and, frequently, keeping the precepts is legally required (in case any readers are moral relativists). All of these are also efficacious in regards to ultimate reality, if there is such a thing.

Following are quotes demonstrating that orthodox Theravada is realism:


Regarding their theory of sense perception and the nature of the cognitive object, the Theravāda Abhidhamma view is a kind of direct realism that says we do perceive external physical objects.

Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 149.

"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters. The whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, which has the attainment of Nibbana as its final goal, is based on the recognition of the material world and the conscious living beings living therein.

Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp.172;

This theory ensures that the object of direct and immediate
perception is not an object of mental interpretation but something that is
ultimately real.
-Karunadasa, Y. Buddhist Analysis of Matter, pp. 149.

Thus the Theravādins were able to establish the theory
of direct perception of the external object despite their recognizing the
theory of momentariness.
-ibid. page 146

What emerges from this Abhidhammic doctrine of dhammas
is a critical realism, one which (unlike idealism) recognises
the distinctness of the world from the experiencing subject
yet also distinguishes between those types of entities that
truly exist independently of the cognitive act and those that
owe their being to the act of cognition itself.
-Y. Kunadasa, The Dhamma Theory, page 38

dhamma theory is best described as dhamma realism
-The Theravada Abhidhamma: Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality
By Y. Karunadasa, chapter 2

It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data. Such a conception of the nature of the real seems to be already implicit in the Sutta Pitaka, particularly in the Buddha’s disquisitions on the aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent arising, etc.,…

Thus by examining the conventional realities with wisdom, we eventually arrive at the objective actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs. It is these objective actualities – the dhammas, which maintain their intrinsic natures independent of the mind’s constructive functions…



…the commentaries consummate the dhamma theory by supplying the formal definition of dhammas as “things which bear their own intrinsic nature” (attano sabhavam dharenti ti dhamma).

…concretely produced matter…possess intrinsic natures and are thus suitable for contemplation and comprehension by insight.

Great seers who are free from craving declare that Nibbana is an
objective state which is deathless, absolutely endless, unconditioned,
and unsurpassed.
Thus as fourfold the Tathagatas reveal the ultimate realities—
consciousness, mental factors, matter, and Nibbana.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, Acariya Anuruddha, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, pages 3, 15, 26, 235, 260
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by asahi »

When one is not knowing the dukkha exactly as it is , here is abhidhamma come in .
No bashing No gossiping
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Ceisiwr
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Sat Feb 04, 2023 3:22 am
Where in the suttas are the mahabhutas specifically said to be dependently originated? Not implied, or inferred, but openly stated "The four great elements are dependently originated, Bhikkhus." Or something similar? All I've seen is suttas where the Buddha kind of sidesteps discussion about some kind of reality by reiterating DO. Like the Kaccanagotta sutta. Everyone thinks he's saying all of reality is DO, but, if so, why didn't he say that? Instead, he suddenly starts listing off the twelve links of DO, which detail the birth of a being, and don't declare anything about the topic at hand directly.
The mahābhūta are said to be internal or external. The internal mahābhūta are part of dependent origination, and are part of our physical side. The eternal mahābhūta is what is external to us. The internal mahābhūta are, quite obviously, dependently originated. As such, they cannot be substances. Now part element meditation is to realise that both the internal and external mahābhūta are the same thing

“Rāhula, the interior earth element and the exterior earth element are just the earth element. This should be truly seen with right understanding like this: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’ When you truly see with right understanding, you reject the earth element, detaching the mind from the earth element." - AN 4.177

What distinguishes them as internal and external is our grasping of them, our labelling of one set as "mine" and the other as "other" but in reality, there is only "earth element". Now, if the internal earth element is dependently originated and so is without substance, the external element must also be without substance, for they are the same thing.

“Mendicants, there are ascetics and brahmins who don’t understand the earth element, its origin, its cessation, and the practice that leads to its cessation. They don’t understand the water element … fire element … air element … Those venerables don’t realize the goal of life as an ascetic or brahmin, and don’t live having realized it with their own insight." - SN 14.39
Again, the word "substances" and the definition you supply isn't found in the suttas. The word read as "substances" in the Phena sutta can also simply mean hollow, void, etc, and thus bares little resemblance to "substances" as you are using it. It might be best to forget the word "substances" all together, unless it can be shown that it is in the suttas in some consistent way that matches your usage. This is unlikely, since the Buddha didn't really teach about substances in that way, to my knowledge, but, rather, left that issue open.
That is similar to how we use "substance" in English. We can say your argument lacks substance, because it has no basis, or we can say form has no substance, because it has no basis. In the sutta form is without substance (asāra), meaning it has no basis. You say the Buddha never touched upon substances, but he did all the time. The main substance the Buddha was concerned with was the atta, but he would have been aware of other substance theories as well. He would have done, because of Jainism and because of either Vaiśeṣika or proto-Vaiśeṣika thought
“Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does the view arise: ‘There are these seven substances that are not made, not derived, not created, without a creator, barren, steady as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. They don’t move or deteriorate or obstruct each other. They’re unable to cause pleasure, pain, or both pleasure and pain to each other. What seven? The substances of earth, water, fire, air; pleasure, pain, and the soul is the seventh. These seven substances are not made, not derived, not created, without a creator, barren, steady as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. They don’t move or deteriorate or obstruct each other."
https://suttacentral.net/sn24.8/en/suja ... ript=latin

The Buddha focused on the atta, but his denial of the atta-substance also extends to all other substances too including earth-substance, air-substance, feeling-substance, matter, etc.
Form as an aggregate of clinging is said to be dependently originated. It's entirely possible that the aggregates not subject to clinging are not DO. This is never clarified further in the suttas, but is left open.

Empty in the suttas is not necessarily dependently originated. It just means not having a self or what belongs to a self, as can be seen from my quote of Thanissaro, above.
On the "aggregates not subject to clinging" if they weren't dependently originated that would mean they are permanent, sukha and ... self. The reason why things are empty is because they are dependently originated. Because they arise dependently, they can't be said to have independent existence. Since they don't have an independent existence, they aren't substances. Are there substances behind sense experience perhaps? The Buddha said it's foolish to speculate on that.
So, hypothetically, if there were some thing that existed, like the cosmos, arising and ceasing over time in cycles of destruction and re arising, it wouldn't violate any sutta doctrine. Dependent origination is not required for things to lack self and permanence.

The thread I linked above gives details on the possibility that DO might only apply to the aggregates of clinging, not everything in the cosmos.
If they don't arise dependently, then they exist independently. If they have independent existence, then they are permanent.
No, I don't think the Nyaya understood the dhamma better than Buddhists, but the Sarvastivadins may have been onto something. That said, though, I don't agree with them, either. Personally, I think the four elements in the suttas are semi permanent so long as the cosmos lasts, and then as it contracts, they are destroyed, and reborn again with the next cosmos. Thus, they are not dependently originated, that's only for beings, but they are impermanent, and lack self.

So, for all intents and purposes, there are such things as matter, and the four elements, in the suttas. They are not DO, but they are temporary, and not self.
To a Vaibhāṣika (what people commonly call Sarvāstivāda) there is direct perception. When we look at a flower, we directly see external and ontologically existent dhammas. We never see a flower of course, as that is a concept, but what really exists, what we really see, are a group of atoms. There is an atom for "long", and atom for "short", an atom for "green" and an atom for "blue and so on. These then are directly cognised by the mind, which is why their system is that of uncompromising realism. Now the effects of these atoms on the mind is temporary, but the atoms themselves always exist. They are enduring substances, which we experience as momentariness due to a difference in them discharging their effects across time. Personally I don't think this is something the Buddha would agree with. On you comment about the four elements, i struggle to see how you can say something is semi-permanent? Something is either permanent or impermanent. If it is permanent, it will always be so. You wish to say something endures across time, but that leads you back to substance theory. We experience the universe as changing characteristics, but the universe itself endures. The universe there has become a substance, and so once again it is to see permanence in sense experience rather than impermanence.
The only reason realism is important to me is because I spent many years as an idealist, and, over time, I read more and more about these ideas, and discovered that philosophies that try to build themselves up on idealism and other such things are, by their own definition, merely imaginary. They always, without exception, have fatal internal contradictions that cause them to collapse. This is innate in such systems. It cannot be avoided. Attacking too much of, or all of existence necessarily causes self destruction.

Interestingly, the Madhyamaka were either consciously aware of this, or subconsciously aware of it, because some of them developed robust defenses against idealism, and presented strong cases for the reality of the conventional world. This is probably why they have two truths in the first place. Some of them were very intelligent (Chandrakirti was probably a literal genius), and saw that their opponents in other schools were making sense when they pointed out the logical fallacies and self refutation inherent in their views, and realized that simply saying, as Nagarjuna did, that their position or view isn't a position, nor a view, isn't enough, and isn't a particularly convincing way out of self refutation. Saying EVERYTHING is dependently originated leads to a vicious infinite regression, and other logical problems, and we end up with a non existent existence (or the emptiness of emptiness). For the faithful, this is no problem, it is the mystery of the dharma. However, for the secular, which is what I generally am, this does not stand, and so I have to look at the dharma/dhamma in ways that do not collapse like that.
Well, I would agree that Idealism doesn't make much sense. We are to use the conventional to awaken but the end point for both the Theravādin and Mahāyānist alike is Emptiness, Signless and Desireless. To arrive at an understanding of the Emptiness of the substance of self in experience (and so what belongs to a self too), the emptiness all signs (characteristics) and the emptiness of there being anything worth having. If we deny substance in experience, and put aside speculations about things existing outside of sense experience, can we really speak of anything existing or not existing at all? If we can't speak of a self or of anything really existing or not existing at all, what is there left to desire?
So, there's even a case for realism in at least some of the Mahayana. I am not alone. But, generally speaking, most Mahayana schools are idealist, or otherwise incompatible with realism, as are the Mahayana sutras. Further, the Madhyamaka are all over the place, and, ultimately, fall into the trap of self refutation, unless one considers only the conventional as true, and conventional reality is just commonsense reality, which, of course, is a form of realism. Some find this palatable, but this is a little redundant in my view. Though I do see great wisdom in the final conclusion of the Madhyamakins like Chandrakirti, that over analysis of anything causes it to break down, and become incoherent, which necessitates seeing conventional reality as true, in at least some sense, I think the steps to get there are superfluous to the extent of being ridiculous. This is why I don't claim to be a Mahayanist. See below for an example of this type of argument.
As I said in an earlier post we speak of substances and think in terms of realism and direct perception in our everyday discourse. There is nothing wrong in this per se. It's a very useful way of communicating. Its also useful to say "We met at sunrise". In reality though, we never met at sunrise. We never did, because what really happened is the earth rotated rather than the sun rising. Likewise, whilst its useful to speak in terms of substances, of "I" and "you" and "houses" and "trees" which we all see and feel, at a higher analysis and insight we can see how these sentences, concepts, words aren't all that accurate at all. Instead we can see dependent origination, and when we see that we see nibbāna. When we see nibbāna instead of seeing "I" and "flowers" and "beautiful" we see Emptiness, Signless and Desireless.
Following are quotes demonstrating that orthodox Theravada is realism:
The Theravādin Abhidhamma is very good in terms of epistemology, and in aiding meditation, but ontologically it become more difficult IMO. As we discussed on another forum, if we take the earth element Theravāda will deny there is any substance to it. There is no earth substance which bears the characteristic of "hard" in Theravāda, for that would be to accept the substance vs attribute distinction, but rather there is only "hardness" and nothing else. This reduces the dhamma to being a mere characteristic or quality of experience, and so it then becomes conceptually hard to understand how this bare quality can be said to exist externally let alone how it can cause "hot" to arise or how it can form objects and so on, or hot the bare quality of "hot" can generate "hardness". I think this was one of the main issues Mahāyānists had with the Abhidharma. That of moving from epistemology and what is experienced to ontology, rather than the Abhidharma per se. From what I've read, many Mahāyānists accept and use Abhidharma but they only do so conventionally.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
zan
Posts: 1402
Joined: Sun Aug 28, 2016 1:57 pm

Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Feb 04, 2023 11:34 am
zan wrote: Sat Feb 04, 2023 3:22 am
Where in the suttas are the mahabhutas specifically said to be dependently originated? Not implied, or inferred, but openly stated "The four great elements are dependently originated, Bhikkhus." Or something similar? All I've seen is suttas where the Buddha kind of sidesteps discussion about some kind of reality by reiterating DO. Like the Kaccanagotta sutta. Everyone thinks he's saying all of reality is DO, but, if so, why didn't he say that? Instead, he suddenly starts listing off the twelve links of DO, which detail the birth of a being, and don't declare anything about the topic at hand directly.
The mahābhūta are said to be internal or external. The internal mahābhūta are part of dependent origination, and are part of our physical side. The eternal mahābhūta is what is external to us. The internal mahābhūta are, quite obviously, dependently originated. As such, they cannot be substances. Now part element meditation is to realise that both the internal and external mahābhūta are the same thing

“Rāhula, the interior earth element and the exterior earth element are just the earth element. This should be truly seen with right understanding like this: ‘This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self.’ When you truly see with right understanding, you reject the earth element, detaching the mind from the earth element." - AN 4.177

What distinguishes them as internal and external is our grasping of them, our labelling of one set as "mine" and the other as "other" but in reality, there is only "earth element". Now, if the internal earth element is dependently originated and so is without substance, the external element must also be without substance, for they are the same thing.

“Mendicants, there are ascetics and brahmins who don’t understand the earth element, its origin, its cessation, and the practice that leads to its cessation. They don’t understand the water element … fire element … air element … Those venerables don’t realize the goal of life as an ascetic or brahmin, and don’t live having realized it with their own insight." - SN 14.39
Again, the word "substances" and the definition you supply isn't found in the suttas. The word read as "substances" in the Phena sutta can also simply mean hollow, void, etc, and thus bares little resemblance to "substances" as you are using it. It might be best to forget the word "substances" all together, unless it can be shown that it is in the suttas in some consistent way that matches your usage. This is unlikely, since the Buddha didn't really teach about substances in that way, to my knowledge, but, rather, left that issue open.
That is similar to how we use "substance" in English. We can say your argument lacks substance, because it has no basis, or we can say form has no substance, because it has no basis. In the sutta form is without substance (asāra), meaning it has no basis. You say the Buddha never touched upon substances, but he did all the time. The main substance the Buddha was concerned with was the atta, but he would have been aware of other substance theories as well. He would have done, because of Jainism and because of either Vaiśeṣika or proto-Vaiśeṣika thought
“Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does the view arise: ‘There are these seven substances that are not made, not derived, not created, without a creator, barren, steady as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. They don’t move or deteriorate or obstruct each other. They’re unable to cause pleasure, pain, or both pleasure and pain to each other. What seven? The substances of earth, water, fire, air; pleasure, pain, and the soul is the seventh. These seven substances are not made, not derived, not created, without a creator, barren, steady as a mountain peak, standing firm like a pillar. They don’t move or deteriorate or obstruct each other."
https://suttacentral.net/sn24.8/en/suja ... ript=latin

The Buddha focused on the atta, but his denial of the atta-substance also extends to all other substances too including earth-substance, air-substance, feeling-substance, matter, etc.
Form as an aggregate of clinging is said to be dependently originated. It's entirely possible that the aggregates not subject to clinging are not DO. This is never clarified further in the suttas, but is left open.

Empty in the suttas is not necessarily dependently originated. It just means not having a self or what belongs to a self, as can be seen from my quote of Thanissaro, above.
On the "aggregates not subject to clinging" if they weren't dependently originated that would mean they are permanent, sukha and ... self. The reason why things are empty is because they are dependently originated. Because they arise dependently, they can't be said to have independent existence. Since they don't have an independent existence, they aren't substances. Are there substances behind sense experience perhaps? The Buddha said it's foolish to speculate on that.
So, hypothetically, if there were some thing that existed, like the cosmos, arising and ceasing over time in cycles of destruction and re arising, it wouldn't violate any sutta doctrine. Dependent origination is not required for things to lack self and permanence.

The thread I linked above gives details on the possibility that DO might only apply to the aggregates of clinging, not everything in the cosmos.
If they don't arise dependently, then they exist independently. If they have independent existence, then they are permanent.
No, I don't think the Nyaya understood the dhamma better than Buddhists, but the Sarvastivadins may have been onto something. That said, though, I don't agree with them, either. Personally, I think the four elements in the suttas are semi permanent so long as the cosmos lasts, and then as it contracts, they are destroyed, and reborn again with the next cosmos. Thus, they are not dependently originated, that's only for beings, but they are impermanent, and lack self.

So, for all intents and purposes, there are such things as matter, and the four elements, in the suttas. They are not DO, but they are temporary, and not self.
To a Vaibhāṣika (what people commonly call Sarvāstivāda) there is direct perception. When we look at a flower, we directly see external and ontologically existent dhammas. We never see a flower of course, as that is a concept, but what really exists, what we really see, are a group of atoms. There is an atom for "long", and atom for "short", an atom for "green" and an atom for "blue and so on. These then are directly cognised by the mind, which is why their system is that of uncompromising realism. Now the effects of these atoms on the mind is temporary, but the atoms themselves always exist. They are enduring substances, which we experience as momentariness due to a difference in them discharging their effects across time. Personally I don't think this is something the Buddha would agree with. On you comment about the four elements, i struggle to see how you can say something is semi-permanent? Something is either permanent or impermanent. If it is permanent, it will always be so. You wish to say something endures across time, but that leads you back to substance theory. We experience the universe as changing characteristics, but the universe itself endures. The universe there has become a substance, and so once again it is to see permanence in sense experience rather than impermanence.
The only reason realism is important to me is because I spent many years as an idealist, and, over time, I read more and more about these ideas, and discovered that philosophies that try to build themselves up on idealism and other such things are, by their own definition, merely imaginary. They always, without exception, have fatal internal contradictions that cause them to collapse. This is innate in such systems. It cannot be avoided. Attacking too much of, or all of existence necessarily causes self destruction.

Interestingly, the Madhyamaka were either consciously aware of this, or subconsciously aware of it, because some of them developed robust defenses against idealism, and presented strong cases for the reality of the conventional world. This is probably why they have two truths in the first place. Some of them were very intelligent (Chandrakirti was probably a literal genius), and saw that their opponents in other schools were making sense when they pointed out the logical fallacies and self refutation inherent in their views, and realized that simply saying, as Nagarjuna did, that their position or view isn't a position, nor a view, isn't enough, and isn't a particularly convincing way out of self refutation. Saying EVERYTHING is dependently originated leads to a vicious infinite regression, and other logical problems, and we end up with a non existent existence (or the emptiness of emptiness). For the faithful, this is no problem, it is the mystery of the dharma. However, for the secular, which is what I generally am, this does not stand, and so I have to look at the dharma/dhamma in ways that do not collapse like that.
Well, I would agree that Idealism doesn't make much sense. We are to use the conventional to awaken but the end point for both the Theravādin and Mahāyānist alike is Emptiness, Signless and Desireless. To arrive at an understanding of the Emptiness of the substance of self in experience (and so what belongs to a self too), the emptiness all signs (characteristics) and the emptiness of there being anything worth having. If we deny substance in experience, and put aside speculations about things existing outside of sense experience, can we really speak of anything existing or not existing at all? If we can't speak of a self or of anything really existing or not existing at all, what is there left to desire?
So, there's even a case for realism in at least some of the Mahayana. I am not alone. But, generally speaking, most Mahayana schools are idealist, or otherwise incompatible with realism, as are the Mahayana sutras. Further, the Madhyamaka are all over the place, and, ultimately, fall into the trap of self refutation, unless one considers only the conventional as true, and conventional reality is just commonsense reality, which, of course, is a form of realism. Some find this palatable, but this is a little redundant in my view. Though I do see great wisdom in the final conclusion of the Madhyamakins like Chandrakirti, that over analysis of anything causes it to break down, and become incoherent, which necessitates seeing conventional reality as true, in at least some sense, I think the steps to get there are superfluous to the extent of being ridiculous. This is why I don't claim to be a Mahayanist. See below for an example of this type of argument.
As I said in an earlier post we speak of substances and think in terms of realism and direct perception in our everyday discourse. There is nothing wrong in this per se. It's a very useful way of communicating. Its also useful to say "We met at sunrise". In reality though, we never met at sunrise. We never did, because what really happened is the earth rotated rather than the sun rising. Likewise, whilst its useful to speak in terms of substances, of "I" and "you" and "houses" and "trees" which we all see and feel, at a higher analysis and insight we can see how these sentences, concepts, words aren't all that accurate at all. Instead we can see dependent origination, and when we see that we see nibbāna. When we see nibbāna instead of seeing "I" and "flowers" and "beautiful" we see Emptiness, Signless and Desireless.
Following are quotes demonstrating that orthodox Theravada is realism:
The Theravādin Abhidhamma is very good in terms of epistemology, and in aiding meditation, but ontologically it become more difficult IMO. As we discussed on another forum, if we take the earth element Theravāda will deny there is any substance to it. There is no earth substance which bears the characteristic of "hard" in Theravāda, for that would be to accept the substance vs attribute distinction, but rather there is only "hardness" and nothing else. This reduces the dhamma to being a mere characteristic or quality of experience, and so it then becomes conceptually hard to understand how this bare quality can be said to exist externally let alone how it can cause "hot" to arise or how it can form objects and so on, or hot the bare quality of "hot" can generate "hardness". I think this was one of the main issues Mahāyānists had with the Abhidharma. That of moving from epistemology and what is experienced to ontology, rather than the Abhidharma per se. From what I've read, many Mahāyānists accept and use Abhidharma but they only do so conventionally.
The reason substances is probably not fruitful word for you and I to discuss is because your definition is the very specific Western philosophy definition. This is the definition not found in the suttas consistently. In the sutta you referenced, for example, the Buddha is explaining and refuting the philosophy of Pakudha Kaccayana, who believed all things are eternal, and never interact with each other, in other suttas, he uses the word in different ways. Hence, as always in the suttas, this doesn't mean he was refuting exactly the western definition of "substance."

When we look up "substance" in a Western philosophy textbook, we find your definition. When we look up "sara" in a Pali dictionary, we find a very different definition, as well as several meanings for the word, only one of which is "substance" and that word is only there because a person who had Western philosophy in mind put it there. It's clear that every time "sara" is used in the suttas, it does not mean precisely your pigeon holed Western usage, which allows you to always say, "Substances are independent, by definition." in all cases that the word "sara" is used, and so on.

As to things being semi permanent, this is the gist of the suttas. The cosmos exist for a very long time, while humans live and die in them. Then, the cosmos contract, and are destroyed, and reborn. Saying something that is always around, and only disappears during a cyclical time of destruction, but always comes back is semi permanent seems like a rational choice of words. It's not impermanent in the usual sense that it will cease entirely necessarily, nor is it permanent in the usual sense that it never goes away. Granted, though, the terms, if taken very literally, end up being an oxymoron of sorts. Maybe I should throw out the word "permanent?" What if I said "the cosmos is temporary, but exists for a very long time before being destroyed, and rearising." ? This satisfies the suttas teaching that all things are temporary, but doesn't necessitate mixing it with DO, which is only spoken about in relation to beings, with very few exceptions, and which most likely still reference the links which are about beings, while the cosmos are spoken about as a separate topic, frequently.

That said, I've no idea why the choice, for you, is either EVERYTHING is dependently originated/empty, or eternal and totally independent. There is no hard and fast, inescapable thinking that means things must be so binary.

As to the elements, the Buddha clearly delineated internal from external, and when he goes on to declare the external elements destroying cities, it would be a little absurd to say that this means they are merely part of the DO of a single being, or only talking about experience, and couldn't delineate anything beyond conscious experience. That's clearly not what he meant. This is further evident, for the fact that the earth element outlasts human beings. And, that human beings leave corpses behind, that are unconscious. There is no way to read that as a teaching that the elements are somehow dependent on a being, or merely facets of experience. If you are correct that they are said to be such in the sutta you referenced, then the suttas are self contradictory, because unconscious dead bodies don't work within that idea. To be clear: I don't think they mean precisely what you say, so there is no contradiction, but if you are right, then there is contradiction. I think they mean that the mahabhutas, internal, and external, are both mind independent, and outlast humans, but are still temporary, and consciousness depends on them being formulated in a specific way.

That said, even if all things are DO, that doesn't mean there cannot be wildly varying timescales. For example, the earth might exist for billions of years, dependent on the cycle of the cosmos, and other elements, while a human being only exists for a hundred years, dependent on food, and other things. This is very compatible with realism. The earth is entirely mind independent, and exists even after a human dies, as again, their corpse is specifically delineated to remain, unconscious. While it is still dependent on the other elements, and will eventually cease to be, this does not mean it exists only as part of experience, or any other such thing. There is no other way to read the teaching that the earth element outlasts a human by a longshot (MN 28), and that humans leave unconscious corpses behind. The mahabhutas are mind independent. Even if they, themselves, the mahabhutas, are dependent on each other, or something else, that does not mean they only exist as part of DO when it is involved with a being. In fact, that reading is conclusively ruled out.
That is what the Buddha said. Then the Holy One, the Teacher, went on to say:

“Form is like a lump of foam;
feeling is like a bubble;
perception seems like a mirage;
choices like a banana tree;
and consciousness like a magic trick:
so taught the kinsman of the Sun.

However you contemplate them,
examining them carefully,
they’re void and hollow
when you look at them closely.

Concerning this body,
he of vast wisdom has taught
that when three things are given up,
you’ll see this form discarded.

Vitality, warmth, and consciousness:
when they leave the body,
it lies there tossed aside,
food for others, mindless.

Such is this process,
this illusion, cooed over by fools.
It’s said to be a killer,
for no substance is found here.
-Phena sutta, SN 22.95
All too soon, this body
will lie on the ground
cast off,
bereft of consciousness,
like a useless scrap
of wood.
-Dhp 41
The first feature of such causality that must be emphasized is that there can be a substantial time interval between a cause and its effect. It is a mistake to assume that the effect follows one moment after its cause, or that it appears simultaneously with its cause. In Buddhist causality, the cause and its effect can be separated by any length of time.
-Ajahn Brahm
As to the realism of Theravada, yes, it is problematic in your opinion. Here's the thing I don't understand about you and most Buddhists: You find problems with everything, but you swallow dependent origination/emptiness of all things (or however you use it) hook, line, and sinker, and claim it as irrefutably true, and preach it like gospel. Do you really not see that there are potentially just as many serious problems with this use of DO, as there are with all the things you critique, and use DO as the solution for? The Madhyamaka geniuses followed this line of thinking all the way through, and demonstrated that it leads to all positions being incoherent, and eventually to self refutation, necessitating denying DO/emptiness as a position in the first place, and the creation of a two truths system. They end up cornered by their opponents, even when their opponents are imaginary, created by them, for their writings, and have no way out of the accusation of self refutation but to say "I'm not wrong because I don't have a position." Which, of course, is nonsense, when they spent countless pages claiming the position that all things are dependently originated is the only correct view on the world. Of note, as I posted previously, no such system is attested in the suttas, and the Buddha actually specifically denied such a system.
Nāgārjuna’s refutation raises an immediate objection from his realist opponent
(Matilal 1986, 64). If there are no well-established means to distinguish reliable from
unreliable cognitions, what is then the epistemic status of this refutation? Is it itself
reliable? If it is, it should be supported by some well-established means of reliable
cognition in flagrant contradiction to the skeptical thesis. If it is not reliable, why should
we give it any credence? Against this accusation that his refutation is self-stultifying,
Nāgārjuna gives this famous answer:
If I had any position, I thereby would be at fault. But since I have no
position, I am not at fault at all.

- THE MADHYAMAKA CONTRIBUTION TO SKEPTICISM
Georges Dreyfus
Williams College
and
Jay L Garfield
Smith College
Harvard Divinity School
Central University of Tibetan Studies
University of Melbourne
"Of course I'm wrong; that's precisely what makes me right,"
-Stafford L Betty, paraphrasing Nagarjuna in "Nagarjuna's Masterpiece: Logical, Mystical, Both, or Neither?"
“The truth is one,

there is no second

about which a person who knows it

would argue with one who knows.”
-Sn 4.12
In other words, DO is problematic. This is the problem the orthodox Theravada dealt with, and possibly solved with their system, it's the problem the Sarvastivadin's dealt with and ended up with eternal dhammas, and the problem the Madhyamakins dealt with, and ended up with the emptiness of emptiness, and so on. Yet each one thinks only the OTHER schools have problems, but their system is air tight. Are you seeing the pattern, and the consistent factor, here?

The Buddha saw this, too, and that's why these topics are on the list of things that shouldn't be thought about lol (AN 4.77)! This, in addition to the evidence of what DO is even said to be in the suttas, is why I think he taught that only beings are DO, because this avoids the whole issue.

Surely you will say you don't think everything is as I'm assuming you do. Okay, then, same question, with a tweak: Do you really not see that there are potentially just as many serious problems with whatever your reading of the dhamma is, as there are with all the things you critique, and use your reading of the dhamma as the solution for?

I see it, for my technical positions on the suttas, which is why I only take the broad stance that the suttas support some degree of mind independent reality. Again, unconscious corpses cannot be spoken of in any other universe but one where mind independent reality is affirmed, not to mention all the other suttas that affirm mind independent reality. Anything else, like whether or not all things are DO, I admit I may be wrong. The only exception is if the counter would also refute mind independent reality, because that introduces contradiction into the suttas. In these cases, like with the mahabhutas, I won't say I know some totally assured point about them, like that they are definitely not DO, but I will say they have to be mind independent. All my other points are speculation.

In other words, I don't have some broad, extremely complex, overarching idea about the dhamma, that I apply to all of reality. I have one simple position. Everything else is just ideas and talk. This is because I know that really complex ideas tend to be more vulnerable to attack, as well as self refutation. Again, this is demonstrated repeatedly by the Madhyamaka, probably in response to their constant refutation of complex systems, including abhidhamma. Conventional reality cannot be refuted without the refutation being refuted in the process. If we say the mind and senses that tell us that, for example, there is a computer, and another person to read my replies, who exists beyond what I currently perceive, and so on, are unreliable, or false, or do not exist outside of mind or something similarly destructive, then, these very same mind and senses, which deliver us the position that they are false, are themselves false. Once we decide nothing is real, things don't exist outside of the mind, or whatever else, we've nothing to discuss, by definition, as if the conventional is totally tossed out, there's no reason to think this post is real, or being read by anyone, and so on. And this includes dramatic critiques to conventional reality, because they always lead to a cascade of other issues, which casts doubt on everything, which, again, means posting things on an internet forum would be irrational, and pointless. So, my position is that conventional reality, which of course holds that there are things which are mind independent, is true, in at least some sense, and that's about it. Thus, we've always something to discuss. The only point I will never bend on is the point that allows us to have a discussion in the first place, because, to fold, and agree that this point is wrong, is to self refute, and, further, make discussion impossible, irrational, and even asinine.

Keep it simple, and we both can agree. Get complicated, and you're probably wrong. I'm probably also wrong lol! We're applying ancient religious ideas about the four elements to modern discussion, it's not likely there is going to be a clear winner when all things are considered.

I'm just wondering, can you agree with this? Or do you really think your complex understanding of DO and other dhamma ideas are truly the unequivocally true explanation of all of reality?

I'm only asking because I want to make sure I'm not beating my head against a wall, here. If you truly believe that DO and whatever other complex dhamma ideas are irrefutably true, and fully demonstrated in the texts, beyond all doubt, then I'll engage you the same way I engage a Hindu who believes the existence of the atta is irrefutably true, and fully demonstrated in their texts, beyond all doubt, because both schools went to the same lengths to prove these points, and both supposedly defeated the other, and both believe modern science, philosophy, etc. agree with them, and prove them correct lol! Hence, if we're discussing things where there is zero give on your side, I've no interest in such a pointless endeavour. I don't argue with Advaitins that god isn't real, and that things aren't imaginary, as I've no desire to try to force my views on someone like that. Let them have their beliefs, if they make them happy. Though I would discuss this with an agnostic, who saw Advaita broadly, with a healthy amount of skepticism. Likewise, I am mostly secular, and agnostic about the complex dhamma teachings, and see that they could have some problems, but I don't want to try to force my agnosticism on the faithful who follow the dhamma and hold it as completely true.

Don't get me wrong, I'll still happily talk to you! You're a very patient, friendly person! You have even been nice when I've been frustrated. You're a pretty awesome guy. I enjoy talking to you! I'm just saying I wouldn't be trying to convince you of my positions, or trying to see if you could see things differently any longer. I will respect that your faith is unshakeable, and leave it at that, and discuss things differently.
Last edited by zan on Sun Feb 05, 2023 8:27 pm, edited 10 times in total.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Sun Feb 05, 2023 6:27 pm The reason substances is probably not fruitful word for you and I to discuss is because your definition is the very specific Western philosophy definition. This is the definition not found in the suttas consistently. In the sutta you referenced, for example, the Buddha is explaining and refuting the philosophy of Pakudha Kaccayana, who believed all things are eternal, and never interact with each other, in other suttas, he uses the word in different ways. Hence, as always in the suttas, this doesn't mean he was refuting exactly the western definition of "substance."
I can't reply in full at the moment, but I did want to reply to this here for now. The substance metaphysics I'm referring to isn't a western thing. The exact same thinking was around during the time of the Buddha. The Jains argued it, as did other schools. Pakudha Kaccayana was arguing for a form of substance metaphysics (and might I say, a consistent one at that). The atta is a substance, for example.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Feb 05, 2023 6:42 pm
zan wrote: Sun Feb 05, 2023 6:27 pm The reason substances is probably not fruitful word for you and I to discuss is because your definition is the very specific Western philosophy definition. This is the definition not found in the suttas consistently. In the sutta you referenced, for example, the Buddha is explaining and refuting the philosophy of Pakudha Kaccayana, who believed all things are eternal, and never interact with each other, in other suttas, he uses the word in different ways. Hence, as always in the suttas, this doesn't mean he was refuting exactly the western definition of "substance."
I can't reply in full at the moment, but I did want to reply to this here for now. The substance metaphysics I'm referring to isn't a western thing. The exact same thinking was around during the time of the Buddha. The Jains argued it, as did other schools. Pakudha Kaccayana was arguing for a form of substance metaphysics (and might I say, a consistent one at that). The atta is a substance, for example.
Yes, in some contexts, it is very similar, I never denied that, which is what I was implicitly agreeing to by pointing out that the word is being used as such when applied to that specific sutta (apologies if I was less than articulate on that point), but "sara" doesn't always mean the Western definition of "substance." Yet, you seem to think it always does. That is the issue, and why I won't be using the word "substance" any longer. "Substance" is always "substance" but "sara" is not always "substance." Sometimes, when "sara" is translated as "substance" it may even be a mistranslation, brought on by the unconscious Western philosophical bias of the translator.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

zan wrote: Sun Feb 05, 2023 6:53 pm
Ceisiwr wrote: Sun Feb 05, 2023 6:42 pm
zan wrote: Sun Feb 05, 2023 6:27 pm The reason substances is probably not fruitful word for you and I to discuss is because your definition is the very specific Western philosophy definition. This is the definition not found in the suttas consistently. In the sutta you referenced, for example, the Buddha is explaining and refuting the philosophy of Pakudha Kaccayana, who believed all things are eternal, and never interact with each other, in other suttas, he uses the word in different ways. Hence, as always in the suttas, this doesn't mean he was refuting exactly the western definition of "substance."
I can't reply in full at the moment, but I did want to reply to this here for now. The substance metaphysics I'm referring to isn't a western thing. The exact same thinking was around during the time of the Buddha. The Jains argued it, as did other schools. Pakudha Kaccayana was arguing for a form of substance metaphysics (and might I say, a consistent one at that). The atta is a substance, for example.
Yes, in some contexts, it is very similar, I never denied that, which is what I was implicitly agreeing to by pointing out that the word is being used as such when applied to that specific sutta (apologies if I was less than articulate on that point), but "sara" doesn't always mean the Western definition of "substance." Yet, you seem to think it always does. That is the issue, and why I won't be using the word "substance" any longer. "Substance" is always "substance" but "sara" is not always "substance." Sometimes, when "sara" is translated as "substance" it may even be a mistranslation, brought on by the unconscious Western philosophical bias of the translator.
I should also point out, that the Western "substance" isn't what I even necessarily mean when I say the mahabhutas might not be DO. They may not be substances, yet they still might not be DO. They might be some other category of thing, that arises and ceases with the cosmological cycle, and do not qualify as "substances."

You seem to think that if things are anything but DO, then the only other alternative is Western substance theory, or its equivalent in eastern thought, Buddhism, and so on. I do not agree with this. This, again, is why I object to the use of the word "substance" as it seems to be pigeon holing the conversation.

I propose, that, the mahabhutas may not be DO, and nor are they substances.

My previous use of the word "substance" was in a more broad sense, and not in the very specific Western philosophy defintion. This is confusing when discussing with someone who uses it pretty strictly in that way. Thus, the easiest solution is for me to drop the word from use.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

Ceisiwr wrote: Sat Feb 04, 2023 11:34 am




The Theravādin Abhidhamma is very good in terms of epistemology, and in aiding meditation, but ontologically it become more difficult IMO. As we discussed on another forum, if we take the earth element Theravāda will deny there is any substance to it. There is no earth substance which bears the characteristic of "hard" in Theravāda, for that would be to accept the substance vs attribute distinction, but rather there is only "hardness" and nothing else. This reduces the dhamma to being a mere characteristic or quality of experience, and so it then becomes conceptually hard to understand how this bare quality can be said to exist externally let alone how it can cause "hot" to arise or how it can form objects and so on, or hot the bare quality of "hot" can generate "hardness". I think this was one of the main issues Mahāyānists had with the Abhidharma. That of moving from epistemology and what is experienced to ontology, rather than the Abhidharma per se. From what I've read, many Mahāyānists accept and use Abhidharma but they only do so conventionally.
This is an issue that is resolved when we realize that the earth element in the abhidhamma is not just hardness, but is also the element of extension that allows objects to occupy space. Thus, it is a force, or a field. This field is also hardness, which can be sensed. Just like one may feel the tug of a magnetic field if one wore a suit of armor while in it, and so we could say the field has "strongness," yet the field still has no substance, so we can say the field of the earth element, which bears other elements, has "hardness." Your leap to the idea that things must be either defined as Western substance theory or some kind of phenomenalism is unwarranted. There are more alternatives to phenomenalism than substance theory.
Thus there is general agreement among the Buddhist schools in maintaining that what is called earth-element stands for the phenomenon of hardness, rigidity, solidity, or compactness in matter. The earth-element is also defined as that which extends or spreads out, pattharatī ti paṭhavī. 63 Extension is occupation in space. “Tri-dimensional extension gives rise to our idea of a solid body. As no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time, Buddhists derive their idea of hardness (kakkhaḷatta-lakkhana) from paṭhavī.”64 Thus the interpretation of earth-element as the element of extension brings into relief a different method of approach. In the commentaries we get futher discussions on the peculiar function of this element. Venerable Buddhaghosa observes that it acts as a foundation, a sort of fulcrum, and that it manifests itself as receiving (sampaṭicchana-paccupaṭṭhānā). 65 This has been further explained to mean that the other three primary elements are established on it (paṭhavī-patiṭṭhitā) and that therefore it serves as a support, a basis (patiṭṭhānaṃ) for them. That this view is shared by the Vaibhāsikas, is shown by their contention that the “bearing up”or supporting (saṃdhārana) of ships by water ( = ocean) is a sufficient ground for the inference that that the earth-element is present in water. 67 A Pali sub-commentary observes that what we conventionally call earth is the support of trees, mountains, etc., even so the earth-element is a support for the other material
-Y Karunadasa, A Buddhist Analysis of Matter
So, it becomes clear, the mere subjective term "hardness" is not all there is to the earth element in orthodox Theravada.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Mon Feb 06, 2023 6:37 pm This is an issue that is resolved when we realize that the earth element in the abhidhamma is not just hardness, but is also the element of extension that allows objects to occupy space. Thus, it is a force, or a field. This field is also hardness, which can be sensed. Just like one may feel the tug of a magnetic field if one wore a suit of armor while in it, and so we could say the field has "strongness," yet the field still has no substance, so we can say the field of the earth element, which bears other elements, has "hardness." Your leap to the idea that things must be either defined as Western substance theory or some kind of phenomenalism is unwarranted. There are more alternatives to phenomenalism than substance theory.
A force is a conceptual abstraction, like substance.
So, it becomes clear, the mere subjective term "hardness" is not all there is to the earth element in orthodox Theravada.
They argue, like the Vaibhāṣika, that apart from a dhamma's sabhāva there is no dhamma. It's sabhāva is it's defining characteristic (sabhāva = characteristic) and so apart from "hard" or "soft" there is no dhamma. We are then told that these bear characteristics can do things, such as the fire element generating the earth element, which means "heat" generates "hardness". This is where it gets confusing. The sub-commentaries will also disagree with you here:

"...so we can say the field of the earth element, which bears other elements, has "hardness."

It is only a manner of expression to say the earth element "has" hardness. In reality the earth element doesn't have hardness, because this would make a subject vs attribute distinction. Rather the earth element is hardness, and nothing more. This is explained below. Also notice that it denies substance here, substance being the metaphysical kind that the commentary has in mind.
Attachments
Dhamma substance.jpg
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
zan
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

Ceisiwr wrote: Mon Feb 06, 2023 6:56 pm
zan wrote: Mon Feb 06, 2023 6:37 pm This is an issue that is resolved when we realize that the earth element in the abhidhamma is not just hardness, but is also the element of extension that allows objects to occupy space. Thus, it is a force, or a field. This field is also hardness, which can be sensed. Just like one may feel the tug of a magnetic field if one wore a suit of armor while in it, and so we could say the field has "strongness," yet the field still has no substance, so we can say the field of the earth element, which bears other elements, has "hardness." Your leap to the idea that things must be either defined as Western substance theory or some kind of phenomenalism is unwarranted. There are more alternatives to phenomenalism than substance theory.
A force is a conceptual abstraction, like substance.
So, it becomes clear, the mere subjective term "hardness" is not all there is to the earth element in orthodox Theravada.
They argue, like the Vaibhāṣika, that apart from a dhamma's sabhāva there is no dhamma. It's sabhāva is it's defining characteristic (sabhāva = characteristic) and so apart from "hard" or "soft" there is no dhamma. We are then told that these bear characteristics can do things, such as the fire element generating the earth element, which means "heat" generates "hardness". This is where it gets confusing. The sub-commentaries will also disagree with you here:

"...so we can say the field of the earth element, which bears other elements, has "hardness."

It is only a manner of expression to say the earth element "has" hardness. In reality the earth element doesn't have hardness, because this would make a subject vs attribute distinction. Rather the earth element is hardness, and nothing more. This is explained below. Also notice that it denies substance here, substance being the metaphysical kind that the commentary has in mind.
You're not addressing the fact that the earth element is also said to be the element of extension. It is not just hardness.

As to substance being a conceptual abstraction: Substance is, well, substantial, and a conceptual abstraction is... not. I can touch a substance, such as sand, I cannot touch the conceptual abstract of pride, or love. Further, a field can be detected, conceptual abstractions cannot. There is no sensor to find the abstract concept of pride out in the universe, outside of humans, but we can detect magnetic fields.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by Ceisiwr »

zan wrote: Mon Feb 06, 2023 7:08 pm
You're not addressing the fact that the earth element is also said to be the element of extension. It is not just hardness.
If I remember correctly extension is it’s “mode” but I’ll have to check.
As to substance being a conceptual abstraction: Substance is, well, substantial, and a conceptual abstraction is... not. I can touch a substance, such as sand, I cannot touch the conceptual abstract of pride, or love. Further, a field can be detected, conceptual abstractions cannot. There is no sensor to find the abstract concept of pride out in the universe, outside of humans, but we can detect magnetic fields.
The thing about substances is that they are always behind, but are the cause of, our sensations (both mental and physical). When you touch sand all you experience is “hardness,” “yellow”, “orange”, “rough” and so on. Empiricists will say this is all you can know, and hard Empiricists will say this is all there is. Rationalists will say that we can also know the reality behind the experience, via reason. Reason being able to grant access to hidden realties, behind or beyond our senses, according to that school of thought. Regardless, both agree that we never actually experience substances. Where they disagree is on if substances can be known, if they can be said to exist.

“[Substance is] something I know not what” John Locke
There is no sensor to find the abstract concept of pride out in the universe, outside of humans, but we can detect magnetic fields.
Magnetic fields are a model of reality, which is why I said they are abstract concepts. Gravity is too.
“Knowing that this body is just like foam,
understanding it has the nature of a mirage,
cutting off Māra’s flower-tipped arrows,
one should go beyond the King of Death’s sight.”
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by zan »

Ceisiwr wrote: Mon Feb 06, 2023 7:17 pm
zan wrote: Mon Feb 06, 2023 7:08 pm
You're not addressing the fact that the earth element is also said to be the element of extension. It is not just hardness.
If I remember correctly extension is it’s “mode” but I’ll have to check.
As to substance being a conceptual abstraction: Substance is, well, substantial, and a conceptual abstraction is... not. I can touch a substance, such as sand, I cannot touch the conceptual abstract of pride, or love. Further, a field can be detected, conceptual abstractions cannot. There is no sensor to find the abstract concept of pride out in the universe, outside of humans, but we can detect magnetic fields.
The thing about substances is that they are always behind, but are the cause of, our sensations (both mental and physical). When you touch sand all you experience is “hardness,” “yellow”, “orange”, “rough” and so on. Empiricists will say this is all you can know, and hard Empiricists will say this is all there is. Rationalists will say that we can also know the reality behind the experience, via reason. Reason being able to grant access to hidden realties, behind or beyond our senses, according to that school of thought. Regardless, both agree that we never actually experience substances. Where they disagree is on if substances can be known, if they can be said to exist.

“[Substance is] something I know not what” John Locke
There is no sensor to find the abstract concept of pride out in the universe, outside of humans, but we can detect magnetic fields.
Magnetic fields are a model of reality, which is why I said they are abstract concepts. Gravity is too.
Okay, let's reorient the issue:

We have a tradition that clearly, unambiguously is akin to a kind of atomism, which they call kalapas, or paramattha dhammas, which disappear and reappear rapidly, dependent on each other. It teaches that these atoms, though, are mind independent. The earth, land, rocks and so on arise and cease on their own, composed of these atoms, the earth appears before people are reborn on it, and it isn't even caused to appear by kamma in the first place. People leave behind corpses after consciousness ceases, the corpse is made of dhammas generated by the fire element, tejo, which can generate matter all on its own, and so on, and, thus, it is quite independent of perception. Scholars generally present it as something like realism, if not outright call it realism.

Then, it inexplicably says that the element of earth is something completely incompatible with all of this: that it is just "hardness."'

A few quotes to substantiate these points, then I'll get back to the question at hand.
It should be noted that the atomic theory prevailed in
India in the time of the Buddha. Paramàõu was the ancient
term for the modern atom. According to the ancient belief
one rathareõu consists of 16 tajjàris, one tajjàri, 16 aõus;
one aõu, 16 paramàõus. The minute particles of dust seen
dancing in the sunbeam are called rathareõus. One paramàõu is, therefore, 4096th part of a rathareõu. This paramàõu was considered indivisible.
With His supernormal knowledge the Buddha analysed this so-called paramàõu and declared that it consists
of paramatthas—ultimate entities which cannot further be
subdivided.
The paramatthas are pañhavi, àpo, tejo, and vàyo.
-Narada Thera, A Manual of Abhidhamma, page 318
It is the dhammas alone that possess ultimate reality: determinate existence “from their own side” (sarupato) independent of the minds conceptual processing of the data.
-Bhikkhu Bodhi, A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, p 3
dhamma theory is best described as dhamma realism
-The Theravada Abhidhamma: Inquiry into the Nature of Conditioned Reality
By Y. Karunadasa, chapter 2
Controverted point: That land is a result of action.
...your proposition is wrong.
...the earth is established and afterwards beings are reborn on it.
-Kv 7.7
But at the time of death, kamma-born material phenomena no
longer arise starting with the stage of presence of the seventeenth
consciousness preceding the death consciousness. Kamma-born
material phenomena that arose earlier occur till the death-moment
and then cease. Following that, the consciousness-born and nutriment-born material phenomena come to cessation. Thereafter,
a continuity of material qualities produced by temperature persists
as long as it can be called a corpse.
-Bodhi, ibid, p 257
Tejo is the element of heat. Cold is also a form of tejo.
Both heat and cold are included in tejo because they possess the power of maturing bodies. Tejo, in other words, is
the vitalizing energy. Preservation and decay are also due
to this element. Unlike the other three essentials of matter,
this element has the power to regenerate matter by itself.
-Narada Thera, A Manual of Abhidhamma p 319
Now what? You say it is phenomenalism. I'd be obliged to agree, if all there was to it was the hardness thing. However, the rest of it completely rules out the phenomenalism reading. So, we have a distinctly phenomenalism thing in a system that otherwise is quite incompatible with phenomenalism.

Then, when we call it realism, we are confronted with this.

Worse, still, mind independent dhammas that exist from their own side, cannot be just "hardness," that is linguistically, and logically, nonsense.

So, either we come up with a solution, or we must say the system is self contradictory, and cannot be called anything, because it doesn't make any sense.

My thinking is we have to take it for granted that their idea of what "hardness" is and means must be different than what it means from the phenomenalist perspective.

I haven't come up with anything to substantiate this position, though, except that it may be some kind of force or field, and that is based on the fact that it is called the element of extension in the commentaries.

Do you have any solution? I respectfully reject the brushing off of the issue by calling it phenomenalism, for no other reason than that other parts of it are incompatible with phenomenalism, which rules out that reading. That said, I would concede that it possibly may be a self contradictory system, and thus insoluble, but not that it is a phenomenalist system.
Assume all of my words on dhamma could be incorrect. Seek an arahant for truth.


"If we base ourselves on the Pali Nikayas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.
-Y. Karunadasa
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by robertk »

zan wrote: Sat Feb 04, 2023 3:22 am . Personally, I think the four elements in the suttas are semi permanent so long as the cosmos lasts, and then as it contracts, they are destroyed, and reborn again with the next cosmos. Thus, they are not dependently originated, that's only for beings, but they are impermanent, and lack self.

Rupa lasts for 17 moments of mind, so it still arises and passes away countless times in a split second.

The matter that was here a second ago has vanished and cannot ever reappear but because of similar causes similar matter arises now.
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Re: On the Abhidhamma

Post by skandha »

I am enjoying the discussions here.

I will chip in a little on the mahabhutas. In terms of physical phenomena, we are totally confined within the experience of the 5 senses. The experience of the 5 senses are given more descriptive nuance using the model of the mahabhutas, it's just masses of vibrations at difference frequency, intensity. The "substance" behind the sensual stimuli is imputed based on the experience of the senses. The experience at the senses are the sabhava dhammas. Different living creatures will impute different "substances" out there based on the way sense stimuli work in their physiological makeup.
A true master of knowledge has passed beyond all that is known and become dispassionate towards all vedanās.
- Sn 529
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